Curzon, Lloyd George and the control of British foreign policy, 1919-22: A reassessment

This article reappraises the complex relationship between Lord Curzon and Lloyd George in the years between the former's appointment as Foreign Secretary and the latter's fall from office as Prime Minister in 1922. It argues that the widely held view that Lloyd George held Curzon in contempt and marginalized him in the conduct of foreign affairs is not accurate. Their relationship is presented as being one of mutual respect and significant levels of cooperation. The article thus questions the extent to which the Foreign Office suffered an 'eclipse' in this period.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919-26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the 'oppressed nationalities' of Austria-Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

Sir Austen Chamberlain and British Foreign Policy 1931-37

This article seeks to analyze Sir Austen Chamberlain's critique of British foreign policy in the six years before his death in 1937. It presents Chamberlain as one of the most perceptive contemporary observers of the international scene, and in particular of Hitler's Germany. Unusually among British politicians, Chamberlain drew a direct causal connection between the domestic policy of the Nazi regime and its likely behaviour in the international arena. However, it is suggested that the basis for his understanding was an innate anti-Germanism, which can be dated back to his experiences as a young man in the 1880s.     

Sir Eric Phipps, the British Government, and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933-1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps' reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933-1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps' attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

The virtues of specialization: British and American diplomatic reporting on Russia, 1921-39

While important changes were made to the organization of the British diplomatic establishment in the years after 1918, most senior officials remained committed to the ethos of the 'generalist'. In the United States, by contrast, significant efforts were made to inculcate the virtues of professionalism and specialization among members of the Foreign Service. This paper examines the way in which members of the American and British diplomatic establishments monitored developments in the USSR during the interwar years. It concludes that US diplomats were no better than their British counterparts at interpreting developments in Soviet Russia, despite the fact that they were generally better trained to carry out their duties.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

Yvon Delbos and Anthony Eden: Anglo-French Cooperation, 1936-1938

The period of tenure of Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos as the foreign ministers of their respective countries coincided with a remarkable improvement and convergence in Anglo-French relations. This was no accident. Both men had similar ideas in relation to the challenges confronting Britain and France in international affairs. Neither wanted really close relations with Soviet Russia and both supported non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War despite their growing concern over German and Italian intervention. Delbos was highly critical of Mussolini's Italy and was firmly opposed to a Franco-Italian rapprochement while Eden, having originally given the Duce the benefit of the doubt, came to distrust him and to oppose even conversations with Italy without prior concessions, such as the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. Finally, both supported the appeasement of Nazi Germany, including colonial concessions, although Delbos towards the end of his period as foreign minister became more sceptical as to the prospects for success.     

'Incidents' and foreign policy: A case study

Anglo-Russian relations during the period 1894-1914 were filled with incidents in large part stemming from the very different social and political frameworks of the two countries. The two countries had sharply differing traditions concerning individual liberty, freedom of the press and other such matters usually covered by the rubric of human rights. While the realities of great power politics forced the two countries to work together, it is not surprising that their collaboration was often marred by clashes of political and social sensibilities.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907-20

As the United States was becoming a major power in the early years of the twentieth century, it was confronted by a dilemma in its desire to promote a democratic free-enterprise system among the republics of the Western hemisphere. Should the United States act unilaterally or collectively to pursue its goals? The rise of the Pan American Union as a collective political and economic organization provided the means to deal with such issues as revolution and economic instabiliry in Latin America. Nations such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic provided early opportunities to test US policy approaches. However, the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and subsequent civil war, provided a major testing ground for both the Taft and Wilson administrations. Ultimately Woodrow Wilson chose to pursue unilateral military intervention in Mexico despite the offer from the Pan American Union and its director, John Barrett, to provide collective negotiations to avoid war and establish political stabiliry in Mexico. As we enter the twenry-first century, the United States finds itself still confronted by these choices on a global scale.     

The British government and the sale of arms to the lesser European powers, 1936-39

This article considers sales of British arms in the prelude to the Second World War, during the end of last Baldwin government, and the Chamberlain government, which had political as well as commercial motivations. Particular attention is paid to the leading British arms manufacturer, Vickers-Armstrong, and sales to Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland. There was often a concern that a failure to procure British arms would lead countries to turn to Germany and Italy. The interest in meeting these requests often conflicted with growing domestic defence needs for the same equipment. The conclusion is drawn that Britain ultimately failed to inspire potential allies with sufficient confidence to commit themselves to Britain.