Revenue Source and Electoral Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Local US Policymakers

Political Behavior - Existing research suggests that tax-reliant governments are more accountable to citizens. This pattern is consistent with micro-level evidence that citizens who are taxed are...     

Accounting and accountability: recent developments in government financial information systems

In developed countries, governmental accounting is considered as an integral part and a successful aspect of public sector reforms. In developing countries, besides being a tool for government financial management modernisation, accounting is regarded as a weapon against fraud and waste in government. The aim of this article is to compare, taking the IPSAS No.1 as a benchmark, the information content of the financial statements submitted by the central governments of Anglo‐Saxon, Nordic, European Continental and Mercosur zone countries. The results give us a point of reference as to where the central governmental accounting of each country studied lies in the ‘spectrum’ from cash to full accrual accounting and to what extent the IPSASs are able to fit into diverse public administration styles in order to improve the transparency, accountability and reliability of the financial information disclosed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector

This article examines the policy consequences of the number of parties in government. We argue that parties externalize costs not borne by their support groups. Larger parties thus internalize more costs than small parties because they represent more groups. This argument implies that the public sector should be larger the more parties there are in the government coalition. We test this prediction using yearly time-series cross-sectional data from 1970 to 1998 in 17 European countries. We find that increasing the number of parties in government increases the fraction of GDP accounted for by government spending by close to half a percentage point, or more than one billion current dollars in the typical year. We find little support for the alternative claim that the number of legislative parties affects the size of the public sector, except via the number of parties in government .     

Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation

Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity, and investment in accountability relationships. Less is known, however, about what explains these observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation‐concerned literatures, this article argues that a reputation‐based perspective on accountability offers an underlying logic that explains how account‐giving actors and account‐holding forums actually manage these expectations and how organizations make sense of and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act as a filtering mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The resulting accountability outcomes are coproduced by the reputational investment of both account‐giver and account‐holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.     

Towards more flexibility of government expenditure: Some recent developments in The Netherlands

As government revenues diminish, budgetary discretions or flexibilities have similarly decreased. A pressing question is therefore how to minimize the inflexible elements or components of a budget. This article distinguishes between technical and political inflexibilities as they are reflected in the budgetary process and argues that the latter are much more difficult to correct. After drawing some examples from studies of the Dutch national budget, the article proposes the use of reconsideration reports as a means to alleviate the politically inflexible components of the budget, as well as a way to assess government programs.I am grateful to Dr. L. J. C. M. Le Blanc, former Director General of the Budget in the Dutch Ministry of Finance for his valuable critical remarks and suggestions to earlier drafts of this article.     

Accountability and Joined‐up Government

The Coombs Royal Commission identified a range of issues relating to the coordination of services. While there has been renewed interest over the last five years in the UK, Canada and Australia in initiatives that support joined‐up and cross‐cutting government, there has been only limited work to address the potential recognised by the Commission for these initiatives to result in unclear accountabilities. This paper reviews accountability approaches to joined‐up government and identifies that while the sharing of accountability for outcomes has emerged quietly over the past 25 years, joining‐up initiatives are demanding a clearer articulation of causal relationships regarding the sharing of outcomes and a fuller consideration of the multiple relationships in the partnership arrangements involved.     

Issue management: process versus progress

• Of all the tools and techniques applied within the field of public affairs and corporate communication, Issue Management is undoubtedly the one which most often attracts excessive process at the expense of real progress. Understanding the causes and sources of this over‐emphasis on process is important to the long‐term success of issue management as an effective tool.
• That understanding is also important to the development of Issue Management models which promote an optimal balance between following a disciplined approach and formulating creative and original solutions.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equity and Accountability: The Impact of State Accountability Systems on School Finance

Using an 11‐year panel data set containing information on revenues, expenditures, and demographics for every school district in the United States, we examine the effects of state‐adopted school accountability systems on the adequacy and equity of school resources. We find little relationship between state implementation of accountability systems and changes in school finance equity, though we do find evidence that states in which courts overturned the school finance system during the decade exhibited significant equity improvements. Additionally, while implementation of accountability per se does not appear linked to changes in resource adequacy, states that implemented strong accountability systems did experience improvements.     

Does E‐Government Promote Accountability? A Comparative Analysis of Website Openness and Government Accountability

Under the global pressure of information technology, the adoption of web-based technologies in public administration has created a new government-and-citizen interface. However, whether e-government will unambiguously lead to a more transparent, interactive, open and hence, accountable, government remains a central question. Applying a framework of global pressure effects on bureaucratic change, this paper conducts an empirical study on website openness and accountability in fourteen countries. Even when overall accountability levels rise, the accountability gap between different national bureaucracies often remains intact as web-based technologies typically maintain or reinforce the existing practices. The question of whether e-government promotes accountability depends on what kind of bureaucracy one is referring to in the first place. In the current debate about global convergence and national divergence on the effect of globalization on public bureaucracies, the spread of e-government provides a case of convergence in practice rather than in results.     

Incentives in Third‐Party Governance: Management Practices and Accountability Implications

Contract incentives are designed to motivate contractor performance and to provide public managers with a powerful tool to achieve contract accountability. Our knowledge of contract incentives is rooted in contract design, yet as we move beyond contract specification and further into the contract lifecycle, we know little about why and how managers implement incentives. This study assesses public managers’ use of contract incentives in practice and advances theory development. A typology of contract incentives is constructed to capture a comprehensive range of formal and informal incentives, and the factors that influence managerial use of incentives are identified. The findings shed light on the complexities of maintaining accountability in third‐party governance structures and the management techniques aimed at improving the performance of public agencies.     

Techno-economic paradigm versus the market: on recent theories of late industrialization

The recent resurgence of intellectual interest in industrialization has been stimulated by the emergence of a wealth of empirical evidence which constitutes a reinterpretation of the East Asian experience, and the rise in mainstream academia of the 'new' theories of trade and growth. Both of these two bodies or writings point to the necessity of placing technological development at the centre of industrialization. There is however considerable doubt among economists over this tematic shift away from the hitherto dominant emphasis on incentive. There are also conceptual ambiguites over the nature of technological development that need to be clarified. This paper aims to reaffirm the centrality of technological development, and to argue that the imperative of technological development normally outstrips the capacity of the regulation of the market.     

'Managing for Outcomes': Accountability and Thrust

Central agencies in New Zealand are now defining public management performance to include both the quality of a manager's 'account' of output-outcome links and the manager's record of delivering efficient outputs. This article: (1) argues that the hard edge of accountability for deliverables must be dulled somewhat in order to pursue outcomes more vigorously; (2) shows how managers can use evaluation tools known as theories-in-action or logic models to give accounts of policy and management thrust; (3) proposes preliminary performance criteria for outcomes-focused management; and (4) attempts to sketch a new 'managing for outcomes' accountability bargain. The conclusions apply broadly to any jurisdiction interested in holding managers accountable for outcomes-focused management.     

Public–Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are growing in popularity as a governing model for delivery of public goods and services. PPPs have existed since the Roman Empire, but their expansion into traditional public projects today raises serious questions about public accountability. This article examines public accountability and its application to government and private firms involved in PPPs. An analytical framework is proposed for assessing the extent to which PPPs provide (or will provide) goods and services consistent with public sector goals of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Six dimensions—risk, costs and benefits, political and social impacts, expertise, collaboration, and performance measurement—are incorporated into a model that assists public managers in improving partnerships’ public accountability.     

Accountability and Leadership in Twenty‐First Century Whitehall

In July 2013 the UK's coalition government published “The Civil Service Reform Plan – One Year on”, reporting on progress against minister Frances Maude's objectives to shake up the civil service. This followed various reported disagreements between ministers and civil servants over policy implementation, and a research report commissioned by the government from think tank IPPR into lessons from overseas for civil service reform. This trio of short articles reviews the government's proposals from three perspectives: that of the lead author of the IPPR report, a former senior civil servant, and the chair of the House of Commons Public Administration Committee (PASC) which oversees the civil service. The authors take differing views on the proposals, which include introduction of ‘extended ministerial offices’, and greater control by ministers over choosing their civil servants. Should these be seen as useful next steps, worrying developments, and/or large and important enough to merit a Commission on the civil service, as PASC has suggested?