Do Politicians Listen to Experts? The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 and The Capacity to Budget

Last year offered a unique opportunity to compare the ideas of experts and politicians. The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act changed the federal budget process. Allen Schick's 1990 book, The Capacity to Budget, included ideas on how to improve budgeting at the federal level. A comparison is made between the new law and the new ideas in several areas of the budgetary process: deficit reduction; resource rationing; adjustment to changing expenditures; increasing budget honesty; decreasing conflict; rou-tinizing the process; integrating the parts of the budget; and balancing claims and resources.     

The Budget Enforcement Act in 1991: Isometric Budgeting

The immediate effect of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was to cancel a pending $110 billion sequester and to change the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets. These and other changes allowed Congress and the administration to escape responsibility for increases in the deficit if discretionary spending was kept within the caps and no new entitlement programs or revenue enhancements were added. This assumption and others relating to the empowerment of the Appropriations Committees and the new authority of the OMB are explored in this article.     

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: The Path to No Fault Budgeting

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, included in the controversial and comprehensive budget legislation passed by Congress in October, makes a number of significant changes in federal budgeting. It shifts the focus of the budget process from deficit reduction to spending control, provides five-year spending totals and mini-sequesters for defense, international and domestic appropriations, and puts entitlements and revenue expenditures on a pay-as-you-go basis. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets have been raised substantially, Social Security surpluses taken out of the deficit calculation and allowance made for further adjustments for inflation, Operation Desert Shield, and other emergency spending, minimizing the prospect for general sequestration. OMB has been given important new estimating authority and the roles of the congressional committees involved in budgeting have been altered.     

The Budget Enforcement Act and Its Survival: Congress Hears from Experts

The unpopularity of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 grew in light of the recession, recent international events, and continuing record budget deficits. This prompted many Congress members and congressional committees to consider the future of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. Two hearings, held in October and November of 1991, exemplify the kinds of choices facing the Congress and the type of advice that Congress has been receiving. This article reviews the testimony given at the hearings by experts with established knowledge of federal budgeting.     

Spending Stabilization Rules: A Solution to Recurring State Budget Crises?

Recurring state fiscal crises raise a fundamental question: Is it possible to stabilize budgets over the business cycle? This paper examines spending stabilization rules, an alternative to the inaccurate process of budget forecasting. Under two spending rules, we assess how state budget situations would compare with actual experience. Our analysis reconstructs recent aggregate state budget patterns assuming states had adopted a rule and then takes a closer look at California and South Carolina. With surpluses partially invested in a rainy‐day fund, a spending rule resulted in stable growth of state budgets throughout the recession and sluggish recovery of the early 2000s.     

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985

This article briefly describes the legislative history of the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) and supplemental security income (SSI) provisions, as well as related Medicare and Medicaid provisions, of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-272). It includes a chronology outlining the interaction of the budget reconciliation process with the development of the OASDI minor and technical changes bill (H.R. 2005) and the development of other social security related legislation resulting in proposals that ultimately combined in the overall Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. The article also provides a detailed summary of the provisions of the legislation.     

The Evolution of Federal Spending Controls: A Brief Overview

This article reviews spending controls in the federal government over the past two decades. During this period, federal spending has grown significantly, despite budgetary controls. The article discusses various Impoundment Control acts throughout this time period with a focus on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 and the budget reforms of the 1990s. The article also gives an overview of whether current spending and deficit control procedures are inadequate and, if so, what stronger measures may be adopted.     

How to Succeed at Increasing Spending Without Really Trying: The Balanced Budget Amendment and the Item Veto

Congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending. In particular, the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents' interests through pork-barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest. However, assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests, we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results. The supermajorities requires by the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log-rolling that promote – and may indeed increase – pork-barrel spending.     

The Impact of Objective and Empathic Dispositions on Local Government Budget Analysts' Spending Preferences

The spending preferences of local government budget analysts are based on individual decision modes; how individuals attend to, encode, and process information. While academicians and practitioners tend to assume that a budget analyst's disposition to act leads to specific spending preferences, that assumption is rarely tested empirically. This study draws on two theoretical constructs derived from social psychology, rationality (objectivism), and emotions (empathy). Leary and his colleagues demonstrate that objectivism predisposes one toward rational decision making in a variety of settings, while Eisenberg and her colleagues show that highly empathic individuals are predisposed toward helping and prosocial behavior. Results of this study suggests that empathic budget analysts, those scoring higher on the empathy scale, have distinctly different spending preferences than those budget analysts scoring higher on the objectivism scale; empathic budget analysts are disposed toward humanitarian criteria in decision making while objective budget analysts are disposed toward quantifiable cost-benefit considerations.     

The Voting Rights Act and Louisiana: Twenty Years of Enforcement

This article examines the interaction of structural change (lawsaffecting voting rights) and cultural continuities (differencesbetween the Protestant and black Catholic political cultures)on the level and quality of black political participation inLouisiana. Blacks who at mid-century resided in the French-Catholicparishes were more likely to register and vote than blacks wholived outside these parishes. The advent of the Voting RightsAct has radically changed this pattern. Northern parishes havingthe highest proportion of black population, the highest landtenancy rates, and a tradition of a plantation economy are nowamong the parishes exhibiting the highest rates of black voterregistration.     

Introducing a New Data Set: Budget Support Suspensions as a Sanctioning Device: An Overview from 1999 to 2014

This article presents a new, publicly available data set covering all budget support (BS) suspensions in the period 1999–2014. The data set covers 239 BS suspensions, involving 18 donors and 40 recipient countries. This article shows an aggregate picture of these suspensions, including the reasons why donors suspended, which donors have been active in suspending their BS, and which countries have been undergoing these aid sanctions. From this aggregate picture some patterns drawn out, substantiate a couple of things that have surfaced in the literature already. With 42% of BS suspensions in the Democracy and Human Rights category, it is clear that democratic governance has been a pertinent reason to legitimize BS suspensions. The large number of suspensions in some countries also indicates the unpredictability of budget support. The data set and the user guide can be downloaded at www.uantwerp.be/budget-support-suspensions .     

The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

The influence of institutions on budgetary behavior at the federal level is the subject of this article, which examines the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. While its impact on budgetary priorities and growth seems modest at best, the Act has had a substantial impact on the process of budgetary decisionmaking, the nature of budgetary debate, and the budgetary strategies employed within Congress. These new and generally dysfunctional forms of congessional budgetary behavior are consequences of a budgetary reform that attempted to transfer many of the resource allocation procedures of the Executive branch to a legislative context. The transfer of many Executive branch budgetary procedures has led to the appearance within Congress of budgetary behavior previously confined largely to the Executive branch. The article also discusses attempts to render the congressional budget process more compatible with the legislative environment, analyzing the modifications in the original budget process that have been effected and proposed in recent years.Earlier versions of this article were delivered at the Workshop on Budgetary Control in the Public Sector, Brussels, Belgium, October 13–14, 1983, the meetings of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, October, 1983, and the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September, 1983. Allen Schick, Robert X. Browning, Alex Hicks, Robert Strauss, John R. Hibbings, Evelyn Brodkin, and Rod Kiewiet provided helpful comments, and Pamela Reyner provided secretarial assistance. All remaining deficiencies are the responsibilities of the authors.     

Implications of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 for the "Devolution Revolution"

From an economist's perspective, the fiscal and administrativegoals of the so-called "devolution revolution" include lessfederal intergovernmental aid, especially if fiscally equalizing;the substitution of block grants for matching grants; greateradministrative flexibility for the states; and fewer underfundedmandates. This article uses these devolulionary yardsticks toanalyze the major provisions of the federal Balanced BudgetAct of 1997. These provisions fall far short of a "devolutionrevolution." The act increases the level of federal assistance,leaves Medicaid as an open-ended entitlement, and preservesa strong role for the federal government in shaping intergovernmentalgrants. The article discusses the political forces moderatingthe act's devolutionary impact.     

The President's FY 1990 Budget: The Last Act in a Decade of Change

This article examines the budget requests of Presidents Reagan and Bush for fiscal year 1990, and how the federal budget has changed during the decade of the 1980s. The author concludes that the federal budget has become less controllable, as the priorities and composition of federal expenditures have shifted during the Reagan years. While the Reagan and Bush budgets do not differ significantly, the manner in which they were constructed does. The effort of President Bush to define his budgetary version of a "kinder, gentler" America may be more illusory than real. The author also traces the change in federal assistance to state and local governments, concluding that, apart from transfer payments, the federal role has markedly declined.     

Incremental Thinking: "Congressional Debate on the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (Excerpts)"

Editors' Note : The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was designed to improve the budget-making process of the national legislature. Although this new process has been in use for less than a decade, proposals for a constitutional amendment to limit the budget powers of the federal government are advancing through Congress. In assessing the potential and problems of budget reform, it would be wise to recall the expectations that animated the introduction of presidential budgeting more than 60 years ago. The following excerpts from the October 1919 debate in the House of Representatives on the legislation that ultimately became the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 have a contemporary ring. The problems are not new, and one wonders whether the solutions are as easy as some claim.