Formal Rules and Informal Cooperation: Inter-governmental Relations in Domestic European Policy Making in Comparative Perspective

One of the key elements of the strategies of interest representation of strong legislative regions in EU policy making is active participation in the co-ordination processes within the member state. This article argues that Europeanization of inter-governmental relations leads to a greater emphasis on cooperation in the formal rules on inter-governmental cooperation in EU affairs. However, when informal practices are taken into account, some member states become more cooperative, others arguably less. This divergence can be explained by the circular interplay of formal and informal practices.     

Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Well‐known theories suggest that administrative procedures may be used as mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy. This study investigates whether three common regulatory analysis procedures—cost‐benefit analysis, risk assessment, and economic impact analysis—lead to greater influence by political officials on bureaucratic policymaking. Multivariate analyses of data from a unique survey of state administrators indicate that regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the perceived influence of elected political officials on the content of administrative rules. This association is particularly evident in cases where proposed rules are subjected to a cost–benefit test. These findings contradict prominent theories of administrative procedures, but are consistent with recent research on the political power of administrative agencies.     

Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross–National Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability

This article examines different explanations for the cross–national diffusion of three recent innovations in bureaucratic accountability—the institution of the ombudsman, freedom of information legislation and data protection (information privacy) law. The first two explanations are based on the assumption that these innovations are by–products of modernization, either the growth of the state or democratization. The third assumes that policy is shaped through processes of international communication. A combination of methodologies is employed to conclude that while the growth of government and liberal democratic values are necessary conditions for the adoption of all three policy instruments, they are not sufficient conditions. The pattern of adoption observed is best explained by examining how evidence about these respective policies flows from adopting states to non–adopters. In the case of the ombudsman, this process can be characterized as one of lesson–drawing; for freedom of information, evidence is used for legitimation purposes; for data protection, the diffusion is attributable to harmonization through international organizations. Policy transfer is hence a multi–faceted concept that embraces a number of distinct processes of transnational learning and communication.     

Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a Deliberative Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability

This essay proposes a deliberative model of bureaucratic accountability and assesses its feasibility. Conventional wisdom suggests that a deliberative theory of bureaucratic accountability has little utility outside corporatist contexts. I reject this view because recent changes in patterns of interest representation have transformed both corporatist and pluralist bureaucracies into more hospitable environments for public deliberation. Contrary to the claims of democratic corporatists, recent pluralist practices of interest representation also seem to be compatible with public deliberation. Hence, movement toward greater openness in administrative decision-making is possible from both liberal pluralist and corporatist starting points. Corporatism clearly has no monopoly on democratic deliberation.     

Citizen Involvement Efforts and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Participatory Values, Stakeholder Pressures, and Administrative Practicality

This article addresses the efforts of local governments to involve citizens in administrative processes. In particular, we explore the following questions: What social and political groups in the community promote citizen involvement? Which groups awre likely to succeed? What barriers obstruct citizen involvement efforts? Do administrative attitudes make a difference in undertaking citizen involvement? Using survey data, this study tests a framework that assumes the decision to involve citizens in administrative processes reflects administrative responsiveness to salient community stakeholders, normative values associated with citizen involvement, and administrative practicality. The statistical results confirm the bureaucratic responsiveness framework and point to future directions for citizen involvement research and practice.     

Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise

We investigate how aspects of "civil service" systems of personnel management interact with bureaucratic discretion to create expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We construct a dynamic model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship-specific) policy expertise and may or may not be interested in policy choices per se. The legislature makes sequentially rational grants of discretion, which serve as incentives for expertise investment and continued service only for policy-motivated bureaucrats. Bureaucratic policy preferences and the legislature's agency problem vis-à-vis bureaucracies develop endogenously in the model. Bureaucratic expertise can be supported in equilibrium only at a cost of its politicization; "neutral competence" is inconsistent with strategic incentives of bureaucrats. We identify several conditions that support the development of an expert bureaucracy in equilibrium, including security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy-motivated bureaucrats.     

Managerialism, Politics and Legal Bureaucratic Rationality in Immigration Policy

Against claims that public sector reforms have made the functions of managers similar to those in private firms, critics of the managerialist model point to constraints on public sector managers that make their decisions on resource allocation and policy development different from those affecting corporations. Through an examination of policy formulation, program management and decision-making in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, this article demonstrates that managerialist program planning, outcome orientation and performance measurement have been introduced, but that this has not precluded an expansion in non-market oriented routine, non-discretionary decision-making involving bureaucratic legal rationality within a legislative and regulatory framework. While some clients have been defined and assessed in terms of economic criteria, they access departmental processing not in terms of market signals, but according to their compliance with the Migration Act and Migration Regulations. Managerialism has not occurred at the expense of classical administrative practices, rather managerialist and legal bureaucratic forms have both grown and influenced political calculations on policy-making.     

Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-Building in Europe

Current approaches examining the effect of institutions on policy processes have difficulty in explaining the results of the legislative process of codecision between the European Parliament and Council within the European Union. The formal Treaty changes that gave rise to codecision have, in turn, given rise to a plethora of informal institutions, in a process that is difficult to understand using dominant modes of analysis. This article provides a framework for analyzing the relationship between formal and informal institutions, showing how the two may be recursively related. Formal institutional change at a particular moment in time may give rise to informal institutions, which may, in turn, affect the negotiation of future formal institutions. The article applies this framework to the codecision process, showing how the codecision procedure has led to the creation of informal institutions and modes of decision-making, which have affected subsequent Treaty negotiations. Through strategic use of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, the European Parliament has been successful in advancing its interests over time and increasing its role in the legislative process.     

Interpreting Administrative Change: Bureaucratic Self‐Interest and Institutional Inheritance in Government

Between 1946 and 1995, Danish central government had been subject to numerous reorganization initiatives. Based on the assumption of self‐interest motivated and risk‐averse bureaucrats, these initiatives are analyzed in a long‐term historical perspective. It is argued that civil servants both feel a strong incentive to and have good chances of defending the existing organization. This creates a historical bias in favor of whatever organizations were created in the past. Still, the mutual dependence between political executives and their civil servants opens up for bargaining dynamics allowing for mostly incremental change. While ideology has been unimportant in the development of central government organization, broadly shared ideas about reform may account for some instances of radical reform, consistently opposed by Danish civil servants.     

激励制度、问责约束与地方治理转型

正向激励与负向问责的二元维度,为理解中国地方政府的治理偏好提供了一个分析框架。地方分权与官员晋升锦标赛等正向激励制度,为地方政府促进经济增长提供了强劲动力,而人大监督、司法监督、社会监督等负向问责约束松弛,导致地方治理存在发展失衡、公共服务供给水平偏低等问题。提升地方政府的公共服务意识和能力,改进公共服务供给及质量,提升地方治理的回应性和公平性,关键在于加强责任政府的制度建设,强化自下而上及横向的问责约束。     

Impact of Political Structures and Informal Political Processes on Health Policy: Comparison of the United States and Canadab

A number of factors, including cultural, social, economic, political, and historical, influence policy. United States and Canada's health care systems are the conscious and subconscious outcomes of formal political structures and informal political processes. The Canadian parliamentary political system encourages centralized, organized, planned policy in health care. However, this is accomplished at the risk of leaving some individuals—physicians in this case—quite frustrated. American constitutional features, the presidential system, weak political parties, and the tireless participation of interest groups in the political process all function to discourage the formation of highly rational and efficient policy. While few special interests are ever completely satisfied with the legislation produced, seldom is any organized group completely thwarted. Therefore, it is no surprise that a tightly integrated national program of universal health insurance was not adopted by Congress in 1993–1994. Political structures and processes discourage effective, comprehensive health care reform in the United States.     

Formal and Informal Volunteering in a Nordic Context: The Case of Denmark

This article compares three different forms of volunteering: formal volunteering which is typically carried out in formalized organizations; informal practical help which is most often provided in a face-to-face context and requires the giving of time; and economic assistance which requires neither the co-presence of actors nor the giving of time. The different nature and structuring of these formal and informal ways of contributing to society suggest that they require different resources. Grounded in sociological theory we argue that three sets of factors are particularly relevant for explaining volunteering: personal or ‘human capital’ factors, social network resources, and civic values. We test in a multivariate analysis how various indicators of these personal and social resources relate to the different forms of volunteering. The study relies on a comprehensive survey of the Danish adult population. The findings, therefore, are interpreted in the light of this particular institutional environment which forms the backdrop for individual choices about volunteering. We find that the different forms of formal and informal volunteering seem to form a continuum of civic engagement going from the most public to the most private. Furthermore, compared to informal ways of volunteering, formal volunteering seems to be more contingent upon access to and supply of different forms of personal and social resources.     

Informal Accountability, Socially Embedded Officials, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China: The Role of Lineage Groups

In recent studies, analysts have found that so-called “informal accountability” exerts significant influence on public goods provision in rural China. According to these studies, such informal accountability may be formed through the embedment of local officials in social groups. However, there seems to be no agreement on the identification of such embedment and the conditions under which this embedment can influence public goods provision. To advance the literature of this debate, this study examines village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explores their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data. Using a direct measure of social embeddedness of village officials, we have found that the embedment of village officials in a social group can be identified through a direct measure designed in this study and that the embedment has a positive effect on public goods provision in rural China. Finally, we draw some important policy implications from our findings.     

Evidence Based Policy: Principles of Transparency and Accountability

This article provides a practical guide for improving the quality of evidence‐based policy. Rather than adopting an approach that gives priority to particular types of research methodologies, this paper argues that evidence drawn from any methodology will improve if standards of transparency and accountability are followed in the process of gathering, analysing, interpreting, and presenting evidence for policy. The papers details what these standards of transparency and accountability mean in practice, how these standards can be achieved, and possible limits to their adoption.