Managerial Responsibility

The concept of managerial responsibility is a shining thread in the literature of public administration, but its definition within our constitutional scheme remains elusive. How will we know responsible public management when we see it? We propose one answer: Public administration should be conducted according to what we term a “precept of managerial responsibility,” which involves four interrelated elements derived from the classical literature of public administration: judgment, accountability, balance, and rationality. We apply this precept to one of the most vexing problems of public administration theory and practice, institutional reform litigation. This application illustrates how the precept solves a major theoretical problem of American public administration by defining a role for administrative officers that fully comports with the Madisonian scheme of separated institutions—legislative, executive, and judicial—sharing power.     

The Politics of Court Budgeting in the States: Is Judicial Independence Threatened by the Budgetary Process?

Judicial independence in American politics has been hailed as a means of preserving individual liberty and minority rights against the actions of the majoritarian branches of government. Recently, however, legal professionals and scholars of the courts have begun to question the magnitude of judicial independence, suggesting that budgeting and finance issues pose a threat to judicial independence. This article explores whether state judiciaries are being threatened on this front by soliciting the perceptions of key state officials. Using surveys of court administrators, executive budget officers, and legislative budget officers in the states, we examine three aspects of the politics of judicial budgeting: competing for scarce resources, interbranch competition, and pressure to raise revenues. The survey responses suggest that, in a substantial number of states, judicial independence has, at times, been threatened by interbranch competition and pressures to raise revenues.     

Judicial politics in Britain: Patrolling the boundaries

This study considers judicial policy‐making in Great Britain by noting the peculiarly British institutional restraints on judicial action of parliamentary sovereignty, the resulting subordination of all courts to the legislative branch and the absence of a codified charter of rights or constitution. Though there is no judicial power to annul legislative or executive actions, British courts and judges still play a small, but significant, role in policy‐making through the common law and, in particular, through judicial review of adminstrative actions. A written bill of rights would likely draw courts further into the the political arena and politicise the appointment of judges.     

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Unilateral presidential actions, such as executive orders, are widely cited as a key strategic tool for presidential power. However, is unilateral action evidence of unilateralism or might it represent executive acquiescence? We answer this by (1) specifying three competing models, each with a different presidential discretion assumption and generating alternative hypotheses; (2) extending the canonical item‐response model to best measure executive‐order significance; and (3) comparing competing theoretical models to data for 1947–2002. Theoretically, we show that legislative preferences may impact unilateral actions differently than previously thought and indicate how parties may be influential. Empirically, a model where the president is responsive to the chamber's majority‐party median fits the data better than models assuming responsiveness to the chamber median or no presidential acquiescence. Unilateral action appears not tantamount to presidential power, as evidence implies that legislative parties, or the judicial actors enforcing their will, are key conditioning factors.     

Exploring Explanations of State Agency Budgets: Institutional Budget Actors or Exogenous Environment?

Budgetary incrementalism argues that three institutional actors—agencies, executive budget offices, and legislative committees—dominate budget outcomes. The complexity and interdependency of public programs expands this expectation to include the influence of exogenous budget factors. Findings from a survey of state agency heads reveal that budget environments do influence state agency budget outcomes. However, the institutional budgetary participants, especially governors and legislatures, envisioned in classical incrementalism retain their principal and primary influence on state agency budgets. A significant departure from classical incrementalism is that agencies are not as influential as previously depicted.     

Nonincremental Policy Change: Lessons from Michigan's Medicaid Managed Care Initiative

Studies of policy implementation have focused primarily on incremental policy change, yet policy change is sometimes implemented quickly and comprehensively. Such is the case with Michigan's recent implementation of a statewide Medicaid managed care initiative. This article analyzes Michigan's quick implementation and highlights the importance of political support, organizational change, and a supportive policy and administrative environment in affecting successful implementation. It also notes the price paid for quick implementation—namely, stakeholder dissatisfaction, mistakes, and lack of public involvement.     

Federalism by Waiver: MEDICAID and the Transformation of Long-term Care

In recent years, many states in the U.S. have substantiallyreinvented their Medicaid programs through the unprecedenteduse of federal waivers. This article focuses on 1915c programwaivers, which gave states the opportunity to overcome Medicaid'sinstitutional bias by offering more home and community-basedservices. The use of this tool has fueled deinstitutionalizationand other program changes. It reflects the rise of executivefederalism—the growing tendency for major program decisionsto shift from the legislative arena to the executive branchof the national and state governments. By functioning as licenses,the 1915c waivers take devolution via the administrative processto new levels. The proliferation of these waivers suggests aneed to revise prior conceptions of federal–state relations,such as picket fence federalism.     

Budgetary Decision Making by Executive and Legislative Budget Analysts: The Impact of Political Cues and Analytical Information

We explore the extent to which attributes of individual analysts and institutional factors lead to budgetary decisions based on political cues and/or analytical information among executive and legislative budget analysts. We surveyed executive and legislative budget analysts in 13 western states to ascertain the factors that influence their budgetary decisions. The findings build on evidence from previous studies that confirms the complexity of factors affecting budget analysts' decisions, and they provide empirical support to analysts' use of a combination of information labeled "budget rationality" by Thurmaier and Willoughby. Also, we provide more conclusive evidence that both executive and legislative analysts follow similar decision-making patterns.     

Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism

This article develops a theory of presidential unilateralism in which both ideological divergence with Congress and legislative capacity influence the president's use of executive orders. We argue that when Congress is less capable of constraining the executive, the president will issue more executive orders during periods of divided government. Conversely, in periods of high legislative capacity, the president is less likely to issue executive orders when faced with an opposed Congress. Based on an examination of institutional changes, we identify years prior to the mid‐1940s as characterized by low congressional capacity and the subsequent period as characterized by high capacity. Testing the theory between 1905 and 2013, we find strong support for these predictions and demonstrate that legislative capacity conditions the role of ideological disagreement in shaping presidential action. Overall, this article deepens our current understanding of the dynamics of separation‐of‐powers politics and the limits of executive power.     

Parliament without Government: The Belgian Parliament and the Government Formation Processes of 2007–2011

Parliamentary systems are characterised by strong links between the executive and the legislature. While the importance of executive–legislative relationships is well-known, the extent to which executive dominance affects parliamentary behaviour is hard to grasp. This study uses the recent institutional crises in Belgium to study parliamentary behaviour in the absence of a government with full powers. Cabinet formation in Belgium has proved to be protracted in recent years, leading to long periods of government formation in both 2007–2008 and 2010–2011. Such circumstances provide a unique comparison between normal situations of parliament in the presence of government, and exceptional situations of prolonged periods of caretaker government. In particular the article looks at three aspects of parliamentary behaviour that are usually linked to executive–legislative relations: legislative initiatives, voting behaviour and party unity. The general hypothesis is that prolonged periods of government formation gave parliamentarians more opportunities to influence the legislative process and more (ideological) freedom. The results show a nuanced picture: parliament became more pro-active, the salience of the government–opposition divide declined, while party unity remained as strong as ever. It is concluded that government formation processes did not lead to drastic changes in the legislative–executive relationship, but rather permitted a modest correction to the extremely weak position of parliament.     

For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch

Legislators are thought to delegate policymaking authority to administrative actors either to avoid blame for controversial policy or to secure policy outcomes. This study tests these competing perspectives and establishes that public attention to policymaking is a powerful predictor of the extent to which significant United States statutes delegate authority to the executive branch. Consistent with the policy‐concerns perspective, by one calculation statutes dealing with high‐attention issues entail 48 percent fewer delegating provisions than statutes dealing with low‐attention issues – a far stronger relationship than is typically found in the delegation literature. As per the blame‐avoidance perspective, a number of additional analyses yield results consistent with the notion that fears about future public attention motivate statutory delegation if legislative conflict is sufficiently great. Overall, however, the results suggest that conflict typically is not sufficiently great and that legislators are generally more inclined to limit statutory delegation when the public is paying attention.     

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN RELATION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*

The relationship between the judiciary and public administration is founded in the constitutional principles which lie at the basis of our system of government. The three branches or arms of government, as they are known to constitutional law, are the legislative, the executive and the judicial. They are said to be equal and coordinate. There is a complex constitutional relationship between the three arms of government which does not always follow a consistent pattern. It is marked somewhat paradoxically both by mutual independence and interdependence. Public administration is carried on by the executive branch.     

Top Management Turnover: The Role of Governing Board Structures

The convergence of performance accountability policies, a graying bureaucracy, and shorter executive tenures highlights the timeliness of investigating executive turnover. Prior public administration research has examined pull and push factors linked to these departures, but it has yet to fully explore the influence of governing board structures and political pressures that stem from such structures. Using data on 123 public four‐year research universities in the United States from 1993 to 2012, this article finds that governing board structures play a pivotal role in predicting the departure decisions of university presidents. While the size of the board increases the risk of departure, boards overseeing multiple institutions and boards with a faculty or student representative lower the risk of departure. Additional evidence suggests that both the share of gubernatorial and legislative appointees on the board and the party division of the legislature have a direct influence on departure.     

Q&A in legislative oversight: A framework for analysis

Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to which they are effective in controlling the executive remains underspecified both theoretically and methodologically. This article advances a systematic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary questions drawing on principal–agent theory, the public administration literature on accountability and communication research. The framework is called the ‘Q&A approach to legislative oversight’ based on the premise that the study of parliamentary questions (Q) needs to be linked to their respective answers (A) and examined together (Q&A) at the micro-level as an exchange of claims between legislative and executive actors. Methodologically, the Q&A approach to legislative oversight offers a step-by-step guide for qualitative content analysis of Q&A that can be applied to different legislative oversight contexts at different levels of governance. It is argued that the effectiveness of Q&A depends on the strength of the questions asked and the responsiveness of answers provided, which are correspondingly operationalised. To illustrate the merits of the approach, the article includes a systematic case study on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision (2013–2018), showing the connection between specific institutional settings and the effectiveness of parliamentary questions.     

Shaping Public Corporation Leadership in a Turbulent Environment

This article explores how public corporation leadership copes with a turbulent environment using political, managerial, and individual leadership elements. It is an in‐depth case study of Lee Ji‐Song, who effectively managed the politically and managerially challenging environment that resulted from the merger of two large public corporations into the Korea Land and Housing Corporation. Lee, an engineer, manager, and chief executive of a major construction company, took advantage of his political, managerial, and individual leadership capital to cope with political challenges from lawmakers and with managerial challenges such as postmerger integration management, organizational stabilization, and financial improvement. The authors suggest that an effective public corporation leader must be a skillful politician and businessperson, as public corporations often operate in an environment in which public and private values interact.     

The direct PM election and the institutional presidentialisation of parliamentary systems

The direct PM election model features as an ‘empty cell’ in typologies of political regimes. A more fine grained analysis of the model shows that it depends on the choices made on three institutional parameters (object of the election, electoral system, legislative/executive relationship) whether it constitutes a distinct regime type. A comparison of nine examples confirms that the label of a direct PM election covers a wide array of institutional designs. A direct PM election may involve a full-fledged presidentialisation, but it may also imply a marginal adaptation of the parliamentary system. The model can only be considered as an intermediate regime type when it combines the exclusive electoral origin of the executive with a parliamentary legislative/executive relationship.     

State Reform in Turkey: Reasons, Needs and Strategies

The state structure in Turkey including all its branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) at both the national and local levels has been shown to be ineffective, even irrelevant, to the ingrained demographic, social, economic and political exigencies of the country. One of the main reasons behind this is the collapse of public finance. Conventional rhetoric limiting solutions to administrative reform fails to provide a sufficiently broad enough context within which public sector reform in Turkey can be discussed. Turkey's determination to become a full member of the EU also necessitates a comprehensive and radical overhaul of the Turkish public sector with respect to efficiency and productivity. Five main strategies are proposed to assist Turkey in overcoming its state governance predicament: initiating and carrying out a state-wide reform by employing modern principles of public management; understanding and solving the problem of internal and external debts; enhancing the conditions of governance; reintroduc-ing and strengthening the principle of meritocracy in public sector and cooperating more with the EU.     

Medicaid,the States and Health Care Reform

Health care reform in the US is relying extensively on Medicaid for achieving universal health coverage. This article addresses the question of whether Medicaid is an appropriate foundation for reducing the ranks of the uninsured, given its dependence on economic conditions and the vulnerability of state budgets, along with the ever-changing preferences of governors and legislators. This article assesses the effects of the ebb and flow of Medicaid policy-making on at‐risk populations and what this implies for the Affordable Care Act. By establishing a nationwide income floor at 133% of the Federal Poverty Level, the legislation eliminates eligibility inequities across the states. However, it is argued that when state budgets are strained, as they undoubtedly will be when the reform bill is fully implemented, local officials will downsize benefit packages, raise co-payments, mandate more managed care, and reduce provider payments, negatively affecting the availability, scope, and quality of services.     

Guiding Regionalism and Reform from the Court: Judge John Feikens

For decades, federal district court judges have been deeply involved in the reform of state and local government agencies. Some scholars describe such a judicial role in institutional reform as “managerial.” This profile examines the managerial role of Judge John Feikens, who, since 1977, has supervised the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department's attempts to comply with federal laws on wastewater treatment and water quality. Through his sustained, effective oversight, Feikens became an influential mediator of metropolitan cooperation. His persistence in resolving metropolitan conflict may be viewed with concern by those who worry about lengthy court involvement in public administration. However, this insightful profile underscores poignant contemporary lessons, even from judicial actions, for enhancing metropolitan problem solving.     

Does Reinvention Need Reinvention? Lessons from Tmncated Managerialism in Britain

Since the 1970s, reformers have pressed innovation in Whitehall management. However, the reinvention efforts by both the Thatcher and Major governments under the banners of public choice and managerialism have led the reform movement to a dead end. Using interviews ranging from 1978 to 1993 and drawing upon the works of public management theorists, this article analyzes the obstacles to reinventing government in the UK. Namely, the politicization of the process coupled with HM Treasuy's stronghold on expenditures has limited managerial discretion and built mistrust of veforms among civil servants. Rather than creating an environment conducive to innovations in public management, the UKs efforts have deepened the divide between policymakers and administrators.