The gender gap in same-gender voting: The role of context

If parties nominate both male and female candidates, open-list PR electoral rules enable voters to engage in same-gender voting (i.e. select candidate of the same gender). In this regard, there is a gender gap in Finland, an otherwise highly egalitarian country: over time, men tend to support mostly male candidates, while women are roughly equally divided between male and female candidates. This study investigates whether voters' likelihood of selecting a candidate of the same gender is affected by contextual factors. Based on pooled cross-sectional data from five Finnish parliamentary elections between 1979 and 2011, it shows that gender differences in same-gender voting are substantially reduced when district magnitude and gender ratios among candidates and elected deputies are taken into account.     

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation

Drawing on new data that combine recorded votes from the Swiss National Assembly with canton-level referendum results on identical legislative proposals, Portmann et al. (Public Choice 151:585–610, 2012) develop an innovative strategy to identify the effect of district magnitude on the relationship between representatives and their constituents. We replicate PSE’s central result and also estimate a related model that allows for the possibility of non-monotonicity in the relationship between district magnitude and representatives’ deviance from referendum median voters. Our results indicate that representatives elected in low-magnitude multi-member districts deviate from canton-level majorities less than either MPs from single-member districts or those from high-magnitude multi-member districts.     

MP behavior in mixed-member electoral systems

Previous research has argued that representatives in mixed-member electoral systems adjust their behavior to the mode of their election, the so-called mandate divide. MPs elected in single-member districts focus on their district, whereas those elected through closed party lists focus on their party. Yet this ignores that candidates in mixed-member systems can run in a district and on their party's list concurrently. This paper presents a model of how the prospects of re-election in the district and through the party list affect the relationship between voters, candidates, and parties. It is shown that the dual candidacy option results in candidates focusing on their party in most instances. The model is applied to a novel data set on the allocation of federal road construction projects in Germany.     

Sponsoring Private Member's Bills in Finland and Estonia: The Electoral Context of Legislative Behaviour

This article examines the degree to which sponsored private member's bills (PMBs) in parliament can be explained by electoral incentives. Such bills are a peculiar piece of draft legislation – technically simple, topically unimportant and with negligible passage rates. Yet members of parliament (MPs) sponsor them in large numbers. One possible explanation for this behaviour is the electoral context arising out of the variance in electoral district size and electoral list types, which makes a strong personal reputation comparatively more important for some MPs. Sponsoring bills that have no realistic chance of becoming actual regulations could be a form of personal reputation‐building and/or vote‐seeking behaviour. Evidence is examined on the sponsoring of such bills in Finland between 2003 and 2007 and in Estonia between 1999 and 2007 in order to determine if the electoral context explains why some MPs do this more frequently. The results suggest that the electoral system does have an effect. MPs who have been elected under rules where personal reputation is not central in getting elected are less likely to sponsor such bills the larger their electoral district becomes.     

Elektorale Responsivität als Kriterium zur Beurteilung des deutschen Bundestagswahlrechts

We argue that plurality systems strengthen the accountability of governments towards the electorate while proportional systems lead to a broad representation of voter interests in parliament and coalition governments. We demonstrate these effects in an analysis of all German federal elections from 1949 to 2017 using first-tier votes and directly elected deputies as reflecting the plurality segment and second-tier votes and the seat shares of parties as reflecting the proportional representation segment. We show that the percentages of directly elected deputies react more to differences in perceived party competences (party valences) than the percentages of all party deputies. Electoral system reforms should take into account the effects of both parts of the German electoral system.     

Adapting to closed-list proportional representation: lessons from Ukraine

This paper examines the implications of Ukraine’s move from a mixed electoral system to one of proportional representation in the 2006 parliamentary elections. In particular, it seeks to understand how the elimination of district contests affected the two major parties’ strategies in selecting candidates. Two strategies are outlined: prioritizing inclusion and prioritizing cohesion. Under the former, parties co-opt unaffiliated district deputies to improve their electoral fortunes despite potential costs to party discipline. The latter involves parties selecting affiliated deputies on the expectation of greater loyalty if elected. The analysis reveals that while the ruling party, Our Ukraine, employed a cautious version of inclusion, its opponent, the Party of Regions, emphasized cohesion. The findings show that “one size does not fit all” when it comes to how parties react to the introduction of list-only systems. Furthermore, given the greater subsequent success of The Party of Regions in gaining office, the results question the degree to which ruling parties benefit electorally from greater inclusion when responding to the advent of more proportional electoral rules.     

A Proposal for Simultaneous Reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords

The disproportional electoral system of the House of Commons is increasingly contested, while the undemocratic composition of the House of Lords has been criticised for a century. I first argue that simultaneous reform of both chambers creates the opportunity for far more optimal outcomes than possible under attempts to reform just one chamber. I then argue that bicameralism should continue so that the UK can be represented in two, currently convoluted, ways: as a singular polity in partisan terms and as both an aggregate of constituencies and union of nations, in geographic terms. The former would best take place in a reformed House of Commons, responsible for government formation, and composed of around 300 MPs elected by ‘pure’ proportional representation. The latter would best take place in a reformed House of Lords of around 300 peers, elected by plurality voting from single-member constituencies. Together, these reforms would improve governance, representation, legitimacy, accountability and the robustness of the union, while retaining celebrated facets of the status quo such as simplicity and the direct constituency link.     

“What have you done for me lately?” Re-thinking local representation

Scholars have studied the influence that constituents exert on elected representatives’ action in national parliaments at length. Still, academic pundits have usually confined local representation to distributive policies and casework, and limited local legislators’ focus to a territorial perspective. In this study, I try and propose a more nuanced theory of local representation, and I use automated text analysis to capture elected representatives’ propensity to serve functional as well as territorial interests. In an effort to provide empirical backing to my theoretical argumentation, I present an analysis of Italian legislators’ behavior which shows that deputies are willing to divert public spending to their district but also to favor the interests of specific economic sectors. Scholars have already acknowledged the multidimensional character of political representation at the national level, my analysis offers theoretical justification and empirical evidence to support doing so at the local level as well.     

Voting Against Your Constituents? How Lobbying Affects Representation

Citizens delegate the representation of their political preferences to members of Parliament (MPs), who are supposed to represent their interests in the legislature. However, MPs are exposed to a variety of interest groups seeking to influence their voting behavior. We argue that interest groups influence how MPs cast their vote in Parliament, but that this effect varies across groups. While lobbying by sectional groups provides incentives for MPs to defect from their constituents, we expect that cause groups in fact strengthen the link between MPs and their voters. We test our argument based on an innovative study of 118 Swiss public referenda, which allows for directly comparing voter preferences with legislative voting of 448 MPs on these issues. Drawing on a multilevel regression analysis, this study shows that interest groups considerably affect the link between MPs and their voters. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation.     

Keynes,Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining parliamentary voting behaviour on fiscal aid for euro area member states

This article investigates the determinants of parliamentary support for international fiscal aid. Departing from the literature on presidential systems, it analyses an exemplary case of a parliamentary system, Germany. Two theoretical accounts are distinguished. The first perceives MPs as policy-seekers and focuses on the positioning of government and opposition parties and individual MPs on an economic left?right and a pro- versus anti-EU dimension. The second regards MPs as vote-seekers and presumes an electoral district connection. The statistical analysis of a new data-set containing information on 17 Bundestag roll-call votes from 2009 to 2015 finds support for the first account: voting in favour of fiscal aid measures is mainly driven by government membership and EU support. By contrast, neither economic ideologies, nor district or mandate characteristics influence support for fiscal aid. The article contributes to a growing literature on the domestic politics of international political economy.     

Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives

This paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1990. The empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time. We find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior, nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns. The most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid, suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district.     

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament’s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives’ incentives to adhere to citizens’ revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences.     

Toe the line,break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies

This article analyses the drivers of individual dissent in floor voting in parliamentary regimes. It focuses on the effect of ideological heterogeneity in legislative parties on individual MPs’ voting behaviour, as well as the different incentives caused by the differing consequences of defection and abstention. Combining individual-level survey and voting data from the Swedish Riksdag, neither of which is subject to selection bias, the study overcomes several limitations of previous research. It shows that MPs’ decisions to dissent are partly driven by ideological differences with their party, but also by the imperatives of maintaining a government majority in a parliamentary regime, along with the level of influence MPs exert on legislation. It also highlights the importance of distinguishing between abstaining from voting and defecting. Merely pooling the two oversimplifies the behaviour of MPs.     

On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking

In this paper, we show that current statistical measures of legislator's shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested. We note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross-sectional regressions where legislators' voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis-specified. We also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct, the uncovered set, and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between Senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate. We argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by Senators is equally consistent with Senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data.     

Do competitive districts get more political attention? Strategic use of geographic representation during campaign and non-campaign periods

MPs are elected as delegates of their electoral district to represent their constituents' interests. Geographical representation is considered a central quality indicator for legislative systems. Yet whether the strategic use of geographic representation is affected by tactical campaign considerations has received less attention. The availability of social media data on a fine-grained level allows us to fill this gap by studying the following question: To what extent do politicians strategically use geographic representation during electoral campaign and non-campaign times? I combine literature comparing campaign and non-campaign periods with studies on strategic incentives for MPs to geographic representation. Empirically, I rely on quantitative text-analytical tools to study German politicians’ tweets from the entire 19th legislative period (2017–2021). My findings have important implications for the geographic representation literature as they imply that MPs use geographic references strategically, especially during campaign periods. Prospective competitive districts receive substantially more political attention already during non-campaign periods, yet further amplified during electoral campaigns.     

Public Preferences for Parliamentary Representation in the UK: An Overlooked Link?

Representation, both as a normative concept and a political process, has generated a rich literature across several national contexts. To develop our understanding of representational systems, scholars tend to assess the degree of policy congruence between parliamentarians and constituents as well as the role orientations adopted by elected parliamentarians and legislators. This paper contends that in order to have a complete understanding of representational systems, we must consider not only the representational roles adopted by parliamentarians, but also the publics' preferences regarding parliamentary representation. Specifically, I posit that individuals have attitudes about the type and degree of relationship that they believe should exist between elected parliamentarians, parties and constituents. Using data from a 2003 survey of the British public, I test the related hypotheses that individuals have meaningful and predictable preferences for the representational relationship they share with their members of parliament (MPs) and that these representational preferences in turn influence how individuals evaluate MPs. Finding support for both hypotheses, I argue that developing an understanding of normative public preferences for political representation is an important and overlooked component in advancing models of public support of both elected officials and governing institutions.     

'Attitudinally Feminist'? The New Labour Women MPs and the Substantive Representation of Women

In the period since the election of 120 women MPs to the House of Commons, discussion concerning their behaviour has been much in evidence. This article seeks to contribute to the analysis of whether women MPs seek to substantively represent women. It draws on qualitative interviews with more than half of the newly elected Labour women MPs. The paper demonstrates that more than two-thirds of the newly elected Labour women MPs are 'attitudinally feminist', one measure of whether women representatives will seek to 'act for' women. The article challenges, therefore, claims that women representatives have not sought feminised change in British politics.     

The Unscientific Determinants of Voting on a Controversial Scientific Issue: An Evaluation of Biofuels Policy in the U.S. Congress

Whether allegiance to party or the preferences of constituents are most important in an elected representative's voting decision has been a long‐running question in political science. This study contributes to this debate through an evaluation of biofuels policy in the U.S. Congress. Results indicate that in this policy area the House and Senate balance these influences differently, with partisanship playing a significant role in the House but not in the Senate. Analysis of voting on this issue indicates that there are important distinctions between how a legislator views the overall partisan preferences of constituents in their district or state versus how they view the interests of particular groups of constituents; when the concentration of agricultural interests in a legislator's district or state is great enough, it can override the effects of party for this issue, which suggests that legislators are especially concerned with specific constituency groups in their district or state that would stand to gain or lose from a policy. The proposition that a legislator is most likely to do that which benefits him or her most regardless of the available science relevant to a policy is a useful starting point for understanding what has been found in this research project.     

How Michael Foot Won the Labour Party Leadership

This paper examines the voting motivations of Labour parliamentarians in the final parliamentary ballot of the Labour party leadership election of 1980. By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Labour parliamentarians and by determining the ideological disposition of the 1980 parliamentary Labour party (PLP) this paper examines the ideological disposition of the candidates' vis‐à‐vis their electorate, and offers a challenge to traditional interpretations of how and why Foot was elected. The traditional interpretation has sought for explanations as to how a right‐wing dominated PLP elected a left‐wing candidate. Whilst citing the traditional interpretations of the impact of the impending Electoral College, mandatory reselection and the assumed weaknesses of the Healey campaign, this paper argues that there was considerably more left‐wing sentiment within the 1980 PLP in terms of economic management, defence and the Common Market, than previously considered. As such this paper suggests that, taken with the impact of the other factors, the victory of Foot should not be seen as that surprising.     

The Parliamentary Party

The Conservative parliamentary party will fulfill three important functions for any incoming Conservative government: it will be the focus of attention for the national media; it will be the bulk vote that will deliver its legislative programme; it will form the talent pool from which members of any incoming government will be recruited. A majority Conservative government could see a majority of its MPs newly elected, with more Conservative women and ethnic minority MPs than ever before (although there will be little change in the socio-economic background of their MPs). These new MPs will present problems in terms of party management, although they will be less likely to rebel than longer-serving MPs. There are also relatively few signs of discontent among incumbent Conservative MPs (the article identifies the most rebellious Conservative MPs). Any new Conservative government will also have to deal with a reformed House of Lords, in which it will no longer have a majority.