The impact of agency failure on executive approval: Evidence from the Bush and Obama presidencies

Over the past few decades, scholars have developed a rich research record on the causes and consequences of low presidential approval ratings. While this literature has provided valuable insight on presidential approval, little attention is paid to how agency failures also impact approval. In this article, I argue this understudied topic can provide additional leverage to help understand when public trust in the president is eroded. Using Markov Regime switching models of weekly approval ratings for the Bush and Obama presidencies, I demonstrate approval falls when agency failures make national headlines. In addition, findings also show that the impact of these events hinge on the number of failures and not the magnitude of any one breakdown in particular.     

Taxation and presidential approval: separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?

Previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians. This literature, however, focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the US president’s approval ratings (over the 1959–2006 period). Our results support this proposition. Specifically, we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings.     

The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion

How does public opinion affect presidential policymaking? We address this issue by testing a diverse set of hypotheses with data concerning a set of individual policies across time. In particular, the data revolve around presidential budgetary proposals on a set of major policy issues for which there are recurring surveys on citizens' preferences over spending. The analysis suggests that presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues that are familiar to citizens in their everyday lives. Also, for reelection‐seeking presidents, responsiveness is shown to depend upon two key political factors. First, presidents are more responsive to public opinion when the next election is imminent. Second, the effect of presidential popularity is nonmonotonic; presidents with average approval ratings are most likely to adopt policy positions congruent with public opinion, whereas presidents with approval ratings that are significantly above or below average have the greatest propensity to take unpopular positions.     

The stock market and U.S. presidential approval

Since the 1970s research has demonstrated a strong relationship between national economic performance and presidential approval. Traditionally, these popularity models rely on macroeconomic conditions; however, other economic performance measures may more fully capture the direction of the economy. One such measure, the stock market index, captures elements of national and household economic well-being. Therefore, market performance should impact presidential ratings. Our presidential approval model, based on quarterly data covering 1960–2011, demonstrates that approval is highly sensitive to the stock market's acceleration or deceleration, even with strong controls in the model for the other economic and political determinants of popularity. A rapid fall in the stock market index reduces president approval, while a sharp acceleration in the index growth boosts U.S. presidential approval.     

The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party

We analyze the first large‐scale, randomized experiment to measure presidential approval levels at all outcomes of a canonical international crisis‐bargaining model, thereby avoiding problems of strategic selection in evaluating presidential incentives. We find support for several assumptions made in the crisis‐bargaining literature, including that a concession from a foreign state leads to higher approval levels than other outcomes, that the magnitudes of audience costs are under presidential control prior to the initiation of hostilities, and that these costs can be made so large that presidents have incentive to fight wars they will not win. Thus, the credibility of democratic threats can be made extremely high. We also find, however, that partisan cues strongly condition presidential incentives. Party elites have incentives to behave according to type in Congress and contrary to type in the Oval Office, and Democratic presidents sometimes have incentives to fight wars they will not win.     

Public responses to the presidential use of military force: A panel analysis

How do citizens respond to dramatic uses of military force? While we know a great deal about the conditions that driveaggregate changes in presidential popularity in response to a president's use of military force, we know surprisingly little about howindividuals respond to such events. What types of individuals operating under what types of conditions are more likely to support such actions? And to what extent does approval of the use of force affect subsequent changes, not only in presidential popularity, but also in more general foreign policy attitudes? We use panel survey data collected before and after the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 to investigate the individual-level dynamics of opinion change in response to this dramatic event. Because our study neatly brackets the Libyan air strikes, we are able to examine in some detail the antecedents and consequences of individuals' reactions to a president's use of military force. We find that watching President Reagan's dramatic televised speech had an unmistakable impact in moving respondents to support the bombing. We also find that support for the Libyan air strikes appeared to precipitate greater approval for a range of more “hard-line” military responses toward terrorism, thus creating opportunities for similar-or even broader—presidential initiatives in the future. Finally, because the bombing was the only significant event occurring between the waves of the panel, our quasi-experimental design ties approval of the bombing clearly to an upsurge in presidential approval. Implications for various perspectives on presidential leadership of public opinion in foreign affairs are discussed.     

The Nationalization of Special Elections for the U.S. House of Representatives

Scholars and political commentators have argued that special elections to the U.S. House of Representatives are national contests, serving as a referendum on the president's party and a predictor of future election outcomes (Sigelman 1981; Smith and Burnnell 2010). But the empirical record is mixed, with one leading study demonstrating that candidate and district characteristics alone explain special election outcomes (Gaddie, Bullock, and Buchanan 1999). We investigate this disagreement by comparing special election and open-seat results using new data for the period 1995–2014. We find that while candidate characteristics affect special election outcomes, presidential approval is predictive of special election outcomes as well. Furthermore, we find that the effect of presidential approval on special election outcomes has increased in magnitude from 1995 to 2014, with the 2002 midterm representing an important juncture in the nationalization of special elections. We conclude that special elections have developed into national contests since the 1970s and situate this development within broader electoral trends.     

Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin

In liberal democracies, the approval ratings of political leaders have been shown to track citizens’ perceptions of the state of the economy. By contrast, in illiberal democracies and competitive autocracies, leaders are often thought to boost their popularity by exploiting nationalism, exaggerating external threats, and manipulating the media. Using time‐series data, I examine the determinants of presidential approval in Russia since 1991, a period in which leaders’ ratings swung between extremes. I find that Yeltsin's and Putin's ratings were, in fact, closely linked to public perceptions of economic performance, which, in turn, reflected objective economic indicators. Although media manipulation, wars, terrorist attacks, and other events also mattered, Putin's unprecedented popularity and the decline in Yeltsin's are well explained by the contrasting economic circumstances over which each presided.     

Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953–2001

Numerous prominent theories have relied on the concept of “audience costs” as a central causal mechanism in their arguments about international conflict, but scholars have had greater difficulty in demonstrating the efficacy and even the existence of such costs outside the bounds of game theory and the political psychology laboratory. We suggest that the audience costs argument focuses too narrowly on the likelihood that leaders will be removed from office by domestic constituencies for failing to make good on threats. Instead, we argue that scholars should ground these arguments on Alastair Smith's ( 1998 ) broader concept of “competency costs.” Our analysis of presidential legislative success from 1953 to 2001 demonstrates the existence of foreign policy competency costs by showing that public disapproval of presidential handling of militarized interstate disputes has a significant and substantial negative impact on the president's ability to move legislation on domestic issues through Congress.     

Policy popularity: The Arizona immigration law

As a maker of policy, a president or a governor invites public approval or disapproval for policy decisions. Public reaction is likely to occur for issues of great salience and clear candidate positions. We focus on immigration policy. Illegal immigration has become a hot issue in recent years, especially in Arizona. The state's governor took a clear stance in 2010 by signing a law that gives police sweeping powers to deal with illegal immigration (Arizona SB 1070). Using an aggregate time-series model, we find that this action affected gubernatorial approval ratings. Indeed the gain in approval proved enduring enough to turn a losing race for re-election into a victory for Governor Brewer. Using individual-level survey data, we find that presidential approval also was affected by reactions to the Arizona Law among residents of the state. When elected officials take clear stances on a salient issue - Governor Brewer for, President Obama against the law-policy moves approval.     

Elections and the Development of Civil War: An Empirical Study of Sri Lanka

Present empirical research on the connection between elections and civil war often treats causality as a one-way effect because it focuses exclusively on either the onset or the consequence of civil war. What is omitted in the literature is the endogenous nature of the election–conflict nexus throughout a civil war. This article dedicates itself to filling that gap. Treating administrative units in conflict as part of a rebellion network, we apply a stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) to the case of Sri Lanka. We find that, on the one hand, rebellion is less likely to occur in Tamil regions if national winners in presidential elections enjoy high local approval ratings (selection effect). On the other hand, regions involved in the rebellion network converge in terms of their local support for the national winner of the presidency (influence effect). Overall, our model-based simulation analysis shows that the influence effect has a larger impact on the endogenous relationship than the selection effect.     

Congressional responsiveness to presidential popularity: The electoral context

A number of recent studies have reported that the influence of the president's public approval rating on congressional support is not substantial. We hypothesize that this unexpected finding might be the result of the inappropriate application of an approval-driven model of legislative voting to the entire Congress. Specifically, we argue that members from certain kinds of electoral contexts—constituencies where the president's, or their own, electoral standing is in doubt—should be especially likely to vary their support for the president with changes in his approval rating. Although the patterns of presidential support scores between 1977 and 1991 do not confirm our specific hypotheses, they do suggest that the electoral context from which a legislator emerges does shape his or her responsiveness to changes in national presidential approval.     

Fundamental models for forecasting elections at the state level

This paper develops new fundamental models for forecasting presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections at the state level using fundamental data. Despite the fact that our models can be used to make forecasts of elections earlier than existing models and they do not use data from polls on voting intentions, our models have lower out-of-sample forecasting errors than existing models. Our models also provide early and accurate probabilities of victory. We obtain this accuracy by constructing new methods of incorporating various economic and political indicators into forecasting models. We also obtain new results about the relative importance of approval ratings, economic indicators, and midterm effects in the different types of races, how economic data can be most meaningfully incorporated in forecasting models, the effects of different types of candidate experience on election outcomes, and that second quarter data is as predictive of election outcomes as third quarter data.     

Convention effects: examining the impact of national presidential nominating conventions on information,preferences, and behavioral intentions

We ask whether and how US presidential nominating conventions matter in contemporary US elections. Using individual-level panel data, we find evidence that the conventions exert important effects on the electorate by influencing post-convention intentions to participate in electoral politics, knowledge about the candidates, and candidate favorability ratings, even after controlling for pre-convention intentions, knowledge, and candidate ratings. We conclude that conventions remain important campaign events that play a role in facilitating democratic processes in America.     

Priming Presidential Approval: The Conditionality of Issue Effects

Variations in the effectiveness of media priming are traditionally attributed to individual differences in political sophistication and news exposure. We contribute to this literature by considering the degree to which the content of an issue prime drives its use in presidential approval. Using a macro level approach, we combine public opinion data on presidential approval from 1981 to 2000 with content analyses of presidential news coverage to see how media attention affects the way issues are weighted in presidential approval. We find that the effectiveness of issue primes depends on issue content, such that familiar and understandable issues are more likely to be primed than more complex and difficult issues.

An Analysis of Presidential Preferences in the Distribution of Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities

Critics regarded the selection of urban empowerment zones and enterprise communities by Secretary Cisneros in 1994 as sympathetic to President Clinton's considerations. However, the secretary countered that cities were chosen based on their ability to revitalize their communities successfully, as outlined in their applications. To determine whether the secretary responded to top-down presidential preferences, data from the complete list of applications is used to test four hypotheses derived from principal—agent theory. The results of the logistic regression models do not validate the significance of the presidential variables (for instance, presidential support score for each city's congressional delegation, marginal districts, and 1992 state vote for President Clinton). Rather, many of the nonpresidential variables (community participation, size of the empowerment zone or enterprise community, and poverty) were significant in supporting the secretary's contention.     

A voter-centric explanation of the success of ideological candidates for the U.S. house

In recent years, ideological candidates for the U.S. House have become increasingly successful, to the point where their chances of being elected are indistinguishable from moderates. However, scholars have still not uncovered exactly why this is happening. Using survey data from the American National Election Studies, I find that voter-centric explanations of vote choice – a voter's partisanship, ideology, and presidential approval rating – have increasingly predicted their vote choice in U.S. House elections from 1980 to 2016. Using data on candidate ideology, I find that candidate ideology is an increasingly poor predictor of individual vote choice over time. Original experimental data supports these claims, finding only a small electoral advantage for moderates, compared to ideologues of their own party, and evidence suggesting that, at least among Democrats, ideological candidates are rated more favorably than moderates. Taken together, these results suggest that the increased electoral success of ideological candidates can be attributed to changes in voters' decision calculus, rather than structural or candidate-centric explanations.     

Strong feelings: Emotional responses to presidents

Although rational models of political behavior prevail in research on public approval of presidents, an emotions model is proposed to consider whether it actually predicts approval as well as, if not better than, the existing rational models. The emotions model is tested for Presidents Carter and Reagan using the American National Election Studies from 1980 to 1986. The model is compared with two rational models: one, an events and conditions model, suggests that people's prospective and retrospective views of their own financial circumstances and the economy dictate their approval of presidential performance; a second, an issue proximity model, proposes that the closeness (or distance) people perceive between their views on key issues and those of the president affects their approval of the president's job. Across numerous tests, the results indicate that the emotions model outperforms either of the rational models. In addition, a multivariate analysis combining rational and emotional indicators shows the strength of the emotions variables. The study concludes that political science research must more fully consider rational and emotional explanations of political behavior.     

The Policy of High‐Tech Industry Development: The Case of Location Assessment for Biotech Industry Parks in Taiwan

Biotechnology will be the star industry of the 21^st century, and will also be one of the main focal areas of Taiwan's future industrial development. Many scholars have suggested that the presence of geographical clusters is an important factor that determines an industry's international competitiveness. As an example of the clustering effect, when high‐tech industry was just starting to take off in Taiwan, the establishment of the Hsinchu Science‐Based Industrial Park successfully promoted the upgrading of the industrial structure. The goal of this study is to explore the development of an industrial park location selection model for Taiwan's biotech industry, while considering the influence of the clustering effect, with the ultimate intent of promoting the industry's development. Because clustering factors are certainly not necessarily independent, and may entail a feedback effect, this study uses the analytic network process (ANP) multiple criteria decision‐making (MCDM) model to construct a “biotech park” location selection model, and then determine the optimal location of a biotech park from three alternatives. The results suggest that Taipei City would be the optimal choice for a biotech park. This finding can serve to guide the government's biotech industry development policies.     

Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections

Early research led scholars to believe that institutional accountability in Congress is lacking because public evaluations of its collective performance do not affect the reelection of its members. However, a changed partisan environment along with new empirical evidence raises unanswered questions about the effect of congressional performance on incumbents' electoral outcomes over time. Analysis of House reelection races across the last several decades produces important findings: (1) low congressional approval ratings generally reduce the electoral margins of majority party incumbents and increase margins for minority party incumbents; (2) partisan polarization in the House increases the magnitude of this partisan differential, mainly through increased electoral accountability among majority party incumbents; (3) these electoral effects of congressional performance ratings hold largely irrespective of a member's individual party loyalty or seat safety. These findings carry significant implications for partisan theories of legislative organization and help explain salient features of recent Congresses.