Japan in the coming century: Looking East or West?

The modernization of Japan's trade policies and social structure, argues Professor Ronald Dore of the London School of Economics, will increase Japan's social instability. The continuation of the outdated Japan‐US alliance, he states, only inhibits the growth of the international order; he warns that the day may come when Japan's interests lie with China rather than the US. Dore advocates that Japan adopt a proactive foreign policy, using military force not for reasons of national interest, but only to contribute to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts.     

Japan's security strategy: Meeting the needs of a new era

A new era has dawned, but the US and Japan remain in a security relationship of parent to child, says Toshiyuki Shikata, professor of inter‐cultural studies at Teikyo University and retired lieutenant general in Japan's Ground Self‐Defense Force. He draws on his familiarity with security issues to examine Japan's strategic challenges in the new era, Japan's role in the alliance, and Japan's defense modernization. He denounces avoiding international security responsibilities due to alleged constitutional constraints, and says that a seat on the UN Security Council would allow Japan to share the full risks and responsibilities in discharging international obligations.     

Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the US-Japan relationship

The impact of the decision about when and if the United States Marine Corp Air Station will be relocated in Okinawa reverberates beyond the prefectural shores. It has the potential to upset the G-8 Summit, scheduled to be held in Nago City in July 2000, as well as to affect the strategic relationship between the US and Japan. In this article, Robert Eldridge, Post-doctoral Fellow at the Suntory Foundation, Osaka, reviews the history of this complicated problem. He argues that the US and Japan must continue to make progress addressing Okinawan requests and concerns. Ameliorating Okinawa” s burden, while at the same time more actively seeking public understanding and suppor t of the US-Japan security relationship and Japan's role in that relationship, as well as increasing Japan's ability to cooperate in times of emergency, is in the interest of both countries.     

A Middle Power's Roles in Shaping East Asian Security Order: Analysis of Japan's Engagement from a Normative Perspective

East Asia is currently in a transitional period. Recognizing the challenges presented by China's rise to the current regional order, existing literature analyses the security situation in Asia by focusing on the material aspects of power distribution between the US and China. Few works substantively discuss the roles played by middle powers such as Japan in shaping the regional order and how they can deal with the challenges of great power competition and threats to the global rules‐based order. By employing Japan's involvement in the South China Sea issues as a case study, this article examines how a middle power attempts to shape or underpin the regional security order and if such attempts are effective. The investigation of Japan's engagement illustrates that a middle power's practical support can indirectly and gradually contribute to sustaining and defending the regional “rules‐based order”.     

China: A function of the Japan‐US alliance

China's greatest future strategic concern is the Japan‐US alliance. Hisahiko Okazaki argues that a strong alliance limits China's foreign policy options, and stresses the importance of Japan and the US working together to establish a foreign policy towards China that will promote peace in the region. Okazaki was born in Dalian, China, in 1930. He served in Japan's Foreign Ministry, holding such posts as minister to the United States, chief of the ministry's Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau, and was ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. This article is adapted from an article first published in August 1995 in The Daily Yomiuri and is printed with the permission of the author.     

Australia and Japan's Return to International Society: Negotiating Allies and the Afro-Asian Bloc, 1952–56

In December 1956, Japan gained membership of the United Nations, marking a significant milestone in Japan's return to international society. In approximately five years since the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect in April 1952, this had been a difficult diplomatic issue for the Australian government. This article examines how the Australian government dealt with this issue by focusing upon the intersection of Australia's policy towards Japan and Japan's status as a member of the emergent Afro-Asian bloc. This article argues that Japan's engagement with the rest of the bloc was a rising factor in Canberra's consideration of Japan's place in the world, thereby helping revisit the orthodox historiography of Australia–Japan relations during the early Cold War era which often overemphasises rapid growth of bilateral trade.     

How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World

This article discusses Japan's contribution to world peace both in the past and in the future. Japan's domestic, historical, and strategic circumstances shaped its concept of comprehensive security focused on international economic cooperation since the 1970s. Three decades of constructive relations with neighbors, including reconciliation with Southeast Asia built a strong foundation for Japan's new security role, one driven by new domestic and external imperatives. The article also documents the evolution of Japan's security policy and role in international peacekeeping, and concludes by arguing that Japan–ASEAN partnership is a key component of Japan's new security role, including permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. In developing this new role, it is critically important that Japan engages its neighbors in ASEAN (and elsewhere) to gain their support for this new role.     

Asia's deepening financial crisis: Japan as a critical uncertainty

Japan's response to the economic crisis in East Asia is critical, not only for Japan itself but also for the Asia‐Pacific region and for the world. Kent Calder, Special Advisor to the US Ambassador to Japan, argues that the massive Japanese economy can potentially serve as a locomotive for the region, and as a sturdy fire wall to prevent the crisis from spreading. To do this, Japan must stimulate its economy, open markets further to Asian imports, and strengthen its financial system. If it fails, Japan could become part of the problem, instead of part of the solution.     

The Future of the Japanese–Chinese Relationship: The Case for a Grand Political Bargain

Compared with the strained relationship during the Koizumi era, Japanese-Chinese relations today seem to prove that despite many bilateral problems, a solution can always be found. This attitude is too complacent as a closer examination of the three main disputes shows: the history-related issues, the territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. Bilateral agreements, understandings, or protracted negotiations may provide temporary relief but may turn out to be very costly in the long run to Japan's national interests and to regional stability while time is not on Japan's side in view of the shifting comprehensive power relationship between the two countries. Instead, Japan should clarify its position in the Japan–US–China triangle, reform its economy, strengthen its Asian policy and sort out its priorities concerning the three main problems by striking a grand bargain.     

Whither Mr Abe's Japan?

This article reviews Japan's strategic options and policy initiatives under Prime Minister Abe, taking into consideration strategic changes in the region; chiefly a rising China and a United States approaching geopolitical retreat, and the policy implications of these developments. Mr Abe's announced goal is to restore Japan to its once great power status, and thus far success is proving elusive.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Hurdles in Mr Abe's path include the differing perceptions between Japan and its neighbours regarding Japan's history, and the deeply entrenched nature of these differences pose a significant barrier. A related aspect is the territorial disputes. A second task is to be a “normal” nation, that is exercising greater independence in security matters and matters of economic policy, and here differences arise with Japan's main ally, the United States. Furthermore Mr Abe also needs to convince the Japanese public as well as Japan's prospective allies about his views regarding Japan's security role in the region. A third task is to increase Japan's economic weight by turning around the Japanese economy from its existing stasis to sustained, robust growth.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mr Abe is making urgent policy efforts in all directions and the rather uneven outcome experienced thus far has not deterred him, thus creating uncertainty for Japan, and enhancing the feeling of insecurity in the region. The ostensible policy choice facing Mr Abe now is to either persist with his existing policies, hence entrenching the increasing tensions in the region, or to accept a rapidly rising China and formulate policies more accommodative of that development.     

Why Japan still matters

This article challenges the prevailing view that China is displacing Japan as Asia's leader and the pre-eminent power in Asia. On the contrary, it argues that in understanding the future of Northeast Asia and the broader Asia–Pacific, it would be a mistake to look only to a rising China and to relegate Japan to a diminishing position. China's rise does not automatically herald Japan's decline. Japan is an emerging, not a retreating power. The rise of China is both obscuring and accelerating the transformation in Japan's regional and global position. Japan is increasing its economic power, technological capabilities, military reach, soft power and diplomatic influence. Furthermore, the rise of China makes Japan strategically more important to the United States and to other countries in the Asia Pacific. Japan will become the main regional counterweight to China and an indispensable partner in America's strategy of balancing China.     

Clarifying the right of collective self‐defense

Since the 1950s the Japanese government has irrationally claimed that the Constitution bars it from exercising the right of collective self‐defense, says Seizaburo Sato, IIPS research director. International law clearly gives Japan the right to exercise both individual and collective self‐defense, says Sato, but the Japanese government's official view does not conform with this law. Sato sees the right to exercise collective self‐defense as essential to Japan's security, and argues that Japan should immediately declare this right. Then, taking all necessary time and in accordance with post‐war Japan's founding ideals, Japan should amend the Constitution.     

Should Japan participate in UN peacekeeping operations?

With the end of the Cold War, the UN has increased the number of peacekeeping operations that it undertakes, and many voices call for Japan's participation. Hisako Shimura, a professor in the International Affairs Department at Tsuda College, analyzes Japan's new Peace Cooperation Law, its Constitution, and the traditional principles that govern UN peacekeeping operations. Shimura finds that Japan's law contains safeguards to ensure that Japan could participate in peacekeeping missions that uphold traditional UN principles, and she also suggests that such participation would be constitutional.     

Japan Seventy Years after World War II: From a Challenger to a Supporter of the International Order

In advance of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, the “Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century” issued its report. The author served as acting chair of the panel which reviewed the history of Japan and the world from the 19th century to World War II through the 70 postwar years. This article looks at Japan's expansionism in the 1930s, wartime conduct, colonial rule, and the end of World War II. As a previous challenger to world order, Japan seeks to share the lessons learned now as a supporter of the international order. This article elucidates ways in which Japan can cooperate with the international community to promote prosperity and peace around the globe.     

Reshaping of Japanese Politics and the Question of Democracy

Japan's need for economic and political reform has been recognized but the means to achieve this has not. In this article, J.A.A. Stockwin, professor of Modern Japanese Studies at the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, considers this question by examining the meaning of democracy then applying the theory to the specific case of Japan. He explains that although not identical to a democracy in a Western sense, Japan's system of government is genuinely democratic. Stockwin argues that Japan is now at a crossroads in her history, but before pressing for reform an understanding of the complexity of the Japanese system is necessary. He concludes that a radical restructuring of Japan's political party system towards a bipolar set of party arrangements is necessary but questions whether Prime Minister Junichirô Koizumi is up to the task.     

Japan's future defense capability

The primary role of Japan's Self‐Defense Forces, says Atsumasa Yamamoto, is to safeguard the independence and liberty of Japan. He notes, however, that in the post‐Cold War world, the SDF must be prepared to play a supplemental role: to help Japan fulfill its international obligations to foster global and regional stability. Whether Japan's SDF will have the capability to perform these functions in the future is the focus of this study. Major Yamamoto was seconded to IIPS in 1993 from the Japan Defense Agency, where he is a member of the Intelligence Division in the Internal Bureau.     

Tempest in a Textbook: A Report on the New Middle-School History Textbook in Japan

How does a middle-school history textbook go about promoting nationalistic pride in adolescent Japanese? Trying to reconcile this goal with the sorry examples of Japan's military exploits before and during World War II has created considerable domestic and international concern, not to mention highly emotional protests. This report presents some of the provocative contents, strategies of presentation, and political repercussions of the “new history textbook,” approved by Japan's Ministry of Education and Science in 2001 for use in public and private middle schools nationwide. Sponsored and authored by the Japan Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai), the textbook's problematic rendition of history has produced an uproar over the government's screening and approval process, renewed concern about an upsurge of nationalistic activity in Japan, and adversely affected Japan's relations with China and South Korea.     

Japan's Foreign Policy beyond Short-term Politics

In August 2009, the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), which had been in power since 1955, lost the general elections to a recently-formed party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The LDP's foreign policy had placed emphasis on relations with the US, and on international cooperation and relations with Asia. The LDP's foreign and defense policy lacked a long term vision; it was incremental, pragmatic and could be described as reactive or passive. An examination of the DPJ's foreign policy, three years after its coming to power, reveals that it has accepted part of the LDP's inheritance. The Japan-US Alliance was reasserted as pivotal to Japan's security. Cooperation with Asia has not given birth to a new regional structure or to new institutional mechanisms, and dialogue with China has not improved; incrementalism is still preferred in the field of defense. Nonetheless, the fact that Japan's opposition is now a catch-all party at the center of the political scene changes the framework of foreign and defense policy-making considerably. Therefore, the likelihood of interpartite cooperation over foreign and security policy is theoretically conceivable. Nonetheless, political and institutional constraints to change in the field remain.     

Getting It Right: Japan and Trans-Pacific Partnership

This paper explores the opportunities presented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to Japan to revitalize its trade policy, bolster economic growth, and increase participation in regional multilateral fora for the 21^st century. Despite its strengths, Japan has continued to face problems caused by its economic, political, and strategic policies. The Japanese economy has been stagnant for the last several decades, and Japan needs to take bold steps to ameliorate this situation. Politically, domestic political paralysis has had a negative impact on Japan's alliances and partnerships and eroded Tokyo's ability to act as a major player in the increasing vital and important Indo-Pacific region. Connected to this, it is imperative for Japan to engage itself deeply in Asia in ways that increase strategic trust. This paper will also highlight the necessary reforms Japan must undertake to take full advantage of the benefits of the TPP, as well as what the TPP might mean for its relationship with both the US and other regional partners.     

Australia and Japan's Admission into the Colombo Plan

In October 1954 Japan was admitted to the Colombo Plan as a donor country with Australia's sponsorship. The dramatic shift in Australia's position on Japan's involvement in the Colombo Plan, from strong opposition to sponsorship, was recognised by the Japanese government as the first Australian initiative to improve the bilateral relationship since the resumption of diplomatic relations in April 1952. This article examines Japan's attempts to participate in the Colombo Plan and considers how Australia's actions and reactions determined the course of events. The episode provides an insight into how Australian diplomacy was conducted towards Japan and the Japanese view of its relations with Australia at the initial stage of the bilateral relationship.