The Role of "Enemy Images" and Ideology of Elite Belief Systems

We use data from the Leadership Opinion Project (LOP), a panel survey of American opinion leaders which brackets the end of the Cold War, to investigate two interrelated questions about the structure of elites' foreign policy beliefs. We assess, first, whether the militant internationalism/cooperative internationalism scheme, developed primarily by Wittkopf (1981, 1990) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990), has continued relevance now that the USSR has collapsed; and second, whether Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987, 1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson, 1993) domain-specific, hierarchical model of mass belief structure can be applied to elite belief systems. The evidence indicates that respondents' past stances toward military and cooperative ventures are highly predictive of their views once the Cold War ends. This continuity in leaders' postures toward international affairs, in itself, suggests that "enemy images" of the Soviet Union were less important within elite belief systems than Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992) posited for the mass public. The starkest difference, however, between their findings for mass samples and our findings for a leadership sample centers on the importance of ideology in constraining foreign policy beliefs, and the close interconnection with domestic beliefs. Consequently, as we illustrate, predictable ideological divisions among opinion leaders persist in the post–Cold War era. In sum, our evidence demonstrates considerable continuity in elites' beliefs despite profound changes in the global system, and reaffirms the importance that ideology plays in structuring attitudes within elite belief systems.     

The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Campaign Contributors

Since the Vietnam War, scholarly interest in public and elite opinion of U.S. foreign policy has grown. Because elites generally have greater access to policy makers and more consistent political views, most work on this topic has focused on elite opinions of foreign policy. Most research has defined the term elite broadly, often placing more emphasis on social status than political power. We will reexamine elite foreign policy beliefs using a different elite, presidential campaign contributors. We have two main goals in this article. First, we will assess the differences between the foreign policy outlooks of political campaign contributors and other elites. While many types of elites may influence policy, political contributors are particularly likely to gain access to policy makers. The second part of this research note offers some food for thought on the origins of these beliefs. We present evidence that foreign policy beliefs are related to the same ideological orientations that shape contributors' views on domestic issues. The origins of foreign and domestic policy views should probably be considered together.     

The U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Nonproliferation Goals

President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India signed a statement of intent in 2005 to allow India access to civilian nuclear technology, despite its not being a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This deal would reverse decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, since India was the source for much of U.S. law on this count. It would require Congress to amend that law to create special exceptions for India. Rationales and critiques of the proposed deal have focused on its impact on the future exercise of U.S. authority on nonproliferation policy worldwide. But the broader impact may be felt internally, since nonproliferation decisions have been inextricably linked to national security imperatives. In acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, the deal has also created a new dependency between U.S. national security policy and the energy profile of emerging powers.     

The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation

The role and range of activities of ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy has received relatively little scholarly attention, though in the wake of the Cold War analysis of their activities has increased. The case of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) during the 1980s suggests, however, that ethnic interest group activity is not new and may be far more complex than our standard conceptualizations allow. We review the literature on the role of ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy and assemble some common assumptions and arguments about their origins, roles and relations with the government, and the conditions that favor their success. Then we examine origins of CANF, its web of relationships with government even during the Cold War, and its role as a near co-executor of policy. We conclude by assessing what the CANF case suggests about standard views of the roles of at least some ethnic interest groups in the process of making U.S. foreign policy, including the need to see how the state may try to use and sponsor such groups to further its policy goals.     

“More Symbolic—More Political—Than Substantive”: An Interview with James R. Clapper on the U.S. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

ABSTRACT

This article considers the status and value of the U.S. Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list via an extended and annotated interview with James R. Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence during the administration of President Barack Obama from 2010–2017. In this interview,¹ Clapper reflects on the role and effectiveness of blacklisting for U.S. national security strategy. The article frames the interview within debates in recent political science and law literatures on blacklisting to situate Clapper’s views. Drawing on recent controversies—including the fraught relationship between the U.S., Pakistan, the Taliban regime, and the Haqqani network—Clapper speaks to the a) symbolism and foreign policy drivers of FTO listing; b) implications of the FTO list for peace negotiations; and, c) the cohesion of terrorist groups and the effectiveness of FTO listings. In reporting the interview thus, the article offers a rare direct insight to the causal reasoning of an elite security official with respect to a process that has, since its inception in 1997, been shrouded in ambiguity and controversy.     

Understanding Broadcast Political Talk

In June 1989, when Chinese citizens were massacred at Tiananmen Square, and in August 1991, when antireform Communists attempted to lead a coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the American public in unusually high numbers paid attention to the crises; the public s views on policy matters were recorded in public opinion surveys; press coverage of both crises was exhaustive; and elite opinion about U.S. policy was widely aired through the media, exposing the American public to the full spectrum of elite opinion. In both cases elite opinion (voiced in the media and measured through content analysis) was compared with public opinion (measured in public opinion surveys) to test the theories of Walter Lippmann and others that the elites lead public opinion about American foreign policy. In neither case could the dependence of mass opinion on elite opinion be demonstrated. The two bodies of opinion appear to have formed and been expressed in two different, nonoverlapping worlds.     

The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy

Why do governments choose multilateralism? We examine a principal-agent model in which states trade some control over the policy for greater burden sharing. The theory generates observable hypotheses regarding the reasons for and the patterns of support and opposition to multilateralism. To focus our study, we analyze support for bilateral and multilateral foreign aid giving in the US. Using new survey data, we provide evidence about the correlates of public and elite support for multilateral engagement. We find weak support for multilateralism and deep partisan divisions. Reflecting elite discourse, public opinion divides over two competing rationales—burden sharing and control—when faced with the choice between multilateral and bilateral aid channels. As domestic groups’ preferences over aid policy diverge from those of the multilateral institution, maintaining control over aid policy becomes more salient and support for multilateralism falls.     

Evaluating Measures of Campaign Tone

Research on framing effects has demonstrated how elites can influence public opinion by the way they present and interpret political issues. However, these findings overwhelmingly stem from experimental settings that differ from how issues are typically discussed in real-world political situations. This study takes framing research to more realistic contexts by exploiting a natural experiment to examine the neglected role of political parties in framing effects. Examining the effects on public opinion of a sudden shift in how a major political party frames a salient issue, I demonstrate that parties can be powerful in shaping the policy preferences among their supporters. Yet, even strong partisans do not follow the party line uncritically. Rather, they judge the party frame according to their own beliefs about the problems surrounding the issue. Thus, party elites face the challenge of developing frames that resonate with their voters' preexisting beliefs if they want to shape policy preferences, even among their otherwise most loyal supporters. These dynamics have important implications for understanding interactions between political elites and the public.     

Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest

American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not particularly fragile and do not require tremendous foresight by either governments or economic actors. We illustrate these mechanisms at work using evidence from every major oil disruption since 1973. We then identify the small subset of disruptive events that would overwhelm these adaptive mechanisms and therefore seriously harm the United States. Finally, we analyze the utility of U.S. foreign military policy tools in addressing these threats. Our findings suggest that the United States can defend its key interests in the Persian Gulf—the world's most important oil-producing region—with a less-intrusive, “over the horizon” posture.     

Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers than to balance against them. In this article, we suggest that state- and individual-level variables can play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy behavior of small states and that small states sometimes choose to balance rather than bandwagon, especially when elite ideology is deeply embedded in formulating foreign policy. We develop this claim in terms of elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the state and examine its plausibility using primary sources and exclusive interviews with the security and foreign policy elite in Georgia. We find that this approach offers a more plausible explanation for Georgia's otherwise puzzling foreign policy behavior than frameworks that focus on the international or regional system. Although Georgia may be the exception that proves the rule, it can advance an understanding of the conditions under which standard explanations of small-state foreign policy behavior may miss their predictive mark and when incorporating the role of elite ideas can provide additional explanatory leverage.     

The Impact of the Threat of Terrorism on U.S. District Court Decisions During Wartime

Federal courts are key actors in the U.S. government’s fight against terrorism because they adjudicate cases based on the USA PATRIOT Act, and accordingly make national security policy. We examine the extent that the terror threat influences judicial decisions in a dataset of 111 USA PATRIOT Act cases decided in the U.S. District Courts from 2001 through 2013, while controlling for other judicial decision-making variables. The results demonstrate that when a case involves a heightened terror threat, federal judges are more likely to defer to the government. Some key control variables are also significant.     

美国东北亚政策的进攻性现实主义解读

以米尔斯海默为代表的进攻性现实主义是现实主义理论的最新发展,其从历史分析与理论论证的角度为美国的东北亚政策提出了"离岸平衡手"的解读与构想。然而朝核危机爆发后,美国的东北亚政策正朝着建立多边安全机制的方向发展,进攻性现实主义提出的"中国威胁论"也不攻自破。     

The Beliefs of the Blob

The conventional wisdom of US foreign policy has at its core a set of widely held yet underexamined beliefs. Together, these notions constitute the essence of what has become tendentiously known as “the blob,” or the official mind of US national security. Debates and analyses can proceed more productively if foreign policy beliefs, rather than the people who hold them, are moved to the center of analysis. The blob is a mindset, not a group of individuals—one that is based on a few basic assumptions about the world and the United States’ place in it. This article describes what those beliefs are and how they influence US foreign policy.     

Challenging U.S. Policymakers' Image of an Isolationist Public

A persisting question in international studies is whether academic research can have an impact on the making of foreign policy. Much research has shown that policy decisions can be greatly influenced by misperceptions, just as much as by objective factors. The article describes an effort by academic researchers to challenge U.S. policymakers' image of an actor in the U.S. foreign policy process—the American public. The study's focus was a widely held assumption in the U.S. foreign policy community that the American public in the wake of the Cold War was entering a renewed phase of isolationism, similar to the interwar years. The study first interviewed policy practitioners on their perceptions of the public, then performed a comprehensive review of existing polling data, and finally conducted new polls with input from policymakers themselves. The net result of the elite interviews and the analysis of public attitudes revealed a significant gap in all areas, which is presented in synopsis. Interviews with policy practitioners reveal two key dynamics that could well contribute to policymakers' misreading the public: a failure to seek out information about the public and a tendency to assume that the vocal public is representative of the general public. Indications that the study did have some impact on the thinking of policy practitioners are discussed in the conclusion.     

The U. S. Policy toward DPRK: Opportunities and Constraints

布什政府上台以来,始终未能阻止朝鲜拥核步伐.朝核试后,美对朝政策有了新的调整,六方会谈得以复会.但美朝双方受各自国家利益和政策目标的限制,在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的尖锐分歧难以解决,朝核危机仍存在再度升级的可能.     

新安全视角下美国政府的气候政策

"人类安全"逐渐成为一种新的安全理念,环境气候问题等各种影响人类安全和福祉的非传统安全问题日益引起广泛关注。全球性安全威胁的严重程度则取决于治理框架的反应能力。包括气候政策、法律和机构在内的气候环境治理框架能够最大限度地削弱全球化冲突的根源,避免影响的发生或减缓其进程。奥巴马上任以来美国新政府能源、环境和应对气候变化政策出现较大调整,大力推动新能源法案来减缓气候变化。这一政策转向具有深刻的历史动因和政治基础,并将给美国经济复苏和美国企业的国际竞争力带来压力,加剧美国对外贸易摩擦和削弱其在国际气候环境合作中的领导地位。     

U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions: Nonlinear Challenges,Practical Opportunities

The Obama Administration's desire to push forward with strategic nuclear arms reductions during the President's second term requires the navigation of numerous shoals and reefs. U.S. and Russian negotiators will have to overcome both political and military obstacles to accomplish post-New START reductions in long-range nuclear weapons. For example, efforts to reduce offensive nuclear weapons are complicated by U.S. and NATO plans for missile defenses deployed in Europe and by exigencies in U.S. and Russian domestic politics. In addition, the military-technical aspects of cyber war and nuclear deterrence can no longer be treated, analytically or practically, as isolated compartments. This article considers several aspects of the relationships among possible post-START offensive force reductions, advanced conventional weapons including missile defenses, and emerging cyber capabilities.     

试析未来美国对外政策的走向

奥巴马国家安全团队组成人员基本上都是经验丰富的温和务实派,体现了美国外交和国际安全问题上的现实主义倾向。美国外交将改变布什政府的单边主义,注重多边合作。中美关系不会过于偏离正常轨道,但在诸如知识产权、汇率、人权、应对全球气候变化等问题上,中国可能面临更多的压力。     

六方会谈与美朝博弈分析

朝核问题的核心是美朝关系问题，美朝之间的博弈影响并左右着六方会谈的进程。美国在既定的对朝战略目标下，在国内强硬派和务实派的政策转换中采取不断变化着的对朝策略；热衷朝美直接对话的朝鲜由于其弱势地位，不得不为应对美国变幻不定的政策措施而变换手法。六方会谈的多边性地位及其维护谈判的公正性正在受到美朝双方博弈的挑战。     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.