PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC DILEMMAS: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN THE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL POLICY

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the role of think tanks in the governance of regional policy. The paper critically reviews a series of reports by United Kingdom (UK) based think tanks, published between 2002 and 2008, a period of interest on the part of national government in the most appropriate configuration of subnational governance. Policy transfer and the role of ideas in regional policy provide the framework for analysis. The interpretation of the findings suggests that the think tanks considered are largely products of national policy debate and party politics in the United Kingdom, despite efforts to devolve power. This is surprising given debates about the influence of European Union regional funding on UK regional policy, seen as a prime example of multi‐level governance.     

POLICY MAKING AND THE DEMONSTRATION EFFECT: PRIVATIZATION IN A DEPRIVED REGION

The aims of public policies are not always clearly articulated by ministers. Further the aims that are stated may not reflect all – or indeed the most important – aims. In some cases declared policy aims bear little relationship to the real intentions of ministers in undertaking an initiative. In other cases policy decisions are intended as symbolic statements, demonstrating government attitudes on a range of issues beyond the specific matter under consideration. These ideas are explored in the context of the privatizations of Harland and Wolff and Shorts, two major industrial government-owned companies in Northern Ireland. The article concludes that government sought to use the privatizations as a symbolic statement, namely to demonstrate that the heavy dependence on the public sector within Northern Ireland had to be reduced.     

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION FOR MINISTERS: THE MINIS SYSTEM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

MINIS, a management information system for ministers in the Department of the Enviroment, was introduced by Michael Heseltine in 1980. The article summarizes the main features of the system and analyses some of the issues arising from its introduction, in particular, whether it is likely to be adopted by other government departments or public bodies. The reasons offered by departments as to why it is difficult to transfer are examined, together with other factors which are likely to inhibit transfer to other public sector bodies. The mechanism for promoting the spread of such systems is also discussed. The conclusion is that MINIS ought to be considered by other bodies and it has almost certainly already had some impact on systems elsewhere in central government, but without a central initiative, more widespread adoption is on past evidence unlikely, although parts of it may be adopted.     

Peacebuilding think tanks,Indian foreign policy and the Kashmir conflict

Abstract

Foreign policy making in India is typically viewed as highly centralised and dominated by the Prime Minister’s Office and bureaucracy. Yet in 2004, the Congress-Party-led United Progressive Alliance government launched a Composite Dialogue with Pakistan which included a place for Indian think tanks in the Kashmir dispute. We suggest that as India liberalised its economy amidst domestic political upheaval, think tanks were given greater access to domestic and foreign funding and adopted new roles in foreign policy making. In the case of the Kashmir conflict, peacebuilding think tanks were encouraged by the government to engage in cross-border activities that would build constituencies for peace with Pakistan and promote economic cooperation as an incentive for peace. While the government aimed to depoliticise the conflict, these think tanks used this opportunity to draw attention to marginalised perspectives and issues. Peacebuilding think tanks nonetheless faced significant challenges in shaping the peace process because of structural constraints regarding access to resources and lack of autonomy to further their agendas. This reflected resistance within the state to depoliticising a conflict that has long been India’s central national security issue.     

Efficacy of Think Tanks in Influencing Public Policies: The Case of Bangladesh

Abstract

This article analyzes contextual and organizational challenges and constraints faced by think tanks in Bangladesh. It argues that while think tanks have been visible in the policy discourse through fostering policy debates and advocating policy proposals, their direct impact on policy outcomes remains limited. Think tanks’ research findings are often interpreted through the prism of politics. A number of think tanks are institutionally weak and face challenges in funding, attracting researchers, and retaining research focus. Think tanks can potentially focus attention to the wider policy community, and emphasize intermediate influences, such as, building capacity, wider networking and interacting with a broader base of policy-makers, in order to be effective and relevant in the policy discussions.     

Duopoly,court politics and the Danish core executive

This article applies the ideas of the core executive and court politics to Danish coalition and minority governments. It asks two questions. Do these ideas travel beyond their Westminster origins? What are the dilemmas confronting the Danish executive and its court politics? The analysis is based on documentary sources and 22 elite interviews with cabinet ministers and permanent secretaries. It identifies a duopoly of Prime Minister and Minister of Finance as a distinctive variety of court politics. It identifies the key dilemmas confronted by the Danish executive; namely trust, political support and politicization. It concludes that court politics provides unique insights into the workings of Danish government. The article is a contribution to the comparative analysis of the court politics of governing elites. It shows that the focus on court politics is not only useful for majoritarian Westminster systems but also for the analysis of consensual parliamentary democracies.     

Performing Independence. The Apolitical Image of Polish Think Tanks

Think tanks—non-governmental policy institutes engaged in both research and advocacy—occupy a position at the intersection of different societal fields. This interstitial position determines how they operate and what language they use. Their claim to expertise hinges upon their successful presentation as independent actors. In this endeavour, an apolitical image is crucial. This article studies the role of language in legitimising the position of think tanks. How do think tanks negotiate their apolitical image? What organisational and historical reasons sustain their claim to be apolitical? These questions will be addressed here, through original empirical material based on semi-structured interviews with Polish think tank leaders.     

Does EU Policymaking Allow for Skilful Networkers But Limited Knowledge Managers? The Think Tanks’ Tale

This article aims to depict how the EU policymaking process affects the knowledge-broker role of EU think tanks. To this end, I examine the organisational and output strategies of 22 EU think tanks—think tanks sharing a EU-transnational origin, an interest in EU subjects, and the intention to contribute to EU policymaking. I argue that certain aspects of EU policymaking, (a) the emphasis on participative processes that foster linkage and exchange activities, (b) concern with stakeholder representatives, (c) development frameworks for knowledge management for particular policy actors, and (d) lack of an overarching European public sphere, affect the knowledge-broker role of EU think tanks. As a result, EU think tanks concentrate on customised knowledge management and platform development and dissemination among target publics in order to appeal to partners, members and sponsors and thereby secure funding and reputation.     

THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON WHITEHALL

This article examines whether the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 has changed Whitehall. Based on a two‐year, ESRC‐funded study, it evaluates the impact of FOI on five characteristics of the Whitehall model: the culture of secrecy, ministerial accountability to Parliament, civil service neutrality, the Cabinet system, and effective government. Proponents of FOI hoped that government would be less secretive, more accountable and more effective; critics feared that civil servants would lose their anonymity, and collective Cabinet responsibility would be undermined. Drawing on interviews, media analysis, case law and official documents, the article finds that the impact of FOI is modest at most. It is not powerful enough to do much good or much ill, and the feared ‘chilling effect' on candour and record‐keeping has not materialized. Leaks do more damage than FOI disclosures. But ministers remain apprehensive about the effect of FOI on Cabinet records and discussions.     

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL DISCRETION IN POST‐COMMUNIST CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

This article addresses the discrepancy between attempts to establish professional, de‐politicized civil services and the politicization of personnel policy at the central government level of post‐communist countries. It develops the concept of formal political discretion as an analytical tool for the assessment of how and to what extent legislative frameworks governing civil services provide institutional conditions for the de‐politicization of personnel policy. The case of Hungary shows that since the change of regime in 1989/90, four civil service reforms have led to the adoption, implementation and revision of civil service legislation that has gradually reduced the possibilities for government ministers to exercise political discretion over personnel policy. Civil service reforms have also led to the institutionalization of various discretionary instruments which ministers can and have used to politicize civil service affairs. The adoption and implementation of civil service laws therefore does not necessarily lead to the de‐politicization of civil services.     

Economics vs. values in political trust in Korea

This paper investigates the relationships between economic and/or value determinants and political trust using the 1985 Public Opinion Study for National Development in Korea conducted by the Korea Institute of Social Studies (KISS). Also examined are the relative effects of perceived personal financial situations and macro/collective economic conditions on levels of political trust to distinguish which one is more important in determining political trust in Korea. Results indicate that the trust in the political institutions and government performance depends on both personal financial security and national economic conditions. Equally important is the perception of how people think they have been treated. If Koreans perceive that they are being treated unfairly, they are likely to form, negative attitudes towards politics. We also found that, regardless of which party Koreans favor, if the government does not stabilize the economy, they do not hesitate to withdraw their support from it.     

Ministerial responsibility and the Scottish Qualifications Agency

The Scottish Qualifications Agency (SQA) is charged with the task of overseeing school–based qualifications in Scotland. However, for the 2000 exam diet the SQA failed to produce either timely or accurate exam results. The events surrounding this failure, accompanied by the responsible minister's explanation of his own actions and inactions, brought to the fore issues of responsibility and accountability. The unresolved nature of accountability and responsibility within government, particularly in relation to non–departmental public bodies (NDPBs), became apparent as the inquiries into the SQA took evidence. Utilizing the SQA as a powerful example, this article explores the problematic structures of accountability and responsibility that exist between NDPBs and ministers.     

Party size and policy outcomes: An empirical analysis of taxation in democracies

Taxation varies widely among democracies. Yet scholars disagree whether differences in political institutions help produce the variation. This article identifies topdown and bottom-up mechanisms by which political institutions are thought to influence taxation. It then combines political and economic data on more than 50 democracies to evaluate the impact of political institutions on government revenues. Cross-sectional and pooled time series analyses that include controls for economic conditions and partisan ideologies of governments confirm an indirect impact of these institutions: there is a curvilinear relationship between the size of political parties in a democracy and the tax revenues collected. Yet the effect of party size on policy outcomes is limited to a subset of democracies. The article opens new paths for research on the roles of electoral, constitutional, legislative, and party institutions in democratic policy making around the world. Andrew C. Gould is associate professor of government at the University of Notre Dame, where he is a Fellow of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies. He recently publishedOrigins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth Century Europe and the article “Conflicting Imperatives and Concept Formation,” which appeared inThe Review of Politics. For their suggestions and/or data, I thank José Antonio Cheibub, Sven Steinmo, Duane Swank, Daniel Verdier, and Michael Wallerstein. For their comments, I am grateful to Carles Boix, Delia Boylan, Lloyd Gruber, Fran Hagopian, Peter Hall, Mark Hallerberg, Gretchen Helmke, Scott Mainwaring, Paul Mueller, Dennis Quinn, Ashutosh Varshney, and two anonymous reviewers. Peter Baker and Tom Lundberg provided insights and skilled research assistance. This work was supported in part by a grant from the Faculty Research Program, University of Notre Dame. A prior version of this article was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. The errors that remain are my own.     

GROUNDING GOVERNANCE IN DIALOGUE? DISCOURSE,PRACTICE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR A NEW PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONAL FORM IN BRITAIN

Drawing on debates about the nature and significance of quasi‐autonomous government organizations, this article asks what happens when trends towards agency creation by government and trends towards stakeholder participation in policy processes come together. Issues are considered through an examination of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, one of a series of new regulatory bodies set up in Britain after 1997 and given the task of providing national guidance on treatments and care for people using the health service. The analysis points to the emergence of a new form – the dialogic intermediary organization. Such an organization, while maintaining close and informal links with government, attempts to build legitimacy for its activities through multiple and potentially competing engagements with diversely constituted publics. The potential theoretical and political importance of dialogic intermediary organizations, and some implications for their fuller empirical study are briefly explored.     

ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF DEPARTMENTAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES: PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW ZEALAND

This article examines the new approach to specifying and assessing the performance of departmental chief executives in New Zealand introduced in 1988 by the fourth Labour government (1984–1990). Drawing on the findings of a series of interviews with ministers, chief executives and other senior public servants conducted between late 1989 and late 1991 by a number of researchers, the article outlines the origins and implementation of the new policy framework, and evaluates its strengths and weaknesses. From the evidence available to date, it appears that the new model has won the support of most of the parties directly affected, and that it has enhanced the accountability of chief executives to their portfolio minister(s). However, the implementation of the new regime has highlighted the inherent problems of assessing the performance of senior personnel in the public sector and of imposing sanctions in the event of substandard performance. In addition, various issues of a constitutional nature have arisen concerning the roles and responsibilities of chief executives, the balance of power between chief executives and their portfolio minister(s), and the proper role of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the new accountability framework.     

RECYCLING BINS,GARBAGE CANS OR THINK TANKS? THREE MYTHS REGARDING POLICY ANALYSIS INSTITUTES

The phrase ‘think tank’ has become ubiquitous – overworked and underspecified – in the political lexicon. It is entrenched in scholarly discussions of public policy as well as in the ‘policy wonk’ of journalists, lobbyists and spin‐doctors. This does not mean that there is an agreed definition of think tank or consensual understanding of their roles and functions. Nevertheless, the majority of organizations with this label undertake policy research of some kind. The idea of think tanks as a research communication ‘bridge’ presupposes that there are discernible boundaries between (social) science and policy. This paper will investigate some of these boundaries. The frontiers are not only organizational and legal; they also exist in how the ‘public interest’ is conceived by these bodies and their financiers. Moreover, the social interactions and exchanges involved in ‘bridging’, themselves muddy the conception of ‘boundary’, allowing for analysis to go beyond the dualism imposed in seeing science on one side of the bridge, and the state on the other, to address the complex relations between experts and public policy.     

THE LOGISTICS OF MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLES

Ministerial reshuffles are complex exercises requiring careful handling. A frequent occurrence in British government, their significance is usually seen in political terms. Prime Ministers attach great importance to maximizing the political advantages to be gained from them. This factor is the chief determinant of their logistics, the principal characteristics of which are secrecy in advance and the speed with which ministerial changes are executed. These features - as much as the frequency of ministerial changes per se - may disrupt the policy process and have serious implications for minister-civil servant power relations. Such problems could be alleviated by giving ministers advance notice of changes of post. The institution of a process of ministerial handovers would strengthen the position of incoming ministers by making them less dependent on their officials, upon whom they rely heavily for initial briefing at present.     

HOW THE REINVENTING GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WAS EXPORTED FROM THE U.S. TO OTHER COUNTRIES

From an academic point of view, Reinventing Government (RG) is a weak book. But the judgment of the academic community leaves with an interesting problem:How can we account for the relative influence that RG ideas have acquired over public management practices and for the enthusiasm with which those ideas have often been received by bureaucratic reformers in many countries? To answer this question, the article develops an analysis that proceeds in two stages. In the first section, I show how RG ideas gained ascendancy in political circles because they altered the terms of discourse about government management and made new kinds of coalitions possible. The second part looks at the structure of the global management consulting industry to show how the consultants who advised the Clinton administration were able to rely on already existing international network of American-based consulting organizations through which they could preach their Reinvention gospel around the globe. The American domination of the world management consulting market; coupled with the growing use by states of external consulting services as a source of advice on management issues, allowed consultants to carry RG ideas into the heart of the policy process.     

The Civil Servant as Legislator: Law Making in British Administration

How are government policy commitments converted into legislation and what happens in the conversion? The role of civil servants in preparing legislation is far more important than is generally assumed. By looking at the work of four recent bill  teams in Britain – teams of civil servants given the task of developing Acts of Parliament – their crucial roles in initiating policies, placing them on the political agenda (even helping secure their place in a party manifesto), developing them, making sure they pass through parliament and enacting them once they have reached the statute books are assessed. The article explores the composition and working methods of bill teams. These teams work with considerable autonomy in developing legislation, but it cannot be assumed that they operate outside ministerial control. Teams see themselves as reflecting the priorities of the government in general and their ministers in particular. Yet ministers typically know relatively little about the law they are bringing in until they receive the submissions and briefings from their officials. Perhaps the biggest danger for democracy is not a civil service putting forward proposals which a minister feels forced to accept, but rather that ministers do not notice or fully appreciate what is being proposed in their name despite having the political authority to change it and a civil service which bends over backwards to consult and accommodate them.