Is electoral authoritarianism good for women's representation? Evidence from the 1999–2011 regional legislative elections in Russia

This article employs a comprehensive set of data on 226 regional legislative elections held in Russia in 1999–2011 in order to assess the impact of electoral authoritarianism upon women's representation in sub-national legislative bodies. The analysis of 50,520 cases of candidate nomination and 9553 cases of electoral success, supported by a cross-regional statistical study of the factors of women's nomination and success, empirically confirms an explanatory model that incorporates three working hypotheses derived from the mainstream literature on women's representation. According to this model, the 2002–2003 electoral reform, by introducing proportional representation into regional electoral systems, strongly facilitated women's representation. After the advent of electoral authoritarianism, proportional rules, in combination with the increased ‘party magnitude’ of the pro-government party, continued to exert expectedly positive effects; yet these effects were offset by the decreased competitiveness in majority districts. As a result, political regime transformation did not lead to a significant increase in the number of female deputies.     

Payoffs,Parties, or Policies: “Money Politics” and Electoral Authoritarian Resilience

A key part of what sustains electoral authoritarianism over the long term is genuine popular support. Dominant parties, particularly in a developmental context (the primary setting for such regimes), and especially where elections are more than minimally meaningful, curry performance legitimacy and loyalty not just through skewed rules and coercion, but through material incentives: “money politics.” If challengers can find a way to de-emphasize support based on material inducements, they stand a chance of securing gains via elections, rather than relying on economic downturns to shrink patronage coffers. Drawing on extensive original ethnographic and survey data from electoral-authoritarian Malaysia, I explore campaign finance and distributions on both sides in the latest, most regime-threatening general election, which was held on May 5, 2013. Evidence suggests that it was by disentangling clientelist networks from the patronage they so often serve to disseminate, allowing a focus on more programmatic than particularistic appeals, that the opposition Pakatan Rakyat alliance so nearly bested the long-dominant Barisan Nasional regime. Persona – being known and seen among the electorate – still matters as much as before, but relies less consistently than in the past on targeted patronage as a premise for loyalty.     

Dying to win: Elections,political violence,and institutional decay in Kenya

This paper examines the lessons learned from Kenya's 2007 post election violence and what has happened since then. It notes that the root causes of the violence still persist, have not been addressed, and easily could be reignited. Faced with a situation where institutions and the rule of law have been weakened deliberately and where diffused violence is widespread, both Kenya's transition to democracy and the fate of the nation remain vulnerable. The argument here is that the problems faced in holding and managing elections in conflict situations often are not simply technical. Instead, in Kenya and elsewhere, many difficulties are symptomatic of larger political and institutional questions related to democratic change that are more difficult to analyze in causal terms or to address.     

Closed spaces or (in)competent citizens? A study of youth preparedness for participation in elections in Zimbabwe

This study sets out to explore the barriers to youth participation and how youth could be supported to enhance their participation in elections and governance processes in Zimbabwe. The study was carried out using quantitative methodologies. A survey was carried out to collect data, which in turn was analysed using SPSS. Evidence from the study shows that decision-making processes are not improving and becoming more participatory and youth inclusive. It was observed that youth participation in elections and governance processes is low and it is hampered inter alia by restrictive political structures, lack of interest, lack of information and lack of funds. Whilst some youth are ready to run for public office, they need to freely participate in politics and develop without restrictions, including getting support through leadership training. These young candidates will also need training in elections and governance processes as well as mobilise and sensitise other youth to register to vote if they are to succeed in their quest for public office. Resources and support must be given to youth-led initiatives that are reaching out to young people and ensure they play their part in democratic processes at all levels of governments.     

Explaining the Rise of Class Politics in Venezuela

The sudden rise to power of leftist former coup leader Hugo Chávez and the subsequent politicisation of social class raises a number of interesting questions about the sources of class politics and political change in Venezuela. Using nationally representative survey data over time, this article considers different explanations for the rise of class politics. It argues that explanations for the politicisation of class can best be understood in terms of 'top-down' approaches that emphasise the role of political agency in reshaping and re-crafting political identities, rather than more 'bottom-up' factors that emphasise the demands that originate within the electorate. The economic crises during the 1990s undermined support for the existing parties, but it did not create a politically salient class-based response. Rather, it created the electoral space that facilitated new actors to enter the political stage and articulate new issue dimensions.     

Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections: The Salience of Electoral Reforms

Nigeria’s 2015 general elections were followed by positive remarks by trusted local and international observers. The highpoint of the elections was the emergence of the opposition candidate as the winner of the 28 March presidential elections. Clearly, this is unprecedented in the electoral history of Nigeria considering the enormous influence that surrounds the office of the incumbent executive in the country. This article analyses the reforms that enhanced the integrity of the elections. The article illustrates the electoral reforms introduced by the electoral management body and their connection to the improvement of the integrity of the 2015 general elections.     

Testing for sources of electoral competition under authoritarianism: an analysis of Russia’s gubernatorial elections

What drives electoral competition in competitive authoritarian regimes? Most scholarship has assumed that the outcome of these elections is decided by regime manipulation alone. Using three rounds of newly reinstated gubernatorial elections in Russia’s regions, I test this assumption. I identify three distinct measures of competition calibrated to authoritarian elections and assess whether voter preferences or regime manipulation best explain the degree of electoral competition. Relying on new data on protests across Russia’s regions, I find that regions with high protest activity have more contested elections with narrower margins of victory. The results also confirm recent scholarship highlighting the importance of voter turnout for delivering pro-regime victories.     

Changes in the Partisan Composition of the Swiss Government. 1891, 1919, 1929, 1943, 1959, 2003, …?

After almost half a century of an unchanged distribution of seats among political parties in the federal government (Federal Council), the Swiss executive has experienced a new change in 2003. This change follows up on other changes in the past which occurred at irregular intervals. The question we wish to address in this paper is how these changes related to the electoral fortunes of the political parties. We find that electoral success does not translate directly into seat gains in the executive. A lag of up to two elections provides the best predictor. Thus, the rapid concession of a second seat to the SVP in 2003 is an outlier compared to the previous changes in the partisan composition of the Swiss government.     

The Monetisation of Consent and its Limits: Explaining Political Dominance and Decline in Malaysia

ABSTRACT

Malaysia’s 14th General Election in 2018 toppled the Barisan Nasional government after six decades in power. Barisan Nasional’s longevity was due to its performance legitimacy and a capacity to manipulate electoral mechanisms. However, it was the use of money in eliciting consent that led to a political change. This article traces how sustaining the dominance of the Barisan Nasional under Najib Razak used a strategy which we term the monetisation of consent. However, when monetising consent loses its efficacy, political dominance is challenged. We discuss why and how manufacturing consent through the use of money has its limits when regime legitimacy is challenged. Intense political competition on the electoral terrain from 2008 and the multiplication of Malay-Muslim political parties induced Najib’s greater personal grip on state funds to gain political support. This resulted in the Najib regime’s kleptocratic turn. Beyond the disbursement of largesse to political power brokers and business elites, his government monetised consent as a populist strategy. The reduced efficacy of electoral manipulation made the monetisation of consent imperative for regime survival but the use of money and unpopular fiscal policies, which deprived citizens of disposable income, led to a legitimacy crisis and the Barisan Nasional’s defeat.     

Forward to democracy or back to authoritarianism? The attitudinal bases of mass support for the Russian election protests of 2011–2012

Two UK-based political scientists present the results of an original survey they conducted in Russia soon after the presidential elections of 2012. The survey examines the interaction between mass attitudes toward the causal triggers of protest during the 2011–2012 electoral cycle and underlying political attitudes regarding the preferred alternatives to a hybrid regime (both more democratic and more authoritarian). They find that supporters of the protests were not stronger advocates of a democratic transition; on the contrary, they were more likely to support authoritarian leadership and ethno-nationalism. This finding leads to a discussion of whether one of the major constraints on elite-mass mobilization in Russia is the authoritarian direction such mobilization might entail.     

Of demons and angels: The “international” gaze on electoral democracy in Africa

This article reflects on the role of international election observers in African elections, following the so-called wave of democratisation at the end of the Cold War. When analysed against the role of the “international” as a geopolitical entity and the construction of the political as an epistemic heritage of the West, international observation comes across as a western gaze over the gale of democratisation sweeping through Africa. This observation is not motivated by meeting the expectations and aspirations of generations of Africans who have been waiting for and working towards freedom, but by the convergence of elite interests locally and abroad. The article therefore suggests that international observation of Africa in a neo-colonised post-colonial environment raises suspicions of imperialist designs to impose on Africa the manner in which it must organise the political arena, and the kind of democracy that it should pursue.