Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics

This article offers a revision of democratic theory in light of the experience of recently democratized countries, located outside of the northwestern quadrant of the world. First, various definitions of democracy that claim to follow Schumpeter and are usually considered to be “minimalist” or “processualist” are critically examined. Building upon but clarifying these conceptual efforts, a realistic and restricted, but not minimalist, definition of a democratic regime is proposed. Thereafter, this article argues that democracy should be analyzed not only at the level of the political regime but also in relation to the state—especially the state qua legal system—and to certain aspects of the overall social context. The main underlying theme that runs through this article is the concept of agency, especially as it is expressed in the legal system of existing democracies. I dedicate this article to my daughter Julia, for the metonymy and much love Guillermo O'Donnell is the Helen Kellogg Professor of Government at the University of Notre Dame. He has written many books and articles on authoritarianism, political transitions, democratization, and democratic theory. His latest book,Counterpoints, was published in 1998 by the University of Notre Dame Press. O'Donnell is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I presented previous versions of this paper and received useful comments at seminars held in April and May 1999 at the University of North Carolina; Cornell University; Berlin's Wissenschaftszentrum; the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August 1999; and in September 1999 at the Kellogg Institute. I also appreciate the comments and criticisms received from Michael Brie, Maxwell Cameron, Jorgen Elklit, Robert Fishman, Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Jonathan Hartlyn, Osvaldo Iazzetta, Gabriela Ippolito-O'Donnell, Iván Jaksić, Oscar Landi, Hans-Joachim Lauth, Steven Levitsky, Juan Linz, Scott Mainwaring, Juan M. Abal Medina, Martha Merritt, Peter Moody, Gerardo Munck, Luis Pásara, Timothy Power, Adam Przeworski, Héctor Schamis, Sidney Tarrow. Charles Tilly, Ashutosh Varshney, and Ruth Zimmerling. I am particularly grateful for the careful revision and editing undertaken by Gerardo Munck and Ruth Collier for the present issue ofSCID.     

Political parties,party systems,and economic reforms: The Turkish case

Turkey’s experience with economic reforms and democratization since the early 1980s underscores the importance of the political parties and the party systems in the interactions between these two processes. The country’s experience with democratic politics and a multiparty system made a significant contribution to the resumption of electoral politics and redemocratization following three years of military rule in the early 1980s. However, the opening up of the political space and the reemergence of competitive party politics ultimately created problems for the successful completion of the economic reforms, as one-party dominance and majority-party governments gave way to fragmentation in the party system with weak coalition governments. The Turkish case is instructive of the difficulties facing countries that seek to simultaneously consolidate their democracies and liberalize their economies. Sabri Sayari is executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies and research professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He has written extensively on Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy, and on issues related to political development, parties and party systems, and democratization.     

Trade and development policies in Colombia: Export promotion and outward orientation, 1967–1992

As developing democracies implement programs of economic adjustment and trade liberalization, we need to examine the relationship between the state and society in the making of foreign economic policies. This article examines trade and development policies in Colombia, one of Latin America's more institutionalized democracies. Colombia was one of the first countries in Latin America to begin a major reorientation away from full dependence on ISI as a strategy of development. The research shows that domestic political institutions and actors have had a decisive impact on the character and direction of foreign economic policies. The study also illustrates how state capacity for economic management is enhanced by bureaucratic insulation and institutional reform. Carlos E. Juárez is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. His research focuses on the politics of trade liberalization in Latin America, government-business relations in developing democracies, and comparative political economy. He was a visiting researcher and lecturer at theUniversidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia from 1991–1992. For 1993–1994 he will be a visiting research fellow with the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego.     

Democracy,economic crisis and the problem of governance: The case of Bolivia

This article examines the political context within which the Bolivian government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985–1989) launched, implemented, and sustained a draconian neoliberal economic stabilization program. The article argues that the key to the successful economic program was the political skill and leadership of President Paz, in particular, his ability to negotiate a political pact with the main opposition party. Finally, the article ponders the tensions and contradictions between neoliberal economic policies and the process of consolidating democracy in a context of extreme economic crisis. James M. Malloy is professor of political science and research professor, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. He is the author of a number of books and articles on Latin America politics, includingAuthoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987). He is presently working on issues of regime transition, economic adjustment, and the role of private sector interest groups in Latin America.     

Bureaucracy and implementation of complex tasks in rapidly developing states: Evidence from Indonesia

Political institutions play key roles in rapidly developing states. This article describes the complex and overlapping responsibilities of Indonesian government institutions and explains how they affect policy design and implementation in two policy arenas: primary education and soil/water conservation. It suggests that the struggles for control over local level implementation between general (territorial) regional government and branch offices of specialized, central ministries seriously constrain performance in these two sectors. Dwight Y. King is associate professor of political science and associate of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115 (internet: dking@niu.edu). He continues use research on how the structures of national bureaucracies and the policies governing them affect civil servants’ behavior and economic development, as well as the political economy of bureaucratic reform.     

Party Cohesion and Fractionalization in New African Democracies: Lessons from Struggles over Third-term Amendments

The recent experiences of ruling parties in Malawi, Zambia, and Namibia provide a unique opportunity to investigate the factors shaping internal party dynamics in new African democracies. Between 1997 and 2003, sitting executives in these countries attempted to amend constitutions so that they could run for third presidential terms. Within that specific context, ruling parties exhibited different tendencies. Whereas the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia held together, ruling parties in Malawi and Zambia fractionalized to varying degrees. This article examines why these ruling parties displayed such varying patterns while the executives attempted to extend their holds on power. Adopting an actor-centered approach to studying internal party politics, the article suggests that four different types of factors can shape party propensities toward coherence or fractionalization: exogenous institutional structures, internal distributions of resources, internal habits of dissent and unity, and external political opportunity structures. Examining the experiences of the ruling parties in light of these factors effectively shows the reasons for their different trajectories and suggests the utility of this approach for future work on similar dynamics in other contexts. Peter VonDoepp is assistant professor of political science at the University of Vermont. His work has appeared inStudies in Comparative International Development, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, The Political Science Quarterly and several edited volumes. He is currently working on a project comparing judiciaries in new African democracies. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 27–August 31, in Philadelphia. The author wishes to thank Regina Boma, Nixon Khembo, Brian Calfano, and Martin Willhoite for research assistance. The author also acknowledges valuable commentary on earlier drafts provided by Nixon Khembo, David Mason, Alex Tan, Eve Sandberg, Irving Leonard Markovitz, Alfred Chanda, and Paul kaiser. All errors of fact or interpretation remain the author's.     

Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them

This article opens with a discussion of the types of institutions that allow markets to perform adequately. While we can identify in broad terms what these are, there is no unique mapping between markets and the non-market institutions that underpin them. The paper emphasizes the importance of “local knowledge”, and argues that a strategy of institution building must not over-emphasize best-practice “blueprints” at the expense of experimentation. Participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and aggregating local knowledge. Democracy is a meta-institution for building good institutions. A range of evidence indicates that participatory democracies enable higher-quality growth. Sakenn pe prie dan sa fason (Everyone can pray as he likes.) —Mauritian folk wisdom This paper was originally prepared for the International Monetary Fund’s Conference on Second-Generation Reforms, Washington, DC, November 8–9, 1999. I thank Ruth Collier, Steve Fish, Mohsin Khan, Saleh Nsouli, conference participants, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Dani Rodrik is professor of international political economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is also the research coordinator for the Group of 24 (G-24), a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a research fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (London). He serves as an advisory committee member of the Institute for International Economics, senior advisor of the Overseas Development Council, and advisory committee member of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey. Professor Rodrik’s recent research is concerned with the consequences of international economic integration, the role of conflict-management institutions in determining economic performance, and the political economy of policy reform.     

Patterns of political instability: Affiliation patterns of politicians and voters in post-communist Estonia,Latvia, and Lithuania

In contrast to established party systems, the transformation of post-communist party systems is not only shaped by shifts in electoral preferences, but also by the changing organizational loyalties of politicians. Post-communist politicians pursue a wide range of organizational strategies such as party fusions, fissions, start-ups, and interparty switching. By focusing on the interaction between these organizational strategies and voters’ electoral preferences, we argue that the seeming instability of post-communist party systems actually reveals distinct patterns of political change. The article develops an analytical framework, which incorporates politician-driven interparty mobility and voter-induced electoral change. It uses this framework to show that the apparently inchoate party systems of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania actually follow definable modes of transformation. Marcus Kreuzer is assistant professor of political science at Villanova University. His work focuses on how electoral and legislative institutions shape the organizational and electioneering practices of parties in interwar Europe and post-communist democracies. He also is studying the origins of liberal democracy in nineteenth century Europe. He is author ofInstitutions and Innovation—Voters, Politicians and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy: France and Germany, 1870–1939 (2001). Vello Pettai is lecturer in political science at the University of Tartu, Estonia. He specializes in comparative ethnopolitics and party politics. He has published previously inNations and Nationalism, Post-Soviet Affairs, East European Politics and Society, andJournal of Democracy. We would like to thank for Artis Pabriks and Darius Zeruolis for sharing their knowledge of Latvian and Lithuanian party politics as well as John T. Ishiyama, Scott Desposato, and two anonymous SCID reviewers for commenting on an earlier draft. Funding for this research came from an Estonian Science Foundation grant, nr. 4904. We gratefully acknowledge their support.     

Political transition and civil society: The cases of Kenya and Zambia

Studies of regime change that focus on the “high politics” of transition tend to overlook the importance of civil society in democratization and liberalization. This article explores the role that organizations and institutions in society play as agents of political change. Elements of civil society influence both the processes and outcomes of political transitions. Case studies of Kenya and Zambia indicate that associational arenas representing civil society made important contributions in liberalizing and democratizing authoritarian regimes. Beyond this, contrasting the two cases highlights the factors that influenced their efficacy as agents of political transition. Differences are found in the character of the civil societies in the two countries. These differences help to account for the extent of Zambia’s transition when compared to Kenya. Peter VonDoepp is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. From 1992 to 1995 he held a Foreign Language/Area Studies Fellowship at Florida’s African Studies Center. He is currently conducting research in Malawi on the role of religious institutions in political change. Until 1997     

Party System Competition and Private Sector Development in Africa

Democratic transitions by many African countries have generated much analysis of the organisational features of political parties or their role in voter mobilisation during elections. Yet, scholars have largely overlooked how parties negotiate economic policymaking or interact with the private sector in countries that are incipient democracies and emerging markets. This article argues that the stability or fragmentation of the party system affects patterns of private sector development and shapes linkages between the state, business and labour. It compares Mozambique and Zambia to demonstrate how variations in party system characteristics influence the relationship between economic and political interests.     

Economics vs. values in political trust in Korea

This paper investigates the relationships between economic and/or value determinants and political trust using the 1985 Public Opinion Study for National Development in Korea conducted by the Korea Institute of Social Studies (KISS). Also examined are the relative effects of perceived personal financial situations and macro/collective economic conditions on levels of political trust to distinguish which one is more important in determining political trust in Korea. Results indicate that the trust in the political institutions and government performance depends on both personal financial security and national economic conditions. Equally important is the perception of how people think they have been treated. If Koreans perceive that they are being treated unfairly, they are likely to form, negative attitudes towards politics. We also found that, regardless of which party Koreans favor, if the government does not stabilize the economy, they do not hesitate to withdraw their support from it.     

Don’t buy from me Argentina: Politics, economics, and trade liberalization in Argentina, 1992–2001

Recently, while opening their markets to international trade through tariff reduction, developing nations have been quietly adopting nontariff measures that impose new barriers on imports. This study contributes to a literature that assesses reactions to recent widespread economic reform, particularly in the developing world. While analysts have identified many determinants of the reform process, we are only beginning to assess the factors that shape its twists, turns, and even reversals. In particular, we do not yet have a clear understanding of the determinants of governments’ treatment of different groups and actors in this process. This article examines these reactions to trade liberalization in Argentina, an important middle-income nation, by drawing upon the significant body of theoretical and empirical literature on trade policy in developed nations that demonstrates that both economic and political factors condition policy implementation. Utilizing a data set of nontariff trade disputes from 1992 to 2001, the analysis employs probit maximum likelihood techniques to assess the relationship between trade policy outputs and economic and political factors. The findings suggest that economic factors, including import flows, and political factors such as the breadth of representation appear to condition trade policy decisions in Argentina. The results also suggest that overall macroeconomic context affects policy outputs. Jeffrey Drope is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Miami. His recent articles and current research examine the political economy of trade policy and, more generally, how interests and institutions interact to generate policy. I thank Wendy Hansen, Ken Roberts, and theSCID reviewers and editors for valuable comments, the Latin American Institute at the University of New Mexico for financial support, and Pablo Sanguinetti for helpful introductions in Argentina.     

An assessment of native American economic development: Putting culture and sovereignty back in the models

Economic indicators in the United States document the poor economic straits in which Native Americans find themselves. Historically, scholars have explained delayed economic development using Linear Stage, Structural-Change, Dependency and Neoclassical Counter Revolution Models. All of these, however, are unable to fully explain the Native American case. We discuss the deficiencies of these models and point out the effects of constantly changing United States policies on Native American economic well-being. We present data from a survey of tribal government respondents about preferred business arrangements on the reservation to support greater attention to cultural identity in economic development studies. A model that incorporates cultural and sovereignty variables is presented. Diane Duffy, Ph.D., is assistant professor of political science at Iowa State University. She combines the study of political psychology and public policy by examining citizen perceptions of political issues. Currently she is examining Native American perceptions of “patriotism.” Jerry Stubben, Ph.D., is an Extension State Communities Specialist and adjunct associate professor in the Professional Studies Department at Iowa State University. He descends from the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska and served as Chair of the American Indian Studies Program at ISU from 1990–1995. Presently, he serves as co-investigator on a National Institute on Drug Abuse funded project to develop, implement, and evaluate a tribally based, family oriented substance abuse prevention program on the Mille Lacs reservation in Minnesota and Lac du Flambeau reservation in Wisconsin.     

Political power in Puerto Rico: bankers,pharmaceuticals and the state

Puerto Rico is characterized by a high degree of structural economic interdependence between state, corporate, and financial actors. This article argues that the structural interdependence was engineered by United States and Puerto Rico government officials to bolster the island’s economy and the government’s creditworthiness, using U.S. corporate investments, both fixed and financial. Following a critique of the relevance of the literature on structural analyses of state, corporate and financial alliances to the Puerto Rican case, the article defines, identifies, and quantifies the major components of this structural economic interdependence in Puerto Rico. The article concludes that the depth of structural economic interdependence of state, corporate and financial actors has seriously constrained the possibilities of economic and political pluralism. The local government has become bound to a relatively limited range of policy options and, thus, a particular development path is forged. In this case, the policies have resulted in the marginalization of local industry, and the privileging of the financial sector to the detriment of domestic capital formation. Sara L. Grusky has taught at Howard University and Catholic University in Washington, D.C. She has recently contributed to21st Century Policy Review andThe Caribbean in the Global Political Economy (Lynne Rienner Publishers). Professor Grusky is currently undertaking two research projects in El Salvador. The first is focused on rural health policy and the second examines the Salvadoran political discourse onel estado de derecho.     

Decentralization: Conceptualization and measurement

Decentralized government institutions are doing more of the work of government than ever before, but there is little agreement about 1) what decentralization means, or 2) how it should be measured. To overcome this confusion, this article builds on standard definitions of decentralization that include three core dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political. The article offers an empirical test of that definition using factor analysis of data from 1996 for sixty-eight countries. Factor analysis confirms these three core dimensions and generates a score for each case in each dimension, allowing countries to be measured according to their type and degree of decentralization. In future work, these scores can be used for hypothesis testing about the causes and effects of decentralization on important social outcomes. This exercise demonstrates that conceptual confusion need not hamper research when empirical tests can help verify conceptual categories. Aaron Schneider is a political scientist at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. His research interests include comparative politics, public finance, and methodology. His current research projects include studies of federalism, decentralization, party systems, budgeting, and taxation. He has conducted research in Brazil and India, and plans to apply the measures derived in this article to study the impact of decentralization. Tel:+44 (0)1273 678270; fax: +44 (0)1273 621202; email: a.schneider@ids.ac.uk. For valuable comments and suggestions, the author would like to thank Mick Moore, Arnab Acharya, Marcus Kurtz, Benjamin Goldfrank, and anonymous reviewers from Studies in Comparative International Development. Financial support was provided by the Department for International Development. All errors or omissions are the author’s own.     

Unlikely candidates for democracy: The role of structural context in democratic consolidation

Many contributors to the new literature on democratic consolidation overemphasize the role of political leadership, strategic choices about basic institutional arrangements or economic policy, and other contingent process variables. Their focus on political crafting has encounraged an undue optimism about the possibility of consolidating democracies in unfavorable structural contexts. This article critiques the current literature and asserts the primary importance of structural context in democratic consolidation. The powerful influence of structural context is illustrated by using just two structural variables, economic development level and prior authoritarian regime type, to indicate a group of thirty-eight countries in which democracy has failed to consolidate during the third wave of democratization (1974-present) and is very unlikely to do so in the near or medium-term future. Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. J. Mark Ruhl is Gleen and Mary Todd Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA. He has written extensively on Latin American politics and has specialized in the cases of Colombia and Honduras. Recent publications by Professor Ruhl includeParty Politics and Elections in Latin America (Westview, 1989), coauthored with R.H. McDonald of Syracuse University, and “Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras”Journal of Intermerican Studies and World Affairs (Spring 1996).     

Pulling the Strings: An Analysis of Informal Local Power Structures in Three Dutch Cities

Recent reform trends in local government ‘constitution’ have aimed at invigorating local democracy by strengthening local executive powers and making political leadership more visible through direct mayor elections. However, observers still tend to paint a gloomy picture of local democracy in contexts where reforms have been implemented. This article evaluates the notion of marginalised local democracy by adopting mandate theory. A data set on Norwegian mayors and deputy mayors provides evidence that mayors elected by the council are more confident in their own success regarding fulfilment of pre-election announcements than deputy mayors are. The mayoral advantage disappears if the mayor is directly elected. Regarding implementation of idiomatic party policy, political cohesion between the mayor and the deputy mayor (coalition or party conjunction) increases the confidence of both. Yet, cohesion does not increase confidence in fulfilling pre-election announcements, thus suggesting a rupture between issues emphasised in campaigns to local election and idiomatic party policy. While results are unfavourable to direct mayor elections, they do not otherwise support the gloomy picture of marginalised local democracy.     

From authoritarianism to political democracy in Grenada: Questions for U.S. policy

Beginning as early as 1498 when Grenada had its initial contact with metropolitan forces, this island state has experienced little of the political democracy U.S. President Reagan pledged to restore to the country as part of the 1983 intervention. Yet, for the 1984 elections that followed the toppling of the remaining vestiges of the 1979–83 revolution, the United States and selected Caribbean allies attempted to amalgamate a party as an alternative to the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) and the remaining revolutionary forces. The resulting New National Party (NNP) was electorally successful in 1984 but by 1987 defections from the Party had produced a base for the National Democratic Congress (NDC). In 1989 the NNP again divided. It was thus predictable that the 1990 elections would not return either wing of the National Party and instead would result in a coalition government led by the NDC. Chances for real political democracy in Grenada are improved but will not be easily realized in the face of severe economic crisis and a potentially weak government. The economic crisis could well promote current movements toward increased regional integration. It is important that the 1983–1984 pledge of the United States to promote democratization in Grenada be honored. W. Marvin Will is associate professor of comparative politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tulsa. He is past president of the Midwest Association of Latin American Studies and a founding member of the Caribbean Studies Association. Will has done extensive field research in the Caribbean and is the recipient of a 1991–92 Fulbright Research Fellowship for Caribbean Research. He is co-author of a forthcoming book on the Pacific and Caribbean Basins.     

Divergent Outcomes of Labor Reform Politics in Democratized Korea and Taiwan

This article seeks to explain the conditions that determine the divergent fates of union actors under democratic governments by examining union activism around four labor reform episodes (union rights recognition, wage increases, workweek reductions, and job protection/anti-privatization) in democratized Korea and Taiwan. This study first describes that labor reform politics in these two new democracies involved contrasting processes and produced divergent outcomes. Korean unions that have resorted to contentious mobilization have been more successful in areas where their sheer mobilizing strength matters (such as company-level bargaining of wages and other material benefits), but less successful in national policy reforms. On the contrary, Taiwanese unions have been more effective in securing labor policy concessions, while obtaining less drastic changes at the company-level gains. This article contends that these divergent outcomes for unions’ gains would not have been possible without the differences they faced in the degree of permeability within their respective formal political institutions and partisan interests that draw these unions into these labor reform politics.