中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。     

核安全全球治理:历史、现实与挑战

核安全风险超越国界,可能跨越地区,甚至影响全球,因而核安全的治理必然是全球治理。各国对核安全风险的评估、核安全意识的养成是一个演进的过程,与此同步的是核安全全球治理。核安全全球治理经历了冷战、冷战结束和九一一事件以来的三个发展阶段,治理的主要内容随着国际安全形势的变化而调整。冷战期间的核安全全球治理主要体现为建立国际原子能机构以管理核能的和平利用,防范无核国家以发展民用核能为由发展核武器,签署和履行与核安全密切相关的国际公约、培育核安全的意识;冷战结束初期,国际原子能机构强化了保障监督能力,多边出口管制机制加强了对涉核物项出口的管控,国家间展开了实质性的核安全合作;九一一恐怖袭击之后,核安全全球治理呈现加速度的趋势,国际社会日益形成核安全共识,全球性制度建设加速,多边合作加强。经过多年努力,核安全全球治理的制度建设取得了显著成就,双边和多边国际合作得到实质性推动,但核安全全球治理仍然面临如何有效减少核材料存量、如何推动相关国家切实履行国家责任等挑战。     

论苏联解体后的“核遗产”及核扩散危机

苏联解体后其庞大的核武库也一分为四,在核武器系统、核材料、核科学家及核技术等三个层次都出现了失控的核扩散危机。以美国为首的国际社会从各个方面给予了大力援助,使前苏联庞大的"核遗产"得到了妥善的处理。因苏联解体而一度出现的核国家增多的问题得以解决,核扩散危机也基本得到消除。这不仅有效地捍卫了国际核不扩散体制,而且在实践上也是对国际核不扩散机制的补充和发展,对人类社会的和平与安全也是重大的贡献。当朝鲜和伊朗核问题屡成危机而长期困扰国际社会时,我们重温这段历史,也具有深刻的现实意义。     

AUKUS核潜艇合作如何冲击国际核不扩散规范体系？

核潜艇合作是美英澳三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS)的核心内容。关于这一核潜艇合作项目是否有悖国际核不扩散规范体系,国际社会存在尖锐的争论。既有研究主要探讨三边安全伙伴关系核潜艇合作与国际核不扩散规范的合规问题,但忽视了其对正在成长中的国际规范的冲击。从规范演化的角度看,违反规范的国家影响力越大,对既有规范的打击越沉重,规范退化的可能性越大。规范的正式程度越低,规范越脆弱,受到冲击后规范退化甚至衰亡的可能性也越大。美英澳核潜艇合作最主要的影响在于,三国利用其独特的影响力破坏了成长中的核不扩散规范。长期以来,由于已有的核潜艇合作活动都没有利用国际核不扩散规范体系中的军用核动力装置漏洞,使得规避利用该漏洞已经成为一个惯例或成长中的规范。然而,由于美英澳的核潜艇合作涉及大量武器级高浓缩铀的转让,且高调引用了军用核动力装置漏洞,这将对军用核动力装置转让、军民两用物项管制和核“突破时间”这三项成长中的核不扩散规范产生严重冲击。     

Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Issue: The Labours and Sorrows of a Supporting Actor

At the time of writing, representatives from Iran and the E3/EU+3 are trying to work out an agreement that will guarantee that Iran’s controversial nuclear programme, widely suspected of having a military purpose, serves only peaceful ends. As the negotiations enter their most crucial phase, the time is ripe to attempt an assessment of the role played by the only actor, besides Iran, that has been on stage since it all began over ten years ago: Europe. Throughout this long drama, Europe’s performance has had some brilliant moments. Yet the quality of its acting has decreased as a new protagonist, the US, has come on stage. Overall, the Europeans’ record is positive, albeit not entirely spotless.     

井上光晴的核文学创作

核文学是20世纪70年代原爆文学的发展过程中,逐渐衍变出来的原爆文学的新形态。考察井上光晴的核文学创作历程,可以看出从对于"人"的命运的思考,到日本社会的心理悲剧分析;从广岛、长崎的个案,到核能的存在所引发的人类社会的精神危机,建构起井上光晴核文学的核心。可以认为,这也是战后日本原爆文学发展的一个缩影。     

On Extended Nuclear Deterrence

This analysis discusses the central challenges that countries face when they practice extended nuclear deterrence. One key problem has to do with credibility: potential aggressors may not believe that a country would fight to defend an ally, particularly if doing so risks a nuclear attack against its homeland. Countries might be able to address this issue by forging formal alliances with protégés or by stationing nuclear forces on the protégé’s territory. Do these measures discourage third-party aggression? Defence pacts involving nuclear-armed states effectively bolster extended deterrence. One risk of extending nuclear protection from the American perspective, however, is that it might pull the United States into unwanted wars by risk-acceptant protégés. Yet, in a nuclear context, the risk of alliance entrapment is generally overblown. Placing nuclear weapons on an ally’s territory does much less to bolster extended deterrence than one might initially think. Although foreign nuclear deployments may reassure allies and promote non-proliferation to some degree, their value for extended deterrence is fairly minimal. The United States continues to deploy nuclear weapons in five European countries, but the case for maintaining these deployments is decidedly weak.     

(Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals?

What explains a state’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program? While instances of nuclear reversal figure prominently in international politics, evidence in the literature has been largely piecemeal. We offer a novel conceptualization of the proliferation process as nonlinear, potentially including instances of reversal, as well as pursuit of a nuclear program and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Employing this theoretical framework, we consider states’ cost-benefit calculations in each phase of the proliferation process, and we test our theory using a multistate model. Two counterintuitive findings emerge from this framework. First, nuclear latency increases the likelihood of pursuit and acquisition but also increases the likelihood of reversal by reducing the costs of restarting a program in the future. Second, the nonproliferation regime discourages states without a nuclear program from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time making states with nuclear programs less likely to reverse course.     

文化因素与战后日本的核政策

战后日本能否始终坚持"无核三原则"的国家政策,是国际社会防止和控制核扩散的一个焦点所在,因此一直受到密切注视。作为学术选题,核政策问题通常是日本政治的领地,但日本政治在本质上是文化与人的产物,日本文化的独特性一直影响和制约着日本人关于核问题的思考与行为方式,而离开了这样的视角,对日本核政策的认识注定是不完善的。     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

War Games redux? Cyberthreats,US–Russian strategic stability,and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control

Some 30 years since the release of the Hollywood blockbuster War Games, the possibility that hackers might break into nuclear command and control facilities, compromise early warning or firing systems, or even cause the launch of a nuclear weapon has become disturbingly real. While this challenge will impact all nuclear-armed states, it appears particularly acute for the USA and Russia given their large, diverse, and highly alerted nuclear forces. The fact that east–west relations have deteriorated to a nadir perhaps not seen since the 1980s, strategic instability has increased – particularly in the wake of the Ukraine and now Syria crises – and that the nuclear arms reductions agenda appears to have reached a standstill makes this challenge particularly pressing. In this discouraging milieu, new cyberthreats are both exacerbating the already strained US–Russia strategic balance – particularly the perceived safety and security of nuclear forces – and at the same time creating new vulnerabilities and problems that might be exploited by a third party. Taken together, these dynamics add another major complication for current arms control agreements and possible future nuclear cuts, and also seem likely to increase the possibility of accidents, miscalculation, and potential unauthorised nuclear use, especially given the large number of nuclear weapons that remain on “hair-trigger” alert.     

伊朗核问题走向与中国安全

伊朗研发核技术的决心(包括能力)与美欧阻遏伊朗拥核的立场严重对立。美国不能容忍伊朗拥核坐大,但能够采取的手段有限,而伊朗问题又涉及诸多大国利益。伊朗核问题将使中东局势乃至大国关系更加复杂,包括对中国的国家安全产生影响。     

Closing the Window of Vulnerability: Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Retaliation

Living with a nuclear-armed enemy is unattractive, but, strangely, states seldom use their military power to prevent the enemy’s entry into the nuclear club. It is puzzling why preventive strikes against nuclear programs have been quite rare. I address this puzzle by considering the role of conventional retaliation, a subfield of deterrence that so far has received scant attention in the literature. I theorize the concept of conventional retaliation and test its explanatory power. First, I explore all historical cases where states struck another state’s nuclear installations and find none occurring when the proliferator threatened conventional retaliation. Second, I explore two cases where a strike was most likely, but the would-be attacker balked and find smoking-gun evidence that the threat of conventional retaliation restrained the would-be attacker. This evidence supports my claim that the threat of conventional retaliation is sufficient to deter a preventive strike against emerging nuclear states.     

美日援俄处理俄太平洋舰队退役核潜艇问题之比较

冷战时期苏联建造的核潜艇到20世纪90年代大部分已经达到或超过服役期，处理数以百计的退役核潜艇对俄罗斯而言是一项艰巨的任务。争取国际社会的支持，开展国际合作是俄解决该问题的必要条件。美国和日本在该问题上的对俄合作表现比较突出，对俄援助活动异同相伴，虽有变化但合作仍为主要趋势。     

The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal

During the 2016 United States presidential election campaign, Donald Trump promised to “renegotiate” the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran nuclear deal. The deal does not prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons and in some ways actually makes it easier for Iran to go nuclear in the future. The mere continuation of the current deal could undermine America’s interests in the Middle East and its global non-proliferation policy. How then can the Donald Trump Administration work to renegotiate the deal? This analysis provides a strategy that the Trump Administration can follow to improve American policy toward Iran, namely do what Iran is doing to the United States: abide by the strict terms of the agreement, whilst competing in all of the ways not covered in the deal. From an American perspective, increasing pressure on Tehran will constrain Iran’s destabilising influence in the region. Over time, Washington can leverage the pressure to force Iran back to the table to strike a renegotiated agreement that eliminates, not just delays, the Iranian nuclear and missile threat.     

Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation

Nuclear weapons' defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. Sooner or later, however, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish; but if they are right, it is exploitative. Like big cars and cheap flights, nuclear deterrence benefits us at the expense of future generations. States that do not already have the bomb should not get it. Britain and France should consider disarmament, while Russia and the United States should slash their arsenals. Minimum deterrence should be equally stable, but most nuclear optimists, being neorealists who hold that war will continue, should want deep cuts even if it is not.     

核事故、能源结构调整与国际气候合作

福岛核事故将对各国能源结构调整和国际气候合作产生重大影响。从短中期来看,部分国家将对核能产业实施紧缩政策,化石能源比重可能增加,在国际气候合作中作出积极减排承诺的意愿也将降低,国际气候合作可能继续陷于僵局之中。在可预见的未来,人类需要通过追求核能安全来维护能源安全和气候安全。     

Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 1

This article analyzes systemically the understudied topic of why and how the nuclear non-proliferation regime has remained a sustainable, even expanding entity, despite the unequal status of its members, and the fragility of international regimes as a species. The author argues that the convergence of two sets of distinct interests derived from the systemic roles and preferences of nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots' has determined the creation and sustenance of the regime. For the nuclear-armed major powers the key factors that facilitate cooperation are the preservation of monopoly rights to possess nuclear weapons and the denial of similar rights to non-major power states. For most non-nuclear states, the regime's norms and principles render an important constraint against nuclear acquisition by their neighbors and a powerful normative restraint against nuclear use by the nuclear weapon states. This unique combination of interests and norms explains why the regime has persisted despite predictions of its demise. The larger theoretical implication is that favorable systemic conditions and system-induced interests have to be present in order for a multilateral security regime to emerge and persist. Conversely, when these favorable systemic conditions change, the regime is likely to weaken or dissipate.     

朝核问题视角下的东北亚安全

冷战后,自从朝核问题出现以来,东北亚的安全局势发生了巨大的变化,朝核问题已然成为东北亚安全的焦点与核心。基于东北亚的区域特点和安全形势,朝核问题的地区解决方式应该是比较稳妥、长远、符合现实的,同时需要地区内主要大国的推动以及双边与多边机制的结合,重要的是在区域的核心点上将朝鲜纳入国际社会的发展轨道。然后,在这些原则基础上去探索东北亚安全机制建构的路径。     

朝核问题考验奥巴马亚洲外交

奥巴马的亚洲政策初显其“灵巧外交”的轮廓,即在坚持基本战略的前提下,注重加强与新兴力量的关系,通过加强对话合作来增加美国对亚洲地区的影响力。然而,极有可能陷入复杂甚至是危险僵局的朝核问题正在考验着美国新政府的亚洲政策。朝核问题不仅反映美朝关系的战略瓶颈,而且受到与朝核问题的变化有着重要相关利益的日、韩的牵制．还要受到美国内一些政治势力的牵制。