Political parties and political shirking

Using ADA roll call voting scores for the 1947–2006 period, I find that senators shirk in their last term. The degree of shirking is limited by political parties, which constrain the politician in his last term, and varies by post-Senate career choices. The results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics.     

Changes in the Location of the Median Voter in theU.S. House of Representatives, 1963–1996

We consider the degree of ideological polarizationwithin and between the parties in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives for the period 1963–1996, using theGroseclose, Levitt and Snyder (1996) adjustment method for ADA and ACU scores to ensure over timecomparability of roll call voting data. We focusespecially on the median House member, since webelieve that change in the median offers a bettermeasure of the impact of the change in party controlthan does changes in the mean roll-call votingscore. Our data analysis makes two general points. First andforemost, when we looked at the change in the locationof the House median voter, we found a dramatic changeafter the Republicans gained a majority in the House in1994. After the Republicans became a majority in theHouse, the ADA median in the House in 1995–1996 was at24, far closer to the Republican median of 4 than tothe Democratic median of 83. The shift in medianfrom 1993–1994 to 1994–1995 involved a change of over 25points in one election – far and away the greatestsingle shift in ideology of the modern era. Incontrast, the mean changed only 1 point overthis same period. Second, for the three decades weinvestigated, we found three historical epochs vis a visthe relative locations of the ADA (or ACU) floormedian and the ADA (or ACU) floor mean in the U.S.House of Representatives – two inflection points in1983 and 1994 which are related to trends in regionalrealignment.     

Mr. Smith and the economy: the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting

This paper estimates the influence of macroeconomic conditions on individual legislator voting over time. Previous work shows legislator voting to be stable over careers. In this paper, voting on an ideological issue space (ADA scores) and a fiscal issue space (NTU scores), from 1976 to 2002, exhibits significant short-term cyclicality with economic conditions. Individual legislators polarize by party in response to rising unemployment, and converge in response to rising inflation. As legislators accumulate tenure, they become more ideologically conservative but more fiscally liberal. Results are also reported on presidential party, divided government, and region. All results are weaker in the Senate than in the House.     

Credit scores,race, and residential sorting

Credit scores have a profound impact on home purchasing power and mortgage pricing, yet little is known about how credit scores influence households' residential location decisions. This study estimates the effects of credit scores on residential sorting behavior using a novel mortgage industry data set combining household demographic, credit, and financial data with property location information and detailed community attribute data. I employ the data set to estimate a discrete‐choice residential sorting model. I find that credit scores significantly predict residential sorting behavior and models that do not account for credit score provide biased estimates of housing utilities for black households in particular. Simulation results show that increases in credit score are associated with increases in the consumption of higher‐priced homes in more expensive school districts, higher‐quality public schools, and proximity to urban/metropolitan areas. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections

ADA scores and Nominate scores are used for the first time to examine the influence of spatial voting records on which candidate wins the party’s presidential nomination and on which nominee wins the general election. We find that the most conservative Republican candidate and moderately liberal Democrats were most likely to win their party’s nomination. For general elections we find that the candidate’s spatial record has nearly as much impact on the outcome as economic growth, which has been the focus of most past empirical research. The nominee whose voting record is more moderate is more likely to be elected.     

Using Panel Data to Determine the Effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Per‐Student Public Education Expenditures at the State Level

The purpose of the present study is to determine whether passage of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990 resulted in a statistically significant increase in per‐student public education expenditures at the state level. Although numerous studies have estimated educational cost functions, no prior study has examined the impact of the ADA on per capita education spending. The results of the present study are consistent with anecdotal evidence in that enactment of the ADA has had a positive effect on per‐student educational expenditures; this result suggests that legislative mandates may lead to increased government spending. In addition to the ADA, several of the leading determinants of per‐student education spending include population density, per capita income, percentage of the state that is over the age of 65, percentage of state's residents who have a four‐year college degree, percentage of state's residents who are homeowners, and total student population.     

Deliberation,Democratic Decision-Making and Internal Political Efficacy

Empirical research into the possible positive consequences of deliberation increasingly reveals that there is a complex relationship between deliberation and its effects on citizens. In this experimental study I examine the relationship between internal political efficacy and one type of deliberation: deliberative decision-making. I also test whether different structures of decision-making mediate between deliberation and internal political efficacy. The data suggest that deliberative decision-making had no direct effect on a global measure of internal political efficacy. Participants in face-to-face deliberative decision-making, though, had higher scores on a situation-specific measure of internal political efficacy than participants who only voted. The structures of decision-making had no effect on either measure of internal political efficacy. These results support claims that deliberation will not necessarily lead to direct, positive effects on citizens internal political efficacy, but they also highlight the likelihood that face-to-face deliberation can lead citizens to feel more competent in their deliberative abilities.     

Community,Authorities, and Support for Vigilantism: Experimental Evidence

Vigilante justice challenges the state’s monopoly over the use of violence and as such has come to the attention of a growing body of political scholars. However, still little is known about the circumstances that foster support for citizens circumventing the state to confront crime directly. I argue that citizens’ perceptions of a trusting community, on the one hand, and an untrustworthy law enforcement, on the other, jointly influence their support for this kind of behavior. I test these hypotheses using a lab-in-the-field experiment in Mexico, a case in which the expansion of vigilante organizations has posed a serious challenge to the state. I find that participants are more supportive of a vigilante action when those considering said action are described to be inserted within a trustworthy community. Furthermore, I find that this effect is moderated by the described trustworthiness of law enforcement. These results contribute to our understanding of the emergence of vigilantism, and how trust in authorities can moderate the normative expression of social capital.     

Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.     

When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover

Varied research traditions suggest that dovish leaders will be thrown out of office under harsh external circumstances. Below, I elaborate a model of rivalry maintenance that draws on and refines the insight from studies of leadership tenure and foreign policy. Specifically, I expect a leader who offers unreciprocated cooperation to a rival (a dove) to be more likely to be deselected from power than a leader that takes a harder line vis-à-vis the rival (a hawk). I test this expectation using event history techniques and data spanning the 1950–1990 time period and find strong evidence that dovish leaders pay an electoral price within a rivalry context. The findings suggest an internationally contingent domestic incentive to maintain rivalry and conflict over time .     

Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation

Beginning with two prominent explanations of international conflict—one based on contiguity and the other on territory—I develop a new joint account that provides two important advancements over the prior explanations. I then test the expectations of this joint account on dispute and war onset for all dyad years from 1919 to 1995. I find strong support for its predictions at the dispute stage and partial support at the war stage, including marked evidence of contingency between contiguity and territory. The results also show territory to be a more consistent engine of conflict than contiguity, especially at the war onset stage. Further, the findings provide insights into the effects of contiguity among nonterritorial disagreements, as well as the effects of territorial strife among noncontiguous pairs. Thus, this investigation clarifies the relative importance of both territory and contiguity within any geography-based explanation of conflict behavior, and therefore has broadly interesting implications.     

Testing the liberal subject: (in)security,responsibility and ‘self-improvement’ in the UK citizenship test

The recent debate over the changes to the ‘Life in the UK’ citizenship test offers another opportunity to reflect on the testing of would-be citizens in liberal democracies. The citizenship test has often been understood as part of the ‘strengthening’ of national borders: set within a discourse of fears over high levels of migration and the risk to cultural homogeneity. Furthermore, it has been viewed as an illustration of the death of multiculturalism and presented as an illiberal strategy of cultural assimilation. I propose that whilst the notion of ‘testing’ is built out of fears regarding ‘threatening’ difference and ‘community cohesion’, what the UK testing process presents is an explicitly liberal strategy of governing. Drawing on the history of the test, I suggest that it is not purely a mechanism of restriction but that it also relies on strategies of responsibility, empowerment and ‘self-improvement’. The citizenship test, alongside other recent border strategies, may be better understood as representing a fascinating nexus between advanced liberal ideas of governing and concerns regarding (in)security. I argue that studying the test in this way offers up vital questions about how community and political membership continues to be shaped in late modernity.     

A strategic response to class size reduction: Combination classes and student achievement in California

The California class size reduction program provided schools with cash rewards for K–3 classes of 20 or fewer students. I show how program rules made it possible for schools to save money by using mixed‐grade classes to meet class size reduction obligations while maintaining larger average class sizes. I also show that this smoothing of students across grades is associated with a significant test score gap for certain second and third grade students. My estimates suggest that class size reduction may lead to lower test scores for students placed in combination classes. Alternative explanations of teacher experience and credentialing changes cannot explain the test score pattern. This result spotlights both the underappreciated role of age heterogeneity in classroom learning and the difficulty of replicating the success of policy experiments in statewide reform. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Political rights,republican freedom,and temporary workers

I defend a neo-republican account of the right to have political rights. Neo-republican freedom from domination is a sufficient condition for the extension of political rights not only for permanent residents, but also for temporary residents, unauthorized migrants, and some expatriates. I argue for the advantages of the neo-republican account over the social membership account, the affected-interest account, the stakeholder account, and accounts based on the justification of state coercion.     

Party systems,electoral systems and constraints on corruption

This article explores the relationship between the party system, electoral formulas and corruption. Previous research has focused on the various incentives for political actors to monitor, or engage in corruption based on variations in the electoral formula. However, the electoral formula has mainly served as a proxy for the party system – whether multi-party or two-party. In this analysis, I test directly the relationship between party systems and corruption and in addition, add a degree of nuance to the established line of thinking within this literature. I argue that two-party systems in countries with predominantly single-member district (SMD) electoral formulas will demonstrate lower corruption on average than multi-party systems in SMD countries. However, I argue that this interaction effect does not play out in countries with proportional representation (PR). I test this hypothesis on 70 democratic and semi-democratic countries from 1987 to 2005 and find strong empirical support for the claim that multipartism in SMD countries is associated with higher levels of corruption, while the party system’s relationship with corruption plays no role in PR countries.     

Another look at whether private schools influence public school quality: Comment

Couch, Shughart, and Williams (1993) report that private school enrollments are positively correlated with scores on a standard algebra test taken by North Carolina public school students. In this paper I show that if any one of five reasonable changes is made to the specification of their model, this correlation disappears.     

The legislative consequences of Mexico’s mixed-member electoral system, 2000–2009

The emergence of mixed-member electoral systems across the globe has been an attempt to balance local representation through single-member districts (SMD) with programmatic representation through proportional representation lists (PR). However, there are several competing theoretical interpretations for the consequences of mixed systems on legislative bodies. Through a study of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, I test several empirical implications of these competing theories by examining the impact of the electoral system on party discipline, participation, and legislative organization. I find little convincing evidence of differences between legislators elected through PR and those elected through SMD in their levels of party discipline, but I do find that PR legislators participate in a manner theoretically consistent with their mode of election. I also find that PR legislators have disproportionate control over key leadership positions. I suggest the primary reasons for these findings is due to differing methods of candidate selection and restricted use of dual candidacy.     

Vigilantes,gangsters, and alcohol: clashing citizenship regimes in postwar Guatemala

In this volatile moment in Latin America, when relations between the state and citizens are in flux, people at the margins of society draw on various notions of citizenship in social conflicts over proper behavior and the common good. I examine an intergenerational conflict over the legality of alcohol in an indigenous village in Guatemala to show how its protagonists creatively recombine different aspects of the various citizenship regimes that they have encountered. Elders have formed vigilante justice groups to combat the youth they consider gangsters. While the vigilantes draw upon a discourse of obligation to justify their actions, the generation below them counters with a language of rights. Some argue that citizenship is less meaningful in contexts where state power is ambiguous and extralegal violence is commonplace. I argue that in such contexts, it is not that citizenship does not have meaning, but rather that its meaning is intensely contested.     

Does the Federal Government Learn from the States? Medicaid and the Limits of Expertise in the Intergovernmental Lobby

State programmatic expertise is an important asset to federalsystems, but this expertise is not always informative to federaldecision-makers. I argue the degree to which state expertiseis informative to federal decision-makers depends on how wellthe policy interests of state and federal levels are aligned.I illustrate variation in these conditions using case studiesof congressional politics over the Medicaid program. I thenapply a statistical test, which demonstrates that states’programmatic expertise regarding Medicaid is less persuasiveto congressional committee members compared to other witnesseswho are equally knowledgeable. The results suggest a "failureof federalism," where the public good potential of state programmaticexpertise often is not realized in the federal system.     

When do people accept government paternalism? Theory and experimental evidence

Under what conditions are people willing to accept paternalistic government policies? The use of libertarian paternalism (“nudges”) has gained popularity and captured the attention of scholars and policy-makers alike. A central underlying assumption in advancing governmental nudges is that the public prefers them over classic paternalistic policies, which, unlike nudges, are coercive. This paper studies the extent and circumstances under which this assumption is justified, arguing that the claim for the preeminence of nudges is overstated. I develop a theoretical framework to account for the conditions under which people prefer coercive and non-coercive paternalism, and test it experimentally among a national U.S. sample. I find that in certain theoretically predictable contexts, individuals not only tolerate, but even prefer coercive paternalism over nudges. These attitudes are systematically explained through the interaction between the coercion level and policy domain in question.