The Strasbourg Court and Indirect Race Discrimination: Going Beyond the Education Domain

Prohibiting indirect discrimination has been hailed as guaranteeing substantive equality by addressing issues of structural discrimination and inequalities in a way that direct discrimination cannot and will not. However, Article 14, the ECHR's non‐discrimination provision, does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. Only in 2007 the European Court of Human Rights explicitly included the notion of indirect (race) discrimination under Article 14 in DH and Others v Czech Republic, its famous judgment on Roma education segregation. Since then it has applied the prohibition of indirect race discrimination in a limited manner to similar education cases. However, in its recent Grand Chamber decision, Biao v Denmark, the Strasbourg Court started clarifying some unsolved issues in the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in its case law and finally applied the concept to the much broader area of immigration and citizenship.     

Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights judgment in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom dealt with the increasingly controversial questions of religious symbols at work and the clash between free conscience and anti‐discrimination norms. In a change of approach, it held that the right to resign could no longer be seen as adequate protection for religious freedom and that workplace norms that restrict religious liberty must satisfy a proportionality test. However, it accorded a wide margin of appreciation to States in reconciling freedom of conscience and freedom from discrimination, ruling that the importance of non‐discrimination could justify a failure to exempt a religious individual from complying with a policy forbidding discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.     

Unveiling a role for the EU? The ‘headscarf controversy’ in European schools

Many European countries have introduced laws and policies which proscribe religious clothing in public educational institutions. The European Convention on Human Rights has been deployed to uphold such actions, the European Court of Human Rights recognising that States should be able to limit the manifestation of religious beliefs. National courts considering the matter in terms of religious freedom (as opposed to discrimination) have reached similar conclusions. Most affected States are members of the European Union as well as the Council of Europe. This article will argue that it is more likely that European Union law could be engaged by an aggrieved teacher to challenge national law.     

Adoption,Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: Gas and Dubois v France

On 15 March 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued its first judgment addressing the differential treatment of same‐sex and opposite‐sex couples in respect of the adoption of a child. 1 The Court held that excluding same‐sex couples in civil partnerships, who have no legal right to marry, from adoption provisions available to married opposite‐sex couples does not violate rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). I argue that the Court's reasoning in Gas and Dubois v France is unpersuasive and unsustainable in light of its wider case law.     

Post‐Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away

This article analyses the critical yet elusive notions of state neutrality, secularism and religious coercion under the European Convention in light of the European Court of Human Rights recent decision in Lautsi v Italy. We contend that the real concern in the Italian crucifix case was not the infringement of the school pupils’ religious freedom nor the proselytising or coercive effect of the ‘passive’ religious symbols. Rather, opponents of the longstanding symbols were animated by desire for strict religious equality, a notion that is, correctly in our view, not guaranteed under the Convention. Lautsi has significantly cleared the conceptual undergrowth surrounding state neutrality and the varieties of secularism, reined in the elastic notion of religious coercion and eschewed attempts to squeeze the constitutional diversity of European religion‐state frameworks into a strict American‐style separationist mould. The Convention jurisprudence on freedom of religion has finally come of age.     

Personal Religious Beliefs in the Workplace: How Not to Define Indirect Discrimination

In cases concerning indirect religious discrimination the claimant must demonstrate that an otherwise neutral measure has caused her to suffer a particular disadvantage because of her religion. In Eweida v British Airways the Court of Appeal held that personal religious beliefs which are not part of official religious dogma cannot be relied upon as the basis for a claim of indirect discrimination. I discuss, first, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Eweida; then I examine the way personal religious beliefs have been treated in other cases in Britain and in the United States; finally, I place the issue in a wider human rights framework.     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.     

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Criminal Suspect

In In re JR38, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a 14 year‐old boy who argued that the dissemination of his image, taken whilst he was participating in sectarian rioting, to local newspapers, violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the Court was divided on whether or not the measures taken by the police engaged the applicant's Article 8(1) rights at all. This case raises fundamental questions as to the scope of private life in the context of criminal investigations, and the place of the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in determining whether Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged. This case comment subjects the majority's interpretation of Article 8(1) to critical scrutiny, concluding that this interpretation may unduly restrict the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to criminal investigations.     

Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim Status,Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning

In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk of being subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. It concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of the Human Rights Watch case, and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally, against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.     

Relatively Absolute? The Undermining of Article 3 ECHR in Ahmad v UK

The recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Ahmad v UK dangerously undermines the well‐established case law of the Court on counter‐terrorism and non‐refoulement towards torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Although ostensibly rejecting the ‘relativist’ approach to Article 3 ECHR adopted by the House of Lords in Wellington v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Court appeared to accept that what is a breach of Article 3 in a domestic context may not be a breach in an extradition or expulsion context. This statement is difficult to reconcile with the jurisprudence constante of the Court in the last fifteen years, according to which Article 3 ECHR is an absolute right in all its applications, including non‐refoulement, regardless of who the potential victim of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is, what she may have done, or where the treatment at issue would occur.     

Is Secularism Neutral?

This article argues that secularism is not neutral. Secularization is a process, the secular state is a structure, whereas secularism is a political philosophy. Secularism takes two main forms: first, a “benevolent” secularism that endeavours to treat all religious and nonreligious belief systems even‐handedly, and, second, a “hostile” kind that privileges unbelief and excludes religion from the public sphere. I analyze the European Court of Human Rights decision in Lautsi v Italy, which illustrates these types. The article concludes that secularism as a political philosophy cannot be neutral, and the secular state is not neutral in its effects, standpoint, governing assumptions or treatment of religious truth claims.     

Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Austin claimed, unsuccessfully, that police kettling at a public protest in London amounted to a violation of her right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This case comment suggests that the court took an unexpected and unorthodox approach to the issue of ‘deprivation’ within Article 5. This decision may come to undermine the protections afforded by Article 5 and extend the current exceptions to Article 5 to an indefinite range of situations.     

Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal

In Redfearn v UK the European Court of Human Rights examined the question whether dismissal for membership of a political party is compatible with freedom of association under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court endorsed a strong commitment to multi‐party democracy and protection of employees against the domination of the employers. This note discusses the judgment and its implications for UK law, looking at three key issues: first, whether the law of unfair dismissal provides effective protection against action that poses a threat to the enjoyment of Convention rights; second, the grounds under which an employer may justify the lawfulness of a dismissal that interferes with a Convention right; third, the available remedies against the employer when there is a breach of a Convention right.     

Ideological Neutrality in the Workplace

This note assesses the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Achbita v G4S Secure Solutions NV and Bougnaoui v Micropole SA, the first cases dealing with religious discrimination under the Equal Treatment Directive 2000/43. Both cases concerned Muslim women wishing to express their religious beliefs by wearing an Islamic headscarf while working in a private undertaking. The Court held that the employees’ dismissal could not be justified by reference to clients’ prejudices against the headscarf. However, dismissal could be justified if pursued on the basis of a corporate policy of ideological neutrality which prohibited all visible religious, political and philosophical symbols. This note criticises the latter part of the Court's decision for, inter alia, placing too much weight on an employer's freedom to run its business in spite of the grave effects this has on employees’ fundamental right to manifest their beliefs at work.     

O'Keeffe v Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide an Effective System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in Education

In O'Keeffe v Ireland, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that Ireland failed to protect the applicant from sexual abuse suffered as a child in an Irish National School in 1973 and violated her rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This note argues that the decision is important in expanding the Court's jurisprudence regarding positive obligations under Article 3 to child sexual abuse in a non‐state setting where there was no knowledge of a ‘real and immediate’ risk to the applicant. It also argues that the case raises concerns about the Court's methodology for the historical application of the Convention and about the interaction of Article 3 positive obligations with vicarious liability in common law tort regimes.     

Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial

This article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio‐legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect defendants to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty‐plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants.     

Equal Civil Partnerships,Discrimination and the Indulgence of Time: R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development

In R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development the Supreme Court unanimously declared that the ban on different‐sex civil partnerships was incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In a strikingly robust and, at times, acerbic manner, the Court systematically dismantled the Secretary of State's request for tolerance of a discriminatory and unsustainable legal position. The decision represents a clear victory for those campaigning for reform and the issuing of a declaration of incompatibility by the Court is likely to have influenced the later announcement by Prime Minister Theresa May in October 2018 that different‐sex civil partnerships will ultimately be introduced in England and Wales.     

Out of Many,One? Strasbourg's Ibrahim Decision on Article 6

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Ibrahim v United Kingdom on 13 September 2016. Relying on Salduz v Turkey, the applicants claimed, largely unsuccessfully, that denial of access to a lawyer during police questioning, and subsequent admission into evidence of statements made in the course of that questioning, violated fair trial rights protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The comment suggests that the decision's unusually emphatic statements about Article 6's ‘internal structure’ have consequences for assessing violations in future applications. Further, the decision creates greater room for public interest balancing in Article 6 cases. The decision may thus undermine the Article 6 guarantees.     

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment,Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber's judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment's profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.     

Class wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace

In this paper, I seek to demonstrate the potential for conflictinherent in the prohibition of discrimination on grounds ofreligion or belief with the regulation of discrimination onother grounds. I suggest that such conflict is inevitable andthat it is a mistake to protect religion and/or belief in likemanner to grounds such as sex, race, sexual orientation anddisability. While such protection is, at present, required byEC law, I suggest that legislation along present lines is notrequired by the European Convention on Human Rights and thatit is not justified by any special quality of religion. On thecontrary, I argue that requiring the accommodation of practicesor beliefs categorised as ‘religious’ tends to perpetuatepractices and beliefs which are problematic on equality andother grounds.