(Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals?

What explains a state’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program? While instances of nuclear reversal figure prominently in international politics, evidence in the literature has been largely piecemeal. We offer a novel conceptualization of the proliferation process as nonlinear, potentially including instances of reversal, as well as pursuit of a nuclear program and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Employing this theoretical framework, we consider states’ cost-benefit calculations in each phase of the proliferation process, and we test our theory using a multistate model. Two counterintuitive findings emerge from this framework. First, nuclear latency increases the likelihood of pursuit and acquisition but also increases the likelihood of reversal by reducing the costs of restarting a program in the future. Second, the nonproliferation regime discourages states without a nuclear program from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time making states with nuclear programs less likely to reverse course.     

Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy

Why do great powers take such different approaches to the issue of nuclear proliferation? Why do states oppose nuclear proliferation more vigorously in some cases than in others? In short, what explains great power nonproliferation policy? To answer these questions, this article tests two competing theories of nonproliferation policy. The first, political relationship theory, suggests that states oppose nuclear proliferation to their enemies but are less concerned when friends acquire nuclear weapons. The second, power-projection theory, argues that states oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to states over which they have the ability to project military power because nuclear proliferation in those situations would constrain their military freedom of action. In contrast, states will be less likely to resist, and more likely to promote, nuclear proliferation to states against which they cannot use force. To test these hypotheses, this article uses evidence from great power nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 2000. While both theories find some support, the power-projection theory performs significantly better. The findings of this article have important implications for international relations theory and US nonproliferation policy.     

防止核扩散的两大难题——以印关核关系为例

全球核不扩散面临着困境,国际社会在目标上的不确定性和体制上的低效性是当今世界核不扩散面临的难题,而各国利益的不一致是其根本原因,它也使这一国际行动的未来充满变数。美国与印度在核关系上的变化以及近年来热议的核合作,也无法回避这些难题。     

Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Theory and a Case Study of Tito's Yugoslavia

Programs of international civil nuclear cooperation—of “Atoms for Peace”—have come under growing criticism for unintentionally fostering nuclear weapons proliferation in developing countries. However, drawing on the literature on international technology transfer and on Albert Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, this article argues that Atoms for Peace efforts may often seriously hamper developing countries’ nuclear weapons ambitions by empowering their scientific workers and by facilitating the brain drain to the developed world. The article then presents a case study of the historical nuclear program of Yugoslavia, which received very generous help from the Atoms for Peace programs of the United States, Soviet Union, and European states at a time when nonproliferation controls were minimal. The international ties of the Yugoslav nuclear program made its scientific workers much less likely to choose simple loyalty to the Tito regime, and much more likely to choose voice or exit, accelerating the program's ultimate collapse.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

'Not Proficient in Table-Thumping': Sir Ernest Satow at Peking, 1900-1906

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme ‐ the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.     

Trick or truth? The British ANF proposal, west Germany and US nonproliferation policy, 1964-68

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme - the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.     

论苏联解体后的“核遗产”及核扩散危机

苏联解体后其庞大的核武库也一分为四,在核武器系统、核材料、核科学家及核技术等三个层次都出现了失控的核扩散危机。以美国为首的国际社会从各个方面给予了大力援助,使前苏联庞大的"核遗产"得到了妥善的处理。因苏联解体而一度出现的核国家增多的问题得以解决,核扩散危机也基本得到消除。这不仅有效地捍卫了国际核不扩散体制,而且在实践上也是对国际核不扩散机制的补充和发展,对人类社会的和平与安全也是重大的贡献。当朝鲜和伊朗核问题屡成危机而长期困扰国际社会时,我们重温这段历史,也具有深刻的现实意义。     

The U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Nonproliferation Goals

President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India signed a statement of intent in 2005 to allow India access to civilian nuclear technology, despite its not being a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This deal would reverse decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, since India was the source for much of U.S. law on this count. It would require Congress to amend that law to create special exceptions for India. Rationales and critiques of the proposed deal have focused on its impact on the future exercise of U.S. authority on nonproliferation policy worldwide. But the broader impact may be felt internally, since nonproliferation decisions have been inextricably linked to national security imperatives. In acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, the deal has also created a new dependency between U.S. national security policy and the energy profile of emerging powers.     

The US–India nuclear deal: the beginning of a beautiful relationship?

The United States (US)–India nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order. The nuclear agreement creates a major exception to the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. Given its far-reaching implications, the Indo-US nuclear agreement has sparked off a heated debate in India, the US and the larger international community. This article examines the debate surrounding the nuclear pact. It argues that the nuclear agreement is about much more than mere nuclear technicalities: it is about the emergence of a new configuration in the global balance of power and a broader need for a new international nuclear order in the face of a global nuclear non-proliferation regime that seems to have become ineffective in meeting the challenges confronting the international community today.     

Security,economics, and missile diplomacy with North Korea

This article reviews American missile diplomacy with North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. North Korea made some missile concessions, such as agreeing to freeze missile tests, but ultimately did not halt its missile programme. US nonproliferation diplomacy was not successful because it did not address the main drivers behind North Korea's missile programmes – securiry threats, economic compulsions, and domestic political pressures. In the future, international engagement that tackles these causes of proliferation could restrain North Korea's missile advances.     

The Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics in the Transition of International Order

The early 21st century finds great change in international order.China's foreign relations have entered a new phase where its driving force is rapidly rising for the emerging countries and new global economic governance mechanism is gradually established.To follow the trend of the times,China has actively participated in global economic governance and supply of public goods.China' s foreign relations present a new vision,idea and strategy under the leadership of President Xi Jinping.It is a new starting point for China to further integrate itself into the world and open itself wider to the world.China takes an active part to participate in global governance and plays an important role in the issues of economic integration,environmental governance,climate change,nuclear nonproliferation,energy crisis,internet security and anti-terrorism,especially anti-terrorism.This article explains the performance of international relations in current transition order and tries to tackle prior (and in some ways more intractable) issues and to analyze the internal logics and external environment of impact of multi-polarization on China's major power diplomacy with its characteristics in the transition of International order.     

Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 1

This article analyzes systemically the understudied topic of why and how the nuclear non-proliferation regime has remained a sustainable, even expanding entity, despite the unequal status of its members, and the fragility of international regimes as a species. The author argues that the convergence of two sets of distinct interests derived from the systemic roles and preferences of nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots' has determined the creation and sustenance of the regime. For the nuclear-armed major powers the key factors that facilitate cooperation are the preservation of monopoly rights to possess nuclear weapons and the denial of similar rights to non-major power states. For most non-nuclear states, the regime's norms and principles render an important constraint against nuclear acquisition by their neighbors and a powerful normative restraint against nuclear use by the nuclear weapon states. This unique combination of interests and norms explains why the regime has persisted despite predictions of its demise. The larger theoretical implication is that favorable systemic conditions and system-induced interests have to be present in order for a multilateral security regime to emerge and persist. Conversely, when these favorable systemic conditions change, the regime is likely to weaken or dissipate.     

Invest,Hold Up,or Accept?China in Multilateral Governance

China has played an inconsistent role in multilateral governance, sometimes contributing to the creation and maintenance of international regimes, sometimes free riding or even threatening to undermine multilateral regimes to improve its position. We show that the strategic context of a particular issue of international concern affects China's approach to multilateralism and argue that our approach adds additional leverage to existing theories that rely on assumptions about its inherent disposition or socialization processes. An emerging global power will be willing to invest more in supporting a regime when its outside options are relatively poor. When its outside options are good, it will free ride on the efforts of more established states if it is not a necessary player in maintaining regimes, and if it is seen as indispensable it will threaten to hold up regime support as a way to win concessions. We show that these two factors, outside options and indispensability, can help explain changes in China's strategy with respect to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the regulation of international finance.     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

The negotiation burden of institutional interactions: non-state organizations and the international negotiations on forests

The participation of non-state actors in international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no longer discussed in single isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organizations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as ‘regime complexes’. This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it with the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found to be insignificant, political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found to be real, demanding a certain type of material and organizational resources in order for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, non-governmental organizations being dominant with respect to business groups.     

US–Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Forward and Retro after 2008?

Abstract

The arrival of a new US administration in 2009 is a swinging door with respect to opportunities for Russian–American cooperation in strategic nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation. Both US presidential candidates in 2008 supported nuclear abolition as a theoretically desirable goal, and the Obama administration will certainly pursue nuclear arms reductions consistent with already agreed, or lower, levels. Missile defenses complicate US–Russian relations on this issue, but they pose negotiable, not insurmountable, barriers to further arms reductions and strategic stability.     

Neo‐nationalism and Neo‐Atlanticism in Italian foreign policy

The European Union has low expectations for the international climate regime after 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol effectively expires. The United States is not thought likely to sign up to new binding international commitments, whereas EU countries have experienced unexpected difficulties in implementing existing commitments. As a consequence, the European Union may be prepared to settle for a surprisingly weak follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, the European Union will pursue bilateral and regional climate agreements with like-minded countries, parallel to the UN framework and possibly independently of it. Collectively, such agreements could produce an international climate regime that is more robust than what could be agreed at the consensus-based UN level. Nevertheless, the European Union will continue to support the UN process as the only legitimate forum for international negotiations on climate change.     

Negotiating Verification: International Diplomacy and the Evolution of Nuclear Safeguards, 1945–1972

Nuclear safeguards have been an essential part of the global order since the beginnings of the nuclear age. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], an international bureaucracy that is supposed to be a non-political, technical institution administers this global nuclear safeguards regime. Even though safeguards have always been controversial, they have turned out to be the most enduring item in the international community’s toolbox to prevent or slow down the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. This analysis shows that nuclear safeguards, whilst they survived the fall of the Iron Curtain, were a genuine invention of the Cold War. At the beginning of the nuclear age, there was an overall understanding that safeguards were not strong enough to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. It was only over the course of the late 1950s and 1960s that safeguards moved from the margins to the centre of diplomatic negotiations about global nuclear order. Newly declassified records from the IAEA Archives in Vienna offer insights into the evolution of early nuclear safeguards and suggest that negotiation patterns, proceedings, and settings affected the outcome of this nuclear diplomacy.     

Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame, and Learning in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime

A distinct feature of contemporary international relations is the proliferation of multilateral monitoring regimes. Despite the significance of this for the study of international law and organization, little empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of multilateral monitoring exists. This article examines the effectiveness of the supervisory system of the International Labor Organization (ILO), widely recognized as the prototypical model for all multilateral monitoring regimes. I examine the speech acts and rule-practices of the ILO regime within a hermeneutic/constructivist framework. This yields a set of heuristic hypotheses reflective of the "logic" that guides regime interactions with its member states. This asserts that "shame" influences member states to comply and respond positively to regime obligations. To test this, I statistically generate global benchmarks. These consist of world and regional averages in the behavioral patterns of member states. Quantitative findings demonstrate recidivist patterns of deviance by "global pariahs" set against a statistical background consisting of large-scale normative conformity on the part of ILO member states but configured around some regional variations. My analysis contends that global benchmarking reduces the risks of member state defection from core international labor standards and thereby promotes monitoring by learning or discursive multilateralism.