Our Arms in Havana: British Military Sales to Batista and Castro, 1958-59

When the United States—the traditional supplier of arms to Cuba—decided not to supply Fulgencio Batista's government after March 1958 and the dictator approached Britain, this presented a dilemma for Harold Macmillan's administration so soon after the 1956 Suez crisis. Whitehall was keen to sell arms but wary of doing business with a country so firmly located in the United States' sphere of influence. It will be seen that the Foreign Office conferred with Washington at every stage in its decision process, both in deciding to arm Batista after gaining US acquiescence, and later in acceding to pressure and not supplying military hardware to Fidel Castro's nascent regime.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

Britain and the Collapse of Egypt's Constitutional Order, 1950-52

Britain's longstanding practice of intervening in the struggle between King Farouk, the Wafd and the constitution was one of the main causes of the demise of parliamentary politics in Egypt. Indeed, the sharp deterioration in the political situation in the winter of 1951-52, which paved the way for the Free Officers' coup on 23 July 1952, was the result of a breakdown in the Anglo-Egyptian defence negotiations. The Wafd government used the 'British question' as a distraction from its own internal shortcomings. Britain responded by pursuing a policy of toppling the Wafd and replacing it with a more amenable administration. To this end, British officials manipulated the United States into co-sponsoring the Middle East Command proposals of October 1951, aware that American backing would be required during imminent disturbances in Egypt. The subsequent Ismailia incident of January 1952 hastened the collapse of Egypt's constitutional order and also transformed British perceptions of the usefulness of the Suez base.     

Britain and Japan: Long-Range Images, 1900-52

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in 1902 was revised substantially in 1905 and 1911. It survived the First World War and did not lapse until 1923. For two decades, it enabled Britain to withdraw its navy from East Asia, leaving its commercial interests to the protection of Japan. Meanwhile it enabled Japan to expand its influence in Korea and China. There was not an immediate breach of the alliance, but interests clashed in China in the difficult world of economic collapse in the 1930s. When they failed to come to an accommodation, Japan declared war on Britain in 1941. After the war, Britain shared with the United States the task of policing the military occupation of Japan. But when that occupation came to an end in 1952 during the anxious days of the Korean war, the vast majority of Japanese believed that their country's future rested with Washington.     

Eisenhower, arms control and disarmament: United States diplomatic documents, 1958-60

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60: Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998.     

A Problem Postponed: Britain and the Future of Austria-Hungary, 1914-18

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

Thirty-seven degrees frigid: US-chilean relations and the spectre of polar arrivistes, 1950-59

After its 1948 proposal to internationalize Antarctica had been rejected, the United States accepted the Chilean Escudero Plan as a necessiry for avoiding further political disputes among the seven nations that had balked at the proposal's call to renounce their sovereign rights. US and Chilean officials proceeded to discuss revisions that might enhance the Escudero Plan's acceptabiliry to the other nations, all of which shared the goal of excluding the Soviet Union. Before there had been any substantial progress, the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year legitimated the USSRs presence in the far south, and already tense US-Chilean relations entered a phase of heightened apprehensiveness. This article explores the diplomatic and contextual nuances of this bilateral interaction that proved central in bringing the Antarctic Treary of 1959 to fruition.     

Before salt: Ten years of US arms control policy, 1958-68

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-60, Vol. Ill, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1996); FRUS, 1961-3 VII, Arms Control and Disarmament (1995); FRUS, 1961-3, VIII, National Security Policy (1996); FRUS, 1964-8, XI, Arms Control and Disarmament (1997).     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.     

中国与英国对非洲经贸关系比较

中、英两国与非洲都有密切的经贸关系.由于政治历史和地理原因,英国与非洲(尤其是英联邦非洲)的经贸交往比中国与非洲更为悠久,历史上也更为密切.但近年来,随着中国生产能力的快速增长,中非贸易发展迅猛,自2004年起已超过英非贸易.在投资方面,英国以私人为主、官方为辅的对非洲投资历时长久,在英国政府的鼓励和促进政策下,至今仍在不断增长;中国以国有企业为主的对非洲投资在近十年来有较快发展,但投资总额仍远低于英国,并由于投资经营等方面的经验与能力问题,中、英两国在对非洲承揽承包工程的最大差别则是英国公司多属私人资本,而中国公司多为国有企业.从未来发展趋势看,中、英两国在对非洲发展经贸关系上存在竞争,也存在合作的潜力.     

'Unfortunate Arabia': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955-63

As it emerged from a long, self-imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo-American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961

The Kuwaiti crisis of 1961 has conventionally been accorded little attention in histories of Britain's role in the Middle East. In fact, the crisis was an important defining moment, focusing the minds of policymakers on British interests in the Gulf, and the question of the best means of preserving them. It was also the largest scale mobilization of British forces in the Middle East in the post-Suez era. This article sets the crisis in the context of longer term British relations with Kuwait, internal developments in the Emirate, the evolution of British strategy in the region since Suez and Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in order to understand the significance of the episode.     

Anglo-American relations after Suez, the rise and decline of the working group experiment, and the french challenge to NATO, 1957-59

This article explores the establishment of a number of Anglo-American working groups at the Washington Conference of October 1957, and explains how the British regarded the groups as an attempt to institutionalize the principle of consultation in Anglo-American relations. American and British officials were anxious that the existence of the groups be kept secret for fear that they would be a cause of resentment to other close allies. De Gaulle's attacks on an Anglo-American monopoly within NATO, and disruptive calls for institutionalizing tripartite cooperation following his assumption of power in June 1958 underlined this point, and helped to cool US attitudes to any notion of formal machinery that by-passed established alliance structures. Practical problems associated with the functioning of the groups, as well as the potential for political embarrassment they could represent, meant that their role had largely by the spring of 1959, yet their brief history was illustrative of the tensions that exclusivity in ANglo-American relations could bring to the Western alliance.     

Anglo-American relations after Suez,the rise and decline of the working group experiment,and the french challenge to NATO, 1957-59

This article explores the establishment of a number of Anglo-American working groups at the Washington Conference of October 1957, and explains how the British regarded the groups as an attempt to institutionalize the principle of consultation in Anglo-American relations. American and British officials were anxious that the existence of the groups be kept secret for fear that they would be a cause of resentment to other close allies. De Gaulle's attacks on an Anglo-American monopoly within NATO, and disruptive calls for institutionalizing tripartite cooperation following his assumption of power in June 1958 underlined this point, and helped to cool US attitudes to any notion of formal machinery that by-passed established alliance structures. Practical problems associated with the functioning of the groups, as well as the potential for political embarrassment they could represent, meant that their role had largely by the spring of 1959, yet their brief history was illustrative of the tensions that exclusivity in ANglo-American relations could bring to the Western alliance.