Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel

This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States.     

联合阵线与美国军事干涉

作为国际体系中的唯一超级大国,美国是冷战后海外用兵最为频繁、进行军事干涉行动次数最多的国家。研究者们通常认为,美国的军事干涉在决策和实施上具有很强的单边主义色彩,其突出特征是动辄使用或威胁使用武力,在决定使用武力时一意孤行,时常将自身意志凌驾于联合国和国际法之上。通过考察冷战后美国在伊拉克战争、阿富汗战争、利比亚战争等重大军事干涉行动中的选择可以发现,尽管美国在使用武力的决策上较少受到国际社会的有效约束,但它在军事干涉行动中既不是纯粹依靠自身力量单干,也不是依靠其缔造的多边或双边军事同盟,而是经常性地采取联合阵线的方式执行军事打击和战后维稳行动。联合阵线的目标确定性及手段灵活性为美国主导军事干涉行动提供了便利,而规避集体行动的困境、让伙伴承担军事行动的负担、为干涉行动寻找合法性以及减少美国的投入和损失等考量,也使得美国具有招募多国参与其军事行动的强烈动机。由于当前国际体系结构的制约,不少国家倾向于加入美国的军事干涉联合阵线,以便在美国主导的等级体系中获取安全保障和经济利益。     

Gaiatsu and Japan's Foreign Aid: Rethinking theReactive–Proactive Debate

This article examines the role of the United States in Japan's foreign aid policy. The Japanese government often alters its course of action under U.S. pressure even if doing so would apparently undermine its own interests. Japan's unusual responsiveness to U.S. preferences appears counterintuitive given the fact that at least in the realm of foreign aid Japan's power clearly surpassed that of the United States. This article posits that Japan's responsiveness stems in large part from the asymmetry of interdependence between the two countries. After critically reviewing the existing literature, it conducts two case studies to examine the validity of the argument. The article concludes that the United States played a crucial role but Japan's responsiveness to American pressure reflects an act of will rather than a lack of coherent policy stemming from bureaucratic politics. The findings have important implications to the ongoing debate over whether Japan is a "reactive state."     

美国因素介入南海争端的用意及影响

在美国"重返东南亚"的大背景下,南海争端呈现复杂化趋势.本文对美国因素介入南海争端的用意及其战略布局进行分析,并就美国介入对南海争端相关当事方的影响进行分析和探讨.     

How NATO remembers: explaining institutional memory in NATO crisis management

This article introduces an argument for how institutional memory of crisis management operations develops in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Scholars of European security and of international organisations have examined organisational learning, but have yet to explain its precondition: institutional memory. In a context of increasing turnover due to defence budget cuts, it remains unclear how shared knowledge of strategic errors is acquired. This article finds that the NATO secretariat facilitates practitioners’ use of informal processes for contributing to institutional memory in response to the constraints of existing formal learning processes. These formal processes, including a lessons learned centre and a lessons learned database, inadvertently disincentivise practitioners from contributing such knowledge as using them can incur reputational costs. Drawing on NATO documentation and interviews with 27 NATO elite practitioners, the paper provides evidence that practitioners instead share knowledge through three informal processes: interpersonal communications, private documentation and crisis simulations.     

US foreign policy,public memory,and autism: representing September 11 and May 4

In this article, we examine the social production of autism in US foreign policy discourse. Autism, we argue, is evident in the active forgetting of US foreign policy and its consequences, both in the US and abroad. It is this forgetting, promoted by the US state, that enabled many Americans to respond to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with the question ‘Why do they hate us?’ The explanation for the social production of an autistic attitude in US foreign policy, we argue, lies in the relations between institutional power and competing narratives and articulations of US foreign policy and domestic politics. The argument is illustrated through analysis of the politics of public memory at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio, where, on May 4, 1970, 13 students were shot, four fatally, while protesting the US invasion of Cambodia.     

Sticks and stones: the relationship between drone strikes and al-Qaeda’s portrayal of the United States

This article seeks to determine the relationship between the implementation of drone strikes and any changes in al-Qaeda’s portrayal of the United States. To this end, the study examines the changes in frequency of 26 different accusations made against the United States in al-Qaeda propaganda published “pre-drone strikes,” as compared to propaganda published during the “drone strike era.” The statistical significance of changes in frequency was evaluated by conducting a series of proportions tests in STATA. The results indicate that al-Qaeda has shifted from more ambiguous claims that the United States meddles in foreign countries’ affairs, tolerates immoral acts, and is an occupying force to more specific accusations that the United States cowardly commits illegal acts and indiscriminately kills civilians.     

The United States and the Promotion of Democracy in Latin America: Then, Now and Tomorrow

The United States has been deeply involved in Latin American affairs for over a century, but promoting democracy has only recently become a priority. The end of the Cold War presented a unique opportunity to provide greater support for democracy in the Western Hemisphere. This article examines the main multilateral and bilateral actions undertaken by the United States to promote democracy in Latin America in recent decades. It makes use of a newly available dataset that specifies the investment made on democracy in different countries and sectors between 1990 and 2005. It also addresses the challenges that the United States confronts in promoting democracy in the region at the current time and the possible scenarios for the near future.     

Why unipolarity doesn't matter (much)

This article first argues that states have not balanced against US unipolar power because the potential balancers do not view the United States as a major threat, because they believe it has benign security-seeking motives, at least with regard to other major powers. This explanation runs counter to the Brooks–Wohlforth argument, which holds that states are not balancing because the magnitude of the United States’ power advantage makes balancing essentially infeasible. The second part of the paper challenges the conventional wisdom on the benefits of unipolarity, arguing that the benefits the United States derives from unipolarity are generally overrated. More specifically, US security need not be significantly reduced by growth in China's economy that supports a return to bipolarity.     

Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq

The need to demonstrate America's resolve is a major argument among those who oppose a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility and embolden the forces of radical Islam in their war against the United States. This article assesses this “reputational” argument and concludes that evidence from radical Islamists’ pronouncements gives the argument significant and unprecedented forcefulness. These pronouncements unmistakably call into question the United States’ resoluteness by pointing to America's past withdrawals from theaters of war and declare Iraq as the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument is also unprecedented when it is compared to its similar formulation during the Vietnam War, when it was vague and short of supporting evidence. The reputational argument may play an important rationale in maintaining a substantial level of American forces in Iraq for years to come.     

Can Europe Fill the Void in U.S. Military Leadership?

This article lays out the case for why Washington's European allies are incapable, both now and in the foreseeable future, of replacing American military leadership. Despite recent substantial force contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan and small-scale interventions in Africa, European military capabilities are limited, declining, and unlikely to rebound, regardless of whether the United States is in strategic retreat. As a result, the United States faces a bleak choice: not whether to trade American global leadership for an equally benevolent European world order, but whether to give up its mantle of leadership and thereby create a void that may be filled by unfriendly, if not overtly hostile, actors.     

US policy and the Kashmir dispute: prospects for resolution

Washington refuses to chart a roadmap for peace in Kashmir. Although the chances for resolving the dispute are low, the probability of failure should not inhibit the US government from pursuing a more proactive role in resolving the conflict. The United States is the “sole pole” in a unipolar international system; regarding the world's thorniest disputes, it either leads or bears the brunt of its own passivity. Leadership requires more than devising policies that are guaranteed to work; it also involves taking risks on bold initiatives that may fail, but whose unlikely success would produce greater stability in global affairs. This article examines the admittedly slim prospects for settling the Kashmir dispute and the role Washington might play in such a process. It argues that only one conflict-resolution option seems even remotely viable: a phased conversion of the existing Kashmiri Line of Control into an internationally recognized Indo-Pakistani border.     

美国对东南亚外交的未来趋势

布什上任后,美国对东南亚地区越来越关注,美国与东南亚地区各国在贸易、军事合作以及外交关系等方面的互动越来越频繁和深入.很多学者认为这是美国借着打击恐怖主义的契机,开始"重返东南亚"①的表现.从近几年美国在东南亚的一系活动来看,反恐并不是美国的唯一目的,而更多地是为了加强它对这一地区的影响和控制.纵观布什政府在东南亚的一系列外交活动,可以看到三个基本的方向:(1)继续在这一地区推行美国价值观和理念;(2)在加强和巩固与传统盟国如泰国和菲律宾的关系与合作的基础上,拓展新的双边关系;(3)积极参与和建构东南亚地区主义进程,提升美国对东南亚地区主义进程的影响.     

Nuclear Proliferation,the Kargil Conflict,and South Asian Security

The idea that the United States is an empire or should adopt imperial strategies has been widely criticized. One of the most persuasive sets of arguments against imperial enthusiasts is that empire is an obsolete and outdated strategy. Both systemic- and domestic-level changes are said to prevent the United States from successfully implementing an imperial strategy. I maintain that the importance of these barriers—whether technological, economic, or ideational—are greatly overstated. In contrast, I point to a number of developments, such as the rise of nontraditional security threats, the revolution in military affairs, and changing norms of humanitarian intervention, that will encourage greater American overseas adventurism.     

Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.     

The Politics of U.S.–UN Reengagement: Achieving Gains in a Hostile Environment

From 1999 to 2001, the United States actively tried to improve its image and role in the United Nations (UN). This was a difficult process due to the many areas of disagreement between the United States and other UN members. However, throughout this period, the focus of reengagement was centered on resolving the large and longstanding U.S. arrears to the UN. While the United States was not able to achieve everything it desired, this period of reengagement resulted in new scales of assessment for the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets that were much more favorable to the United States. This article draws on practitioner interviews to analyze the U.S. campaign to resolve its arrears, most specifically focusing on six factors that explain why the United States was able to achieve so much in the face of such an inhospitable environment at the UN. In doing so, the article identifies several areas where scholars and practitioners are highlighting similar dynamics, and it uncovers important policy implications for future U.S. efforts to push other UN members in directions that they may not be eager to go. These policy implications are especially relevant for current U.S.–UN relations given the U.S. failure to secure Security Council authorization for the use of force against Iraq in March 2003 .     

Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics

As globalization accelerates, U.S. foreign policy makers have become less convinced of the influence geopolitics and power politics have on international affairs. They now risk losing touch with rising competitors like China that continue to view the international system in geopolitical terms. Chinese geopolitical strategists have great influence with the country's defense policy makers, who are focusing increasingly on the need for China to establish command of the seas—a goal that threatens conflict between it and the United States throughout Asia. In order to prevent a return to a world dominated by aggressive, geopolitically driven actors, the United States cannot afford to assume that China shares its worldview and that geopolitics has disappeared from international relations.     

The birth of ANZUS: America's attempt to create a defense linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

This article discusses the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand andthe United States) security treaty negotiations, with specialemphasis on the 1951 Canberra talks, and examines why the USentered into a formal security alliance with Australia and NewZealand. It argues that the US concluded the security treatywith Australia and New Zealand in order to obtain their politicalsupport for a proposed American peace treaty with Japan, whichwould allow unconditional revitalization of Japanese militarypower. It is also the argument of this article that the US createdANZUS as a means of consolidating its own strategic positionin Northeast Asia by committing Australia and New Zealand tothe defense of US bases and forces stationed on the Japaneseislands.     

South China Sea： Disputes and Great Powers

In the South China Sea disputes,China has ample proof to claim sovereignty over the Xisha Islands(the Paracel Islands)and Nansha Islands(the Spratly Islands)while the claims of certain southeast Asian countries do not hold any water.The South China Sea disputes have their origins in the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951,the result of intervention by the United States and Great Britain in regional affairs.Even today,the United States has not discarded its Cold War mentality and continues to intervene in the South China Sea disputes.The only change in the United States’ attitude is that it has changed its pretext for intervention from "containing Communist expansion" in the past to "preserving freedom of navigation in the South China Sea" in the present.     

美国国家安全委员会变迁探析

美国建立了世界上第一个国家安全委员会,历经67年世势风云的洗礼,美国国家安全委员会已成为美国处理所有国际事务的中心,作为美国国家安全事务的咨询与协调机构,它在美国国家安全决策过程乃至世界外交局势的演变中都持续发挥着重要的影响力。历经各任领导者对其地位与角色的不同定位,美国国家安全委员会的职能、制度、运行及决策程序在不断修改与调整中走向稳定与成熟。其机构和人员的设置既审时度势、灵活多样、顺应时代变化,又逐渐探索确立了富有特色的部际协调机制,将各法定成员、法定顾问、国家安全事务助理以及非法定成员有效地组织起来,通过形式各异的正式程序、非正式程序以及秘密程序的分析、评估与协调会议,为总统的国家安全事务决策提供必不可少的支持。美国国家安全委员会变迁与改革的每一步都伴随着法律及行政法令的颁行与修订,授权与监督,体现了法制先行的特点。美国国家安全委员会戏剧性的发展历程中积累的经验与教训,为中国建立不久的中央国家安全委员会提供了借鉴。