人权的革命与革命中的人权——对罗伯斯比尔人权观的重新解读

本文在介绍了罗伯斯比尔关于人权的基本观点后,分析了罗伯斯比尔人权观中存在的内在矛盾,并结合法国大革命的历史背景着重探讨了导致罗伯斯比尔人权理想和人权实践形成巨大差距的原因。本文认为造成罗伯斯比尔人权观的悲剧既与其思想中存在的民粹主义和道德理想主义密切相关,也与那时的人权是一种人权革命后的人权和革命中的人权这一事实有着极为重要的关系。     

以人权促进发展:工具性人权论

人权与发展是当今世界两大议题,而长久以来人权与发展在两条互不搭界的轨道上运行,人权与发展的结合能为人类增添更多福祉。人权是发展的目的,发展是为了扩展人权,这是目的性人权论。而人权必须以经济社会发展为基础,且人权能够促进经济社会发展,因而"以人权促进发展"的工具性人权,是人权最终得以保障的最佳路径。工具性人权有着深厚的法理底蕴、现实基础和规范支撑,人权演进的历史其实就是一部工具性人权的发展史,从古代到现代、从美国到中国的实践经验无不表明人权对发展的重大作用,世界人权宪章等国际规范性文件无不论证着工具性人权的重要价值。     

和谐人权:中国精神与人权文化的互济

根植于冲突与对立的传统人权观已不能应对现代社会文化多元的挑战,人权原教旨主义者的坚守、人权政治学的庸俗实用化、人权法理学的技术性进步都在戕害着人权本身固有的批判精神.以发乎和谐的中国精神化育西方文化本位人权观,并不是对其价值的抛弃或取代,而是对其精神的拓展与提升.基于和谐的人权不仅会使西方人权观超越其历史局限性而赢得其普遍性,也会使中国精神超越其民族性而赢得其世界性.     

论环境权的人权属性

对于环境权的属性问题一直是法学界争论的一个焦点 ,可谓众说纷纭 ,莫衷一是。从权利本原的角度入手 ,阐述目前我国研究权利特别是环境权的范式存在的误区 ,提出应从唯物主义的立场揭示环境权的自然权利属性。同时 ,对人权的历史发展中概念、性质、主体和内容的变化进行剖析 ,推断出环境权符合人权的构成要件 ,在精神实质与价值内涵上与人权存在固有的联系 ,是一项人类社会生存与发展不可或缺的基本人权。     

Human Rights – Human Bodies? Some Reflections on Corporate Human Rights Distortion,The Legal Subject, Embodiment and Human Rights Theory

This paper responds to the subversion of international human rights discourse by corporations. It begins by placing such subversion in three contexts: the ascendance of human rights as the dominant discourse of contemporary moral and political life; the emerging challenges to human rights posed by other-than-natural-human entities; and ambiguity in the relationship between the legal subject and the human being. The author suggests that in order to resist corporate human rights distortion it is important to reclaim the language of the human for the natural human being, despite complex philosophical and definitional challenges attending the designation of the term ‘human.’ The author suggests that by re-attending to the implications of human embodiment for human rights theory it might be possible to re-invigorate the protective potential of human rights for vulnerable human beings and communities against powerful disembodied legal persons (corporations).     

作为偶像崇拜的人权

人权既不是一种世俗宗教,也不是一种形而上学。认为人固有天然的尊严之类的主张尚可争议。人权不能被建立在人性基础上,而应建立在人类的历史和经验,如大屠杀、世界大战、奥斯威辛集中营、柯利马劳改营这样的基础之上。人权说明什么是对的,不说明什么是善的。人权只有作为一种关于“什么是对的”的“稀薄”理论才能博得全球认同。一种保护人权的普遍政治制度与道德个人主义是相容的。在一个全球社会,人权最低限度的共识在于这样一种基本直觉:对你来说是痛苦和羞辱的事情对我必定也是如此。     

以人权看待发展

发展权问题在理论和实践上至今没有得到很好的解决,主要是因为观念和制度上的障碍与误解。从将发展权界分为国际社会的主张与人权体系的重新分类来看,狭义的发展权意味着人权谱系的拓展,意味着需要以开放的方式理解人权。以人权看待发展,意味着对发展问题和人权问题的双向重新审视。     

区域性人权保护制度对全球性国际人权保护的启示

尽管目前已存在为数不少的国际人权公约,国际社会成员也越来越多地加入这些公约,但全球范围内国际人权保护的效果并不明显。相比而言,区域性人权保护制度更具可行性。区域性人权保护制度在人权保护中取得了显著成绩,对全球性国际人权保护有重大启迪作用。     

Human Flourishing, Human Dignity, and Human Rights

Rather than treating them as discrete and incommensurable ideas, we sketch some connections between human flourishing and human dignity, and link them to human rights. We contend that the metaphor of flourishing provides an illuminating aspirational framework for thinking about human development and obligations, and that the idea of human dignity is a critical element within that discussion. We conclude with some suggestions as to how these conceptions of human dignity and human flourishing might underpin and inform appeals to human rights.     

The Effectiveness of Human Rights Due Diligence for Preventing Business Human Rights Abuses

Netherlands International Law Review - Human rights due diligence is today a key aspect of the international, regional and national debates about corporate accountability for human rights abuse. It...     

Raz on Rights: Human Rights,Fundamental Rights,and Balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations—a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.     

论人权到近代民权的重构——兼论近代民权催生的本土机制

作为近代民主政治思想的核心概念,民权一词有着独特的文化内涵.传统权力一元化思维模式揭示了民权产生的权力来源;以义务为本位的法律思想造成了民权之个体权利诉求意识的缺失;以顺服为核心的儒家伦理规则窒息了个体权利主体的生成;以宗法为特征的传统组织模式则直接抑制了多元对抗社会的萌生.在传统文化的重构下,民权远离了西方的人权理念.     

论艾滋病人的权利及其人权保障

艾滋病是一种会对他人的健康构成严重威胁且蔓延势头极为迅猛的传染病。在艾滋病防治方面,法律的进步有赖于医学科学的进步,后者是前者的基础之一。对艾滋病人所采取的隔离措施有其法律根据,隔离行为本身具有合法性,但也是有条件的。中国政府对艾滋病防治的长远规划是,以为艾滋病人提供一个更为人道、更有益于他们身心健康的环境,不使这一弱势群体脱离家庭、与世隔绝,而使他们得以在社会中过正常人的生活为目的。社会在要求艾滋病人承担起责任的同时,理应对他们因此而丧失的诸多利益进行补偿。艾滋病人应当在法律上享有与其他公民同样的权利,同时也与其他公民一样必须承担相应的义务。关注艾滋病人的生存状态,关爱艾滋病人群体,反对将他们排斥在社会之外,对于防治艾滋病和遏制其蔓延,具有重要意义。近些年来,从中央到地方政府所制定的关于防治艾滋病的一系列法律文件,无一不体现出一种深切的人道主义精神和关怀,而要将这些政策和法律文件转化为实实在在的温暖,还将走一段较长且艰难的道路。目前,汇集现有艾滋病防治的各种政策法律文件,制定一部专门的法典——《艾滋病防治法》,已成为中国依法治国进程中一项重要且亟待着手进行的任务。     

论作为人权与公民权的自由权

自中世纪以来 ,自由就是人类所追求的一种价值目标和生存状态。本文从人权和公民权的角度来论述自由权。在具体论述时从自由的含义出发 ,阐述自由和自由人权 ,进而揭示自由的法律意义 ,即法律上的自由权。在此基础之上 ,本文最后简要论述了自由与平等、秩序等价值目标的矛盾和平衡。     

The Concept of Rights in Contemporary Human Rights Discourse

In a variety of disciplines, there exists a consensus that human rights are individual claim rights that all human beings possess simply as a consequence of being human. That consensus seems to me to obscure the real character of the concept and hinder the progress of discussion. I contend that rather than thinking of human rights in the first instance as “claim rights” possessed by individuals, we should regard human rights as higher order norms that articulate standards of legitimacy for sociopolitical and legal institutions.     

论人权与基本权利的关系——以德国法和一般法学理论为背景

人权和宪法上的基本权利这两个源自西语的概念,在汉语法学文献中的使用并不统一,这直接或间接影响到宪法引领下的实定法体系内在的系统化和统一性。本文旨在从一般法学理论角度澄清二者之间的区别和关联。本文特别指出,从人权转化为宪法权利要经过四个限缩性过渡——民族国家化、制度化、理性科学化和习俗化。基本权利不仅是人权的制度化,而且它总是包含着以人权为指针,从而最大程度上实现人权的要求。最后,通过运用这一新的分析框架,本文概括性地分析了现行宪法和法律实践中出现的一些问题。     

The European Union and Human Rights: Towards A Post-National Human Rights Institution?

There is growing evidence that the European Union (EU) is becomingmore involved in human rights protection and has the capacityto turn into an unprecedented post-national human rights protectioninstitution. Based on that evidence, this article suggests differentarguments in favour of a further development in this direction.These arguments stem not only from a general global justiceapproach to post-national institutions’ responsibilities,but also from the concept of human rights itself and the specificneeds of human rights protection at the post-national level.The EU's institutional framework presents advantages that fitthe general criteria of institutional design in the human rightscontext. Of course, many doubts and critiques may be raisedagainst an entity which started primarily as a functional andeconomic institution, and important reforms, some of which areventured in the present article, are still needed to get theEU closer to this institutional ideal. More generally, the articleemphasises the unique example and precedent the EU may constitutefor normative institutional thinking about global justice atthe post-national level.     

Human Dignity and Socio-Economic Rights

The South African Constitution numbers among a very few constitutions around the world which include justiciable socio-economic rights. One of the controversies surrounding judicial enforcement of such rights is the extent to which it is appropriate for courts to engage in policy choices in relation to the use of state resources in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers. The South African Constitutional Court has responded by developing an approach to adjudication of socio-economic rights in which the role of the court is to determine the reasonableness or otherwise of measures taken by the legislature and executive to implement such rights. However, the South African Constitution is also notable for its identification of human dignity as an underlying value and the explicit duty placed on the courts to interpret the rights protected under the Bill of Rights in conformity with this value. This article scrutinises the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional court in light of the Constitutional commitment to human dignity. It questions whether reasonableness review in socio-economic cases successfully balances human dignity with the appropriate degree of deference to the legislature and executive, in compliance with the doctrine of the separation of powers.