Citizenship studies: A general theory

Societies face two contradictory principles. They are organised around issues of scarcity, which result in exclusionary structures such as gender divisions, social classes and status groups, but they must also secure social solidarity. In social science, these contradictory principles are characteristically referred to as the allocative and integrative requirements. In a secular society, especially where social inequality is intensified by economic rationalism, citizenship functions as a major foundation of social solidarity. The article also explores the scope of citizenship studies through an examination of identity, civic virtue and community. It concludes with an extensive critique of the legacy of T. H. Marshall, pointing to the future of citizenship studies around the theme of globalisation and human rights.     

A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections

In this paper, we construct a general probabilistic spatial theory of elections and examine sufficient conditions for equilibrium in two-candidate contests with expected vote-maximizing candidates. Given strict concavity of the candidate objective function, a unique equilibrium exists and the candidates adopt the same set of policy positions. Prospective uncertainty, reduced policy salience, degree of concavity of voter utility functions, some degree of centrality in the feasible set of policy locations, and restrictions on the dimensionality of the policy space are all stabilizing factors in two-candidate elections. 3. CITIZEN. We have been called so of many, not that our heads are some brown, some black, some auburn, some bald, but that our wits are so diversely colored. And truly I think if all our wits were to issue out of one skill, they would fly east, west, north, south, and their consent of one direct way should be at once to all points o' the compass. (Shakespeare, coriolanus II.iii. 19–26)     

A complete general theory of planning is impossible

The essay defines the domain of planning theory and proposes two criteria—brevity and neutrality — for a prime table displaying the basic propositions of a complete general theory. I argue—on sociological rather than on formal epistemological grounds—that these two criteria cannot be met simultaneously. Even the most aggressive development of the policy sciences is not likely, therefore, to culminate in a complete general theory of planning.     

Dilemmas in a general theory of planning

The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is bound to fail, becuase of the nature of these problems. They are wicked problems, whereas science has developed to deal with tame problems. Policy problems cannot be definitively described. Moreover, in a pluralistic society there is nothing like the undisputable public good; there is no objective definition of equity; policies that respond to social problems cannot be meaningfully correct or false; and it makes no sense to talk about optimal solutions to social problems unless severe qualifications are imposed first. Even worse, there are no solutions in the sense of definitive and objective answers.This is a modification of a paper presented to the Panel on Policy Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston, December 1969.     

A tribute to Earl A. Thompson and, in his own words, a summary of his general economic and social theory

Brilliant but little known, in part because his style was dense and crucial papers unpublished, Earl Thompson reformulated standard theory to achieve policy relevance, focusing on significant rent-seeking inefficiencies stemming from private information and transaction costs. Drawing on history, he showed a vast array of institutions to be efficient which economists had previously found to be inefficient, modeled governments and their nature, defined government’s functions, and showed why dominant states rise and fall.     

Egalitarian justice and interpersonal comparison

Abstract. This paper surveys the strengths and weaknesses of three widely–discussed egalitarian standards of interpersonal comparison: welfare, resource , and capability . We argue that welfare egalitarianism is beset by numerous serious problems, and should be rejected. Capability and resourcist standards conform with egalitarian convictions more closely, but each faces distinctive problems. We itemise a set of desiderata which a fully adequate account of interpersonal comparison would satisfy. We conclude that the choice between capability and resourcist standards turns on the relative importance of such an account being able to accommodate reasonable pluralism and identify inequality in a publicly verifiable manner.     

On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective

It is a widely held belief that interest groups respond competitively to political challenges from other groups. This view is found not only in the traditional theory of interest groups, but also in the literature on policy typologies. Though it is not necessarily supposed that groups form in response to opposition, it is believed that when groups exist, they compete. If an interest group is thought of as a multipurpose organization, whose leaders might spend organizational funds on nonpolitical programs which directly serve the members, the supposition of competition can be subjected to rigorous examination. Political competition causes the cost of political success to rise. Since group leaders must allocate scarce revenue among projects, it seems that nonpolitical projects might become more attractive when the political environment becomes competitive. Political scientists have usually been disposed to take the opposite view, believing that demand for political activity rises as the cost of political success increases. The nature of political action as an organizational investment is discussed from the allocative perspective in this essay. It is shown that competition cannot be safely assumed unless other strong hypotheses are invoked. A Slutsky-type theorem is deduced for political reaction.     

A general analysis of rent-seeking games

In this paper we reconsider the basic model of “efficient rent seeking.” We stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents.     

A theory of credit bureaus

When both the buyer and seller have the potential to exercise opportunistic behavior some balancing of these mal-incentives must be found. Seller financing has the potential to work as a quality assurance device because the lien holder is clearly at risk when mortgaged property fails. The buyer is at risk in the amount of the down payment and installments if the property is abused. Credit bureaus act as arbitrators. Our model accurately predicts the shifting in contract terms to account for relative opportunism and the incidence of this contract based on changes in the relative costs and benefits.     

A general constitutional possibility theorem

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem shows that there exist no transitive social preferences in nonoligarchic societies for all possible profiles of individual preference orderings. Similarly, a generalization of Sen's Theorem of the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal implies under the same conditions that non-Pareto-optimal outcomes may be present in the resulting cyclical preference relations. This essay changes the customary perspective. It demonstrates that, for any profile of individual preferences, we can always find a nonoligarchic assignment of rights to different subsets of society, to decide between pairs of outcomes, together with adequate decision rules, which escapes these problems. This assignment of rights can be a purely liberal one even for each profile, but not one in which everybody participates in all decisions and which uses simple or qualified-majority voting (Total Direct Democracy). The adequate purely liberal constitution, on the other hand, may imply an oligarchy if too few outcomes are present.     

A distributional theory of government growth

This article presents a closed form solution for time-consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter. Extending Meltzer and Richard’s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government. At low stages of economic development the median voter, identified as a relatively poor worker, prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings. Through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage. At higher stages of development, however, when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller, the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises. Yet, in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times. Hence, government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state.     

A theory of the spoils system

In a spoils system, it is axiomatic that ‘to the winners go the spoils.’ This essay formalizes spoils systems as cooperative games, with winners given by a simple game structure, and represented by a fixed number of political appointments. We analyze the resulting spoils games by means of the non-transferable utility value, and we offer two practical applications of the results.     

A political theory of intergovernmental grants

This paper formulates a political theory of intergovernmental grants. A model of vote-maximizing federal politicians is developed. Grants are assumed to buy the support of state voters and the ‘political capital or resources’ of state politicians and interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters for the federal politician. The model is tested for 49 states. Similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians and the size of the Democrat majority in the state legislature increases the per capita dollar amount of grants made to a state. Likewise, increases in both the size of the state bureaucracy and union membership lead to greater grants for a state. Over time, the importance of interest groups (bureaucracy and unions) has increased relative to political groups (state politicians).     

A threat-centered theory of policy entrepreneurship

Policy Sciences - We know relatively little about the conditions that encourage people to jump into the political fray as policy entrepreneurs, advocates who devote substantial time, energy, and...     

A general framework for social science

It is possible to construct a basic framework that potentially accommodates the interactions of all biological, biosocial, cultural and situational determinants of behavior. While specific problems will require changes of detail, a single structure of interactions for all problems increases the additive possibilities of the field, and makes feasible definition of the limits and applicability of alternative general theories. The framework should help the applied social scientist relate his suggestions to the full range of interactions.The inspiration for the adaptation of the system approach to my determinants came from a consideration of the modeling and systems work of Jay W. Forrester (1961, 1969). With all its substantive flaws and overstatement, I have found his work methodologically very suggestive.