Re/visioning the women's movement in Israel

Current literature on the women's movement argues that in recent decades, a schism based on the politics of identity has divided women and led to the weakening of the movement. This process, intersecting with the escalation of neoliberal trends and the ‘NGOization’ of civil society, has resulted in the depoliticization of the women's movement and the waning of its influence as a political force. The present paper seeks to examine whether this argument is consistent with the situation in the Israeli women's movement of the early twenty-first century. Based on the history of the women's movement in Israel, the paper posits a twofold argument: (a) the women's movement in Israel has not disappeared but has been restructured as a result of its NGOization; (b) despite criticism of the movement in the literature and on the part of activists as the result of its NGOization, the movement's political messages have remained intact and even expanded to embrace questions of social justice, including novel thinking on matters of peace and security.     

The economics of emergency response

Federal first responder funding is estimated to be $98 billion below the minimum required level over the 5 years ending in 2010. A significant portion of that shortfall can be covered by savings attained by eliminating non-public-good services, initiating public–private partnerships for meeting peak time demand in emergency situations, and contracting-out other public services. We concentrate on such savings in the context of response to false calls to police, fire, and ambulance services. Solving the false alarm problem for police, fire, and ambulance services and eliminating some non-public-good police services could release significant service-hours and 23.7–31.4% of the required additional Homeland Security (HLS) annual spending. Reducing false alarms means 88,000 police, fire, and ambulance first responders could be shifted to HLS activities.

The economics of having children

When populations grow rapidly, per capita incomes rise less rapidly, because investment and technology cannot keep pace. Reduced fertility would reduce the ratio of dependent children to work age adults, increasing possible savings. Maximizing future incomes per capita means having completed families smaller than parents usually desire. In the United States if parents typically had 2.1 surviving children altogether, the net reproduction rate would fall to unity and a zero population growth might be achieved in a.d. 2060 at 345 millions. The political-social-economic problem is that each couple wants more children for itself than all couples collectively want other couples to have. The State may need to encourage fewer births per family through taxes and subsidies.     

The lightship in economics

What role does government play in the provision of public goods? Economists have used the lighthouse as an empirical example to illustrate the extent to which the private provision of public goods is possible. This inquiry, however, has neglected the private provision of lightships. We investigate the private operation of the world’s first modern lightship, established in 1731 on the banks of the Thames estuary going in and out of London. First, we show that the Nore lightship was able to operate profitably and without government enforcement in the collection of payments for lighting services. Second, we show how private efforts to build lightships were crowded out by Trinity House, the public authority responsible for establishing and maintaining lighthouses in England and Wales. By including lightships into the broader lighthouse market, we argue that the provision of lighting services exemplifies not a market failure, but a government failure.     

政府公共危机管理的经济学分析

随着危机事件的频频发生,政府公共危机管理越来越是人们研究的重点领域。传统研究更多地倾向于用制度主义来解释危机事件管理不善的原因,很少从经济学角度对之进行研究。本文以经济学相关理论为基础提出了政府公共危机管理的三个假说,以三鹿奶粉事件为实证进行经济学分析,并多角度探讨了政府公共危机管理长效机制的建设路径。     

The political economics of not paying taxes

This paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance. When tax avoidance is possible, the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay. This affects both redistributive outcomes as well as political attitudes towards taxation. Depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge. When the avoidance possibilities are limited, the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained. If the tax avoidance technology is more effective, however, the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation where a coalition of poor and the very richest favor a higher tax rate. Comparing the model predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity, it comes surprisingly close to actual observations.