THOMAS HOBBES AND THE CONSTITUENT POWER OF THE PEOPLE

Abstract. The paper examines Hobbes's doctrine of representation and argues that implicit in this doctrine is the modern notion of the people as the constituent power of the state. Attention is focused on the progressive evolution of Hobbes's ideas about the multitude, the people, and the constitution of political unity, and on the connection between his doctrine of political representation and his concept of personality. The paper ends by assessing the compatibility of Hobbes's concept of the people as constituent power and his concept of the commonwealth by acquisition.     

BEATING THE ODDS: MAYORAL LEADERSHIP AND THE ACQUISITION OF POWER

During a time of dwindling resources, Boston Mayor Kevin White acquired a significant amount of power. This was in contrast to the experiences of other mayors during the 1960s and 1970s and to the predictions for mayoral leadership in general. Examining the paradox of White's administration underscores the need for politically skillful executives. Effective political skills include the ability to perceive resource opportunities, to select the appropriate strategies and to choose the best arena in which to operate. While all mayors have access to resources, they do not always use them effectively. Resources must be conserved, protected, and pyramided. Focusing on White's role as a power accumulator, his use of federal money, and his shift from audience and media politics to constituent and organization politics, this article examines how a mayor expands his political capital in an environment of limited resources. The major themes that emerge are the importance of political skills and political organization to strong mayoral leadership.     

THE POWER OF THE PURSE AND BUDGETARY ACCOUNTABILITY: EXPERIENCES FROM SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA

Accountability is the cornerstone of fiscal administration. This research studies the relationship between accountability and the sharing of budgetary power. We found that the accountability in China is supported by the superior of bureaucratic power, instead of the comprehensiveness of various accountability components. The implication is that the accountability is facilitated in terms of emphasising to whom government officials are accountable within the chain of command, reducing goal conflicts and improving strategic goal attainment. However, it is hindered at the same time in terms of lacking evaluations perceived to be impartial, limited room for democratic accountability, over‐implementation of policies at all costs, and weak comprehensive awareness of ‘accountable for what’ (as long as it is a policy direction from the top). The structure of the power of the purse both enables and limits the tone and terrain of budget accountability in particular and government accountability in general. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.