Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

Emergence of the Greater China Circle Economies: Cooperation versus competition

The integration of the so-called greater China economies among Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is one part of the global trend of regionalism. The significance of integration in terms of foreign trade and foreign direct investment demonstrates not only rapid growth but also diversity, ever since Mainland China pursued her open door policy of economic reform in 1979. For instance, the combined volume of Hong Kong and Taiwan accounted for as much as 74.1% of Mainland China's capital utilization in 1993, which in turn contributed to the rapid economic growth of Mainland China over the last two decades. The membership of Mainland China and Taiwan to the WTO, as expected by the end of 2001, will facilitate a more official arrangement of intergovernmental coordination within these Triangle Economies. However, the government of Taiwan will continue to evaluate the cross-strait relations in the context of the nation's overall political and economic security as long as the government of Mainland China does not renounce the use of military force against Taiwan.     

The Missing Link in Sino–Latin American Relations

The growing economic presence of China around the world is a widely recognized reality. China's expanding economic relations with other developing countries have generated both positive and negative reactions. Many believe that the increasing economic ties between China and these countries will enhance China's political influence and encourage political cooperation between China and other countries in the Global South. How strong is the economic–political link? This article examines this question in the context of Sino–Latin American relations in recent years. It finds that thus far China's expanding economic relations with the region have not had a significant spillover effect into the political realm. The article provides preliminary explanations of the missing link between the economic and the political. It calls for more nuanced ways to apply familiar international relations paradigms to understanding the implications of the rise of China.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

The Hong Kong Policy of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1997

China's policy toward Hong Kong in the period 1949-1997 was primarily driven by utilitarian calculations of national interests and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. The Hong Kong policy of China, as an integral part of its foreign policy, was distinctive in that ideological fervor and nationalist passions had limited influence. The goals to be achieved by the Hong Kong policy remained unchanged throughout the period; the strategies adopted, however, changed in accordance with the changing international situation and the national interests as defined by the Chinese leaders. The primary goals of the Hong Kong policy were to secure a less threatening external political environment for China and to make calculated use of Hong Kong for China's economic development. By tolerating Hong Kong as a British colony, China also depended on Britain to control the potentially threatening anti-Communist Chinese population there. The 'over-dependence' on the British to control the Chinese people in Hong Kong on the eve of Hong Kong's reversion to China, however, alienated the Hong Kong people as well as impeded the formation of local political leaders in the territory. As a result, the acquisition of Hong Kong by China in 1997 has not been accompanied by political rapport between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong people, thus sowing seeds for lingering friction between them.     

Nationalism and Democratization in Contemporary China

The crippled economic and political reform in China has come with two schools of thought: the new-left and nationalism. The new-left focuses on domestic issues, while nationalism tackles more international relationships. This paper explores the effects of radical nationalism on China's democratization process. It argues that if nationalism takes the dominant position in China's political process, Chinese reform will go astray.     

How Do Americans Evaluate China's International Responsibility? An Empirical Assessment

China in recent years has been asked by other major powers to take a greater share in international responsibility in response to the rise in China's national capability. Negative perceptions about how China is dodging its international responsibility exist not only among policy makers around the world, but have spread to worldwide mass publics, especially across the American people. In this article, we apply the dataset from the ‘Americans’ Attitudes toward China Survey' (AACS) to investigate what the American public think of China's international responsibility and which factors explain the varying evaluations from different theoretical perspectives. The results indicate that Americans' negative evaluations of China's international responsibility are associated with poor ratings regarding China's fulfillment of its domestic obligations and apprehension regarding China's potential threat, but has little to do with China's international behavior. To reduce these negative evaluations, China needs to improve its human rights conditions, give people more political rights, and convince the American public of the benevolence of its ascending power. In addition, persistent efforts toward soft-power construction are also very important since Americans who are interested in Chinese culture or knowledge tend not to think that China is dodging its international responsibility.     

China and Major Power Relations in East Asia

Tremendous changes have taken place in East Asia in the post-Cold War era, which have a great impact on Chinese foreign policy and its relations with major powers in East Asia. This new power configuration is related to as 'two ups' and 'two downs', which have become apparent since the early 1990s. The 'two ups' concern the rise of the United States and China. The United States' rise to sole superpower status has given Washington a dominant role in all four dimensions of world affairs: political, strategic, economic, and technological/cultural. Meanwhile, China has achieved a spectacular economic performance for the past two decades, sustaining high growth rates, and escaping, so far, the Asian economic crisis of 1997‐98. This expansion has greatly increased China's influence in regional and global affairs. The 'two downs' refer to the downturns of Russia and Japan. This article provides a detailed analysis of China's international environment in the context of the changing dynamics of major-power relations in East Asia. Special attention is paid to the crucial Beijing‐Tokyo‐Washington triangle. The examination focuses upon political, economic, and strategic dimensions.     

China and Asian regionalism: Challenge and policy choice

Regionalism has become an interesting phenomenon in Asian international relations. Driven by fast growing trade and investment, Asian countries have developed variegated patterns of economic co‐operation and a complex level of interdependence among themselves. Although the growing Asian regionalism is very much an economics‐driven process, it has profound impacts on regional political organization. This analysis examines Beijing's changing attitudes toward Asian regionalism and its policy choice in the regional economic integration. It is argued that the integration of the Chinese economy into the regional structure is promoted by the government as well as driven by market dynamics. Although Beijing has let the Chinese economy develop into the regional ‘flying geese’ structure, the best policy choice for China, as many Chinese scholars have argued, would be a three‐circle strategy of integrating into the world economy and a strategy of ‘market for technology’ in regional economic co‐operation. This analysis also discusses the regional political obstacles impeding co‐operation across national borders. It is argued that healthy bilateral relations and more political will toward regional multilateralism on political issues would be instrumental for future regional prosperity and stablity in Asia.     

The political economy of Taiwan's mainland policy

The emerging patterns of the cross‐strait interaction present a perplexing duality, revealing both the trends toward closer economic convergence and greater political divergence. Taiwan's mainland policy is both the manifestation and the catalyst of the two contradictory processes. It is the locus of confrontation of the various economic, social, and political forces that propels the two concurrent processes. It has been propelled by the epic changes in the global political economy, the market‐oriented reform in China, and Taiwan's economic restructuring process. It has also been prompted by the perceived challenges and opportunities brought about by the transition to the post‐Cold War era, the unraveling of structural conflicts between a status‐quo power (i.e., the US) and a rising power (i.e., the PRC) and by the politics of political succession within the CCP. In more immediate terms, it has been driven by the power struggle over political succession within the KMT, the bureaucratic process, the interest group politics, the partisan politics in both the electoral and legislative arenas, and the unfolding of the national identity crisis during Taiwan's recent transition to democracy.     

Chinese Nationalism and its Political and Social Origins

Using the 2008 China Survey, this paper examines Chinese respondents' feelings toward their country and how such feelings are related to their democratic values. First, it compares Chinese nationalism with that of 35 countries and regions in the 2003 National Identity Survey. Second, it looks at the origins of Chinese nationalism as embedded in the social and political characteristics of individuals. Third, it further examines the impact of nationalism on people's political attitudes. The findings show that nationalism in contemporary China is better predicted by the political and economic characteristics of an individual rather than cultural attributes, and that nationalism serves as a powerful instrument in impeding public demand for democratic change.     

The China–asean Free Trade Agreement And Taiwan

While China's move toward a FTA with ASEAN reflects Beijing's most recent foreign economic policy adjustment and represents a new stage in the nation's open-door policy, it inevitably produces significant impact on cross-Taiwan Straits relations. This recent development in China's foreign economic relations brings not only substantial psychological and real effects and pressure on Taiwan for its possible isolation and marginalization from the ongoing process of regional integration in East Asia, but also growing pressure exerted by the island's business community that fears being pushed into a disadvantageous position in competition with ASEAN companies in the ever expanding and lucrative market of the mainland. For strategic, diplomatic, and economic considerations in the face of this new challenge, Taiwan is pursuing counter-measures by searching for its own FTAs with other countries within and beyond the region.     

Securing Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: New challenges and opportunities

Cross-Taiwan Straits economic interaction is a political as well as an economic issue. General trends of economic interdependence and globalization that are weakening the role of the nation state should promote a focus of shared 'civilian governance' between Taiwan and mainland China. WTO entry will provide opportunities as well as challenges for cross-Strait economic relations. In anticipation of this dynamic, the new government in Taiwan is attempting to design a new national security web to guarantee Taiwan's 'economic security' in coping with Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on mainland China. As one key agent of globalization, economic cooperation in the urban areas on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may potentially improve relations between Taiwan and mainland China. As decentralization and privatization on mainland China proceed, major cities have developed closer interaction and systems of accountability with the civil society. From a prudent perspective, developing functional cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China at the urban level could be a first substantial step to confidence building between these two economies.     

China's Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States

During the past few decades, China's economic success has permitted it to pursue a greater role on the international stage. China is recognized both as a regional and aspiring global power. Nowhere is this more evident than within Southeast Asia, where China's more active diplomacy is reflected in growing trade relations, proposals for stronger security ties, and the signing of numerous cooperative agreements on issues as varied as environmental protection, drug trafficking, and public health. As a whole, the region has received China's activism with both enthusiasm and trepidation. China has expended significant effort to assuage the fears of its neighbors by adopting a foreign policy approach that is active, non-threatening, and generally aligned with the economic and security interests of the region. This positive diplomacy has clearly yielded some success, most notably in the trade realm, where China is rapidly emerging as an engine of regional economic growth and integration that may well challenge Japanese and American dominance in the next three to five years. In the security realm, China's diplomacy, while rhetorically appealing to regional actors, has yet to make significant inroads in a regional security structure dominated by the United States and its bilateral security relationships. Most significantly, however, if China is to emerge as a real leader within Southeast Asia, it will also need to assume more of the social and political burden that leadership entails. As China continues to advance itself as a regional leader, its policies on issues such as health, drugs, the environment and human rights will face additional scrutiny not only for their impact on the region but also for the more profound question they raise concerning the potential of China's moral leadership. For the United States, China's greater presence and activism suggest at the very least that it cannot remain complacent about the status quo that has governed political, economic and security relations for the past few decades. Shared leadership within Southeast Asia will likely include China in the near future, with all the potential benefits and challenges that such leadership will entail.     

Discussion of 'International Political Economy from a Chinese Angle'

According to Zhu Wenli, Chinese scholars of political economy have been examining many of the same issues as their American counterparts, but have reached quite different conclusions. Chinese scholars accept the importance of globalization, but do not believe that globalization is making the nation-state less relevant or international regimes more powerful. They concede that economic and other transnational issues are becoming increasingly salient in international affairs, but conclude that they are simply altering the ways in which nations compete for power rather than making the international system more cooperative. They agree that much of today's world order is rooted in American hegemony, but do not consider that US foreign policy can be characterized as 'benign'. These conclusions have troubling implications for US‐China relations. They suggest that China will not agree to be integrated into an international community led by the United States, and that the relationship between Beijing and Washington is more likely to be competitive than cooperative.     

China's Dilemma on Iran: between energy security and a responsible rising power

As international pressure on China's policy concerning its increasing investments in Iran grows, the Chinese leadership has to painfully balance its impulse toward energy and economic cooperation with Iran against other important interests, including enhancing its image as a responsible big country. After analyzing the evolution of China–Iran energy relations, this paper tries to answer the question of how China has responded to the intensification of US-led sanctions against Iran, what merits and shortcomings China's attempts to balance or reconcile its interests in Iran might create, and what options China can take to deal with a possible oil crisis.     

Explaining the Change in China's Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: a norm change perspective

China's attitude towards UNPKOs has experienced two shifts since the 1980s. One is about changing from non-financial-support, non-voting, and non-participation concerning peacekeeping to financial-support, voting, and participation in 1981. The other shift concerns China's gradual change in its attitude toward non-traditional peacekeeping over the 1990s. This paper provides a norm perspective on the issue. Specifically the author argues that China's attitude toward UNPKOs changed as a result of the change in international norm from prioritizing sovereignty to prioritizing human rights, and the diffusion of the norm of human rights into China through a variety of agents such as foreign policy elites and two special groups of PLA officers.     

Hong Kong in United States‐China relations: The international politics of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty

This article examines the implications of the political transition of Hong Kong on US‐China relations in strategic, political and economic dimensions. It evaluates the impact of Hong Kong's changing status in the context of the engagement‐containment debate on China policy in the US. It suggests that US concerns over questions such as democracy and human rights and China's rejection of foreign interference’ in Hong Kong would turn the territory into a source of political conflict between the US and China. Finally it points out that any major trade confrontation between the two countries would have serious implications for the territory. The article concludes by arguing that if Hong Kong could continue to be a prosperous and free society with a global outlook, it would facilitate China's integration with the global community, but if a reversion to authoritarian rule occurred in Hong Kong, US‐China relations will be aversely affected.     

China's Economic Diplomacy towards the Arab Countries: challenges ahead?

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.     

China and North Korea: A fragile relationship of strategic convenience

The common view is that China is North Korea's ally. The two countries share a similar political system and considerable strategic interest in regional international relations. Indeed, this is true to a large extent. This paper, however, analyses the problems in the bilateral relations that are gradually eroding the strategic ties the two countries formed 50 years ago. Its central argument is that, in reality, beneath the surface of the alliance relations the two countries share very few common interests. In fact, the two countries can hardly agree to any matters between them, be it historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programs, or diplomatic interactions. This heralds an uncertain future for the bilateral relations and thus may further complicate the security situation in the Korean Peninsula.