Police accountability and the Irish law of evidence

Common law courts have differed on whether and to what extent an exclusionary rule should be used as a tool to impose standards on the police. The Irish courts have pursued an uncompromising approach in this area. Basing themselves on the imperative of upholding the constitutional rights of the accused, they have been willing to exclude relevant and cogent evidence on the basis that it was obtained by the police in breach of those rights. This article locates the Irish constitutional exclusionary rule in the broader context of the role of the law of evidence in police governance. Citing specific examples from the Irish legislation and case law, it shows how recent legislative interventions and some judicial hesitancy have fuelled inconsistent and contradictory trends. It concludes that there is now a pressing need for reflection on the respective roles of the legislature and the courts in this area.     

Brains in context in the neurolaw debate: the examples of free will and "dangerous" brains

Will neuroscience revolutionize forensic practice and our legal institutions? In the debate about the legal implications of brain research, free will and the neural bases of antisocial or criminal behavior are of central importance. By analyzing frequently quoted examples for the unconscious determinants of behavior and antisocial personality changes caused by brain lesions in a wider psychological and social context, the paper argues for a cautious middle position: Evidence for an impending normative "neuro-revolution" is scarce and neuroscience may instead gradually improve legal practice in the long run, particularly where normative questions directly pertain to brain-related questions. In the conclusion the paper raises concerns that applying neuroscience methods about an individual's responsibility or dangerousness is premature at the present time and carries serious individual and societal risks. Putting findings from brain research in wider contexts renders them empirically investigable in a way that does not neglect psychological and social aspects of human mind and behavior.     

遗嘱内容和效力的法律适用问题之研究——兼评《中华人民共和国民法（草案）》第9编第74条

遗嘱内容和效力的法律适用是涉外遗嘱继承关系的一个十分重要的问题,但是理论界对此的研究很少,我国现有的立法未对遗嘱继承之准据法作出明确规定。为此文章拟对上述的问题进行深入的探讨和分析,兼对《中华人民共和国民法(草案)》第74条进行评析,并提出修改意见。     

The concept of free will and forensic psychiatry

This text examines how conceptions of free will impact on legal systems and forensic psychiatry: free will is generally regarded as a prerequisite for responsibility, criminal responsibility included, while forensic psychiatry to a large extent deals with the limits imposed on responsibility by mental disorder. First we discuss the question of whether there is and has been such an impact. The answer is yes: different conceptions of free will have inspired different systems of law and forensic psychiatry, as becomes clear when looking at the accountability doctrine as compared to the unique Swedish system rejecting this doctrine. However, there is no necessary connection between doctrines of responsibility and conceptions of free will, since the former primarily says something about when someone should be held responsible and the latter says something about when someone really is free in a sense relevant to responsibility. This leads to the second question: should conceptions of free will have an impact on law and forensic psychiatry? We argue: that they should not, given the implausibility the normative theory retributivism, which posits a direct connection between free will and punishment. More importantly, questions of free will are complicated and unresolved philosophical issues that are better left out of the everyday decision-making incumbent on the legal and psychiatric systems. Instead, we recommend using an empirically useful and gradual conception of autonomy to facilitate the determination of legal responsibility. This autonomy conception, being neutral on the question of free will, eliminates the need to take a stand on it.     

The issue of constitutional law legitimacy on "human assisted reproduction" between reasonableness of the choices and effectiveness of the protection of all involved subjects.

This artiche analyzes the constitutionality petition to the constitutional Court against Law 40 of 2004 on "human assisted reproduction", where it prohibits the "preimplantatory genetical diagnosis", because it could be against the mother's right to health (art. 32 Italian Constitution) and the egalitarian protection clause (art. 3 Italian Constitution). In the constitutionally petition the ordinary judge proposes an interpretation in accordance with Constitution of the contested disposition (art. 13 of Law 40 of 2004) and this could be the possibility to teste the "living law" theory and its relation with the "adequate interpretation" of the law and the Constitution.     

Women prisoners and the law: Which way will the pendulum swing?

Women prisoners have had avenues to legal assistance open to them for several years. Even though it has been possible for them to seek recourse in the courts, many barriers to this help remain in place. This article focuses on how women prisoners and women's prisons can change through litigation.     

论“适当法”的内涵与局限性

“适当法理论”是英国学者创立的一种冲突法学说。其宗旨是以“适当”为原则来确定涉外民事关系应该适用的法律。那么,依此原则所选的法律应该是良法,而正义平等、秩序是衡量良法的标准;但适当法原则的运用存在着局限性、非安全性和不确定性,对法律秩序稳定性有一定影响。     

Who's flying the plane: serotonin levels, aggression and free will

The present paper addresses the philosophical problem raised by current causal neurochemical models of impulsive violence and aggression: to what extent can we hold violent criminal offenders responsible for their conduct if that conduct is the result of deterministic biochemical processes in the brain. This question is currently receiving a great deal of attention among neuroscientists, legal scholars and philosophers. We examine our current knowledge of neuroscience to assess the possible roles of deterministic factors which induce impulsive aggression, and the extent to which this behavior can be controlled by neural conditioning mechanisms. Neural conditioning mechanisms, we suggest, may underlie what we consider the basis of responsible (though not necessarily moral) behavior: the capacity to give and take reasons. The models we first examine are based in part upon the role played by the neurotransmitter, serotonin, in the regulation of violence and aggression. Collectively, these results would appear to argue in favor of the view that low brain serotonin levels induce impulsive aggression which overrides mechanisms related to rational decision making processes. We next present an account of responsibility as based on the capacity to exercise a certain kind of reason-responsive control over one's conduct. The problem with such accounts of responsibility, however, is that they fail to specify a neurobiological realization of such mechanisms of control. We present a neurobiological, and weakly determinist, framework for understanding how persons can exercise guidance control over their conduct. This framework is based upon classical conditioning of neurons in the prefrontal cortex that allow for a decision making mechanism that provides for prefrontal cortical control of the sites in the brain which express aggressive behavior that include the hypothalamus and midbrain periaqueductal gray. The authors support the view that, in many circumstances, neural conditioning mechanisms provide the basis for the control of human aggression in spite of the presence of brain serotonin levels that might otherwise favor the expression of impulsive aggressive behavior. Indeed if those neural conditioning mechanisms underlie the human capacity to exercise control, they may be the neural realization of reason-responsiveness generally.     

HIPAA privacy: "individual rights" and the "minimum necessary" requirements

This Article focuses on two key aspects of the proposed regulations related to health information privacy published by the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). These two aspects, the provisions regarding individual rights and the provisions requiring use of the minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish a given purpose, will be particularly burdensome for the healthcare industry. Furthermore, they are likely to generate a significant number of complaints to the DHHS Secretary relating to alleged violations of the regulations. This Article analyzes the proposed regulations governing these two issues and offers practical advice regarding steps that entities should take in anticipation of the final regulations.     

"法律事实"概念的法哲学思考

本文从法哲学的角度对法律事实这一概念进行了分析 ,认为法律事实是客观事实的一种 ,并不是有些人所说的“经验事实”或“主观事实” ,也不是“法律证据”、“法的事实”、“事实上的法” ;法律事实与其它客观事实的区别只在于它对法律有意义 ,对于法律工作者来说具有历史性、间接性 ;法律事实是由事物、事物的运动及其结果构成的 ,可分为物的方面和人的方面 ,而人的方面又分为外部行为和内心活动两方面。对法律事实的认识是通过对证据的认识进行的 ,而这一认识是很复杂的 ,不同历史时期 ,人们把对证据的普遍性认识固定在法律中 ,因而形成历史上特定的证据制度。人们对法律事实的认识与法律事实本身的一致是相对的 ,也就是说 ,其真实性是相对的 ,从程度上来说可以分为两种 ,即形式真实和实质真实。人对法律事实的认识的相对性和差异性决定了司法工作中“以事实为根据”的事实只可能是客观事实或法律事实本身 ,而不能是法律工作者内心对事实的认识或一般所说的“经验事实”、“主观事实”。     

试论民法中的"错误"意思表示

在我国民事立法中,对于"错误"意思表示情形及效力问题的规定只局限于"重大误解",而对于其它的"错误"情形则未涉及.本文在分析借鉴大陆法系和英美法系有关"错误"的具体规定的基础上,针对我国民事立法中的"错误"规定进行评析,在错误意思表示的情形、效力以及补救方式方面,对我国的民事立法提出了完善性建议.