Lawyers' Roles in Voluntary Associations: Declining Social Capital?

The extent and nature of lawyers'participation in civic life probably has important effects on the character of the community's activity and its out-comes. Where and how lawyers participate in voluntary associations may influence the ability of those organizations to function within the larger structure of American institutions.
This paper compares findings from two surveys of Chicago lawyers, the first conducted in 1975 and the second in 1994-95. Contrary to some expectations, the available evidence does not suggest that community activities of lawyers decreased. Moreover, lawyers'energies in 1995 appear to have been devoted more often to socially concerned organizations, those with a reformist agenda, than had been the case in 1975. The types of organizations with the greatest increase in activity were religious and civic associations. A smaller percentage of the respondents held leadership positions in 1995 than in 1975, but, because of a doubling in the number of lawyers, the best estimate is that the bar's absolute level of contribution to community leadership did not change greatly.
In both 1975 and 1995, a hierarchy of social prestige appears to have influenced the pattern of lawyers'community activities. Lawyers who had higher incomes, were middle-aged, were Protestants, and who had attended elite law schools were more likely to be active or leaders in most kinds of organizations. In ethnic and fraternal organizations, however, the elites of the profession had relatively low rates of participation, while government lawyers, solo practitioners, and graduates of less prestigious law schools predominated. Status hierarchies within the broader community—as well as social differences in taste, preference, or "culture"—clearly penetrate the bar.     

Ownership conversions in health care organizations: who should benefit?

Because equity capital is becoming an important financing source for health care organizations, the conversion of many such organizations from nonprofit to for-profit status is a significant public policy issue. Since many states require converting nonprofits to repay the "community" for its investment during the nonprofit status period, three questions arise: (1) How much is the entity worth? (2) How much of that worth should be returned to the community? (3) In what form should it be returned? The paper addresses these questions, and demonstrates why responsible public policy calls for them to be carefully considered if community interests are to be preserved.     

Revoking consent: A ‘blind spot’ in data protection law?

The flow of personal data throughout the public and private sectors is central to the functioning of modern society. The processing of these data is, however, increasingly being viewed as a major concern, particularly in light of many recent high profile data losses. It is generally assumed that individuals have a right to withdraw, or revoke, their consent to the processing of their personal data by others; however this may not be straightforward in practice, or addressed adequately by the law. Examination of the creation of data protection legislation in Europe and the UK, and its relationship with human rights law, suggests that such a general right to withdraw consent was assumed to be inbuilt, despite the lack of express provisions in both the European Data Protection Directive and UK Data Protection Act. In this article we highlight potential shortcomings in the provisions that most closely relate to this right in the UK Act. These raise questions as to the extent of meaningful rights of revocation, and thus rights of informational privacy, afforded to individuals in a democratic society.     

The RedTube copyright infringement affair in Germany: shame on who?

Recently, tens of thousands of German Internet users were confronted with copyright infringement claims for allegedly watching porn clips on the streaming platform RedTube.com. The alleged copyright infringers received ‘Abmahnung’ cease and desist letters that gave them an opportunity to settle copyright infringements out of court by paying rights-holders €250 in compensation. While in cases relating to peer-to-peer file-sharing, the IP address of a peer can easily be identified,¹1. In order to identify the subscriber of a certain IP address at a given time, the rights-holders will file a disclosure request with a court. For details see below, Section 2.3.View all notes the RedTube case raises the question how consumers of a stream could be identified. In addition, it raises the question of whether the consumption of a stream is illegal under German law. Assuming that this is not the case, this analysis of the RedTube case highlights that the system of Abmahnungen is prone to abuse in an Internet context. Several weaknesses of the current system are identified, which show that disclosure requests are not thoroughly assessed by courts and that lawyers are far too willing to send out cease and desist letters although an infringement is not obvious. This environment allowed the emergence of anti-piracy business models that succeed in turning infringements into profit and that do not hesitate to make unfounded claims.     

(Why) should we require consent to participation in research?

It is widely accepted that informed consent is a requirement of ethical biomedical research. It is less clear why this is so. As an argumentative strategy the article asks whether it would be legitimate for the state to require people to participate in research. This article argues that the consent requirement cannot be defended by appeal to any simple principle, such as not treating people merely as a means, bodily integrity, and autonomy. As an argumentative strategy the article asks whether it would be legitimate for the state to require people to participate in research. I argue that while it would be legitimate and potentially justifiable to coerce people to participate in research as a matter of first-order moral principles, there are good reasons to adopt a general prohibition on coercive participation as a matter of second-order morality.