The judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom: a public choice analysis

The Human Rights Act 1998 unprecedentedly enabled the senior courts in the United Kingdom to review parliamentary enactments for compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. This article seeks to analyze within the framework of public choice economics two phenomena arising from this development that are counterintuitive: What made Parliament voluntarily invite the judiciary to monitor its acts? Why has Parliament consistently complied with rulings of the Judicial House of Lords that challenged primary legislation over the last 10 years? It argues that the Act was designed in a way that fulfilled the electoral commitments of the enacting majority by supplying promised policies to its constituencies, while minimizing agency costs and information problems in favor of Parliament’s corporate interests. Significantly, the Act left intact the veto powers of Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. As such, it disincentivized the Judicial House of Lords to risk costly overturns of its rulings by Parliament for straying too far from the range of the ideal policy positions spanned by Parliament and Strasbourg. Drawing from the empirical evidence of the past decade, it will be shown that in nearly all cases the Law Lords have either upheld the compatibility of challenged statutes, reaffirmed parliamentary preferences, or followed the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

中国司法审查制度需关注的几个问题

一、中国法院没有违宪审查权。但中国法院的法官有选择适用法律的权力。以确保司法审查中法制的统一实施 (一)依据《宪法》和《立法法》的规定,中国法院的法官有选择适用法律的权力,法官在法律审判中依据法律适用的规则,有权不适用与《宪法》和上位法不相一致的法律规范。按照《宪法》及《立法法》的规定,中央和地方不同立法主体制定的法律规范,其效力范围     

Refusal of the biological proof practice and the harm of the law to effective judicial guardianship in constitutional jurisprudence]

The Spanish Constitution protects the free investigation of the paternity on its 39.2 the article, in which is granted that possibility. This right is not absolute, it has limits, but those limits will have to be interpreted in a restrictive way due to the principles based on it, such as the legal equality of children, and the integral protection of them. In view of this, the sentences are a very valuable element to delimit the aplication of this right, and establish its limitations.     

鉴定纠纷及其解决机制——基于民事司法鉴定的实践逻辑

在当今民事司法实践中,当事人与为法院提供司法鉴定意见的社会鉴定机构及其鉴定人就相关鉴定问题频起纷争,一度还衍生出暴力事件.追根溯源,鉴定纠纷起源于民事司法,是民事庭审的鉴定争议解决机制功能失灵与民事纠纷的案件结构等多重因素共同诱导的结果.然而,国家提供的公力救济与当事人寻求的私力救济皆证明,脱离原审法院的鉴定纠纷解决机制,事实上都进退维谷,而且促使鉴定纠纷扩大化.鉴定纠纷不单反映民事司法问题与鉴定技术问题,它也是当事人双方深层社会矛盾的表现.所以,国家应对鉴定纠纷,就应树立"复合解决/治理"的理念与体系,但关键在于实现民事司法解决鉴定争议的制度功能;同时,基于当事人强烈的制度需求,国家也应重塑合理可行的鉴定纠纷解决机制.     

Recombinant DNA research: actions under the guidelines--NIH. Notice of actions under NIH guidelines for research involving recombinant DNA molecules

This notice sets forth actions taken by the Director, National Institute of Allergy and infectious Diseases (NIAID), by authority of the Director. NIH, under the June 1983 NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (48 FR 24556).