Economic cooperation in Northeast Asia: The proposed Tumen River scheme

Abstract

This paper examines a relatively unexplored aspect of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute: the involvement of subnational actors. It focuses in particular on the sustained campaign of domestic lobbying and paradiplomacy by elites from the Far East region of Sakhalin aimed at preventing the Russian central government from transferring the South Kuril Islands/Northern Territories to Japan during the 1990s. It explores the various responses to the ‘Sakhalin factor’ from federal authorities in Russia, as well as private and public bodies in Japan, highlighting the subsequent localization and pluralization of diplomatic channels. The paper also considers why the ‘Sakhalin factor’ became so prominent, pointing to a synergy of factors that include the high-profile anti-concessionary campaigns of the Sakhalin political elite, the fallout from Russia's troubled attempts at state building and a possible convergence of interests between Boris Yeltsin and regional authorities. The paper concludes with an analysis of how Vladimir Putin's federal reforms, launched in 2000, have diminished Sakhalin's authority over the South Kuril Islands.     

Self‐interest in new wrapping: “Appeal to the public interest” as a topos in lobbying

This article explores public affairs and lobbying strategies that make public appeals beyond organizational self‐interest and instead focus on appeals to the public interest. While research has highlighted such appeals as a staple for lobbying campaigns, there is scant research exploring the communicative construction of this notion. Thus, this article uses the rhetorical concept of topos to explore how lobbyists attempt to fuse their private interests with a broader appeal to what is best for society. In particular, we discuss how different types of organizations have different rhetorical opportunities to ground their arguments. Finally, we discuss the democratic implications of appeals to the public interest as a standard lobbying strategy.     

Mixing business with politics: Does corporate social responsibility end where lobbying transparency begins?

Scholars increasingly have argued that the future effectiveness and legitimacy of firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities are dependent on more transparent forms of lobbying to ensure firms' policy positions are aligned with their CSR commitments. Very little empirical work, however, has systematically analyzed firms' lobbying disclosures or examined how these firms coordinate their lobbying and CSR activities. We address these empirical questions by analyzing the CSR reports of 150 corporations from Germany, the UK and the US over an 18-year period and by conducting interviews with the CSR managers of these firms. We find that corporations have become more transparent about their public policy advocacy over time, thus acknowledging that lobbying is a CSR issue. For most firms, however, this commitment to transparency appears to be largely ceremonial. Few firms disclose the specific policy positions they advocate or sufficiently coordinate the work of their lobbying and CSR units to foster greater alignment of these activities. These modest changes in lobbying transparency appear to be driven by legitimacy concerns and, in a few instances, by governance gaps firms perceive to be relevant to their future business interests.     

Autonomy or Privilege? Lobbying Intensity of Local Business Associations in China

This article examines the relationship between the state and society in contemporary China by analyzing the lobbying behavior of business associations. Particularly, it asks whether and how autonomy and/or privileged access exert/s influence on their lobbying frequency. A formal model is developed that focuses on the trade-off between lobbying intensity and the private provision of collective goods. The hypotheses are tested against the original survey data from Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces. The research finds that self-established associations lobby less, and those with consultant status assigned by the government lobby the government more often. In contrast, the impact of “autonomy” in a narrow sense is weaker than is commonly claimed in the Chinese lobbying literature.     

When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics

Business–government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or – less often – lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public–private interactions with examples from the USA, the European Union, and Brazil.     

Blurring Boundaries: The Integration of NGOs into Governance in Kenya

This article examines the impact of the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on governance in Kenya. Looking specifically at service provision, it analyzes how the growth of NGOs has begun to change the way decisions are made and policy is formulated. In so doing, the article explores shifting NGO–government relations over time. The governance of service provision has become a complex, intertwined affair in which NGOs sit on national policymaking committees, government integrates NGO plans and budgets into national policy, and government actors learn from and copy NGOs' participatory, accountable approach. Through (1) the integration of former NGO leaders in government, (2) increasing the variety of voices heard in government decision making, (3) lobbying by NGOs, and (4) mimicry of NGOs by government, governance of Kenyan service provision has begun to become more democratic. Through such changes, developing countries are witnessing a blurring of the line between public and private.     

Lobbying and asymmetric information

Informational lobbying — the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies — is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or conceal its private information. It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobbying can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry information in the ‘right direction’. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the message as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. qu]Much of the pressure placed upon government and its agencies takes the form of freely provided “objective” studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment of particular policies (Bartlett, 1973: 133, his quotation marks). qu]The analysis here is vague. What is needed is an equilibrium model in which lobbying activities have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to building such a model that would explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with decision makers, and so on) and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful. (Tirole, 1989: Ch. 1.3, p. 77, Rentseeking behavior).     

Public Subsidies for Private Schooling: A Comparative Analysis of Argentina and Chile

Argentina and Chile have long-standing policies that award public subsidies to private schools. This article compares the academic outcomes of seventh- and eighth-graders in public and private schools in each country. Three types of private schools are analyzed: Catholic schools that are subsidized by the government, nonreligious schools that are subsidized, and private schools that receive no subsidies. Ultimately, the analyses suggest a mixed portrait of private school effectiveness, in which Catholic schools have the most consistent links to achievement. Nonreligious subsidized schools in Chile, often operated by for-profit corporations, produce outcomes no different from public schools.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists: Evidence from the American States

‘‘Revolving-door” lobbyists are individuals who transition from governmental positions into lobbying for private entities. Such lobbyists thrive on the insider connections and political knowledge that they developed while in government. These assets afford former lawmakers more access to and influence over incumbent lawmakers. The value of their connections and knowledge, however, is contingent on former colleagues remaining within the legislature. As new legislators enter the assembly, the connections and knowledge of former members expire and lose value. Whereas increases in turnover or assembly size generate more former lawmakers who might lobby, such increases negatively affect former members’ value as lobbyists. Interest groups accordingly hire fewer former legislators to lobby. Other factors, such as longer cooling-off periods or increased legislative staff resources, produce slight or no substantive effects on rates of revolving. Legislative characteristics mostly determine rates of revolving for former lawmakers.     

Determinants of Firm‐Level Lobbying and Government Responsiveness in Agricultural Biotechnology in China

Understanding what stimulates agribusiness firms to lobby the government and what makes the government responsive to lobbying are the two issues that have been discussed extensively in the debates concerning determinants of biotechnology policy. This paper examines the factors influencing agribusiness firms' lobbying and government response using econometric modeling on a new data set of 160 leading agribusiness firms in the food, feed, chemical, and seed industries in China. The results show that approximately 10% of agribusiness firms lobbied the government about biotechnology policy and regulations and over half of those that lobbied received a verbal or written acknowledgment from government agencies. Seed and feed companies are more likely to engage in lobbying than chemical companies. Owning GM patents not only has a positive impact on firms' lobbying activities, but firms with these patents are more likely to receive a government response to their lobbying efforts. The experience of selling GM products does not significantly influence lobbying activities or response from the government.     

Social capital, lobbying and community-based interest groups

Recent discussions of social capital within the public choice literature have tended to focus on its role in solving collective action problems and promoting political accountability. Consequently, two areas of inquiry remain underexplored: (1) the role social capital plays in facilitating lobbying and rent seeking, and (2) the possibility that the availability of government resources can cause community-based groups to re-orient their stocks of social capital away from mutual assistance and toward lobbying and rent seeking. This article examines the relationship between social capital and lobbying in New Orleans??s post-Katrina recovery.     

Lobbying by Law Firms: A Study of Lobbying by National Law Firms in Canberra1

This article examines the way in which national law firms lobby the federal government from their Canberra offices. It is based on extensive interviews with lobbyists from those law firms, other commercial lobbyists in Canberra and legal professional bodies. The article begins by establishing the unique nature of law firm lobbying. In particular, it looks at the technical skills law firm lobbyists possess, their access to specialist legal knowledge and their preference for administrative, over political, lobbying. The development of law firm lobbying is then discussed. This centres around changes to the legal profession, federal business laws and federal government decision-making. The article concludes by suggesting that law firm lobbying both reflects and stimulates changes in government decision-making and will grow in importance as the legal profession in Canberra grows.     

Buying National Ink

Abstract

Advertorials are paid messages in the media sponsored by organized interests to create and sustain a favorable political environment to pursue their respective goals. Advertorials, a form of outside lobbying, take two broad forms: (1) image advertorials designed to create a positive impression of the sponsor and a favorable climate of opinion, and (2) advocacy advertorials intended to win support for an interest's viewpoints on controversial issues. We analyze the population of 3,375 advertorials placed from 1985 through 2000 by organized interests to reach the mass audience of TIME, the most widely circulated and read weekly newsmagazine in the United States. Typologies of advertorials (11 categories), organized interests (21 categories), corporate and non-corporate economic interests (29 categories), and policy content (28 categories) are used to document over time the placement of advertorials, what types of advertorials are being used, what interests avail themselves of advertorial campaigns, which issue areas are receiving attention, what images and policy messages are being communicated, which organizations sponsor the most advertorials, and the timing of such political advertising campaigns. It is apparent by their popularity that organized interests consider advertorials to be an effective form of political communication. We find over time an increasing number of advertorials, an increasing number and diversity of sponsoring interest organizations, an increasing trend in the placement of image rather than advocacy advertorials, and a continuing but somewhat declining dominance by corporations and their associations.     

Lobbying and the 2006 U.S. midterm elections

• Lobbyists are inextricably intertwined with the electoral process in the United States, but rarely have they ever featured so prominently in an election year as in 2006. The midterm elections came at the end of a year in which the political news was often dominated by stories of lobbying scandal, most notably that involving Jack Abramoff. Lobbying was an important issue in many peoples' voting decisions, and moreover one of the immediate outcomes of the election was a raft of lobbying reform measures both in Congress and in the individual states. As one commentator put it: ‘For lobbyists, 2006 rolled by like a late‐night B movie where the earthquake wipes out the villagers who refused to heed the warning signs’ (Divis, 2006 ). This article reviews some of the most substantial lobbying scandals which emerged during 2006, considers how lobbying and lobbyists fared during the election campaigns, and analyses the various reforms which have recently been considered and implemented, before briefly examining how lobbyists will impact upon the 2008 election races.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Governments Regulate Governments

This article advances a political theory of regulation that accounts for the choices of regulators and regulated entities when both are governments. Leading theories of regulation assume that governments regulate profit‐maximizing firms: Governments set rules, to which firms respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior. But often the entities that governments regulate are other governments. We argue that government agencies and private firms often face different compliance costs, and that agencies have greater incentives than firms to appeal regulations through political channels. Simultaneously, the typical enforcement instruments that regulators use to influence firm behavior may be less effective against governments. Our empirical subjects are public and private entities’ compliance with the U.S. Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. We find that, compared with private firms, governments violate these laws significantly more frequently and are less likely to be penalized for violations.     

Disaggregating public-private governance interactions: European Union interventions in transnational private sustainability governance

Transnational private sustainability governance, such as eco-certification, does not operate in a regulatory or jurisdictional vacuum. A public authority may intervene in private governance for various reasons, including to improve private governance's efficient functioning or to assert public regulatory primacy. This article argues that to properly understand the nature of public-private governance interactions—whether more competitive or complementary—we need to disaggregate a public authority's intervention. The article distinguishes between four features of private governance in which a public authority can intervene: standard setting, procedural aspects, supply chain signaling, and compliance incentives. Using the cases of the European Union's policies on organic agriculture and biofuels production, the article shows that public-private governance interaction dynamics vary across these private governance features as well as over time. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the importance of active lobbying by private governance actors in influencing these dynamics and the resulting policy outputs.     

Public affairs: an American perspective

This paper explores the development and broadening scope of public affairs practice within the United States of America and charts the factors that have influenced its current development. To understand the scope of how public affairs has developed in the United States, it is necessary to examine the historical evolution of the function in the USA and the early 20th century influence of the US government on defining and regulating its definition of public relations and public affairs, which resulted in the still‐in‐effect Gillett Amendment. Since then, public affairs has expanded into the private as well as the public sectors as corporations and organisations recognise the need to gain public trust for their ventures. In the US today, public affairs practitioners perform duties that range from issues management to environmental scanning to legislative affairs. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATIONS AMONG CANADIAN CROWN CORPORATIONS*

Abstract: Among the developed and developing countries, the use of government corporations in business has come under increased scrutiny. Fundamental questions are being asked about the problems of public enterprise management, the roles of corporate executives, and their relationships to the governments and societies which they serve. Sadly, the interpretations of policy-makers often have been derived from cliches or myths, not from systematic appraisals of the phenomena propelling the behaviour of those firms. By reviewing the evolutionary tendencies among Canadian public corporations which are engaged in commercial activities, this paper seeks to clarify aspects of those debates. The suggestion is that, as an analysis steps back from the minutiae of day-to-day management, single decisions, and individual conflicts with government officials, developmental patterns can be identified across corporation histories. Public enterprises, like their counterparts in the private sector, move through phases which have configurations of business strategies and internal administrations, regimes of accountability, and dominant interpretations of organisational performance or "success". On a long-term basis, some corporations have come to compete directly against private firms, and their organisational and competitive practices have been modelled along the lines of those rivals. Others have been differentiated away from the orientations of private firms and niche positions have been adopted within their industries. The choices have reflected the structure of the markets in which the enterprises have operated, their financial status, and the command structures which have surrounded them.