Community development intermediary systems in the United States: Origins,evolution, and functions

Abstract

Acting between the forceful capital market and the state, community development intermediaries are finding ways to assist resource‐poor community development organizations to increase production volume and to gain access to a wider capital and political market.

This article presents a brief historical review of how the intermediary system originated and how it has evolved into different large‐scale models since the 1960s. The philosophies and programs of three major intermediary organizations—the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, The Enterprise Foundation, and the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation—are considered. The article concludes by recognizing the contributions of intermediaries while raising issues with their accountability and future direction.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Migrating women: Mexican women in the United States

"This analysis considers some aspects of the international migration of Mexican women, seen under the light of two recent statistical sources: the [U.S.] 1990 census and the 1993-1994... International Migration Survey at the Mexican Northern Border. The joint analysis of migrations and migrant inventories reveals the hidden scope of feminine exile, as well as some of its peculiarities, and offers numerical answers to two questions: How does sex differentiate Mexican immigrants in the United States? How does the migration affect work, marriage, child-bearing, etc. of Mexican women? The results suggest the need to address migration no longer as an action of individuals, but of families (most immigrants are married), and to place the mother or the wife at the gravity center of the household migratory space." (SUMMARY IN ENG)     

Natalist Policies in the United States

This retrospective reviews the policies that affect the fertility of American women, both policies designed to alter fertility intentionally as well as those that change childbearing unintentionally. Becker's seminal work on the economics of fertility serves as the theoretical foundation for this literature. After describing Becker's economic model, we review the empirical literature on fertility responses to social welfare policies, tax policies, the mandated health care coverage of infertility treatments, abortion policies, and government‐sponsored family planning services. We also address several Supreme Court cases that have played an important role in the interpretation of these policies. Where relevant, this retrospective describes the distributional effects of these natalist policies. We also discuss the limitations of this literature and identify important gaps. Unlike most developed countries that have created strategies to increase fertility to support their ageing population, the United States spends considerably less time and thought on this issue. Our reading of the literature suggests that we have many public policies that have affected and continue to influence the fertility choices made by families in the United States and that this is a topical area that deserves more attention in policy debates.     

Intergovernmental councils in the United States

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on intergovernmental councils (IGCs) in the United States in which prominent state-level executive politicians, that is, governors, play a leadership role. In the US case, these IGCs developed out of a desire to facilitate interstate information exchanges and a need for state governments to join forces to protect their autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government. In this latter role, the councils function as lobbyists for state government interests. The research question driving the analysis has to do with impact: what difference do executive-led IGCs make, either vertically or horizontally, in the US federal system? The question of impact is particularly relevant because growing partisan polarization in contemporary federal and state political institutions complicates collective action by states.     

Financial Regulation in the United States: Lessons from History

History is institutional memory writ large. One looks at economic history to see what problems recur, what causes them to recur, what solutions have worked best in the past, and which interventions have made the problems worse. The authors argue that a moderately complex interaction between the workings of the financial sector, the way in which the political system is organized, and the administration of regulation makes perfect regulation of the financial sector extremely unlikely. Many of these problems arise as a result of conflicting incentives for those participating in and regulating the financial field. The authors find that some proposed solutions have improved matters but have costs, and that some proposed solutions have actually worsened problems in the financial sector.

Peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.
— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1837

     

Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behaviour of interest groups

Different types of interest groups use different lobbying strategies. This article presents an investigation of this already well‐established hypothesis once more, but additionally proposes that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate also influences their lobbying behaviour. More specifically, it is shown that groups working in the interest of the public are better integrated into the policy‐making process when direct democratic instruments, such as referendums, occur regularly (as in Switzerland) than when referendums are the exception (Germany). The article demonstrates that Swiss cause groups – often also referred to as ‘public interest groups’ in the literature – use a more balanced mixture of insider and outsider strategies than their German peers, but also that this moderating effect cannot be found for specific interest groups, such as industry groups or unions.