Democracy,the Market,and the Logic of Social Choice

This article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources. I argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters’ inability to compare the effects of different parties’ policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources. Markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms’ products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation. The economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets, instead of political parties and elections, to allocate scarce resources. However, in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions, I argue markets’ epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers’ need for knowledge or understanding.     

Global IR through dialogue

This article aims to address how to ensure a two-way ‘dialogue’ across ‘the West/non-West distinction’ in international studies. To this end, I first discuss three different approaches to dialogue, the Socratic, the Habermasian, and the Weberian, and clarify what kind of thing dialogue should be if it is to overcome the ‘West-non-West divide’ and transform the current ‘Western-centric’ IR into a global discipline. I argue that dialogue should be understood as reciprocal feedback from different perspectives for mutual learning. In order to achieve this goal (i.e. mutual learning), I call for an ‘instrumentalist’ approach to dialogue. To elucidate this point, I offer an empirical illustration. The focus here is on dialogue as mutual learning between Western-centric IR theory, more specifically constructivism, and the indigenous experience and knowledge of East Asia.     

Subsidizing the affluent: the case of medical education.

State and federal funds are important sources of revenue for medical schools, and a strong case can be made for public support for these institutions. Although the federal role is more widely known, the states in fact provide the bulk of direct support for medical training. The nature of aid from the two sources differs in significant ways. Most federal aid supports research or patient care, but much of state aid goes to support unconditional tuition subsidies. The primary beneficiaries of these subsidies are relatively affluent nonminority students who are beginning lucrative careers in the medical field--careers that would be lucrative even if no subsidies were provided. Nor does it appear that general subsidies are needed to attract poor and minority applicants. While targeted loans and scholarships to individuals may be justified, general tuition subsidies are not.     

线路治安管理的群众工作六法谈

做好群众工作不仅是一门学问,更是一门艺术,需要讲究方式方法。面对蓬勃发展的高铁事业和高要求、高标准的线路治安工作,必须深入群众调查走访,知民情、懂民意,掌握沿线社会治安状况;必须宣传教育、提醒警示,提高沿线群众爱路护路意识;必须广交朋友、建立感情,调动群众安全防范积极性;必须外联内控、综合治理,严控线路安全危险源头;必须灵活运用、区别对待,教育群众、打击犯罪,提升公安机关威慑力;必须加强学习、苦练内功,提高线路民警做群众工作的能力和水平。     

Incentive Effects of Expanding Federal Mass Transit Formula Grants

Public subsidies to industries firms incentives to alter their behavior. When calculating the effects of such programs, previous assessments of transit subsidies have not included the effects of these incentives on the firms' output. This article reports the responses of mass transit firms to the federal transit subsidy program and changes the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21) made to that program, as predicted by a structural model of output choice. TEA 21 increases bus service in medium‐sized cities by 6‐8 percent, butincreases service in large cities by only 1‐2 percent. The formula's incentive tier is weak, and the size of the subsidy depends little on whether that output results in increased ridership. The formula could be redesigned to provide stronger incentives to lower cost and increase ridership, thus encouraging a more efficient response from transit firms. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The Learning Process and Technological Change in Wind Power: Evidence from China's CDM Wind Projects

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a project‐based carbon trade mechanism that subsidizes the users of climate‐friendly technologies and encourages technology transfer. The CDM has provided financial support for a large share of Chinese wind projects since 2002. Using pooled cross‐sectional data of 486 registered CDM wind projects in China from 2002 to 2009, we examine the determinants of technological change in wind power from a learning perspective. We use a spatial error model to estimate the effects of different channels of learning—learning through R&D in wind turbine manufacturing, learning from a firm's previous wind project experience, spillovers from industry‐wide project experience, and learning through the network interaction between project developer and turbine manufacturer—on technological change, measured as reductions in projected costs or as increased capacity factor across CDM wind projects. While we find that a project developer's previous experience matters, interactions between a wind project developer and its partner foreign turbine manufacturer lead to the largest cost reductions and capacity factor improvement. We also find that spillovers from industry‐wide experience only exist for wind farm installation. The evidence of industry‐wide spillovers and the joint learning within partnerships between project developers and foreign turbine manufacturers supports the subsidies to users of wind technologies, and policy regimes that promote international collaboration and technology transfer.     

Introduction to Neumann: law and socialist political theory

Abstract

Regulators attempt to understand financial markets and their risks in terms of categories of knowledge and datasets that are defined and produced by the markets. However, regulators cannot adequately interpret or utilize such knowledge, for reasons including their social distance from the sites of knowledge production, the diversity of financial firms’ proprietary risk models, firms’ abilities to game the rules thus rendering the ‘metrics’ meaningless and several backfiring aspects of global regulatory networking and reform. Calls for yet more information about trading, posed in terms of the merits of transparency, result in information swamping of regulators. Meanwhile, while policy-makers tinker with regulatory structures (‘architecture’), political reaction to the crisis de-legitimizes public regulation as a project. Yet there is one positive aspect of the reforms – enhancing powers for ‘resolution’ of financial firms in ways that impact upon investors while minimizing wider destabilization – upon which the regulatory information requirement can and should be refocused. To protect the public interest, legal transparency is required, trading transparency is not. This paper introduces these issues by drawing on critical work on transparency and markets.     

New Technologies in the Politics Classroom: Using Internet Classrooms to Support Teaching and Learning

This article introduces some ideas about using internet classrooms to enrich the experience of those learning and teaching politics. It draws and reflects upon my three-year experience of using internet classrooms to teach politics in optional and compulsory politics undergraduate modules, providing critical evaluation of the successes and problems involved. Much of what the article discusses can be applied to most, if not all, politics modules and will be useful to those wishing to use new technologies to support active learning strategies in their undergraduate teaching. The article is based on personal experience and student evaluations, rather than any rigorous research of learning outcomes. As such, I do not set out to prove that using internet classrooms has pedagogical advantages over using only traditional methods, and I am not arguing a case for or against using either.     

Exploring the Basis of Declining Party Membership in Denmark: A Scandinavian Comparison*

Short-term changes in party membership figures have hypothetically been attributed to a connection between electoral success and membership effort. In the long-term, however, mass party organizations may be doomed to oudive themselves, since elections can be won by utilizing modern mass media techniques. Both assertions could more easily be falsified than confirmed in my study of Scandinavian party membership. After World War II. party membership in Scandinavia has steadily been increasing, except in Denmark where membership has continuously shrunk. Findings show that most rank-and-file party members are superfluous in electoral campaigns. But Die main function of party members is no longer campaigning. Instead, they are holding seats in a multitude of municipal councils, boards, and committees. This change is made possible mainly by two factors public party subsidies and the politicization of municipal elections. The causal link between these two factors is, however, not mechanical. Instead it depends on how many public subsidies are offered, the platforms of parties, and the number of seats needed in running the municipalities. In Denmark, public subsidies are unheard of and expensive public elections are held at least annually. Also, the number of supplied seats are few. Thus, if costs are high and rewards are few, then a membership decline is probable.     

The Cult of Collaboration in Public Policy

A 'cult of collaboration' is emerging in Australian public policy circles. In this article I argue this reflects a misunderstanding of the concept and its distinctive characteristics. Here I reintroduce collaboration vis-à-vis other forms of 'working together' and question whether we have taken a collaborative turn in public policy. In doing so I hope to contribute to a debate on the relevance of collaboration for public policy.     

Making Hay ... or Clutching at Ontological Straws? Notes on Realism, 'As-If-Realism' and Actualism

Stuart McAnulla provides an eloquent defence of a particular variant of critical realism, suggesting that it provides a more appropriate set of ontological foundations for the kind of critical political analysis I espouse than the ontological actualism he attributes to me. In this rejoinder, whilst welcoming McAnulla's important intervention in the debate, I defend myself against his charge of actualism (if the attribution of an ontology to an author can be regarded as a charge), whilst indicating how the 'as-if-realism' that perhaps better reflects my ontological assumptions is perfectly compatible with critical political analysis. In so doing I caution against ontological evangelism, the notion that only 'real' entities can be causal, and the appeal to structures (like patriarchy) as causes. I conclude by reflecting on the complex and seldom discussed relationship between experience and ontology.     

On the limits to rent-seeking waste

The general equilibrium framework developed in this paper for analyzing the limits to rent-seeking waste goes beyond the existing literature by incorporating tax-financed, public subsidies and rent-protecting activities into a rent-seeking environment. We show that the limits to rent-seeking waste depend on the extent to which government subsidizes rent seekers and rent defenders through tax-financed grants, contracts and favors. As observed by Tullock (1967), the diversion of resources toward efforts to acquire a monopoly rent causes a social waste in addition to the excess burden of monopoly pricing measured by the Harberger triangle. In the absence of government subsidies to rent-seeking and under competitive conditions, this additional waste cannot exceed the maximum monopoly rent attainable. However, if government subsidizes expenditures on rent-seeking, then the additional waste can exceed the Tullock rectangle of monopoly rent and, in the limit, equal the economy's maximum potential social surplus.Rent avoidance expenditures reduce the rent to be captured and thus discourage rent-seeking. If rent avoidance is a relatively efficient mechanism for transferring consumer surplus to rent granters, then rent-seeking expenditures are displaced by less wasteful expenditures on rent defending. As a result, under competitive conditions, unsubsidized demand for private rent protection may be socially efficient. Nonetheless, the upper limit to rent-seeking waste depends on constitutionally determined maximum rates of public subsidies to rent-seeking and rent-avoidance activities.     

Employee buy-outs and privatization: Issues and implications for LDCs and post-communist countries of UK experience

Privatization has become an international phenomenon. Most attention has been devoted to privatization by stock market flotation or by sales to third parties. Management and employee buy-outs present a third main possibility for transferring assets from the public to the private sector. This paper discusses the scope for privatization buy-outs in LDCs and ‘post-communist’ economies in the light of conceptual issues and UK experience. The positive aspects of privatization by management and employee buy-outs concern: ownership incentives; the introduction of control mechanisms by institutional investors and various types of financing instruments; indigenous ownership, decentralized privatization; greater incentives in firms where specific skills are involved; the ability to improve trading relationships between a privatized supplier (the buy-out) and its former parent, which remains in the public sector where the supplier is heavily dependent on its former parent; and the general contribution of buy-outs to a redrawing of a state firm's spread of activities to create a more viable entity. The potential problems with buy-outs concern such issues as: absence of entrepreneurial skills; the scope of their applicability; the potentially restrictive effects of debt and debt-like finance; the need to deal with investment requirements of firms; the lack of personal wealth; the use of inside information by managers to purchase a firm at a price which is to the detriment of the public interest; and the possibility of social and political problems if individuals are perceived to enhance their personal wealth significantly as an accident of where they work. There are means by which many of these potential problems can be dealt with and the paper addresses these.     

Experimentalist interactions: Joining up the transnational timber legality regime

This paper analyzes the interactions between the separate components of the emerging transnational timber legality regime, both public and private. It examines how far, and through what institutional mechanisms, these interactions are producing a joined-up transnational regime, based on a shared normative commitment to combat illegal logging and cooperative efforts to implement and enforce it. The paper argues that the experimentalist architecture of the EU FLEGT initiative has fostered productive, mutually reinforcing interactions both with public timber legality regulation in other consumer countries and with private certification schemes. But this emerging regime remains highly polyarchic, with broad scope for autonomous initiatives by NGOs and private service providers, along with national governments, international organizations, and multi-donor partnerships. Hence horizontal integration and coordination within it depend on a series of institutional mechanisms, some of which are distinctively experimentalist, while others can also be found in more conventional regimes. These mechanisms include cross-referencing and reciprocal endorsement of rules and standards; recursive learning through information pooling and peer review of implementation experience; public oversight and joint assessment of private certification and legality verification schemes; and the “penalty default” effect of public legality regulation in consumer countries, which have pushed both exporting countries and transnational firms to comply with the norms and procedures of the emerging transnational regime. The paper's findings thus provide robust new evidence for the claim advanced in previous work that a joined-up transnational regime can be assembled piece by piece under polyarchic conditions through coordinated learning from decentralized experimentation, without a hegemonic power to impose common global rules.     

Policy Networks,Elections, and State Subsidies1

What are the effects of electoral competition on the disbursement of state subsidies in industrialized democracies? I argue that the scope of subsidies, which ranges from economy‐wide to regional and industry‐specific subsidies, is determined by the extent of political (electoral) monopoly conditioned by economic threats from foreign competition. The mechanism through which electoral competition is linked to subsidies is the policy network. I assess this argument by examining thirteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the period 1990–1993. The findings offer amendments to models of policy networks and speak to the importance of domestic institutions on factor mobility and trade policy.     

Taxes, Subsidies, and Listeners Like You: Public Policy and Contributions to Public Radio

Public radio in the United States receives both direct and indirect government funding. Direct subsidies come in the form of lump-sum and matching grants, while indirect subsidies proceed from tax revenues forgone on tax-deductible private donations. Each of these sources of government money affects charitable giving to public radio. This article estimates both of these effects, using data on 91 public radio stations in the United States during 1995. Data analysis shows that public funding to stations has a positive impact on private giving, but this impact rapidly decreases as the level of government subsidies increases. The analysis also indicates that increases in state tax rates correspond with significantly higher donation levels. This article explores the implications of these and other findings for policy makers, public administrators, and nonprofit managers.     

Public Subsidies for Private Schooling: A Comparative Analysis of Argentina and Chile

Argentina and Chile have long-standing policies that award public subsidies to private schools. This article compares the academic outcomes of seventh- and eighth-graders in public and private schools in each country. Three types of private schools are analyzed: Catholic schools that are subsidized by the government, nonreligious schools that are subsidized, and private schools that receive no subsidies. Ultimately, the analyses suggest a mixed portrait of private school effectiveness, in which Catholic schools have the most consistent links to achievement. Nonreligious subsidized schools in Chile, often operated by for-profit corporations, produce outcomes no different from public schools.     

THE IMAGE OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The more that I have thought about the question of the image of the public administrator, the more complex and ambiguous the whole concept has seemed to be. Our knowledge of the facts is patchy enough. Our understanding of causes and effects is thinner still. The best approach is perhaps to pool what we know from different sources. So today I propose to add to the available material, including the recent ANOP survey findings, such fragments of information and such conclusions as are available in the British context. I shall certainly look forward to learning more about Australian experiences while I am here. Between us, we may be able to make a little progress.     

Learning by doing in contests

We introduce learning by doing in a dynamic contest. Contestants compete in an early round and can use the experience gained to reduce effort cost in a subsequent contest. A contest designer can decide how much of the prize mass to distribute in the early contest and how much to leave for the later one in order to maximize total efforts. We show how this division affects effort at each stage, and present conditions that characterize the optimal split. There is a trade off here, since a large early prize increases first period efforts leading to a substantial reduction in second round effort cost; on the other hand, there is less of the prize mass to fight over in the second round, reducing effort at that stage. The results are indicative of the fact that the designer often prefers to leave most of the prize mass for the second contest to reap the gains from the learning by doing effect.     

In Search of True Public Arts Support

Most of the debate over government arts support focuses on direct subsidies to nonprofit arts organizations. In this article, however, I show that a much larger amount of public sector money comes from indirect aid, in the form of tax revenues forgone on tax-deductible contributions by individuals. Specifically, every dollar in direct federal arts funding is accompanied by about $14 in indirect aid. Analysis of the 1996 General Social Survey shows that private givers and supporters of direct government aid fit different demographic profiles, meaning that direct and indirect funding owe to distinct constituencies. These findings lead to a number of implications for nonprofit and public arts managers.

It is sometime proper for the state to encourage and protect dishonorable but useful professions, without those who exercise them being more highly considered for that.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau ¹