Health insurance coverage of the unemployed: COBRA and the potential effects of Kassebaum-Kennedy.

We use the April 1993 Current Population Survey to examine the health insurance coverage decisions of the unemployed and to simulate the potential effects of the new Kassebaum-Kennedy legislation. After controlling for demographic characteristics, COBRA eligibility raises the probability of health insurance coverage by 0.095, while eligibility for spouse employer insurance increases the likelihood of coverage by 0.318, and eligibility for both increases the likelihood of coverage by 0.341. In our simulations, we find that had Kassebaum-Kennedy been in effect in April 1993, 9.0 percent of the unemployed would be eligible to take up coverage, and the coverage rate of the unemployed would have been increased by 0.85 percent to 1.5 percent from 41.6 percent. Our estimates of the effect of Kassebaum-Kennedy on health insurance coverage are much lower than those reported by the Government Accounting Office prior to the passage of the legislation.     

Public Health Insurance and Medical Spending: The Incidence of the ACA Medicaid Expansion

This paper examines the incidence of the cost burden associated with expanding public health insurance to low-income adults in the context of the Affordable Care Act. Using data from the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), I exploit exogenous variation in Medicaid eligibility rules across states, income groups and time. I find that public insurance eligibility reduced mean out-of-pocket spending by 19.6 percent among targeted households, but it did not causally increase total expenditures among beneficiaries. Rather, Medicaid expansion shifted the burden of payment from eligible households and private insurance (21.5 percent reduction) to taxpayers in the form of public insurance (46.6 percent increase). The efficiency of these public funds can be summarized by a mean Marginal Value of Public Funds of 0.70 in the full sample, 0.99 among households with at least one pre-existing condition, and 1.26 in states with an above-median number of public hospitals.     

Welcome Mats and On‐Ramps for Older Adults: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansions on Dual Enrollment in Medicare and Medicaid

For many low‐income Medicare beneficiaries, Medicaid provides important supplemental insurance that covers out‐of‐pocket costs and additional benefits. We examine whether Medicaid participation by low‐income adults age 65 and up increased as a result of Medicaid expansions to working‐age adults under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Previous literature documents so‐called “welcome mat” effects in other populations but has not explicitly studied older persons dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. We extend this literature by estimating models of Medicaid participation among persons age 65 and up using American Community Survey data from 2010 to 2017 and state variation in ACA Medicaid expansions. We find that Medicaid expansions to working‐age adults increased Medicaid participation among low‐income older adults by 1.8 percentage points (4.4 percent). We also find evidence of an “on‐ramp” effect; that is, low‐income Medicare beneficiaries residing in expansion states who were young enough to gain coverage under the 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions before aging into Medicare were 4 percentage points (9.5 percent) more likely to have dual Medicaid coverage relative to similar individuals who either turned 65 before the 2014 expansions or resided in non‐expansion states. This on‐ramp effect is an important mechanism behind welcome mat effects among some older adults.     

Does Medicare Coverage Improve Cancer Detection and Mortality Outcomes?

Medicare is a large government health insurance program in the United States that covers about 60 million people. This paper analyzes the effects of Medicare insurance on health for a group of people in urgent need of medical care: people with cancer. We used a regression discontinuity design to assess impacts of near-universal Medicare insurance at age 65 on cancer detection and outcomes, using population-based cancer registries and vital statistics data. Our analysis focused on the three tumor sites for which screening is recommended both before and after age 65: breast, colorectal, and lung cancer. At age 65, cancer detection increased by 72 per 100,000 population among women and 33 per 100,000 population among men; cancer mortality also decreased by nine per 100,000 population for women but did not significantly change for men. In a placebo check, we found no comparable changes at age 65 in Canada. This study provides the first evidence to our knowledge that near-universal access to Medicare at age 65 is associated with improvements in population-level cancer mortality.     

The Continuing Evolution of Medicare Hospice Policy

This case study traces the creation and evolution of Medicare hospice policy. The Medicare hospice benefit, created in 1982, emphasizes palliative rather than curative care. It focuses on quality of life for the dying patient and family and encompasses medical, psychological, and spiritual care. Because no standard hospice care practices existed before this benefit was implemented, Medicare rules almost exclusively dictated the structure and delivery of services. Despite initial concerns about low use, spending averaged 17 percent per year between 1991 and 2001, largely driven by increased enrollment, covered days, services provided, and inflation. A rich accumulation of research studies and analyses of specific aspects of the hospice program provides an opportunity for a retrospective analysis of the program's genesis, impact on health care delivery, and implications for future policy decisions.     

Child Support and the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansions

A quickly developing literature has shown that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) Medicaid expansions have improved health insurance coverage, health, and financial well‐being among low‐income adults without dependent children. This population includes noncustodial parents. With substantial overlap in the population that is typically obligated to pay child support and the population that has strongly benefited from the expansions, there may be potential implications for child support enforcement. In this paper, I examine the effect of public health insurance eligibility to low‐income adults on child support outcomes. I find that the ACA Medicaid expansions increased child support distributed to custodial families as arrears by 8.5 percent. Evidence also suggests current support distributions increased by about 2 percent. There were no significant effects on paying toward a child support order. Among unmarried mothers, the likelihood of child support receipt increased by 8 percent. These results imply that access to public health insurance can increase the ability of noncustodial parents to pay child support.     

The effects of state policy design features on take-up and crowd-out rates for the State Children's Health Insurance Program.

We evaluate the effects of state policy design features on SCHIP take-up rates and on the degree to which SCHIP benefits crowd out private benefits. The results indicate overall program take-up rates of approximately 10 percent. However, there is considerable heterogeneity across states, suggesting a potential role of inter-state variation in policy design. We find that several design mechanisms have significant and substantial positive effects on take-up. For example, eliminating asset tests, offering continuous coverage, simplifying the application and renewal processes, and extending benefits to parents all have sizable and positive effects on take-up rates. Mandatory waiting periods, on the other hand, consistently reduce take-up rates. In all, inter-state differences in outreach and anti-crowd-out efforts explain roughly one-quarter of the cross-state variation in take-up rates. Concerning the crowding out of private health insurance benefits, we find that between one-quarter and one-third of the increase in public health insurance coverage for SCHIP-eligible children is offset by a decline in private health coverage. We find little evidence that the policy-induced variation in take-up is associated with a significant degree of crowd out, and no evidence that the negative effect on private coverage caused by state policy choices is any greater than the overall crowding-out effect. This suggests that states are not augmenting take-up rates by enrolling children that are relatively more likely to have private health insurance benefits.     

Disability benefit coverage and program interactions in the working-age population

Over three-fourths of the working-age population in the United States is insured for Disability Insurance (DI); this group is protected against a total loss of earned income typically associated with severe disability. However, little is known about the role the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program plays in protecting against the financial consequences of severe disability for this population. We find that over one-third (36 percent) of the working-age population is covered by SSI in the event of a severe disability. Three important implications follow, which we discuss in sequence below: (1) SSI increases the overall coverage of the working-age population; (2) SSI enhances the bundle of cash benefits available to disabled individuals; and (3) interactions with other programs also enhance the safety net, most notably in the area of health insurance coverage. Ignoring these implications could lead to inaccurate inferences about disability program coverage, health insurance coverage, and the well-being of working-age individuals with disabilities. The first major finding is that SSI substantially increases overall cash benefit coverage. Thus SSI dramatically increases protection against the financial risk of disablement in the working-age population. While roughly 23 percent of the U.S. working-age population was not insured for DI in November 1996, SSI provides coverage for more than half of this seemingly "uncovered" population. An important innovation of our analysis is that we account for the possibility that many of those who appear ineligible for SSI based on current income could become eligible as a result of a disability shock that causes their earnings to drop. Thus the estimated proportion that is protected by SSI increases when the possibility of earnings loss because of disability is considered. Considering DI and SSI together, roughly 90 percent of the working-age population would be potentially covered for benefits in the event of a disability. Those who are covered by SSI--as opposed to those covered by DI alone-tend to be relatively young, less educated, and in relatively poor health. The remaining 10 percent or so are not covered by either DI or SSI. This group is economically vulnerable in some sense (they are poorer, older, and more likely to be women than those covered only by DI), but they are not as economically vulnerable in terms of income, resource holdings, and private health insurance coverage as those who are eligible for SSI. A disproportionate share of those who are not covered by either DI or SSI consists of married women. The second major finding is that SSI substantially enhances the bundle of available cash benefits. Roughly one-third of those covered by DI are initially covered by SSI as well. SSI enhances the bundle of available cash benefits through two mechanisms: (1) SSI provides cash payments during the 5-month DI waiting period, and (2) SSI supplements the DI benefit after the DI waiting period for people whose initial SSI payment is larger than the DI benefit. We find that the role of SSI cash payments is temporary for most of those who are initially covered by both SSI and DI: They would receive SSI during the DI waiting period, but would lose SSI eligibility afterwards because the higher DI benefit completely offsets the SSI benefit. However, a smaller group of DI beneficiaries with low DI benefit levels would continue to be covered by both SSI and DI after the DI waiting period because the relatively low DI benefit would not completely offset the SSI benefit. The third major finding is that interactions with other programs also substantially enhance the safety net. The most important interactions involve health insurance coverage. In the working-age population, Medicare is available to DI beneficiaries, but only after a 24-month waiting period. By contrast, SSI is an important pathway to Medicaid benefits for severely disabled adults with limited income and resources and has no waiting period. SSI can provide a pathway to health insurance coverage during the 24-month Medicare waiting period for some DI beneficiaries through providing access to Medicaid. Interactions with other programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), workers' compensation (WC), and veterans' disability programs, modify the role of DI and SSI in protecting people against the adverse financial effects of disablement. The nature of the interactions with other programs differs depending on individual circumstances. Employment-related programs (including UI, WC, and veteran's disability programs) are particularly important for those who are covered by DI. By contrast, the means-tested programs (including TANF and Food Stamp) are more important for those who would be eligible for SSI. In conclusion, SSI plays a substantial role in protecting working-age people against the adverse financial consequences of disablement through three mechanisms: (1) providing coverage to many who are not DI insured; (2) providing additional cash benefits to many who are DI insured and also covered by SSI; and (3) enhancing the social safety net by interacting with other programs, most notably Medicaid. Through these mechanisms, the role of SSI is substantial enough that it cannot be safely ignored in econometric and policy research on DI.     

Does Spending More Get More? Health Care Delivery and Fiscal Implications From a Medicare Fee Bump

While salient features of the Affordable Care Act include insurance expansions and private coverage reforms, various other provisions are embedded within the law. We focus on a temporary 10 percent fee increase for primary care visits supplied to publicly insured (Medicare) beneficiaries. Using administrative and survey data, we assess the price shock's impact on service volume, physician labor supply, and quality of care. Primary care physicians (PCPs) in independent practices demonstrate, at most, a marginal 2 percent increase in new patient visits while horizontally and vertically integrated PCPs show no change. Both PCP organizational types witness declines in established patient visits, on average, but there is marked heterogeneity: established patient visits increase by 1 to 2 percent among PCPs with fewer Medicare claims in the pre‐period. The Medicare fee bump did not observably impact other labor supply outcomes and quality of care margins. We estimate that the policy introduced a $1.5 billion transfer from taxpayers to providers during the initiative's first three years.     

Eligibility for the Medicare buy-in programs, based on a survey of income and program participation simulation.

Medicare buy-in programs are designed to reduce out-of-pocket expenses of beneficiaries with modest income and assets. This article provides estimates of the size of the Medicare beneficiary population eligible for the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) program, the Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary (SLMB) program, and the Qualified Individual-1 (QI-1) program. The buy-in programs use the same resource limits (twice those used in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program) but different thresholds for determining income eligibility. The QMB program uses 100 percent of the poverty line as the cutoff, QI-1 covers persons above 120 percent but at or below 135 percent of the poverty line, and the SLMB program is in between. Making informed judgments about the rate of participation in the buy-in programs and the need for outreach requires an accurate estimate of the size of the eligible population. If that population is underestimated, policymakers might come to unduly optimistic conclusions about current buy-in participation. In contrast, an overestimate may make current participation seem too low. If policymakers react to an upwardly biased estimate of the eligible population by increasing outreach, they are bound to be disappointed by the results of that effort. Estimates of the eligible population from past studies of the QMB and SLMB programs range from 5.1 million to 9.1 million. In the absence of new information, it is difficult to judge the accuracy of those estimates because the methodologies had substantial shortcomings that might bias the results. The most common shortcomings include the lack of high-quality, monthly income data and the lack of information on assets from the same data file that was used to estimate participation and income eligibility for Medicare. The current study uses the most recently available (as of August 2000) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) file that is matched to the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) administrative records. The data file covers 1995 information. Estimates were also obtained using 1991 data to assess the sensitivity of eligibility estimates to the year chosen. The SIPP has several major advantages over other data sources because it contains relevant, high-quality information on both income and assets for establishing financial eligibility for the buy-in programs. First, the SIPP collects detailed and conceptually appropriate information on monthly, rather than annual, income and therefore has more complete information about income than do other surveys. As a result, SIPP-based estimates of poverty are substantially lower than estimates based on the Current Population Survey. Second, the SIPP also collects information on assets at the individual level. Thus, the survey provides enough detail to measure the major income and asset exclusions directly. Finally, the SIPP data are matched to SSA administrative records: Medicare eligibility can therefore be accurately measured, and self-reported data on Social Security and SSI benefits can be replaced with more accurate monthly information. Our 1995 simulation estimates that approximately 4.8 million persons in the U.S. noninstitutionalized population were eligible for the QMB program and an additional 1.6 million for the SLMB program. The total--roughly 6.5 million--is within the range of estimates from past studies but is closer to the lower end, suggesting that the eligible population is smaller than was previously believed. When the estimated QI-1 eligible population of 0.9 million is added, the total for the three buy-in programs is 7.4 million. Because the QI-1 program did not exist in 1995, only the estimated 6.5 million QMBs and SLMBs would actually have been eligible to receive benefits. The 7.4 million figure represents the 1995 Medicare beneficiaries who would be eligible for buy-in under program rules for 2000. Adjusting that number to account for increases in the Medicare population between 1995 and 1999 yields an estimated eligible population of 7.8 million in 1999. Compared with other elderly Medicare recipients, eligible elderly QMBs and SLMBs have poorer health, more functional limitations, and higher rates of health care use. Thus, not only are their income resources relatively limited, but their need for potentially expensive medical care is also greater. Similar differences were not found in health, functional limitations, and health care use among disabled participants in the QMB and SLMB programs. Our estimates imply that about 2.5 million noninstitutionalized individuals were eligible for but not enrolled in the QMB and SLMB programs in 1999. That finding suggests that fewer eligibles may be available for targeting by outreach efforts than was previously believed. Outreach may be more difficult than it would be with a larger eligible population. (ABSTRACT TRUNCATED)     

收入、健康与医疗保险对老年人幸福感的影响

本文使用中国9个省、2200名55岁以上老年人的微观调查数据,主要检验了收入水平、健康状况与医疗保险对主观幸福感的影响。Ordered Logit回归分析结果表明：收入增加能够显著提高城镇老年人的主观幸福感,收入差距的影响不显著;对农村老年人而言,收入的作用不明显,而收入差距则有显著的负向影响。心理健康和城乡老年人幸福感呈高度的正相关,记忆力、日常生活自理能力等身体健康因素也具有显著的正向影响。公费医疗显著提高农村老年人的幸福感,城镇职工医疗保险和合作医疗分别对城镇和农村老年人幸福感具有积极的作用。总体上,城镇老年人的主观幸福感高于农村,东部老年人幸福感高于中部,中部高于西部。因此,增加老年人的收入水平,完善老年人医疗保险制度,并逐步协调城乡和地区经济发展,有助于从整体上提高老年人的幸福感。     

The erosion of retiree health benefits and retirement behavior: implications for the disability insurance program

The effects of retiree health insurance on the decision to retire have not been examined until recently. It is an area of increasing significance because of rising health care costs for retirees, the uncertain future of Medicare, and increased life expectancy. In general, studies suggest that individual retirement decisions are strongly responsive to the availability of retiree health insurance. Early retiree benefits and retirement behavior are also important because they may affect the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program. It is not apparent that if a person loses retiree health benefits, or if fewer people are eligible for retiree health benefits in general, claims for DI will increase. The potential 2-year loss of health benefits may be a deterrent to leaving the labor force and claiming DI, although persons who are unable to work would leave the labor force even without health benefits. In order to understand how the decline in retiree health benefits may affect enrollment in DI, analysts must at least incorporate the role of coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). That act provides many people with access to health insurance during the 2-year gap between eligibility for DI and Medicare. In fact, persons with sufficient means to retire early could use the income from Disability Insurance to buy COBRA coverage during the first 2 years of DI coverage. Determining the effect of the erosion of retiree health benefits on DI must account properly for the role of other factors that affect DI eligibility and participation. The financial incentives of Social Security, pension plans, retirement savings programs, health status, the availability of health insurance, and other factors influencing retirement decisions must be taken fully into account in order to isolate the precise effect of retiree health benefits.     

The Effects of Mandated Health Insurance Benefits for Autism on Out‐of‐Pocket Costs and Access to Treatment

As of 2014, 37 states have passed mandates requiring many private health insurance policies to cover diagnostic and treatment services for autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). We explore whether ASD mandates are associated with out‐of‐pocket costs, financial burden, and cost or insurance‐related problems with access to treatment among privately insured children with special health care needs (CSHCNs). We use difference‐in‐difference and difference‐in‐difference‐in‐difference approaches, comparing pre–post mandate changes in outcomes among CSHCN who have ASD versus CSHCN other than ASD. Data come from the 2005 to 2006 and the 2009 to 2010 waves of the National Survey of CSHCN. Based on the model used, our findings show no statistically significant association between state ASD mandates and caregivers’ reports about financial burden, access to care, and unmet need for services. However, we do find some evidence that ASD mandates may have beneficial effects in states in which greater percentages of privately insured individuals are subject to the mandates. We caution that we do not study the characteristics of ASD mandates in detail, and most ASD mandates have gone into effect very recently during our study period.