Explaining European Union Adjustments in Sweden's Central Administration

Existing theories on why administrative reorganizations take place point in opposite directions. This article assesses which logic of action provides the most accurate characterization of reform activities in Sweden's central administration since accession to the European Union (EU) in 1995. In order to explain reorganization activities, two explanatory models are specified: a Rational Actor Model (RAM) and a Normative Organization Model (NOM). The results reveal that the Social Democratic government has been committed to realizing a comprehensive reorganization of the Government Offices. More powers have been concentrated in the Prime Minister's Office, while, for instance, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has lost many of its previous functions. This review of the machinery of government has been predominantly a rational activity with the explicit purpose of strengthening coordination of EU policy between ministries. Nonetheless, the reform activities involve normative considerations and demonstrate that the theoretical cleavage that has nurtured the debate between rational choice theorists and its opponents has been exaggerated.     

Mass Administrative Reorganization,Media Attention,and the Paradox of Information

How does media attention influence government decisions about whether to terminate independent administrative agencies? The authors argue that an agency's salience with partisan audiences has a direct effect, but a high media profile can disrupt normal government monitoring processes and obfuscate termination decisions. This argument is evaluated in the context of a recent mass administrative reorganization by the British coalition government using probit and heteroscedastic probit regression models. The evidence suggests that termination is less likely for agencies salient in newspapers popular with the government's core supporters but not those read by its minority coalition partner. We also find that agencies with greater overall newspaper salience as well as younger agencies have a higher error variance.     

我国“大部门体制”的理论内涵和改革路径

建立职能整合、机构协调的大部门体制是我国行政管理体制改革的必然要求。我国的大部门体制是在借鉴西方成功经验的基础上,各项改革不断深化的结果,它围绕政府职能的整合与重组,贯穿决策权、执行权和监督权的分立协调,有利于政府流程再造和现阶段诸多问题的解决。由于国情不同,大部制在我国的顺利推进需要选择与西方截然不同的改革路径。     

Parliamentary questions as a control mechanism in coalition governments

This article argues that government parties can use parliamentary questions to monitor coalition partners in order to reduce agency loss through ministerial drift. According to this control logic, government parties have particular incentives to question ministers whose jurisdictions display high policy conflict and high electoral salience and thus hold the prospect of electorally damaging ministerial drift. Multivariate regression analysis of all parliamentary questions in the German Bundestag between 1980 and 2017 supports this hypothesis, showing that cabinet parties address substantially and significantly more questions to ministries held by coalition partners on salient and ideologically divisive issues. This interactive effect does not occur for opposition parties or questions posed to own-party ministers. These findings, as well as the temporal patterns of questioning over the electoral cycle, indicate that control within coalitions is a distinct motivation for questioning ministers that cannot be reduced to existing explanations such as electorally motivated issue competition.     

Unveiling the Political Elite: High-Ranking Chinese Officials on Television Talk Shows

Many high-ranking Chinese officials have recently changed their low-key persona and have discussed sensitive issues on television talk shows. Using complete participant observations of a CCTV talk show, we argue, besides officials’ personal factors, that the unequal power distribution between the central ministries and the promotion competition among officials is the mechanism that motivates senior officials to enter the spotlight. State ministries with less political clout and local officials are more active talk show guests. They take advantage of media interviews to enhance policy adherence, signal administrative needs, and display achievements to the central government. The media political platform also brings more personal interaction between Chinese media and political elite, which may increase personalization of politics and autonomy for the media.     

Politics of administrative reform and reorganization in Bangladesh

The present military government in Bangladesh has implemented a number of major administrative reform and reorganization measures. The government claims that effectuation of such measures has led to the decentralization of power and authority to the grass-root level ensuring increasing popular participation in administration; the achievement of cost-effectiveness by reducing the number of ministries, divisions and personnel from the public pay roll and by quickening of the pace of decision-making due to elimination of redundant bureaucratic layers. But the implementation, in reality, has contributed among other things to the legitimization and strengthening of the military government, and a weakening of the democratically organized political opposition. It also enables generalist civil servants to preserve, and to some extent strengthen, their position within the civil service system.     

政府绩效视角下的行政管理体制改革战略反思——基于地方政府公务员的感知调查

改革开放以来,我国行政管理体制改革一直坚持以组织结构调整为主的模式.对于这一模式的影响,尤其对地方政府的影响,一直缺少科学层面的检验和理论层面的反思.本文选取政府绩效作为标杆,利用地方政府公务员的问卷调查数据,探索政府部门间关系和部门管理制度建设影响部门绩效的路径和程度,使用结构方程模型实证检验了行政管理体制改革战略在地方层面的有效性.结果表明,部门间关系作为政府结构的核心特征对于政府绩效并没有直接的影响作用,其影响作用是通过部门制度建设和部门文化间接发挥的;部门制度建设对政府绩效的整体影响要大于部门间关系.因此,在今后的改革中应该给予管理制度层面的改革更多的重视,通过局部的、具体制度的改革为整体的、基本制度的变革创造条件.同时,还应在改革过程中维护政府组织文化的凝聚力和激励性.     

The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure by Arjen Boin,Paul 't Hart,Eric Stern,and Bengt Sundelius

ABSTRACT

The article addresses two principal questions: how public management reforms develop in a context of high government turnover, and how, under these circumstances, features of the specific area of public management policy affect the dynamics of the reform and in particular its “technical feasibility.” The research questions are addressed through the case study of the Italian administrative context between 1992 and 2007, a period marked by tumultuous government turnovers. The article presents reforms in two policy areas of public management: civil service reform and innovation, over a three-period time span covering 15 years. The brief duration of political leadership represents a threat to the approval and implementation of policy interventions irrespective of the political salience of the issue and the need for legal enactment. Therefore, the success of a public management reform process in an unstable political context characterized by frequent government turnovers depends on meeting certain conditions for successful policy entrepreneurship: the a priori expertise of policy entrepreneurs, their ability to repackage the issue, keep a community of practice alive, and maneuver the dynamics of the legal process. However, implementation, being a less visible phase, suffers from greater discontinuity as “maintenance activities” necessary for the success of reform are disregarded. Thus, the consideration of the temporal dimension of the policy cycle and the area-specific effects on public management reform dynamics exerted by diverse levels of political salience and legal enactment represent the main contributions of this work to the theories on public management policy change.     

Congruence between voters and parties: The role of party-level issue salience

The level of congruence between parties and their voters can vary greatly from one policy issue to another, which raises questions regarding the effectiveness of political representation. We seek to explain variation in party–voter congruence across issues and parties. We focus on the hypotheses that (1) average proximity between the positions of voters and the party they vote for will be highest on the issues that the party emphasises in the election campaign and that (2) this relationship will be stronger for niche parties. We test these hypotheses using data on the policy preferences of voters, party positions, party attention profiles and salience on concrete policy issues in four countries: The Netherlands, Ireland, Germany and Sweden. Overall, we find that voter–party proximity tends to be higher on issues that the party emphasises. As these are the issues where parties typically have the greatest policy impact, this implies that the quality of representation is highest where it matters most. There is some limited evidence that the positive relationship between issue salience and proximity is stronger for niche parties. In sum, the quality of policy representation varies strongly with party-level issue salience and to a lesser extent with the type of political party.     

The ministerial system in Niue

A ministerial system of government has been developed in the tiny micro state of Niue, and in this article the pattern of ministerialization is compared with a typology derived from a study of the ministerial systems in other countries with ministries and ministerial departments. In Niue while the foundations of responsible government were being laid, and functions and powers transferred to an elected executive committee, no corresponding moves were made to reorganize established public service departments and there is, therefore, a mismatch between ministers and departments. Niue like New Zealand has a form of ministerialization that initially appears to conform to the least developed mode in the typology. Niue, however, has a unique arrangement in having a Secretary to Government who is the head of the public service and chief administrative officer with control over all departments, and with a right to attend Cabinet meetings and speak on any matter. Niue, as a consequence, has a ministerial system which overall does not conform with the typology and has interest as an attempt to develop a form appropriate to a micro state.     

Salience and Complexity in Supranational Policymaking: The Case of Subnational Interests

This study examined whether Gormley's insights about the effects of public salience and technical complexity on the patterns of participation in the regulatory process have explanatory power in an international setting. Specifically, I tracked 60 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission and estimated the change made by the supranational technocrats in response to the requests of subnational politicians. I found support for the theoretical propositions about the differentiated effect of salience and complexity on political and administrative actors. Consistent with the notion of bureaucratic expertise, the Commission is less responsive when the policy issues require expertise to be tackled efficiently. Although the European Union has been pursuing various mechanisms to democratize its policy process, the technical character of supranational regulation precludes the broader public and elected politicians from assuming a larger role and bureaucracy will continue to be a major player in the international arena.     

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE

This symposium examines issues related to the links between administrative reform policy and economic development policy. The symposium introduction paper consists of two parts. First, it offers an overview of the background of theoretical and conceptual issues that are important to the connection between administrative reform and economic development. The issues reviewed include the role of government in economic development, the importance of public policy and management to economic development, the contribution of development administration, and the need of administrative reform to remove bureaucratic problems and promote efficiency. Next, the introduction paper provides a brief summary of the research arguments and findings addressed in the following six articles. They include an evaluation of administrative reform in Arab world economic growth, an examination of administrative reform and economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean, a political economy analysis of policy reform in Korea, a study of the implementation of privatization strategies in India's public sector reform, a discussion of the concerns between efficiency and ethics in China's economic development, and the study of administrative and economic development in Mongolia. The implications of the research findings and the need for further study of the linkage between administrative reform and economic development are emphasized in the conclusion.     

Coalition Government,Legislative Institutions,and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies

Most democracies are governed by coalitions, comprising multiple political parties with conflicting policy positions. The prevalence of these governments poses a significant question: Which parties' electoral commitments are ultimately reflected in government policy? Recent theories have challenged our understanding of multiparty government, arguing that the relative influence of coalition parties depends crucially on institutional context. Specifically, where institutions allow credible enforcement of bargains, policy should reflect a compromise among all governing parties; where such institutions are absent, the preferences of parties controlling the relevant ministries should prevail. Critically, empirical work has thus far failed to provide direct evidence for this conditional relationship. Analyzing changes in social protection policies in 15 parliamentary democracies, we provide the first systematic evidence that the strength of legislative institutions significantly shapes the relative policy influence of coalition parties. Our findings have implications for our understanding of coalition government, policymaking, and electoral responsiveness.     

Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control

In a world where goods and services (but also people, capital and ideas) are increasingly ignoring national borders, competition policy has emerged as a highly salient issue at the heart of international trade discussions. Aspects of competition policy, from cartels and monopolies to state aids and the liberalization of the utilities, have become a regular feature in the pages of the financial and legal press and have become identified as a central element in any government's policy towards industry and its drive for competitiveness. This article focuses on European Union merger control and although appreciative of the dominance of economics and law in competition policy, stresses the political dimension to competition policy. A government and public administration perspective is essential. This is in evidence in the type of regime, the commitment to enforcing the law, the role of discretion and issues such as transparency and democracy. The example of merger control is used to illustrate how the European Commission (EC) has emerged and operates as a genuinely federal actor in determining and shaping merger policy throughout the EU. In short, this article accounts for policy development, the decision making process and in particular the degree to which discretion and politicization underpin one of the most crucial aspects of economic regulation.     

Decentralization for regional development: A comparative study of Tanzania,Zambia and Papua New Guinea

Decentralization has been a common aim in administrative reform and this article points to common themes in the decentralization programmes of Tanzania, Zambia and Papua New Guinea. The programmes involve both developing field administrative structures on an area basis in which horizontal links between the field staff of different ministries are at least as important as the vertical lines of authority linking field staff with headquarters' departments, and also decentralizing authority over planning and implementing development programmes to local decision making bodies. The impact of these decentralization programmes has not hitherto been adequately monitored or evaluated, and experience of attempts at doing this in Tanzania emphasizes the importance of building into a decentralization programme a method of monitoring it which produces usable information. The article points to the plans for monitoring to be pursued in Zambia.     

Disentangling the Value of a Ministry: Party Leaders’ Evaluations of German State Ministries

While the role played by ministries in the process of coalition government has been investigated from multiple angles, there is a clear lack of knowledge about which specific ministry features party leaders actually value as they assess different government posts. This paper aims at discovering whether, next to office considerations, the policy influence resting with a ministry does affect its value. A new survey of party leaders in the German states enables us to estimate the relative importance of specific office (e.g. public standing) and policy considerations (e.g. influence via legislation) for ministries’ values as well as to directly investigate differences between parties. The results show that both office and policy considerations matter for ministry evaluation generally, but also that different aspects have different weights. Furthermore, while all parties value the policy influence of a ministry, there is variation as to which type of policy influence (cross-sectional vs. within-jurisdictional) parties emphasise.     

The Italian state: no longer Catholic,no longer Christian

The constant appearance of highly detailed studies of parties in the different West European countries creates the need for a theory which summarises their major findings and relates them to each other. Such a theory needs to be general in form, but existing formulations (for example, minimal‐winning criteria for government formation) are limited to one aspect of government and are theoretically inadequate. A general theory covering all major aspects of democratic party government (formation, distribution of ministries, reshuffles, policy formation and termination) is proposed and its fit with existing findings illustrated.     

Lobbying and uncertainty: Lobbying's varying response to different political events

Does political uncertainty affect whether lobbyists contact government officials? We suggest that the answer depends on the type of uncertainty introduced. Distinguishing between policy objective uncertainty—where organized interests and lobbyists are uncertain about the policy intentions of decision makers—and issue information uncertainty—where policymakers are uncertain about the technical details of issues—we hypothesize that whereas an increase in policy objective uncertainty leads to a decrease in lobbying, a rise in issue information uncertainty leads to more lobbying. We test the hypotheses with longitudinal data from the Canadian Lobbyists Registry measuring change in the number of times lobbyists have contacted government ministries each month from 2008 to 2018. The results suggest that lobbying intensity does respond differently to these types of uncertainty. Whereas events introducing issue information uncertainty have a statistically significant positive relationship with lobbying, events introducing policy objective uncertainty do not.     

Holding governments accountable? Individual heterogeneity in performance voting

This study suggests that performance voting is characterised by extensive individual heterogeneity. Most economic voting studies to date treat voters as rather homogeneous in their reactions to economic performance of incumbents. Yet, a large and well‐established line of research from the American context demonstrates the conditional impact of political sophistication and salience on voters' political attitudes and behaviour. Building on this work, this article explores individual‐level variation in performance voting due to political sophistication and salience. Utilising cross‐national data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) including 25 democracies, performance voting is examined across an array of policy areas including the economy, social welfare, immigration and national security, and it is shown that political sophistication and salience are key moderators of performance voting. The findings suggest that holding governments to account for past performance is mainly the prerogative of the highly sophisticated and thus may be more laborious than previously assumed. At the same time, the results indicate that the sophistication gap in performance voting narrows when voters attach a higher degree of salience to a policy area. As long as voters care enough about government activities in a particular policy area, incumbents can expect credit or blame for policy outcomes. This should provide at least some impetus for responsive policy making.