Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation

Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA—operationalized as local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience—declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open .     

Roadmaps to Representation: An Experimental Study of How Voter Education Tools Affect Citizen Decision Making

Efforts to educate citizens about the candidates and issues at stake in elections are widespread. These include distributing voter guides describing candidates’ policy views and interactive tools conveying similar information. Do these voter education tools help voters identify candidates who share their policy views? We address this question by conducting survey experiments that randomly assign a nonpartisan voter guide, political party endorsements, a spatial map showing voters their own and the candidates’ ideological positions, or both a spatial map and party endorsements. We find that each type of information strengthens the relationship between voters’ policy views and those of the candidates they choose. These effects are largest for uninformed voters. When spatial maps and party endorsements send conflicting signals, many voters choose candidates with more similar policy views, against their party’s recommendation. These results contribute to debates about citizen competence and demonstrate the efficacy of practical efforts to inform electorates.

     

Proportional Representation,Majoritarian Legislatures,and Coalitional Voting

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives. In proportional representation systems, voters face more complex incentives as electoral outcomes don’t translate as directly into policy outcomes as in plurality rule elections. A common approach is to assume electoral outcomes translate into policy as a vote‐weighted average of all party platforms. However, most of the world’s legislatures are majoritarian institutions, and elections in PR systems are generally followed by a process of coalition formation. Results obtained using this assumption are not robust to the introduction of even minimal forms of majoritarianism. Incentives to engage in strategic voting depend on considerations about the coalitions that may form after the election, and the voters’ equilibrium strategies are shaped by policy balancing and the postelectoral coalition bargaining situation, including considerations about who will be appointed the formateur.     

How Diffusion of Power in Parliaments Affects Voter Choice

e-mail: oritk{at}umich.edu I analyze how the diffusion of power in parliaments affectsvoter choice. Using a two-step research design, I first estimatean individual-level model of voter choice in 14 parliamentarydemocracies, allowing voters to hold preferences both for theparty most similar to them ideologically and for the party thatpulls policy in their direction. While in systems in which poweris concentrated the two motivations converge, in consensualsystems they diverge: since votes will likely be watered downby bargaining in the parliament, outcome-oriented choice inconsensual systems often leads voters to endorse parties whosepositions differ from their own views. In the second step, Iutilize institutional measures of power diffusion in the parliamentto account for the degree to which voters in different politiespursue one motivation versus the other. I demonstrate that themore power diffusion and compromise built into the politicalsystem via institutional mechanisms, the more voters compensatefor the watering down of their vote by endorsing parties whosepositions differ from their own views.     

Assessing the Impact of Alternative Voting Technologies on Multi-Party Elections: Design Features,Heuristic Processing and Voter Choice

This paper analyzes the influence of alternative voting technologies on electoral outcomes in multi-party systems. Using data from a field experiment conducted during the 2005 legislative election in Argentina, we examine the role of information effects associated with alternative voting devices on the support for the competing parties. We find that differences in the type of information displayed and how it was presented across devices favored some parties to the detriment of others. The impact of voting technologies was found to be larger than in two-party systems, and could lead to changes in election results. We conclude that authorities in countries moving to adopt new voting systems should carefully take the potential partisan advantages induced by different technologies into account when evaluating their implementation.     

How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?

An accumulating body of research suggests that African Americans cast invalid ballots at a higher rate than whites. Our analysis of a unique precinct-level dataset from South Carolina and Louisiana shows that the black-white gap in voided ballots depends crucially on the voting equipment people use. In areas with punch cards or optically scanned ballots, the black-white gap ranged from four to six percentage points. Lever and electronic machines, which prohibit overvoting and make undervoting more transparent and correctible, cut the discrepancy by a factor of ten. Judging from exit polls and opinion surveys, much of the remaining difference could be due to intentional undervoting, which African Americans profess to practice at a slightly higher rate than whites. In any case, the use of appropriate voting technologies can virtually eliminate the black-white disparity in invalid ballots.     

Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model

We report results from a laboratory experiment testing the basic hypothesis embedded in various rational voter models that there is a direct correlation between the strength of an individual's belief that his or her vote will be pivotal and the likelihood that individual incurs the cost to vote. This belief is typically unobservable. In one of our experimental treatments we elicit these subjective beliefs using a proper scoring rule that induces truthful revelation of beliefs. This allows us to directly test the pivotal voter model. We find that a higher subjective probability of being pivotal increases the likelihood that an individual votes, but the probability thresholds used by subjects are not as crisp as the theory would predict. There is some evidence that individuals learn over time to adjust their beliefs to be more consistent with the historical frequency of pivotality. However, many subjects keep substantially overestimating their probability of being pivotal.     

Proportional Representation in Scandinavia: Implications for Finland

The comparative study of electoral system requires uniform methods easily applicable to every country's electoral data. In this paper we have presented two such possibilities: a new graphical method that portrays the proportionality profile of a country's electoral rule, and measures to calculate the systematic and random deviation from proportionality. The empirical data consist of election results from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Around 1950, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden changed from the d'Hondt method of allocation to the modified Sainte Lague rule. The consequences of this shift represent the primary focus of this article. What can the present Finnish constitutional reformers learn from the Scandinavian experience? According to the empirical results, three distinct patterns of proportionality profiles can be distinguished: 1) systems involving nationwide adjustment seats, 2) modified St. Lague (without adjustment seats) and 3) d'Hondt (without adjustment seats). The d'Hondt system gives a high advantage ratio to large parties, the modified Sainte Lague method favors middle-size parties, and the adjustment seats system overrides the basic characteristics of both the d'Hondt and modified Sainte Lague methods. The proportionality indices show the modified Sainte Lague to be more proportional than the d'Hondt method. The proportionality of elections is nearly perfect with adjustment seats system irrespective of the method of allocation applied.     

Early Voting Changes and Voter Turnout: North Carolina in the 2016 General Election

North Carolina offers its residents the opportunity to cast early in-person (EIP) ballots prior to Election Day, a practice known locally as “One-Stop” voting. Following a successful legal challenge to the state’s controversial 2013 Voter Information and Verification Act, North Carolina’s 100 counties were given wide discretion over the hours and locations of EIP voting for the 2016 General Election. This discretion yielded a patchwork of election practices across the state, providing us with a set of natural experiments to study the effect of changes in early voting hours on voter turnout. Drawing on individual-level voting records from the North Carolina State Board of Elections, our research design matches voters on race, party, and geography. We find little evidence that changes to early opportunities in North Carolina had uniform effects on voter turnout. Nonetheless, we do identify areas in the presidential battleground state where voters appear to have reacted to local changes in early voting availability, albeit not always in directions consistent with the existing literature. We suspect that effects of changes to early voting rules are conditional on local conditions, and future research on the effects of election law changes on turnout should explore these conditions in detail.

     

The Effect of Voting Technology on Voter Turnout: Do Computers Scare the Elderly?

In the aftermath of the Florida debacle in the 2000 Presidential election, there has been an emphasis on replacing voting equipment perceived as inferior (e.g., punch card ballots) with more technologically advanced voting methods. It is possible, however, that not all voters will be comfortable with high-tech voting devices. Elderly voters, for example, might be familiar with the old voting machines but apprehensive about computerized voting. If this is the case, the fear of new voting technology might cause the turnout of elderly voters to decrease. We test for this effect by analyzing the change in voter turnout across Georgia counties in the two most recent gubernatorial elections, as it relates to the share of the counties’ populations that is over the age of 65 years. Consistent with the hypothesis that computers scare the elderly, we find a significantly negative relationship between the change in voter turnout and the elderly share of the population. An additional 1% of the population that is elderly is associated with a 0.3–0.4% decrease in turnout. The hypothesis that elderly voters were apprehensive about the change in voting technology is also supported by the increase in absentee balloting.     

Electronic Voting in Belgium: A Legitimised Choice?

Computer voting was introduced in Belgium in 1994. Paradoxically, no action had been taken to ascertain the opinion of electors confronted with this original method of voting. This article verifies the social and empirical dimensions of legitimacy of this new method through several empirical indicators used in a survey conducted on the occasion of the federal elections of 18 May 2003: (a) how easy/difficult it was for electors to vote on a computer; (b) to what extent they trust voting on a computer; (c) if they have a philosophical/social opposition to voting on a computer.     

Electoral Participation in Pursuit of Policy Representation: Ideological Congruence and Voter Turnout

In this article, we examine whether lack of ideological congruence with the viable party options discourages turnout, and under which conditions. We conceive congruence from the perspective of the individual citizen, and, drawing on policy-based arguments for non-voting, we hypothesize that: having no party in the political menu sharing similar views should especially reduce turnout of citizens holding extremist views and that this effect would be greatest in proportional electoral systems. Relying on data collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we show that lack of congruence with the electoral menu reduces extremists’ turnout and does so particularly in PR systems.     

Biases at the Ballot Box: How Multiple Forms of Voter Discrimination Impede the Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Ethnic Minority Groups

Political Behavior - Research shows that ethnic minority candidates often face an electoral penalty at the ballot box. In this study, we argue that this penalty depends on both candidate and voter...     

The Impact of Proportional Representation on Government Effectiveness: The New Zealand Experience

It is often claimed that proportional representation (PR) undermines government effectiveness, including decisional efficacy, fiscal prudence, electoral responsiveness and accountability. Drawing on New Zealand's experience since the introduction of a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996, this article examines the impact of the new voting system on government effectiveness. Although government durability has been substantially reduced and the policy-making process has become more complex, governments under MMP appear to be no less able to address major policy problems or respond to changing economic circumstances. Moreover, New Zealand has maintained continuous fiscal surpluses under MMP — a radical departure from the protracted, and often large, deficits that characterised the previous two decades under a majoritarian electoral system.     

Rational Ignorance,Rational Voter Expectations,and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion

This paper demonstrates that rational ignorance, properly defined, allows the possibility that fiscal illusion affects policies in a democracy. The implications of rational ignorance are examined in a setting where voters are assumed to completely understand the fiscal environment and make perfect use of any information that they possess. In this setting, it is demonstrated that ignorance may be rational, manipulated, and generate biased expectations over fiscal parameters. The analysis suggests that the electoral impact of voter ignorance is reduced, but not eliminated by electoral competition. Candidate positions only affect the electoral choices of individuals who are at least partially informed about those positions. Consequently electoral competition tends to generate policies that advance the interests of relatively informed voters. This implies that election based public policies are based upon better information than one would expect based on the widespread fiscal ignorance reported in surveys. However, even in this setting, the votes cast and the policies adopted are affected by the estimated marginal rates of substitution between private and governmental services which can not be unbiased if areas of ignorance remain — even if voters make the very best use of information in their possession. The existence of rational ignorance, once carefully defined, is sufficient to generate policy relevant fiscal illusion.     

School Choice: Money,Race, and Congressional Voting on Vouchers

Milton Friedman has suggested that the political power of the AmericanFederation of Teachers and the National Education Association (the twomajor teachers unions) has been instrumental in defeating the adoption ofeducational vouchers. We test this hypothesis.We find that a campaign contribution to a memberof the U.S. House of Representatives by either unionreduces the probability that also a Representative will vote for apro school choice amendment to the ``No Child Left Behind Act of2001.'' Also a Representative whose districthas a large African American population or who is Republicanis more likely to vote for vouchers.