A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy

If public opinion about foreign policy is such an elite‐driven process, why does the public often disagree with what elites have to say? We argue here that elite cue‐taking models in International Relations are both overly pessimistic and unnecessarily restrictive. Members of the public may lack information about the world around them, but they do not lack principles, and information need not only cascade from the top down. We present the results from five survey experiments where we show that cues from social peers are at least as strong as those from political elites. Our theory and results build on a growing number of findings that individuals are embedded in a social context that combines with their general orientations toward foreign policy in shaping responses toward the world around them. Thus, we suggest the public is perhaps better equipped for espousing judgments in foreign affairs than many of our top‐down models claim.     

Political values in independent agencies

Despite that independent agencies are typically justified in terms of technical efficiency, they inevitably have to make political judgments. How can political reasoning be legitimate in such institutions? This paper starts by investigating the merits of two prominent models. The “avoidance model” asks agency reasoning to stick to empirical facts and as far as possible stay clear of political values. By contrast, the “specification model” recognizes the need for constructive normative work, but confines it to the refinement of given statutes. This paper challenges both models and defends a third alternative. The “public reason model” requires agencies to ground their value judgments in a publicly accessible framework of reasoning, which is here interpreted as their overarching mandate. The paper argues that agency mandates should be conceived as distinct domains of reasoning, and it delineates three institutional virtues that enable agencies to track this domain.     

The structuring of the vote in post-communist part systems: The Bulgarian example

Abstract. Consolidated democracies involve structured linkages between citizens and political decision making elites that are typically organized via political parties. Given the economic and institutional instability and uncertainty in post-communist emerging democracies, it has often been maintained that a structuring of party systems in such countries is slow to emerge. This paper demonstrates with data from a 1991 pre-election study in Bulgaria that significant aspects of political structuring may in fact appear in post-communist polities quite early. The structuring is based on citizens' individual resources which they expect to convert into economic benefits in the economic market economy, their market location in occupational terms, their general ideological dispositions, and their evaluation of the economic performance of the incumbent governments. While the structuring of party systems may still be weaker than in Western Europe, the Bulgarian evidence casts doubt on the tabula rasa hypothesis in the study of post-communist politics. Of course, further comparative analysis of post-communist democracies is required to buttress our conclusions.     

Do Voters Polarize When Radical Parties Enter Parliament?

Do voters polarize ideologically when radical views gain political legitimacy, or does the rise of radical voices merely reflect societal conflict? We argue that elite polarization as signaled by radical parties' first entrance into parliament leads to voter divergence. Immediately after the election, legitimization and backlash effects mean that voters on both ideological sides move toward the extremes. In the longer term, this polarization is solidified because of radical parties' parliamentary presence. A panel study of Dutch voters shows that the 2002 parliamentary entrance of a radical‐right party indeed led to immediate ideological polarization across the political spectrum. Estimating time‐series cross‐sectional models on Eurobarometer data from 17 countries (1973–2016) shows an additional long‐term impact of radical‐right party entry on polarization. The presence of radical voices on the right has polarizing effects, illustrating how such institutional recognition and legitimization can have a far‐reaching impact on society.     

Employers,the state and the politics of institutional change: Vocational education and training in Austria,Germany and Switzerland

An in‐depth comparison of Austria, Germany and Switzerland shows that the employers' constellation and the elites of the public education administration affect patterns of institutional change. If large firms are the dominant actors and collaborate with elites in the public education administration, institutional change follows a transformative pattern. If small and medium‐sized firms are in a strong position and have the power to influence public elites according to their interests, self‐preserving institutional change results. The article also shows that it is not so much trade unions as small and medium‐sized firms that act as a brake on transformative change. The article adds to the literature of institutional change by arguing that specifying and explaining patterns of institutional change requires that sufficient scope be allowed for actors' creative handling of institutions. It also suggests that in order to differentiate between self‐preserving and transformative change, one has to specify the important institutional dimensions that sustain an institution. The article combines Mill's method of agreement and difference.     

Integration of the Swedish Local Elite: The Role of Professional and Private Networks

This article uses social network data to study the integration of local elites in four Swedish municipalities. Four research questions are asked. First: How integrated are the elites? While the results modify the picture that there are two rather distinct elites in Sweden – that is, a political elite dominated by the labour movement and an economic elite dominated by business and the large business organizations – it is interesting to note that integration between elite spheres is lowest for the relation between politicians and business representatives. To a considerable degree, integration between political and economic elites is indirect, mediated through the administrative elite. The second question is: Are the inner elite circles dominated by the political, economic or administrative elite? The study indicates that local elites in Sweden are strongly dominated by political elites, and also by administrative elites. This is reassuring, since it would indicate a democratic deficit if the structural power of decision making in municipalities resided predominantly in economic actors and administrators. The third question is: What is the role of friendship relations in creating elite integration? The study indicates that private relations among elites both reinforce professional networks and extend them in important ways. The final question is: Is elite integration contingent on political stability and/or the structure of local business? The results are surprisingly stable across the four municipalities, even though the largest distinction was found between elite core and periphery in the politically most stable municipality, which was also the one with the lowest economic diversity.     

Television and party political dissent: intra‐party competition and the formation of news agendas

This paper re‐examines the formation of political news agendas on British television. It argues that studies of news agenda formation in political communication have been overly focused on general election campaigns and the competition between the main political parties to set the news agenda. It suggests that such studies see political parties as either homogeneous or focus exclusively on the activities of communication elites and therefore miss another important aspect of the modern political communication process. Using the British party conferences as a case study, this paper argues that in order to capture the complexities of agenda formation outside election periods, political parties have to be seen as heterogeneous organisations, consisting of various ‘claim‐makers’. News agendas in certain situations have to be understood as the product of intra‐party competition between the leadership and dissenting voices. While this competition is imperfect, favouring resource rich party elites, on certain newsworthy issues broadcasting professionals act as a counterweight to leadership resource advantages, and help shape the outcome of intra‐party competition. In conclusion the paper suggests that dissenting actors within political parties, when newsworthy, can make a substantial contribution to the formation of television news agendas despite the resistance of party leaderships. Taking account of the communicative activity of these actors and of news values will provide further insights into the formation of political news agendas between general elections. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea: the Case of the Kim Young Sam Administration, 1993–1998

This article examines the nature of political and institutional reform initiatives that have been carried out under former president Kim Young Sam. How effective have they been in consolidating democracy in Korea? Specifically, we examine why the Kim Young Sam government's political reform campaigns have been limited, and explore the impact of this limitation on his institutional reform initiatives and the process of consolidation of democracy in Korea. We argue that Kim Young Sam's initial political reform campaigns have contributed to creating a favorable environment for his institutional reform efforts. However, limitations of these initial political reform campaigns such as political funding and bribery scandals have hampered institutional reforms. We also argue that these difficulties were intensified by public dissatisfaction with Korea's poor economic performance and International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance. As a result, Kim Young Sam's moral legitimacy as a civilian and reform-oriented leader toward the public has totally evaporated. Therefore, experiences under the Kim Young Sam administration are just trials and errors of democratization that show another failure in presidential leadership in Korea. These experiences will negatively affect the consolidation process of democracy in Korea by increasing the public's distrust of government as a whole. As a result, democratic consolidation in Korea is being delayed.     

The Blair Governments, Public Sector Reform and State Strategic Capacity

Two books at the end of the Blair era—by Michael Barber and Julian Le Grand—offer to redeem the ‘third way’. Both authors explore the political case for public sector reform and the means by which it can be accomplished. They explore a similar range of reform models: command and control; quasi‐markets; and devolution and transparency. But the circle between efficiency, client service and continuous improvement must be squared. Neither author considers the ‘learning by doing’ alternative. No less fundamentally, neither author addresses the political and technical challenges in developing strategy. How are issues to be aired in advance so as to expose evidence and perspectives? How are interests to be engaged and supporting coalitions formed? How are these processes to occur without executive commitment? How are unconventional ideas to be aired without being over‐ruled by populist or media sensationalism? These are the practical dilemmas that confounded Blair's efforts. These books invite a strategic conversation that is badly needed. But where in the political system can it be pursued?     

A European Security Policy? The Attitudes of Candidates for the European Parliament*

It has been argued that the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent is declining in Western Europe. Whether this is true or not, it seems clear that support for the NATO alliance had reached a remarkably low level among Western European political elites as the 1970s drew to a close. One possible alternative to continued reliance on the Atlantic Alliance would be for Western Europe to develop its own independent defence capabilities. Certainly, in terms of economic and technological resources, this option should be within reach of an integrated European Community. And indeed there seems to be widespread support among European political leaders for the principle of having Western Europe play a more independent role vis-à-vis both superpowers. But there is no clear consensus in favour of the increased defence expenditures that such a policy would entail. Nor is there a consensus in favour of developing a unified West European security system inside or outside the institutional framework of the European Community. Our evidence in support of these conclusions is based on interviews carried out with candidates for the European Parliament in all nine member countries during the months immediately preceding the first direct elections in June, 1979.     

以行动者为中心的制度主义——基于转型政治体系的思考

基于对西方新制度主义政治学"制度中心观"普适性的反思和对低制度化政治体系的经验体认,试图建立一种适合分析低制度化转型政治体系的"以行动者为中心的新制度主义".为此,从行动者所掌握的政治资源、行动能力、利益和价值偏好等角度,把政治行动者分为精英(政治精英、经济精英和文化精英)和政治弱势群体,主要讨论了政治精英的特征及其内外部关系,及政治弱势群体的特征.从行动者的角度,分析初始制度的三种选择模式、制度的重要性与自主性、制度绩效、制度变迁与转型、观念与制度之间的关系等问题,认为制度的初始性选择取决于相关的不同行动者之间的博弈,最初的制度选择模式具有强烈的路径"锁定"作用,但这种作用是通过既得利益者的强制手段来维持的;不同制度的重要与否对不同的行动者来说是不一样的;制度的自主性来自其维持的行动者的政治资源与行动能力;制度绩效的评价不仅体现在它带来的绩效增长,而且还关系到绩效在不同行动者之间的分配公平与否,制度的变迁与转型实际上是行动者之间利益的调整与重新分配.     

Elitist theory and political tolerance in Western Europe

This paper addresses the problem of democratic elitism within the context of Western European politics. An entrenched assertion of the so-calledelitist theory of democracy is that elites are more strongly committed to democratic values such as political tolerance than are ordinary citizens. The processes through which elites become more tolerant include political socialization, resocialization, political practice, and experience. Some have even argued that elites are the primary carriers of thedemocratic creed. Our purpose here is to test several hypothese drawn from elitist theory. Relying on opinion surveys conducted in each of the twelve nations of the European Community in 1988, we focus on political tolerance. Our basic hypothesis is that political activism contributes to greater political tolerance. Special attention is given to a sample of opinion leaders as a test of the elitist theory. The analysis is conducted both at the level of the individual citizen and the level of the nation state. This is one of very few efforts to test elitist theory from a broad, cross-national perspective. Consequently, the analysis will be crucial in recasting elitist theory to comport more closely with empirical evidence.     

Trust in elections and the institutional design of electoral authorities: Evidence from Latin America

It is often assumed that the institutional organization of electoral management bodies (EMB) has an impact on the credibility of elections, but this proposition has been difficult to verify empirically. I examine whether the degree of autonomy from the political process of EMB administrators affects attitudes towards elections among citizens and legislators by analyzing mass and elite surveys across Latin America. I conclude that levels of confidence in the electoral process among political elites are higher in countries with politically autonomous EMBs, but this effect is muted in the analysis of citizen attitudes. This association holds after controlling for individual-level determinants of trust in elections and for other relevant country-level predictors in multilevel statistical models.     

Reemployment Services in the Netherlands: A Comparative Study of Bureaucratic, Market, and Network Forms of Organization

Progress in New Public Management research requires careful comparison of different organizational approaches to public tasks, preferably within a single political and institutional setting. This paper presents a study of three approaches to reemployment services, a recent development in the Netherlands. How do bureaucratic, networked, and market‐based forms of organization function with regard to the new public aim of second‐tier reemployment in the Netherlands? It appears that there is no simple dependence between performance and instrumental or organizational features. Even in the setting of a single welfare state, intricate interactions exist between performance, stakeholder interests, and institutional conditions. Given the importance of these interactions, New Public Management research would benefit by shifting focus away from organizational performance toward a “politics of institutional structuring.”     

Debating China’s Economic Reform: New Leftists vs. Liberals

There have been heated debates on outcome and orientation of China’s economic reforms which started in the late 1970s. Though most of the previous studies on Chinese politics concentrate on the role of elites in policy-making, I argue that the intellectual discourse over policy have become increasingly salient in the post-Mao period. The paper focuses on the following research questions: How and under what circumstances did the New Left and liberals emerge in China? What are the major debates between the two? To what extent have the New Leftists and liberals affected the economic reforms and what change they might bring to the political climate?

     

A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia

This article examines the judicialization of electoral politics in Asia, an important but understudied trend, as demonstrated in Thailand and Indonesia. Though the constitutional courts in both have similar histories and institutional arrangements, their electoral interventions vary radically. We argue that the diffusion or concentration of power among post‐transition elites determines whether the effect of judicial activism will be to shore up or undermine electoral governance. Where power is diffused, as in Indonesia, political actors, less able to impose their own will on the judiciary, seem to prefer a credible referee, which fosters electoral competition. Where power is concentrated, as in Thailand, elites have both the motive and the means to turn judicial activism to antidemocratic ends. By focusing on the ends, rather than the means, of judicial activism, this account goes beyond personalities and institutional design to enhance understanding of the role of the courts in transitional democracies.     

Setting the Post War Australian Policy Agenda – Causes and Content

What are the origins of policy agendas and what determines agenda setting? The one robust theory in the literature associates different agendas with different moments in the evolution of the broader party system namely mass, catch‐all and most recently cartel patterns. This article explores Australian evidence for this thesis. It also argues the cartel moment has recently mutated. Agenda setting is now circumscribed by a mismatch between the needs of policy making and the political incentive structure. The media have become primary tissue connecting political elites to their publics. But this traps the system in short term, primarily populist stances. Systemic capacities to mediate agenda setting have thus been corrupted.     

Perceptions of policy choice in contemporary democracies

Though the concept of choice is essential to democracy, little is known about how citizens make sense of the diversity of policies offered by political elites. Research has found that institutional arrangements such as low electoral thresholds and multiple party competitors are associated with greater policy choice. Other work emphasises non‐institutional factors. No research, however, examines what the voters think. In this article these alternative explanations are assessed in terms of whether citizens believe parties to provide choice over policy. Evidence from 25 democracies reveals that electoral and party systems have no direct effect. Choice perceptions are instead affected by non‐policy factors: social heterogeneity and individual political dispositions. This result contrasts with analyses showing a strong connection between electoral rules and the diversity of messages communicated by parties during campaigns. The article also shows how choice perceptions matter for political behaviour. Overall, study findings imply that the promise of institutions for fostering representation is weaker than previously assumed.     

Reforming post‐Communist bureaucracies: The effect of transitional justice

Observers of post‐Communist politics recognize that civil service reform, an important part of the institutional transformation in Eastern Europe, was initiated at a very uneven pace. Hungary and Poland adopted changes quickly after the fall of Communism, while Romania and Slovakia waited longer. How can one explain the timing of civil service reform after 1989? Previous research blames a number of factors but inconsistencies between predictions and actual outcomes warrant a more thorough investigation. What has been overlooked, we argue, are the policies of transitional justice that altered the costs and benefits for elites to keep the institutional status quo. The empirical analysis reveals that when in place, lustration by vetting of public officials reduced the likelihood of passing a civil service reform act. This effect is conditioned by the legislative strength of ex‐Communist parties, as demonstrated by results from logistic regression tests on data from 11 countries.     

The Global Climate Regime: Explaining Lagging Reform

There have been growing calls for reform of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). How have governments met the demand for action on climate change despite the lagging pace of UNFCCC reform? New qualitative data demonstrate that the institutional, sectoral, and technical characteristics of multilateral institutions have guided government choices in managing climate change issues. Institutional resources and sectoral participation in multilateral institutions have enabled governments to handle climate change issues outside the UNFCCC, reducing the need to invest in its reform as demand for action has grown. These specialized institutions are able to mitigate political disputes and facilitate greater efficacy in handling specific issues such as financing and emissions mitigation. They have mandates that overlap with the cross‐cutting nature of climate change, requiring no new mandates, which mitigates political disputes in managing specific climate issues.