Rational choice theory and the analysis of political action

The rational choice approach to the analysis of political action takes as its starting point the need to construct a model of the individual actor and its choices as the basis for its investigations of the interactions of a plurality of actors. This paper questions the theoretical foundations of that approach, concentrating on its postulates of rationality, homogeneity, and individualism. It argues that the conceptualisation of actors, their decisions, and the conditions in which they are made, rasies important questions that cannot be posed within the rational choice approach. A final section indicates some of the problems with recent attempts to integrate elements of the rational choice approach into marxism.     

Public choice theory and antitrust policy

We survey the pioneering contributions of Robert Tollison to the theory and practice of antitrust law enforcement. Inspired by his period of service during Ronald Reagan’s first administration as Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, Tollison was the first scholar to apply public choice reasoning to the question why antitrust frequently fails to achieve its stated goal of protecting consumers against unwarranted exercises of market power. In supplying evidence that the outcomes of antitrust processes are shaped more by special interests than by the public’s interest, he was instrumental in launching a wholly new research program.     

A mixed-utility theory of vote choice regret

The paper builds upon an original pre- and post-election survey that we conducted before and after the 2015 Canadian election. Directly after Election Day, we asked Canadians for which party they voted, and whether they regret their choice. We find that 39% of them are not perfectly happy with their decision, and 4% even say that they made a bad decision. We show that the propensity to regret can be explained by a mixed-utility theory, whereby voters attempt to maximize a mixture of instrumental and expressive utilities. Our study contributes to the literatures on voting behaviour and political economy, which usually considers that voters are either instrumental or expressive, but not both at the same time.     

The median voter model in public choice theory

The changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world. Early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter. This claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector. In the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory, but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether. The model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is. These latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model, appropriately applied.Pointing out that the model might not be valid under some circumstances in no way implies that the model is never valid. In fact, this paper has reviewed strong arguments, both empirical and theoretical, suggesting that the median voter model is a good approximation of demand aggregation in the public sector for many issues. One paper will not change the opinions of public choice theorists on the median voter model. But the argument given here is that there is a large amount of theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the median voter model as a good foundation for the development of the theory of public sector demand. Once the overly ambitious claims that have been made for the model are set aside, the median voter model is in a good position to provide a base for the development of a theory of political structure that is analogous to the theory of market structure in economics.     

The Condorcet-Jefferson connection and the origins of social choice theory

This paper explores the relationship between Condorcet and Jefferson to gain insight into the early development of social choice theory. Jefferson does not seem to have read or understood Condorcet's theoretical work, but studying the relationship leads to the identification of intellectual intermediaries and a different perspective on the creation of social choice theory in the French Academy of Sciences.     

Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation

This paper benefited from valuable comments when presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Rutgers University Advanced Workshop in Public Utility Economics and Regulation at Bolton Landing, New York in May 1987.     

The anti-discriminatory tradition in Virginia school public choice theory

Public Choice - This paper studies the practice of Müsadere in the Ottoman Empire. Müsadere refers to the expropriation of elites—often tax farmers or administrators—by the...     

Rational choice theory,public policy and the liberal state

Liberalism requires a high order of responsible behaviour from its citizens in order to be sustainable. Yet when the modern liberal state makes policy, it is the stereotyped economic man, driven by self-interest and influenced only by carrots and sticks, who occupies center stage. This regulatory approach to public policy can be shown theoretically to give rise to a paradox — the greater the need for regulation, the less likely, because of compliance problems, it is to succeed. It is contended that an alternative approach which explicitly focuses on a broader behavioral understanding of citizens' attitudes and motivations provides a rationale for the use of a much wider range of policy instruments than does the regulatory framework, and is also more in keeping with those values necessary to the sustainability of the liberal state.     

Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice

Contrary to some criticism (Musgrave and Musgrave, and West) the small group collective choice model may yield a determinate, Pareto optimal solution even with all or none bargaining. Such bargaining as well as the solution are implied by the basic assumptions of the theoretical model.     

A public choice theory of the Great Contraction: Further evidence

We benefitted from comments by John Johnson and Lloyd Blenman. M. Bala Subrahmanyam, Steven Moore, and Thomas Lewis provided valuable research assistance. Any remaining errors are our own.     

Voter turnout and candidate choice: A merged theory

An alternative approach to the explanation of voting behavior is offered, suggesting that the starting point of electoral decision making is individuals' recall of their behavior in the last similar situation. Whether or not this recall is accurate is irrelevant in our model, since the voters' reasoning proceeds from their belief about their earlier behavior, whether or not it is correct. Using this approach we are able to treat voting from a unified perspective, rather than adopting the current stance of treating the turnout decision as separate from and preceding the candidate choice decision.     

Public choice theory and petroleum policies in Canada, Britain and Norway

Abstract. It is assumed that the development of an economically promising resource such as petroleum would be amenable to analysis from an economic viewpoint, and that government initiatives in this area might reveal the essential economic interests of the state. If governments are assumed to have similar economic and political objectives (i.e., to attain the greatest revenues possible from the exploitation of a depleting natural resource and to maintain public office), then it is to be expected that the petroleum policy outputs in various states would likewise be similar. Such differences as do exist should be amenable to explanation by examining the differences in the political constraints and economic situations of the states in question. The study models petroleum policy in four areas: state participation, pricing, depletion (including exploration and production policies), and fiscal arrangements, based on assumptions central to public choice theory. A comparison of policy outputs in the three case states illustrates the usefulness of the public choice approach to comparative policy analysis.