PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES,PUBLIC SERVANTS AND DUE PROCESS

Abstract: The parliamentary system of government in its Australian form has a number of unresolved problems, notwithstanding its many virtues. One such problem is that of the role of public servants when called before parliamentary committees as witnesses. The current guidelines are mainly advice to public servants as to how they should avoid or defer questions which neither the minister nor the departmental secretary has authorised them to answer. Of course, this is useful and proper within its limits. However, it fails to address many of the dilemmas and career-threatening choices which can face public servants who find themselves being questioned in an aggressive, hostile manner by members of a parliamentary committee. Unfair treatment of witnesses is not a trivial matter and there are more than isolated instances. This article deals with an episode involving the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts in 1982. The case is now some years in the past, but it is still worth examining for what it teaches about gaps in our constitutional conventions. At the end of the article we suggest action in four areas. Intensive training and retraining is needed, first in the upper ranks of the public service, and secondly for chairpersons and members of parliamentary committees. Thirdly there is a need for MAB-MIAC to revisit yet again their guidelines on accountability and to instigate a review of the government's guidelines for public servants appearing as witnesses. Both sets of guidelines are anachronisms. Finally, we suggest that, in any future review of government policy in this area, consideration be given to the amendment of relevant legislation to bring due process and the protection of witnesses more closely into line with the rights available to persons appearing before a court.     

PROGRAM EVALUATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

What is the role of program evaluation research in making and implementing social policy and how do program evaluators view the social programs they evaluate? This article discusses the findings of two closely related studies that examine these questions from the perspective of organization theory. These studies found that program evaluations rely on methods of research that do not correspond to the extent of uncertainty in social programs over goals and causal knowledge, and that most evaluations define organizational effectiveness solely in terms of goal achievement. In addition, of the various groups with a stake in the evaluation process, only federal and top program administrators influenced the implementation and interpretation of the studies. These findings, when taken together, suggest that program evaluation research acts more to augment administrative control than to increase our understanding of the effects of social policy.     

THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LEGISLATION

Abstract: Freedom of information legislation is now an item on the political agenda. In the debate about the scope of such legislation, however, some important administrative questions have been ignored. Relevant overseas experience, particularly that of North America, has not been given the attention it deserves. By 1972 the Labor Party had made "open government" an electoral issue, although four distinct notions were involved in this concept, namely administrative review; public comment by public servants; more helpful institutions; and autonomous access to information in institutions. However the efforts of the Labor government during 1972-75 to implement freedom of information proposals foundered partly because issues of procedures, cost and personnel were not perceived as being salient; and the situation has not changed much since. Questions about the administration of freedom of information legislation are discussed in relation to the recommendations of the Coombs Report, and it is argued that the matter needs to be approached in new ways, one of which is through action research.     

CLASSIFICATIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES

Abstract: Scrutiny committees of the Thirty-Third Parliament (1983-84) are classified as undertaking work in one or more of the following categories: legislation; nonlegislative policy; administrative oversight; and information systems for increased accountability. Only Senate committees scrutinise legislation. The majority of scrutiny committees examine non-legislative policy. In contrast, administrative oversight work (compliance and efficiency) is undertaken by a relatively small number of committees. Information systems for increased accountability are a special category and represent the work of several committees particularly in respect of statutory authorities. Reports on non-legislative policy and administrative oversight are classified against the functional classifications of expenditure used in Budget Statement No. 3. In seeking to explain limited policy scrutiny in areas such as taxation and social security and welfare, one cannot ignore the effects that the strategic priorities of adversary politics have on bi-partisan committee inquiry. From classification and related comment one can question whether there is insufficient scrutiny of legislation, insufficient oversight of the administration and too much policy scrutiny. This in turn opens up the broader question of the overall direction and scope of scrutiny committee activity.