论公司临近破产时的董事义务及问责制——基于公司法与破产法交错视角的思考

当公司临近破产或破产不可避免时,公司利益中心将由股东转向债权人,后者成为公司风险的真正承担者。这意味着董事信义义务发生转化。在此情形下,他们行使权力、履行义务时还应考虑债权人利益。这有助于约束董事机会主义行为、保护债权人。作为立法回应,以德国为代表的欧陆法多要求董事采取合理措施避免破产或当破产不可避免时及时申请破产,而以英国为代表的英美法则向董事课以不当交易防止义务,且多数立法规定债权人可在董事违反义务时行使间接追索权。比较而言,我国现行法关于董事义务的规范仅在极有限情形下可用于债权人向董事问责。因此,在公司法与破产法共同修改背景下,应考虑就两法交错区域——临近破产公司董事义务及问责制进行协调立法,并主要由破产法具体规定,包括向董事课以类似于欧陆法上的积极作为义务以及怠于履行义务时的侵权责任等。     

公司支付不能或资不抵债时申请破产的义务和责任

尽管我国新《破产法》未直接将支付不能与资不抵债作为公司法人破产界限,但基于理论和实践的分析,两者应当构成破产界限。当公司达到支付不能或资不抵债时,公司董事会的每一董事都应当负有在一定时间内及时申请破产的强制义务。若董事迟延或不申请破产,则会产生系列法律后果:董事应当对公司负损害赔偿责任;董事个人应当对破产界限出现前已存在的旧公司债权人承担差额损害赔偿责任,对破产界限出现后产生的新公司债权人承担全额损害赔偿责任;在有限责任公司中,一定情况下股东个人也可能对公司债权人承担损害赔偿责任等。     

论美国公司法中董事对债权人的信义义务

在公司丧失偿付能力但尚未申请破产时,公司资产减损的风险由债权人承担,且股东和债权人对公司经营风险的偏好发生明显异化,因而有必要对债权人提供有别于公司经营健康时期的特别保护。鉴于此,美国法院确立了董事在这一特殊时期对公司承担的信义义务的受益人从股东转变为债权人的法律实践;而当公司濒临无偿付能力时,则要求董事在决策过程中综合考虑股东和债权人的利益。美国的该法律规则对我国具有借鉴价值。     

有限公司股东清算义务人地位质疑

我国现行的清算义务人制度是基于中国的实际情况而产生的法律制度,对保护债权人利益具有重要意义。现行《公司法》及其《公司法司法解释(二)》将有限公司股东作为清算义务人,使股东责任从有限责任变为无限责任,致使股东与债权人之间利益关系的失衡,已经摧毁了我国的市场退出法律体系。基于股东、董事、监事、直接责任人等在公司治理结构中地位、职权等的比较分析可以看出,有限公司的清算义务人不是股东,只有董事才是妥当的清算义务人。现行制度根源于对公司解散效力等一系列制度的误解,已造成债权人从破产清算向非破产清算逃逸,损害了股东利益。保护债权人利益的正道在于,继续保留清算义务人制度,增设董事的破产申请义务。     

企业濒临破产时与破产重整程序中的董事信义义务研究

在企业濒临破产时与破产重整程序中,董事信义义务例外延伸至债权人。信义义务的种类包括勤勉义务、忠实义务、询问义务和纳税义务。在判断董事是否履行信义义务时,应以商业判断规则为主、公平标准为辅。我国目前不宜排除或者限制董事因违反信义义务而承担的责任。董事信义义务的理论基础是信托基金理论。在判断董事承担信义义务的时点时,以“最后交易”标准中的主观标准为主,同时以市价计算公司资产价值。我国《破产法》对董事信义义务的规定应从具体要求、资产管理、自我交易、关联交易、D&O险处理和免责等方面进行完善,同时关注SOX法案的最新要求。董事应从多个角度更好地履行信义义务。     

公司资本流出视域下董事对债权人的赔偿责任

本轮公司法修订仍未解决公司资本流出制度中债权人救济规范供给不足的问题,董事对债权人的个人赔偿责任规范需进一步明确适用情景与规范边界。基于组织法的董事信义义务与传统契约义务在规范假设和功能界定上具有异质性,公司偿付能力会对董事信义义务产生结构性影响。在公司丧失应对到期债务的经济能力时,股东的传统权力会转移至债权人,董事应对债权人利益负责。在董事对债权人担责的规范建构中,应当将商业判断规则作为董事行为的司法审查标准,以公司丧失清偿能力为债权人对董事的诉权产生时点。在责任形式上,在公司与董事承担连带责任的同时,依据过错程度对董事施加比例连带责任。连带责任的比例化一次性地解决了董事之间的责任划分,以终局性的裁决方式节约了司法资源,消除了董事面临的不确定风险,矫正了因被迫和解而扭曲的损失分配,为董事责任保险制度提供了良好的发展背景。     

论公司社会责任的内涵界定与实现机制建构——以董事的信义义务为视角

公司利益区别于股东利益和公共利益,与前者的区别构成公司承担社会责任的基础,与后者的区别则说明公司承担社会责任是有边界的.公司社会责任经董事的商业决策而获得实现,董事对公司的信义义务蕴含着股东和利益相关者的冲突和协调,董事在商业决策中实现股东利益的同时也应当考虑利益相关者的利益,以实现公司利益最佳化.为促进公司社会责任的实现,立法、司法应建立起对董事践行社会责任的激励机制,同时,外部市场的约束机制也不可或缺.     

论债权人提出破产申请的实质要件

破产案件一般通过债务人或债权人向法院提出破产申请而开始。债务人或债权人为使破产申请得到法院的受理,必须遵守破产法对破产申请所规定的形式要件和实质要件。所谓破产申请的实质要件,是指债务人或债权人有权提出破产申请的条件。由于破产法对债务人自愿提出的破产申请通常不作实质性限制,因此,研究破产申请的实质     

英国法上影子董事制度评述

英国《1980年公司法》正式使用“影子董事”一词，《1985年公司法》始有标准定义，并在《1986年公司董事资格剥夺法》、《1986年金融服务法》以及《1986年破产法》中进行相关规定。Re Tasbian Ltd（No．3）Official Receiver诉Nixon等典型判例反映了对影子董事定义的理解与使用。影子董事虽然不是董事，但依靠其在公司中的“地位”却能够指挥公司行为之人，如果其实际上进行了指挥，即应承担董事责任。从司法实践来看，影子董事责任主要出现于公司破产或无力偿付阶段，对于保护债权人利益具有积极意义。影子董事制度在保护公司债权人权益上确有其独到之处，我国相关立法、司法操作可资参考。     

论英国破产法对我国债权人申请破产之启示——兼论我国《破产法》第7条第2款之完善

英国破产法对于债权人提出的破产申请,要求金额须在750英镑以上,且须发出法定格式的催款函,21天后若债务人仍未还款、提供令债权人满意的保证或和解时,债权人才可向法院提出申请。我国破产法对此只规定了债权人向法院申请债务人破产时需主张债务人不能清偿到期债务,法院主要依据债务人提出的异议进而决定是否作出受理裁定,对于债权人的破产申请资格和条件立法上没有做任何详细规定,英国的上述规定值得我国在今后的司法解释中进一步借鉴。     

Criminal Liability of Directors of a Private Limited Company Seated in Germany

During the last decade, a great number of German businesses formed private limited companies by shares in England and transferred the company’s real seat to Germany in order to avoid the minimum capital rules for the German limited liability company. The discrepancy between the place of registration and the real seat leads to questions about the criminal liability of company directors under English and German law. This article shows that English courts have jurisdiction over certain offences regardless of the place the director acted. In particular, he may be convicted for failing to comply with statutory duties under the Companies Act 2006 as well as false accounting or false statements under Theft Act 1968 ss. 17, 19. With respect to German law, the company law reform of 2008 explicitly imposed the duty to file for insolvency on directors of foreign corporations. Also, the criminal offence for failing to file for insolvency in § 15a (4) of the Insolvency Code is compatible with the freedom of establishment under European law. If the director causes a financial loss to the company by breaching his director’s duties, he may be convicted for breach of trust under § 266 of the Criminal Code regardless of the fact that the relevant duties are regulated by English law. The German Federal Supreme Court recently held that recourse to English company law in order to establish a criminal breach of trust does not violate the principle of legal certainty in Article 103 (2) of the Basic Law. Furthermore, German bankruptcy offences may apply if the director violates the authoritative English accounting standards.     

The fiduciary duties of healthcare directors in the "zone of insolvency"

Directors of healthcare organizations normally owe fiduciary duties to their shareholders or, in the case of nonprofits, to the charitable mission of the organization. As an organization descends to bankruptcy, however, the board's duties may shift. At some point, the board may be imposed with different and often conflicting obligations to the corporate enterprise as a whole, with a primary criterion being the interests of creditors. In this article, the authors analyze the murky areas of the Zone and give guidance as to when the board's duty may shift-and as to how directors should proceed both in determining their duties and in working to fulfill them.     

Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors

There is case law to the effect that when companies are in financial difficulty directors owe a duty to take into account the interests of their companies' creditors. This article examines the primary reasons why contractarian theory, as applied by the law and economics school, is opposed to the existence of such a responsibility, namely it undermines efficiency and creditors can take measures in order to protect themselves adequately. The article asserts that efficiency cannot alone determine whether a duty should or should not be imposed on directors. Another critical value, fairness, must also be considered, and this value justifies the duty on the basis, inter alia, that many creditors are not able to protect themselves adequately, or at all by contracting, and are deserving of the limited protection that the duty would bring. In any event, it is submitted that a duty to creditors would enhance efficiency in some respects and warrants consideration on that basis.     

破产别除权理论与实务研究

别除权是破产程序中一项重要的优先受偿权利,其优先权的行使不受破产清算与和解程序的限制。根据新破产法的规定,别除权之债权属于破产债权,其担保物属于破产财产。别除权的基础权利是担保物权及特别优先权,定金担保债权和一般优先权不享有别除权。同一担保物上存在两个以上的担保性质相同或不同的别除权时,应依据相关法律规定确定各项别除权间的清偿顺序,以保证破产程序的公平、顺利进行。别除权人享有破产申请权,也应当申报债权,未依法申报债权者不得依照破产法规定的程序行使权利。别除权人是债权人会议的成员,未放弃优先受偿权者也有表决权,但对债权人会议与其无利害关系的特定决议事项无表决权。新破产法对债权人会议表决标准的规定仍有需完善之处。     

论公司对外担保合同的效力——兼评《公司法》第149条第3款

《公司法》第16条与第122条均不属于效力性规范,仅是公司的内部管理规范。除非公司证明债权人知道或者应当知晓公司董事违反公司章程的情况下还接受公司的对外担保,否则公司的对外担保行为有效;若公司章程未就对外担保事项作规定,应将对外担保作为董事会的决议事项,使担保权人、公司、公司自身的债权人以及公司中小股东的利益能够获得适当的平衡。在对外担保合同无效时,《担保法》及其司法解释过于注重对债权人的保障而忽略了对公司利益的维护,有必要予以适当修正。     

Laws, Models, and Real People: Choice of Chapter in Personal Bankruptcy

It has been a central assumption in bankruptcy policy debates that financially troubled persons faced with bankruptcy will respond to economic incentives and disincentives. Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (Chapters 7 and 13) are most commonly used by individual debtors. Under Chapter 7 debtors agree to give up all their property (n excess of state-determined exemptions) to a trustee for sale and distribution to creditors. Under Chapter 13 debtors keep all their property but agree to pay all or part of their debts over three to five years. This empirical study of fifteen hundred consumers in three states explores whether economic incentives and disincentives are in fact the chief factors influencing choice of chapter. The analysis demonstrates that while economic factors play a part, noneconomic factors are also significant, among them intra- and interstate migration, marital status, self-employment, state of residence, and local legal culture. We conclude that to explore fully how individual decisions are made, the simplistic economic model must be replaced by a more sophisticated model that accounts for both economic and noneconomic factors.     

ON CASES AGAINST CORPORATE MANAGERS FOR BREACHING THEIR DUTY OF LOYALTY AND/OR DUTY OF DILIGENCE IN CHINA

The statistics of 137 cases from 14 provinces or municipalities of China concerning the disputes of corporate managers’ duty of loyalty and duty of diligence shows that the majority of companies involved in such cases are those whose shares are not publicly traded (mainly limited liability companies and all sorts of foreign invested enterprises). Joint stock limited companies (including listed companies) rarely file lawsuit against their directors, supervisors, or senior officers. The duty of loyalty has been the center of most cases. Many cases pertain to issues that are not within the list of prohibited acts in the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China to directors, supervisors, and senior managers. Therefore, courts frequently make their judgments according to one of the general provisions of the Company Law. Courts conduct different forms of legal interpretations in their decisions. On one hand, in the majority of cases, courts tend to procedurally examine the questions of facts and to literally apply the law. Actually, the duty of loyalty and duty of diligence have been applied by many courts as “the duty of compliance with law.” On the other hand, a few decisions demonstrate that some courts examine cases under the doctrine of substance-over-form, showing their creative interpretations of the law. The focus of the judicial practice in this type of cases today in China is on how courts should explain and apply the general provisions in Article 148 (1) and Article 149 (1.8) of the 2005 Company Law of China (amended in 2013).     

(Un)secured debt and the likelihood of court-supervised reorganization

Secured and unsecured creditors engaged in a bankruptcy process have different preference on the issue of financial distress. Secured creditors generally prefer liquidation whereas unsecured creditors tend to promote firm??s reorganization. As a consequence, secured creditors might be an obstacle to reorganization when all classes of creditors have to vote to approve the reorganization plan. To complete this analysis, we study the link between bankrupt firm??s capital structure and the likelihood of reorganization when bankruptcy Courts (instead of creditors) decide whether or not firms are reorganized. Our main result is that the reduction of secured creditors?? influence on the reorganization process might constitute a means to promote bankrupt firm??s reorganization. More generally, the paper analyses the link between the amounts/numbers of both secured and unsecured claims and the final issues of a Court-supervised reorganization process.     

Serving the creditors after insolvency filings: from value creation to value distribution

This paper provides original empirical evidence on the financial outcome of insolvency filings in Europe. We adopt a cross-country analysis of the determinants of recovery rates isolating three types of creditors (junior, senior, and new money claims). We investigate the structure of recoveries on a unique hand-collected sample of bankrupt firms in France, Germany, and the UK. We initially question value maximization, and study to which extent the legal provisions prevailing after insolvency filing can influence creditors’ overall recoveries. Three procedures differ significantly from our benchmark (UK liquidations). French continuation and UK receivership exert a positive influence onto total repayments, while such influence becomes negative under French liquidation. We relate this finding to the ability of the two former procedures to improve coordination among the creditors, monitoring of the debtor, and/or incentives to file early. We then analyze value distribution by examining competition between the categories of creditors. We show that the insolvency systems do not converge. Junior and senior creditors are better served under the German and the French continuation procedures than in any other bankruptcy path. At the opposite, the UK liquidation procedures fail to satisfactorily serve the junior/senior creditors. Still, nearly all the insolvency procedures support fresh financing by protecting quite well new money claims. Overall, we do not confirm any superiority of one family of insolvency system over another, but rather stress the importance of an appropriate design of the procedures, especially regarding the incentives they create before and after insolvency filing.     

董事勤勉义务和遵守法律、公司章程的关系——从比较法的角度

中国《公司法》规定的勤勉义务的内容偏向于遵守法律义务,没有考虑主观要件。这种规定存在立法上的疏漏,董事等违反注意义务的行为应当包含玩忽职守的行为。即董事执行公司职务时玩忽职守,给公司造成损失的,应当承担赔偿责任。但董事超过经营范围所导致的结果,如果公司损失,该董事没有过失或故意,则不需要承担损害赔偿责任。