Defending <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">Law</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">Matters:</Emphasis> Responses to Commentaries

Why Law Matters examines various legal and political institutions and procedures and argues that the desirability of these institutions and procedures is not contingent and does not hinge (only) on the prospects that these institutions are conducive to the realization of valuable ends. Instead, various legal institutions and legal procedures that are often perceived as contingent means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends matter as such.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Verfahrensrecht</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

Verfahrensrecht     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">MRG</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

MRG     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">WEG</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

WEG     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">WEG</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

WEG     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Grundbuchsrecht</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

Grundbuchsrecht     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">MRG</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

MRG     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">MRG</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

MRG     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">ABGB</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

ABGB     

The Uncertainties in the Rule in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Re Hasting</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Bass</Emphasis>

Writing extra-judicially, Sir Robert Walker once commented that ‘the decision in Re Hastings-Bass must be seen in its judicial context. It cannot be regarded as giving a “carte blanche” excuse to every body of trustees who have made a mistake. The law on the issue now stands in a state of some uncertainty’ (Walker, The limits of the principle in Re Hastings-Bass, P.C.B 226, 2002). There is no doubt in the minds of most commentators and, indeed those persons seeking to invoke the rule in Re Hastings-Bass on behalf of their clients, that much clarification is needed as to the proper scope of the rule. Recent judicial trends suggest that, not only is the rule in Hastings-Bass being applied at such an unprecedented rate with very little scrutiny from a court beyond that of the High Court, it is also showing signs of plaguing the wider fiduciary community. As the opportunity for the Court of Appeal, and indeed the Supreme Court, to exercise some judicial scrutiny of the rule may not be that far away, this article highlights some of the present uncertainties with the rule in Re Hastings-Bass.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Karl Korinek</Emphasis> – der Verfassungsrichter

Der Beitrag schildert aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstages die gro?en Verdienste, die sich Karl Korinek um die ?sterreichische Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Allgemeinen sowie als Pr?sident des VfGH im Besonderen erworben hat.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ayam aham asmīti</Emphasis>: Self-consciousness and Identity in the Eighth Chapter of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Chāndogya Upanişad</Emphasis> vs. Śankara’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Bhāşya</Emphasis>

The article offers a close reading of the famous upanişadic story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upanişad versus Śankara’s bhāşya, with special reference to the notions of suşupti and turīya. That Śankara is not always loyal to the Upanişadic texts is a well-known fact. That the Upanişads are (too) often read through Śan-kara’s Advaitic eyes is also known. The following lines will not merely illustrate the gap between text and commentary but will also reveal an unexpected Upanişadic depiction of ‘dreamless sleep’ and ‘transcendental consciousness’. Suşupti is described here as ‘one step too far’, as a ‘break’ or discontinuity in one’s consciousness; whereas turīya is depicted positively, and surprisingly even in wordly terms. Unlike the third state of consciousness in which there is no ‘world’ nor ‘me’, and which is described through Indra’s character as ‘total destruction’ (vināśa); in turīya, the world ‘comes back’, or rather the ‘renouncer’ returns to the world. Sankara’s position, as far as the story under discussion is concerned, is radically different. For him, the Upanişadic story illustrates the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states is an error (adhyāsa) which causes suffering. Consciousness prevails even in suşupti, and turīya has nothing to do with ‘coming back to the world’, since there is nowhere to come back from or to. Turīya, as seen by the Advaitin, consists of all the other states of consciousness together, or as K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages’. The article is dedicated to Prof. Daya Krishna (1924-2007).     

Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical <Emphasis Type="Italic">Reductio</Emphasis>

How can hard determinism deal with the need to punish, when coupled with the obligation to be just? I argue that even though hard determinists might find it morally permissible to incarcerate wrongdoers apart from lawful society, they are committed to the punishment’s taking a very different form from common practice in contemporary Western societies. Hard determinists are in fact committed to what I will call funishment, instead of punishment. But, by its nature funishment is a practical reductio of hard determinism: it makes implementing hard determinism impossible to contemplate. Indeed, the social practices that hard determinism requires turn out to be morally bad even according to hard determinism itself. I conclude by briefly reflecting upon the implications.     

Psychological Testimony and the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Daubert</Emphasis> Standard

In the legal system, mental health professionals are now a primary source for expert information. Because potentially every psychologist might be drawn into a legal situation, competency requires accommodation of the nexus between the legal system and professional ethics and standards. Three particular Supreme Court cases create a framework for testifying about psychological information. This article reviews those three cases, defines the commitment to evidence-based (scientific) testimony, and explains how psychological ethics and standards should be accommodated. It reviews the major issues that psychologists face in Daubert admissibility challenges. Finally, it makes pertinent recommendations to help avoid the pitfall in dealing with court.