The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics

We consider the consequences of the Senate electoral cycle and bicameralism for distributive politics, introducing the concept of contested credit claiming, i.e., that members of a state's House and Senate delegations must share the credit for appropriations that originate in their chamber with delegation members in the other chamber. Using data that isolate appropriations of each chamber, we test a model of the strategic incentives contested credit claiming creates. Our empirical analysis indicates that the Senate electoral cycle induces a back-loading of benefits to the end of senatorial terms, but that the House blunts this tendency with countercyclical appropriations. Our analysis informs our understanding of appropriations earmarking and points a way forward in studying the larger consequences of bicameral legislatures.     

State Court Strategies and Politics during the Appropriations Process

This article explores state court budgetary strategies and their effectiveness in the appropriations process as perceived by key budgeting actors. In general, we find evidence of state judiciaries that try to remain "above politics" when dealing with budget issues. The most important strategies to this effect include submitting realistic requests, providing documentation to support needs, and not using budget "weapons" at their disposal (e.g., writs of mandamus). However, the survey results do indicate that state judiciaries use certain strategies that have a more political tint, such as lobbying by court officials.     

Federal and Local Interests in the Nation's Capital: Congress and District of Columbia Appropriations

Canadian political scientist Donald C. Rowat posits the thesis that there is a "conflict of interest" in all federal capital cities between the national government and the local residents. Federal and local interests in the nation's capital have been so intertwined that it is difficult to define or separate them. Congress has used the appropriations process to intervene in local policy matters even when the federal interest is not involved.     

The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies

The establishment of agencies at the European level is one of the most notable recent developments in EU regulatory policy. This article examines how politics has shaped the design of EU regulatory agencies. Building on the American politics literature on delegation, the article explains how principal-agent concerns and political compromise have influenced agency design in the EU context; shows how conflicts between the EU's primary legislative actors - the Council and the Parliament - and its primary executive actor - the Commission - have influenced the design of new bureaucratic agencies; and discusses how the growing power of the European Parliament as a political principal has changed the politics of agency design.     

Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies,Presidents, and Congress

Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats and agencies that are directly comparable with those of other political actors. These estimates produce insights into the nature of the bureaucratic state and provide traction on a host of questions about American politics. We discuss what these estimates reveal about the political environment of bureaucracy and their potential for testing theories of political institutions. We demonstrate their utility by testing key propositions from Gailmard and Patty's (2007) influential model of political control and endogenous expertise development.     

Congressional Supervision of America's Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee

In 1947, the United States created a modern intelligence community to guard against another surprise attack like the one at Pearl Harbor. This community consists of 13 major agencies, among them the CIA and the FBI. Concealed from public view, they pose a significant challenge to the concept of government accountability in a democratic society. This article examines the failure of congressional lawmakers to hold the secret agencies accountable during the Cold War. Contrary to recent theoretical research on legislative oversight, which suggests reasons that accountability has been strong in the United States, this study finds that a weak system of legislative review has permitted a dangerous erosion of civil liberties. The study also explores the efforts of the Church Committee in 1975 to fashion new safeguards that would reduce the probability of further abuse of power by the intelligence community.     

Committee Assignment Politics in the Danish Folketing

Committees are the backbone of nearly every modern legislature. Yet there is relatively little knowledge about how committee assignment politics occur in the multiparty parliaments with minority coalition governments that so often are the case in many European countries. Is there a pattern to which MPs are assigned to which committees? In this article the Danish case is used to address this question. A dataset of all committee assignments in the Danish Folketing from the period 1994–2007 has been collected; added to this are data on each MP. The data are analysed using a quantitative approach, and drawing on the literature on committee assignments in the United States Congress and the European Parliament, complementing the vast qualitative studies, and updating the few quantitative studies, of the Danish parliamentary committees. The results show that which variables have an influence on committee assignments varies across parties and that no uniform pattern is found.     

Structure and Opportunity: Committee Jurisdiction and Issue Attention in Congress

This article explores how the congressional committee system shapes the dynamics of issue attention. Consisting of what is referred to as a congressional opportunity structure, it describes how committee jurisdictions provide an important institutional context for the attention paid to new issues in congressional hearings. This is illustrated through an examination of congressional attention to biotechnology over a 30-year period. This article finds that committees with broader jurisdictions were more active in biotechnology than committees with a narrow policy remit. However, these institutional effects varied widely, even within a single policy domain. This variation suggests that issue attention depends on the degree of fit between issue characteristics and the congressional opportunity structure. More broadly, the findings here illustrate the virtues of public policy research in studies of Congress.     

The Bureaucrat Who Fell Under a Bus: Ministerial Responsibility, Executive Agencies and The Derek Lewis Affair in Britain

Various concerns have been raised about the practicability of Next Steps and the adequacy of accountability mechanisms in Britain, particularly after the dismissal of Derek Lewis as chief executive of the Prison Service. This article critically reviews these concerns. It argues that the agency model is viable notwithstanding doubts about the practicability of the policy–operations distinction; that Next Steps is not the cause of defective accountability or the scapegoating of bureaucrats by ministers; and that a commonly proposed solution—making agency heads accountable to parliamentary select committees—has fundamental drawbacks of its own. The conventional wisdom that Next Steps cannot work ignores important evidence and badly needs reassessment.     

Models of Executive Politics: a Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi–presidential Regimes

The study of executives politics has been characterized by dichotomous country–specific debates about whether there is, for example, prime ministerial or cabinet government. Recent work has established new terms for these debates leading to more pluralistic conceptualizations of executive politics. Nevertheless, this work has not created the conditions for rigorous cross-national comparison. This article establishes a framework to compare executive branch power relations. It identifies six models of executive politics comprising a comprehensive set of ways in which power may be distributed amongst chief executives, cabinets, ministers and bureaucrats. On the basis of this framework it is argued that it is necessary to engage in empirical observation to determine which models of government occur and to identify the reasons why these models emerge.     

Committee characteristics and re-election margins: An empirical investigation of the US House

Models of legislative organization frequently begin with the premise that the committee system serves the re-election interests of incumbent legislators. Attempts to substantiate this notion empirically have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the notion lives on, nourished by a stylized characterization of the committee system. In the standard model committees have jurisdictional monopolies over specialized policy areas and legislators gravitate toward those committees that deal most closely with the policy concerns of their constituents. Contrary to this simplifying characterization, the degree of monopoly control and policy specialization varies across standing committees in the us congress. Some committees have wide jurisdictions and attract members with diverse policy preferences. Jurisdictional overlap and resulting turf battles are common aspects of congressional sessions. We suggest here that these realities warrant a re-opening of the empirical investigation into the link between electoral success and committee characteristics. Our findings indicate that assignment to a committee with a relatively high degree of monopoly control increases a member's vote share, and that assignment to a narrowly focused (specialized) committee does not.