NEGOTIATING HOUSING POLICY THE QUEENSLAND HOUSING COMMISSION AND FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 1945–64

Abstract: An examination of a single institution and its relationships with different levels of government can be used to question commonly held interpretations. This study of the Queensland Housing Commission (QHC) indicates that there is some need to reassess the effectiveness of tied grants as a mechanism for commonwealth intervention in areas of state concern. In Queensland, at least, the state government played a much more significant role in determining both the overall direction of the housing authority and its day-to-day operations. This suggests that the assumption that statutory authorities have some autonomy from direct government intervention may not always be appropriate. The weakness of local government in Australia is acknowledged but it is important to note that state government instrumentalities have contributed significantly to this weakness. This study of the QHC provides one example of how local autonomy can be compromised.     

SCIENCE IN A PUBLIC SERVICE ENVIRONMENT: ARE STATUTORY AUTHORITIES THE ANSWER?*

Abstract: The Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration reported evidence of widespread morale problems among government scientists. A major contributing cause was seen as the environment under which science is conducted within a departmental structure. One solution which has been advocated by many scientists, although rejected by the RCAGA, is to transfer government scientific laboratories into statutory authorities.     

THE TASMANIAN PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE FUTURE

Abstract: State governments in Australia have been regarded essentially as service deliverers, with the result that the specialist heads of public organizations, although technically competent, have rarely questioned the need for their activities. Nor does the argument that such questioning is the responsibility of the politician take account of the inertia of the existing system; an analysis of the activities which the Tasmanian government has undertaken over the past six years—including those of statutory authorities—shows a fair degree of stability. Thus we should consider building into the State's existing organizational arrangements some means of evaluating existing programs and new proposals. Such policy analysis should widen the narrow focus of the advice currently offered by public servants. Although there have been some moves in this direction in Tasmania (particularly in the Premier's Department), it has not been reflected in the structures of the public service generally. A survey of 22 government departments showed that only eight had officers concerned with evaluatory planning, and only three departments were engaged in innovative and initiatory planning. Other directions in which Tasmania's public organizations could move with benefit include an increase in lateral recruitment; breaking down the rigidity of the promotion appeals and classification systems; introducing flexible management and budgeting procedures throughout the service as a whole; and continually reviewing the structure and functions of public organizations. The questions that have been raised by recent inquiries into State and Federal government administration, namely coordination, efficiency, economy, effectiveness, decentralization and participation, have not stressed sufficiently the key issue for the public services of the 1980s, which is the nature of the relationship between the politician, the public service and the community.     

THE INTER-STATE COMMISSION*

Abstract: The Inter-State Commission (ISC), although required by Australia's Constitution, has been in existence from 1913 to 1920 only. In 1975 the Labor government introduced a bill to set up the Commission. The bill was passed in a heavily amended form, but the legislation was not proclaimed by the incoming coalition government. A brief history of the "first" ISC raises the question of whether the High Court would ever have accepted the regulatory powers that the Labor government wished to invest in the late Commission. The ISC envisaged by the Labor government's bill would have had strong powers of regulation, arbitration and investigation over interstate and overseas transport. The Senate left it with weakened investigative powers only. Our Federal system encourages many government practices which are not in the interests of the community as a whole. However, while the ISC's role in curbing these practices would have been beneficial, the States have shown themselves too powerful politically to accept such policing, even if the High Court had allowed the ISC to do so. The ISC as conceived by Labor's bill would not have been politically viable, but the ISC as provided for in the Act would be worth setting up, as it would have several advantages over existing investigative mechanisms. It would have more experience and competence than ad hoc inquiries, and its continued existence would make it difficult to shelve its reports. Its statutory basis, broader terms of reference and its ability to force organizations to divulge information would all serve to make it a better investigative body than the Bureau of Transport Economics.     

THE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

One of the minor curiosities of public sector analysis in Australia is that rather little attention has been paid to the tools and instruments that could provide a more effective management of government research and development. Once government R & D is mentioned, we immediately think of the large statutory bodies such as CSIRO or the Atomic Energy Commission, but the subject extends widely beyond these two bodies. The Australian Government, federal and states, provides 70% of all the funds for Australian R & D, and the government itself performs, in its own laboratories and statutory authorities, 54% of the total R & D carried out in Australia Of OECD countries, these percentages of government activity are exceeded only by Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal and Turkey. Virtually every federal department and every department of each state government performs R&D. Apart from the "big two" of CSIRO and Atomic Energy, the Post Office, Defence, Health, Housing, and Minerals and Energy all have research laboratories, and the last major survey of Australian R & D in 1973 listed 22 federal departments and 130 organizations in the State Governments performing R & D. A recent article in this journal correctly noted a shift from "ends to means" in Australian science policy. The present article proposes a specific means of managing this almost unique public involvement in R & D in Australia.     

Government Has No “Religious Agency”: James Madison's Fundamental Principle of Religious Liberty

Religious liberty has reemerged as a problem in liberal democracy. For guidance we can turn to James Madison. Unfortunately, his fundamental principle of religious liberty has been misunderstood. Madison believed that power over religious conscience always remains with the individual, which means that government never has a power to attempt to cause or prohibit religious opinions or profession and only has the power to prohibit religious practices that are “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Madison's fundamental principle of religious liberty is therefore that government has no “religious agency.” In matters of religious establishment, “no agency” means that government lacks even the power to cognize religious opinions or practices. But in matters of free exercise, “no agency” means that government can accommodate citizens’ religious consciences, even if that accommodation requires cognizing their religious opinions. An important but widely overlooked example of Madison's complex but principled approach to religious liberty is his 1790 proposal for a statutory exemption from federal militia service for religious objectors.     

THE PUBLIC SERVICES AND CO-OPERATTVE FEDERALISM

A paper of this type clearly calls for some definition of terms. Although "The Public Services" are usually seen to comprise the State Public Services and the Australian Public Service, in reality of course, government institutionalized services to the public go beyond these seven agencies. All the statutory authorities—Commissions, Corporations, Boards and Trusts—are part of public administration; so also are local government bodies. There are in the various public services some agencies which form part of the public service proper (i.e. a Department defined as such under one or other of the Public Service Acts) whereas in others they have the independence of a corporate entity. In South Australia for instance the whole state water supply and sewerage services are provided by one public service department, the Engineering and Water Supply Department. In the other states those services are provided by more than one agency and these range from government departments and local governing bodies to statutory authorities. A similar division of responsibility exists in the road construction area where some states perform their highway undertakings through the agency of a statutory authority, while others prefer the tighter Ministerial control of a government department.     

Sir Henry Bland and the Fraser Government's Administrative Review Committee: Another Chapter in the Statutory Authority Wars?

The release of the 1976 Commonwealth cabinet records on 1 January 2007 provided the opportunity to review the work of the Administrative Review Committee (ARC) appointed by the Fraser government and headed by Sir Henry Bland and so to open up a hitherto little appreciated chapter in Australian administrative history. At first glance, it appeared that Bland's ARC had been strongly opposed to widespread use of statutory authorities, for so long a regular part of Australia's machinery of government, thus providing an interesting point of comparison with the Uhrig inquiry of 2003-04, which attracted much notice for its antipathy towards statutorily independent agencies. Given the unusual methodology of the ARC, it was also likely that an account of its work would shed further light on public inquiries generally, perhaps assisting in development of a typology of such inquiries.     

THE PERMANENT HEAD*

The position of Permanent Head of a ministerial department is a central feature of the Westminster system of government as it evolved in Britain during the nineteenth century. It has been adopted and applied in Australia with some variations. It is not surprising, therefore, that when debate takes place about the system of public administration the role and functions of Permanent Heads receive much attention.     

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE USA: LESSONS LEARNT AND TO BE LEARNT

Abstract: In the 1970s, both Australia and the United States instituted legal reforms aimed at promoting greater accountability among public servants. Prompted by growing awareness of the need to encourage and protect federal government whistleblowers, Congress enacted whistleblower protection measures in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Although the notion of open government in Australia has never been extended to include whistleblowing by public servants, probing the issue of whether or not United States whistleblower protection can serve as a reform model in the search for more effective legal mechanisms for ensuring government accountability can provide lessons and insights of value to Australian public administrators. Analysis of the role and impact of the Office of the Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board as established under the Civil Service Reform Act reveals many difficulties associated with whistleblower protection. Research has substantiated the jurisdictional ambiguities, administrative and procedural deficiencies and lack of sanctioning power which plague this reform effort. Similar deficiencies also impede the protection of parliamentary witnesses in Australia. Evaluation of whistleblower protection leads to the conclusion that reform models in either country for ensuring government accountability must not be judged solely through examination of statutory provisions. There must also be in place strong stabilising factors such as political unity, economic comfort, social discipline, civic virtue and public service ideology in order to achieve the common public service goal of rendering governmental decision-making more accountable to persons affected by it and open to review by independent decision makers.     

MANAGING AUSTRALIA'S POLICE: THE CHALLENGE TO IDENTIFY WHO SHOULD BE IN CHARGE—POLITICIANS OR POLICE?

Abstract: The management of police by government in Australia is a controversial but neglected topic, with little research or theoretical work having been undertaken. What is clear from the limited information available is that governments tend to adopt an arms-length policy and allow police to act with a greater degree of independence than they do with many other government agencies. What underpins this approach is the traditional British model for managing police. This model is considered in this paper, along with other matters such as local police statutes, discretion, statutory authority status and accountability. These aspects of the arms-length approach are discussed in the light of current policy-making and accountability systems. Consideration is also given to the question of whether this approach by government is still appropriate.     

With Strings Attached: Statutory Delegations of Authority to the Executive Branch

While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter‐branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency autonomy. Close examination of statutes creating each federal agency between 1946 and 1997 reveal that divided government increases specificity of statutory control. In addition, the particular type of divided government involving split partisan control between the chambers of Congress fosters greater specific statutory control when new government agencies are created.     

The political identities of neighbourhood planning in England

The collective empowerment imagined in the government rhetoric of localism bears little resemblance to the market model of aggregative democracy that characterizes much of the practice of participation in spatial planning. This paper explores one of the rare statutory strategies to engage collective participation and to mobilize the neighbourhood as an institution of spatial planning. In a study of neighbourhood planning in England, it investigates the new political identities that emerged and the conflicts and antagonism that accompanied them. Drawing on the work of philosopher Chantal Mouffe, the paper explores the significance of the political practices that resulted for the state strategy of localism.     

A rent-seeking model of TELs

Tax and expenditure limits or TELs are constitutional or statutory constraints on the fiscal powers of government. Since the taxpayer revolt beginning in the late 1970s, TELs have been introduced in twenty-three states. In recent years a number of studies attempting to test the impact of TELs have found little evidence that TELs significantly reduced the growth of state government. In this study we challenge the implicit Leviathan model that underlies most of these studies, and offer an alternative rent-seeking model. Econometric tests provide support for this rentseeking model, and indicate that TELs have been significant in reducing the growth of state government, at least in the short run. “... the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed, that political power will be abused to promote the particular purpose of the holder; not because it always is so, but because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which is the especial use of free institutions”     

THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LEGISLATION

Abstract: Freedom of information legislation is now an item on the political agenda. In the debate about the scope of such legislation, however, some important administrative questions have been ignored. Relevant overseas experience, particularly that of North America, has not been given the attention it deserves. By 1972 the Labor Party had made "open government" an electoral issue, although four distinct notions were involved in this concept, namely administrative review; public comment by public servants; more helpful institutions; and autonomous access to information in institutions. However the efforts of the Labor government during 1972-75 to implement freedom of information proposals foundered partly because issues of procedures, cost and personnel were not perceived as being salient; and the situation has not changed much since. Questions about the administration of freedom of information legislation are discussed in relation to the recommendations of the Coombs Report, and it is argued that the matter needs to be approached in new ways, one of which is through action research.     

Regulate Yourself

The Leveson Inquiry recommended that a new press regulator be created, with a statutory backing—which the government and opposition agreed should be a Royal Charter. Presently, a Press Recognition Panel, backed by the Charter, has been created, but has attracted no requests for recognition. Only one regulator has been set up—IPSO: it has a membership of most of the newspaper and magazine groups in the UK, but will not ask for recognition, since it does not wish to have any formal link with the state. Though the campaign against the Royal Charter has been grossly overblown, the press is right to refuse to join an institution which is guaranteed by the state. State‐backed regulation, in any form, will not in the UK lead to tyranny, censorship or any more than occasional meddling. But a link to the state is a bad idea for an independent press. Not only does this set a bad precedent, opening up a temptation for behind‐the‐scenes pressure, but more importantly it misses the point. Bad and abusive journalism is not improved by regulation. It is improved by journalists understanding the main task of journalism is to report and analyse accurately and neutrally. This complements robust debate and opinion and contributes greatly to a well‐informed citizenry.     

THE MARKET PROVISION OF MANDATORY SOCIAL SECURITY: Protecting the Public Interest in Perpetuity

Pressures to introduce market reforms to public social security system emerged as a reaction to state welfare paternalism, drawing strength from the spirit of liberalism and emphasizing the virtues of the marketplace. Market reform advocates seek to shift the prevailing social security paradigm away from community solidarity to individual responsibility, with a view to divesting government of some of its statutory social security responsibilities. Market reform of public social security provision redefines the public‐private boundary, making socio‐political governance more a process of co‐ordination, steering, influencing, and balancing pluralist interactions, with the civil service increasingly expected to act as trustee of the public interest. What, however, the public interest is and how it differs from private interest is problematic and it should reflect the shared values that create social bonds and identity within a society. The daunting twin challenges facing governments are to design a set of regulatory arrangements that can protect the public interest in perpetuity, and to resist calls for government subsidies to support the economic rent expectations of privatized providers. To meet these challenges the “hollowed‐out” state must become a “smart” state.     

THE NORTHERN TERRITORY GOVERNMENTS CANBERRA REPRESENTATIVE

On 14 July 1980 an experiment began in Australian Federal-State relations which has been accorded little recognition. On that day the Northern Territory government opened an office in Canberra for its new "Canberra Representative". It was a step no State government had ever taken, although several had discussed such a move over the previous decade during general reconsiderations of the machinery of Federal-State relations. In particular, Sir Henry Bland's Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Public Service saw some benefits in the location in Canberra of one or more members of a proposed Commonwealth/State Relations Unit (now the Federal Affairs Division of the Premier's Department) in the State public service, although it chose finally not to recommend it     

CASH TRANSFERS BY THE QUEENSLAND STATE GOVERNMENT TO NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Abstract: This is the first in a series of studies into cash transfers from the State government to non-government organizations in Queensland. It focuses particularly on transfers from the Departments of Welfare Services and Children's Services. Information has been obtained from public government documents, departmental files and records, and from interviews with representatives of eight non-government organizations in receipt of cash transfers. The study documents the pattern and process of transfers and explores existing means of achieving accountability, accessibility, effectiveness, efficiency and equity. While transfers to the non-government sector in Queensland are a well established practice, the proportion of government funds going to the non-government sector is small. The larger, well-established organizations receive the most and are best satisfied with their relationship to government. It would appear that much could be done to improve accessibility to government transfers in Queensland, where program accountability has not been emphasized. The final section of the paper questions the advisability of jumping on the program evaluation bandwagon. The need for more research into the impact of government funding on program development, efficient use of resources, social cohesion, political position and meeting the most pressing needs in the community is emphasized. Glennerster's "pluralist planning model" is suggested as a possible guide for improving the process of allocation of transfers in Queensland.     

NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: SOME POINTERS FROM THE UK STRUCTURE PLANNING EXPERIENCE

Abstract: Environmental planning legislation in Australia has been primarily concerned with the formulation of detailed land-use allocation plans. Changing circumstances are leading to a more broadly-based view of the planning process centred around the delineation of development principles and the broad structure of land uses. The United Kingdom's experience with structure plans during the past decade is of value in reshaping environmental planning in Australia. Within the United Kingdom both the slow speed of structure plan preparation and its very broad scope have posed problems. By merging land-use issues with the development plans of other government instrumentalities structure plans have exceeded the responsibility of the central planning agency. Simultaneously they have been seized upon by the public as the only formal means of dissent against governmental decisions in such areas as social service and housing. Reactions have been twofold. In Scotland regional reports have imposed an additional corporate plan which provides guidelines for subsequent control of land use. In England and Wales structure plans have become increasingly general, long-term and land-use orientated, thereby side-stepping the problems their introduction created. To be effective in Australia, structure plans must achieve corporate liaison with other government departments and statutory undertakings. This will be achieved not by copying the English structure planning model, but by working towards regional reports prepared by a combination of State government agencies and reconciled through decisions at parliamentary level. Local, detailed land-use plans, based upon written reports as in the United Kingdom, can fit readily into such a framework, supplemented where necessary by State-wide guidelines pertaining to critical land-use considerations. The coordination of development will be facilitated by the liberalization and increased availability of professionally recognized qualifications.