The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts'Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R.

Historians and political scientists have noted that appointments of judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not determined by senatorial courtesy alone. What has not been adequately explained is why and when a president defers to a senator's choice rather than seek to control the selection. This article attempts to understand the politics of federal appellate court appointments. The author first identifies a major change in the work of the courts of appeals during the years 1900-1945—the growth in review of the actions of newly created federal regulatory agencies. Then, by examining Justice Department files and presidential correspondence, he discoveres three patterns of appointment emerging in the same period. The patterns vary with presidential perceptions of the role of the federal government and of the courts of appeals' ability to affect accomplishment of administration goals. Appointments during the first years of the presidencies of Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and during the Harding and Coolidge administrations were dominated by patronage concerns. Those administrations yielded to the recommendations of senators and demonstrated no interest in the policy-making potential of these courts. In the two other patterns the White House played a more active role, with senators more often deferring to the president's selection. Concerns about professionalism dominated selections in Taft's and Hoover's administrations: because they recognized the policy importance of those judgeships but saw the role of government as limited, they sought judicial craftsmen who would make policy only incrementally. Policy concerns dominated selections during Wilson's administration and the latter years of both the Roosevelts' administrations: Justice Department officials screened nominees to determine their policy orientation, because federal appellate court judgeships were perceived as crucial policy positions that could affect the president's ability to implement his reform programs.     

Pornography, Pragmatism, and Proscription

The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 criminalizes the possession of extreme pornography, namely, images of bestiality, necrophilia, and life-threatening or serious violence, and is the immediate context for this article which seeks to present a pragmatic liberal humanist critique of pornography regulation. Such a critique, derived in particular from the writings of Nussbaum and Rorty, presents an alternative case for regulation, eschewing the visceral competing fundamentalisms which characterized the 'porn wars' of the 1980s and 1990s. Whilst moral and epistemological philosophers squabble with radical feminists and radical libertarians, extreme pornography can nurture real injustice and ruin real lives. A pragmatic liberal humanism demands a pragmatic response to extreme pornography. The first part of this article will revisit the longer history of the 'porn wars'; the second describes the parameters of a pragmatic liberal humanist critique; the third examines the shorter history of pornography regulation written into the provisions now enacted in the 2008 Act.     

Prosecuting 'child pornography': Possession and taking of indecent photographs of children

This article examines the application of 'child pornography' law by police, prosecutors and the courts and presents the key findings from the first national study conducted into child pornography trials in the Crown Court in England and Wales against a wider statistical analysis of proceedings for possession of 'child pornography' in the Magistrates' Court. The findings show that there are very few prosecutions in the Crown Court and, of defendants proceeded against, most are involved in the taking of photographs rather than in distribution or possession per se . Notwithstanding, few of these defendants are charged with any additional sexual offence, although in the act of taking an indecent photograph of a child some further offence(s) must inevitably be committed. The findings suggest a relationship between child pornography and child sexual abuse. Defendants engage in disavowal and minimizing strategies, while judges also fail to recognize the dangerousness of those defendants convicted of possession or distribution. Sentencing continues to reflect the view that such child pornographers are benign and prison terms remain at the lower end of the tariff range.     

Would John Stuart Mill have Regulated Pornography?

John Stuart Mill dominates contemporary pornography debates where he is routinely invoked as an authoritative defence against regulation. This article, by contrast, argues that a broader understanding of Mill's ethical liberalism, his utilitarianism, and his feminism casts doubt over such an assumption. New insights into Mill's approach to sex, sexual activity, and the regulation of prostitution reveal an altogether more nuanced and activist approach. We conclude that John Stuart Mill would almost certainly have accepted certain forms of pornography regulation and, in this light, we argue that Mill can provide the foundation for new, liberal justifications of some forms of pornography regulation.     

The Intent Behind the Cryptic Concurrence That Provided a Reporter's Privilege

Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes that, despite a majority opinion to the contrary, eventually provided room for journalists to claim a privilege against testifying in grand jury proceedings. For decades, scholars and judges have questioned what Justice Powell meant by his concurrence and whether he, in fact, supported a reporter's right to refuse to reveal confidential information. Justice Powell's personal papers and case files, as well as those of his fellow justices, observations of one of his former law clerks, and oral arguments shed light on the reasoning behind Justice Powell's enigmatic concurrence. This article concludes that Justice Powell supported a qualified reporter's privilege, applied on a case-by-case basis.     

Justice Brennan,Justice Harlan and New York Times co. v. Sullivan: A case study in supreme court decision making

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is arguably the most important free speech case ever decided by the Supreme Court. This case, the Court's first substantive treatment of libel law, delineated a new approach toward the treatment of free speech. Because the Court attempts to present a unified front when it cuts broad swaths in the law, a unanimous or near‐unanimous opinion was very important in Times v. Sullivan.For a time in the deliberations, however, it appeared that Justice William Brennan would not win even a bare majority for his propositions. This article examines the deliberations in the case, providing not only a renewed understanding of the importance of Times v. Sullivan, but also giving a rare glimpse of how the Court operates and how process affects result.     

Regina v. Butler: The harms approach and freedom of expression

In Regina v. Butler the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly accepted the argument that obscenity law should be based on harm rather than morality. The court's opinion, and the view of certain feminists, depends heavily on social science research that shows exposure to some pornographic materials may have harmful effects. However, an analysis of these studies indicates that the findings encompass a wide range of stimuli and are not limited to pornography. Based on the research, the court's shift to a harms approach should logically include all presentations containing harmful messages, regardless of the degree of sexual explicitness. As such, this article argues that the court has not really abandoned its moral approach to obscenity. It has just disguised it by adopting the rhetoric of harmfulness.     

If a Deputy is Guilty…

A people's deputy! Great trust and human respect are joined in this concept, so familiar to the Soviet people. A deputy's person is inviolable. This means that criminal proceedings cannot be instituted against him, nor can he be arrested or subjected to administrative punishment imposed by the courts without the consent of the relevant soviet or, while it is not in session, without the consent of its presidium or executive committee.     

What's the Next Step after Mt. Laurel?

Since its beginnings, zoning has been at its core a tool for achieving exclusionary objectives. Judge Westenhaver, who wrote the lower court decision in Ambler Realty Co. u. Village of Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924) invalidating the village's zoning ordinance, observed that its purpose “is really to regulate the mode of Living of persons who may here-after inhabit [the village]. In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them according to their income or station in life.” In reversing his decision, Justice Sutherland classified apartments as “mere parasites … which would deprive children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities,” In effect, he held that the state's police power could be used to create different levels of health, safety and genera1 welfare for different classes of people. One level was adequate for the poor and another level could be enforced at the behest of the rich who could afford to buy homes in single-family, low-density districts. Even Justice Douglas, a most unlikely bedmate for Justice Sutherland, reflected the same attitude when he wrote recently.     

‘Dutty Babylon’: policing Black communities and the politics of resistance

Justice, when it's swift, is most effective; it's about ensuring that they see the shock and awe of the criminal justice system. Because we represent society, we want to ensure that society is reflected in our courtrooms and we want them to experience what they made us experience. (Nazir Afzal, Chief Crown Prosecutor, Manchester; Channel 4 News, 11 August, 2011; emphasis added)     

‘The referring court asks,in essence’: Is reformulation of preliminary questions by the Court of Justice a decision writing fixture or a decision‐making approach?

The Court of Justice can rephrase or otherwise depart from the questions referred to it by national courts under Article 267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. It does so routinely: a practice known as reformulation. Legal literature often argues that reformulation is used to clarify national court questions and bring them within the scope of European Union law. The aim of the present article is to explore this claim systematically. To this end, it compiles a unique dataset consisting of the Orders for Reference, in which the referring courts embed the preliminary questions, and the judgments, in which the Court of Justice communicates the answers. The findings suggest that reformulation is a decision‐making approach rather than a fixture of decision writing. It's main function is to neutralize conflicts and Europeanise disputes. It underlines the Court's power to shape the preliminary ruling procedure and its outcomes.     

Dismantling or Strengthening Labour Law: The Case of the European Court of Justice

Abstract: The European Court of Justice is increasingly accused of dismantling labour law. The unusually sharp criticism is mainly motivated by four determining, though concealed reasons. First, the fact that many decisions address conflicts familiar to national law which are however largely repressed in the national context; second, the crisis of the national labour markets and the ensuing attempts to fence them off from the consequences of advancing integration; third, the inconsistent policies of a Union caught between the prevailing orientation towards a distinctly economic Community and the demands of a slowly progressing political Union; and fourth, the Union's difficulties to meet its own claims. As a result, the Court of Justice is more and more distracted from its judicial role and forced into a regulatory function. Hence, it is important to recall that a consistent integration process inevitably requires abandoning national regulations and creating a growing body of common rules intended to realise the common objectives. Further, the Union must more than ever attempt to correct its structural deficiencies and lay down fundamental rights, both in order to give direction to its regulatory interventions, and to limit them. Finally, the time has come for a clear specialisation of the European Court of Justice itself, as well as a systematic review of the conditions governing preliminary rulings, in order to avoid any further instrumen-talisation of the Court for the solution ofinternal conflicts of the Member States.     

From a Pluralism of Grounds to Proto‐Legal Relations: Accounting for the Grounds of Obligations of Justice

In this paper I discuss critically Mathias Risse's paper “Responsibility and Global Justice.” First, I argue that for Risse's pluralist account of the grounds of justice to hold together, there is need to presuppose a monist standpoint which ultimately contributes to grounding principles of justice. Second, I point out that Risse's understanding of obligations of accountability and justification is rather narrow in that it functions as an addendum to obligations of justice. Conversely, I will suggest that the obligation of accountability plays a deeper role: The conditions that ground it feature at the same time among the grounds of obligations of justice. Accordingly, the kind of relation that gives rise to a duty among agents to account for their actions must be in place when obligations of justice obtain. Following on from these remarks I will adumbrate an alternative account of the relation which grounds (enforceable) obligations of justice.     

Time and Transcendence: Narrating Higher Authority at the Caribbean Court of Justice

This article examines the relationship between time and authority in courts of law. Newness, in particular, poses an obstacle to a court's efforts to establish authority because it tethers the institution to a timeline in which the human origins of the court and the political controversies preceding it are easily recalled. Moreover, the abbreviated timeline necessarily limits the body of legal authority (namely, the number of judgments) that could have been produced. This article asks how a court might establish its authority when faced with such problematic newness. Based on extensive ethnographic research at the Caribbean Court of Justice, I demonstrate how the staff and judges at this relatively young tribunal work to create a narrative in which the Court transcends its own troublesome timeline. They do this by attempting to construct a time‐transcendent principle of Caribbeanness and proffering the Court as a manifestation of this higher authority. The Court's narrative of its timelessness, however, is regularly challenged by far more familiar tales of its becoming, suggesting that in this court, as in all courts, the work of building and maintaining authority is ongoing.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

Towards Law and Music

Through a review of Sara Ramshaw’s, Justice as Improvisation, the essay evaluates recent scholarly directions in the interdisciplinary field of law and music. The essay considers both methodological and epistemological questions motivating this scholarship, and argues that there yet remains the opportunity to pursue with even greater specificity the meaning of music, in terms of its own vocabulary and genre. The new field of law and music is slowly but surely combining these formal considerations with an ever richer vocabulary, and a richer inter-disciplinary dialogue not just about jazz but with it. What might have been a somewhat sterile exercise in virtuosity is turning into a fully-fledged interdisciplinary claim, with its own methodology and its own epistemology, capable of illuminating not just law or music, but both in light of the other.     

Entrapment Through the Lens of the Actio Libera in Causa

The entrapment defense is a puzzle of long standing. One the one hand, we are offended by the government’s subjecting someone vulnerable to extreme temptation. It seems like something anyone might fall prey to. On the other hand, it is hard to explain why someone who actually commits, or attempts a crime, and who would be liable if anyone other than the government had tempted him, should escape punishment. His blameworthiness seems the same. This essay seeks to illuminate this puzzle by showing how it parallels the long-standing debate surrounding the criminal law problem of the actio libera in causa—situations in which someone seeks to escape liability by contriving to put a certain defense in place, such as provoking his victim into attacking him, so that he can then kill him in self-defense. The parallels between the two problems do not serve to resolve either, but make them appear in a rather different light.     

UK Abortion Law: Reform Proposals,Private Members’ Bills,Devolution and the Role of the Courts

UK abortion law remains unsettled, and subject to on‐going controversy and reform. This article offers a comprehensive critique of all reforms implemented or proposed since 2016. It examines reforms proposed in both Houses of Parliament and contextualises them within a public law analysis, showing both that the complex parliamentary processes relating to Private Members’ Bills have frustrated reform attempts, and that these attempts have been contradictory in their aims between the two Houses. Secondly, it examines the unique positions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to show the extent to which devolutionary settlements have influenced both reforms and executive involvement. Finally, it examines the potential impact of the courts on abortion law following Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review, showing that the Supreme Court's reframing of the debate in human rights terms is likely to affect abortion law, not only in Northern Ireland, but in the whole of the UK.