Civil rights and regulatory wrongs: the Reagan administration and the medical treatment of handicapped infants

Beginning in 1982 the Reagan administration tried to impose federal regulations (based on the civil rights approach of Section 504) on the medical treatment of handicapped newborns in the nation's hospitals. After issuing three sets of regulations, the administration found itself rebuffed by the courts and in ill repute with providers and parts of the public, especially after its widely publicized intervention in the case of Baby Jane Doe illustrated the pitfalls of federal regulation in complex medical decisions. Congress, however, soon enacted legislation employing different means to protect handicapped newborns. The episode offers insights into the dynamics of the U.S. system of separated powers, the limitations of the "civil rights" approach, and the importance of negotiating structures for the resolution of private moral dilemmas with public implications.     

The safeguarding and foundation of human rights

Human rights, as legally understood, must be safeguarded. This presupposes a state of law. The safeguarding of human rights further presupposes an independent judiciary applying the law in a community with common values and aspirations. The foundation of human rights is an individualistic philosophy dependent on the respect for truth and the possibility for the individual to attain it. The respect for the dignity of the human person is the result of a long historical development from this starting point.Dedicated to Helmut CoingTranslated by E. F. Kaelin.     

The nature and basis of inalienable rights

This paper has two purposes. One is primarily (but not exclusively) conceptual and the other is normative. The first aim is to say what inalienable rights are. To explain this, inalienable rights are contrasted with the notions of forfeitable rights and absolute rights. A recent novel analysis of inalienable rights by Feinberg is explained and criticized. The first task is concluded by discussing what duties inalienable rights imply. The second aim is to see what moral principles, if any, justify designating some rights as inalienable. The claim of Nozick and others that inalienable rights must be paternalistically grounded is examined and rejected. After a brief critical discussion of the Lockean and Hobbesean accounts of the basis of inalienable rights, it is argued that the harm principle can serve as an adequate ground for categorizing at least the right to life (and perhaps other rights) as inalienable.An earlier version of this paper was read at Guilford College, Tulane University, and Wake Forest University. I have benefited from the suggestions and comments of members of those audiences and from Stephen Darwall, Thomas Hill, Jr., Edward Langerak, Ruth Lucier, James Smith, Lance Stell, Laurence Thomas, and Donald Van DeVeer.     

Human rights and trade mark rights

Legal context. For some time the UK Trade Marks Registry hasrefused to register trade marks which consists of the name ofa well-known individual. This article examines whether the practiceis permissible, not in the terms of intellectual property lawbut whether it is in contravention of the applicant's humanrights. Key points. Looking at the application of the Human Rights Actin the United Kingdom, the article asks how it could apply toan intellectual property case, concluding that the Trade MarkRegistry is clearly a ‘public authority’ and thatthere are a number of ways in which current practice in respectof well-known individuals could be said to infringe their humanrights. Practical significance. It remains to be seen what the Registry'sresponse will be to such arguments and whether it might in thefuture be possible to obtain protection for the name of a celebrity.     

The House of Lords and homeless people's rights

For the past 20 years, there has been legislation enshrining certain rights for homeless people. This essay is an assessment of the judiciary's role towards homeless people as far as it applies to the most senior court, the House of Lords. It describes the nature of those issues where the House of Lords have had the opportunity to discuss the operation of the homeless persons legislation. It also seeks to explore the reasons why the approach taken has been restrictive. The House of Lords has played an important part in interpreting the homeless rights legislation. The restrictive role of their Lordships is contrasted with other areas where the court has taken rather more generous perspectives on the rights of vulnerable people. It canvasses the various reasons why this should have occurred and notes that limited assistance can be gleaned from traditional approaches to this judicial task. It suggests that the concept of differential politicization throws useful light on the process.