Civilian victimization and international military intervention in civil wars

Civil wars are particularly destructive and asymmetric in nature. As a result, humanitarian crises and episodes of one-sided violence against civilians are likely to emerge. In the post-Cold War era, human rights norms have been strengthened by a global commitment stating that nations have a responsibility to protect people against war crimes. Although the doctrine does not require military responses, as episodes of one-sided violence increase dramatically in the midst of civil conflict, we would expect those cases to experience relatively swift foreign response, including military intervention; a growing trend of at least purportedly humanitarian interventions should be observable. Expectations relating to the responsibility to protect are tested on all civil conflicts occurring between 1989 and 2006. Findings indicate that there is little evidence that one-sided violence leads to military intervention, suggesting that the internationally community does not use its most powerful tool to protect civilians in trouble.     

Knowledge for Statecraft Lecture Given by the Winner of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, Uppsala, October 3, 1998

The occasion of receiving the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science is perhaps an appropriate occasion to recall the origins of my interest in developing knowledge for statecraft. During the course of my years as a member of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, I became aware that much academic research on international relations was not providing the type of theory and knowledge needed for dealing with the challenges the United States was facing during the Cold War. I felt it necessary to undertake the challenging task of devising a new approach for producing the type of knowledge that would come closer to meeting the needs of policy makers who were trying to avoid getting into dangerous war-threatening crises and, when such crises nonetheless occurred, to manage and terminate them without triggering escalation to war.     

The Persian Gulf War's impact on Americans' political information

Does war increase Americans' normally low levels of political information? Data from the Center for Political Studies' Political Consequences of War Study, which plumbed Americans' information about the Persian Gulf War, suggest it does, albeit slightly. Criticisms of mass public competence to influence foreign policy lose some of their sting, but there remain grounds for concern about the quality of public opinion. Old knowledge aids in the acquisition of new, and most people were too uninformed to benefit much from intensive media coverage of the Gulf crisis.     

Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.     

Pretexts and US foreign policy: the war on terrorism in historical perspective

This article analyzes the way that US foreign policy élites have used pretexts to manage public opinion. Policymakers, it is argued, often seize upon threatening external events, and use these events to create a favorable political climate in which to “sell” policies of militarization and external expansion to the public. The article argues that the Bush administration has used the threat of terrorism as a pretext to implement a wide range of policies that had been decided upon in advance of the 9/11 attacks. It also argues that the recent uses of pretexts by the Bush administration have strong historical precedents: extended case studies of pretexts are presented for the events surrounding the Korea crisis of 1950 and the Afghanistan crisis of 1979–1980, as well as the more recent War on Terrorism.     

Changing Horses in Wartime? The 2004 Presidential Election

The literature makes clear that foreign policy affects voting, but it does not lead to clear expectations as to how a war will affect voting. Will views about the advisability of the war predominate? Or will the indirect effect through the incumbent’s image be more important? Will a war crowd out other potential issues, particularly domestic ones? This paper addresses these questions through a series of focused analyses of NES survey data. We find that an increase in strong Republican partisans clinched the election for President Bush. The Iraq War was not a direct vote gainer for the President, but the larger War on Terrorism burnished his image as a leader, at least long enough to win the election. Likewise, the cultural war allowed President Bush to retain some of the votes that he might otherwise have lost due to the unpopularity of the Iraq War.     

The Hollywood War Machine

What we call the "Hollywood War Machine" analyzes the production of films within the studio system depicting the glories of US military action within theaters from around the world, spanning the Revolutionary War period to the present. A large majority of films under discussion here can be understood from the perspective of "good wars" that the film industry has strongly favored, especially during the 1990s. This essay reveals an increasing emphasis on the World War II experience as the quintessential "good war" that brings American audiences back to the undistilled benevolence of the US military through its various patriotic and heroic exploits. The undoubtedly powerful impact of the September 11, 2001 events and their aftermath upon the Hollywood War Machine is a topic worthy of further discussion.     

Beeinflusst Angst politische Einstellungen? Eine Analyse der öffentlichen Meinung während des Golfkriegs 1991

This article examines the effects of anxiety aroused by the Gulf War in 1991 on political attitudes among German citizens. Building on several strands of previous research, I argue that anxiety affects attitudes toward policies concerning the war at the Gulf. I also hypothesize that anxiety conditions the impact of war-related attitudes on more general attitudes toward political actors. The empirical analysis shows that anxiety decreases support for the US-led military intervention at the Gulf, sending German troops to Turkey and the German government’s conduct during the Gulf crisis. At the same time, anxiety increases the impact of these war-related attitudes on general evaluations of political actors, thereby rendering the latter more responsive to political events.     

History lessons for today's housing policy: the politics of low-income housing

History offers valuable lessons to housing policymakers. For those who would devise new low-income housing programs during today's trying economic circumstances, it is helpful to study the strategies that succeeded in achieving low-income housing programs in past difficult times. This article, History Lessons for Today's Housing Policy, examines the political processes that led to the adoption of new low-income housing policies during four political crises. The four crises were the Great Depression of the 1930s, the post-World War II housing shortage, the urban crisis of the 1960s, and the policy crisis of the 1970s. Among other history lessons, the article reveals that well-organized political support, especially from large institutions, is crucial to achieving distinctly different new programs; that decentralized programs are more politically resilient than centralized programs; that programs that appeal to the nation's broad middle-class are most popular; and that policy research is valuable but that politics trumps research.     

Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict

Wars within states have become much more common than wars between them. A dominant approach to understanding civil war assumes that opposition movements are unitary, when empirically, most of them are not. I develop a theory for how internal divisions within opposition movements affect their ability to bargain with the state and avoid conflict. I argue that more divided movements generate greater commitment and information problems, thus making civil war more likely. I test this expectation using new annual data on the internal structure of opposition movements seeking self‐determination. I find that more divided movements are much more likely to experience civil war onset and incidence. This analysis suggests that the assumption that these movements are unitary has severely limited our understanding of when these disputes degenerate into civil wars.     

The Public Salience of Foreign and Security Policy in Britain,Germany and France

The salience of foreign affairs to general publics is an important but often neglected parameter for the role of public opinion in foreign and security policy. This article explores the determinants of foreign affairs' public salience and probes into the respective patterns in Germany, Britain and France. Building on the theory of news values, the article proposes to distinguish between issue-specific and country-specific influences on the public salience of foreign and security policy. The data suggest that broad international crises on the scale of 9/11 or the Iraq war go along with distinct cross-national peaks in the salience of foreign affairs to general publics. At the same time, the effects of constant issue logics are refracted by country-specific factors: most notably, the latter account for the much higher overall salience of foreign affairs to the British public than to the German and French publics since late 2002.     

The rally 'round the flag effect in U.S. foreign policy crises, 1950–1985

We calculate the rally 'round the flag effect (Mueller, 1970, 1973) for all 41 U.S. foreign policy crises, 1950–1985, identified by the International Crisis Behavior Project (Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser, 1988). The mean change in the president's approval rating is surprisingly small: 1.4 percent among all respondents. The greatest influences on the rallying effect of a crisis are whether or not the United States is involved in an ongoing war and, especially, theNew York Times's coverage of the president's major response to a crisis. When a major response is reported in the headlines, the rally is more than 8 percentage points greater,ceteris paribus, than when it is not reported on the front page. TheNew York Times's reporting is influenced by the nature of the president's response, the efforts of his administration to publicize his actions, the degree of Soviet involvement, the location of the crisis, and the willingness of opposition leaders to take a newsworthy position regarding the president's performance.     

Voters' reasoning processes and media influences during the Persian Gulf War

Voters engage in complex reasoning processes in deriving their policy preferences. Such reasoning processes take place in the environment of media helping to construct the discourse of an issue. To demonstrate the reasoning processes and media influences on the processes, this study analyzes the panel data gathered from a national probability sample before and after the Persian Gulf War. The results show a process of forming one's support of the Bush administration's Gulf War policies that involved feelings toward Bush, patriotic feelings, and acceptance of the official statements of U.S. foreign policy goals. These positive contributors are all related to heavier exposure to television news. Respondents' level of public affairs information and exposure to newspaper public affairs functioned as a contingent factor in the reasoning processes: Those at the upper half of the scale showed a greater emphasis on ideology and negative emotional reactions to the destruction of the war in forming their support of the Bush administration's Gulf War policies. The importance of the homogeneity in the discourse of the issue is further demonstrated by the effects of the news media exposure on higher likelihood of dissent concerning the end of the war.     

A sheriff, two bullets and three problems

This paper analyzes deterrence in international conflicts. Assume a strong country has several opponents and faces a military capacity constraint, which is not exhausted after just one war. Two main effects are at work. If the strong country is constrained, then reputation is more expensive and may occur less often. The problem is that the opponents may (but need not) be more aggressive compared to a world without a constraint. It may be that an “axis of evil” does not exist before a war occurs, but is implicitly formed even by moderate countries after the first war was waged. A point of interest is whether the constrained strong country should obtain additional capacity, given that the objective is to minimize the number of wars. The analysis sheds some new light on the U.S. foreign policy, the United Nations and the “axis of evil”     

Permanent war? The domestic hegemony of the New American militarism

Although there is an expanding body of excellent work on 9/11 and the War on Terror, and the changing forms of war‐making, militarism and imperialism, this literature lacks a sufficient critical synthesis of the historical and conjunctural events of 9/11 and its aftermath with the structural and systemic forms of US militarism and the military‐industrial complex. This article attempts a broad, critical‐theoretical analysis of the increased domestic hegemony of militarism in the US since 9/11. The article examines the complex social‐systemic interlocking of militarism with other historical, political, institutional, economic, cultural and psychological forces which tend to reinforce the hegemony of militarism and aggressive, preemptive foreign policy in the current period.     

Internally Displaced Persons Between Nonprofits and Government: Comparing Two Israeli Wars

Abstract

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) crises provide a dramatic backdrop to government–nonprofit relations, as they tend to engage variegated actors at local, national, and international levels. Such crises reveal the composition, forms of engagement, roles, and relationships of the actors involved. The comparison of two crises along Israeli history, separated by years of changing welfare systems and social and political contexts, is an exceptional opportunity to examine government–nonprofit relations over time, and assess the impact of this relationship on IDP crisis management. This article compares two separate studies of IDP response, one in the Israeli War of Independence and one in the Second Lebanon War. The differences are analysed using models of government–nonprofit relations, and reflect the dynamic nature and complexity of these relations in IDP crises. Some conclusions concerning IDP crisis management are suggested.     

State of the Field

Although scholars of West European politics have long debated whether the region's highly institutionalised party systems were becoming de‐aligned and electorally unstable, the political fallout from the post‐2008 financial crisis has lent a new sense of urgency to the debate. The threats posed to party systems by economic crises are hardly unique to Europe, however. The Latin American experience with the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that party system upheaval was not simply a function of retrospective economic voting during the period of crisis. It was also attributable to programmatically de‐aligning policy responses to crises – namely the ‘bait‐and‐switch’ imposition of austerity and adjustment measures by labour‐based, left‐leaning parties that were traditional champions of statist and redistributive policies. Such patterns of reform made it difficult for party systems to channel societal resistance to market orthodoxy in the post‐adjustment era, setting the stage for convulsive ‘reactive sequences’ when such resistance arose outside and against mainstream parties through varied forms of social and electoral protest, typically on the left flank. This article explores the political fallout from the European and Latin American economic crises from a comparative perspective, arguing that it is essential to think beyond the short‐term political dynamics of crisis management to consider the longer‐term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged around crisis‐induced policy reforms.     

Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?

This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.     

21世纪初危机应对中的俄罗斯国家形象塑造

危机发生后,一国政府如何应对危机一定程度上损害或修复着国家形象。21世纪初的十来年,世界上发生了一系列与俄罗斯相关的国内外危机,面对这些事件,在苏联解体后俄罗斯国际形象受损的颓势背景下,俄罗斯政府积极应对,既灵活务实,又顽强有力,客观上塑造了资源丰富、经济回升、政局稳定、政权有力、追求多极化、在国际上有发言权的世界大国形象。     

War as the Continuation of Hegemony by Other Means: How Contemporary Wars Reach into Societies

Much thinking on war has been inspired by von Clausewitz’ famous dictum of “war being merely the continuation of policy by other means.” Such a politics/war dialectic conceives of war as being excluded from life within state and society; yet, contemporary warfare is in many ways constitutive for societies on and off the battlefield. Recent debates on war call for rethinking war in a more vernacular, critical sense. By joining this call, the article takes its cues from the theory of hegemony as developed by political theorist Ernesto Laclau in order to pave a theoretical avenue on how war reaches into society. Paraphrasing Clausewitz, I argue that war is the continuation of hegemony with other means, explaining how and why war has stabilizing and constraining effects on (democratic) political and societal life. Illustrating my argument with observations from the “Global War on Terror,” I am able to show how war is entangled with society having dire consequences for societal cohesion in Western societies.