The Condorcet-Jefferson connection and the origins of social choice theory

This paper explores the relationship between Condorcet and Jefferson to gain insight into the early development of social choice theory. Jefferson does not seem to have read or understood Condorcet's theoretical work, but studying the relationship leads to the identification of intellectual intermediaries and a different perspective on the creation of social choice theory in the French Academy of Sciences.     

The political monetary business cycle: Political reality and economic theory

This paper addresses the issue of expectations incorporated into political business cycle models. Rational agents anticipate Democratic efforts to stimulate the economy via monetary policy, discounting money supply from the calculations for determining output variance, so that output under Democrats is wholly unaffected by changes in the money supply. Rational agents appear to be naive about Republicans, incorporating money supply into the calculations for determining output variance, so that output under Republicans is significantly related to money supply.     

The median voter model in public choice theory

The changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world. Early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter. This claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector. In the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory, but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether. The model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is. These latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model, appropriately applied.Pointing out that the model might not be valid under some circumstances in no way implies that the model is never valid. In fact, this paper has reviewed strong arguments, both empirical and theoretical, suggesting that the median voter model is a good approximation of demand aggregation in the public sector for many issues. One paper will not change the opinions of public choice theorists on the median voter model. But the argument given here is that there is a large amount of theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the median voter model as a good foundation for the development of the theory of public sector demand. Once the overly ambitious claims that have been made for the model are set aside, the median voter model is in a good position to provide a base for the development of a theory of political structure that is analogous to the theory of market structure in economics.     

Slowing monetary growth since 1984: A public choice explanation

Until about 1984, the U.S. monetary base typically grew at an accelerating rate. Since then, that acceleration has stopped. Modern evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve responds to political pressure. We present empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that reduced monetary base growth reflects the fact that the political advantages of price inflation have been significantly reduced by the tax indexation provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.     

The simple analytics of slack-maximizing bureaucracy

Using a utility-based graphical model of bureaucratic choice, this paper develops four empirical predictions from the theory of slack-maximizing bureaucracy. These predictions are compared to those resulting from the Niskanen budget-maximizing model of bureaucracy. Slack-maximizing and budget-maximizing bureaucracies are similar in their response to changes in cost and in their generation of flypaper effects, but they differ in their responses to matching and lump-sum grants.     

Public choice theory and antitrust policy

We survey the pioneering contributions of Robert Tollison to the theory and practice of antitrust law enforcement. Inspired by his period of service during Ronald Reagan’s first administration as Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, Tollison was the first scholar to apply public choice reasoning to the question why antitrust frequently fails to achieve its stated goal of protecting consumers against unwarranted exercises of market power. In supplying evidence that the outcomes of antitrust processes are shaped more by special interests than by the public’s interest, he was instrumental in launching a wholly new research program.     

Rational choice theory and the analysis of political action

The rational choice approach to the analysis of political action takes as its starting point the need to construct a model of the individual actor and its choices as the basis for its investigations of the interactions of a plurality of actors. This paper questions the theoretical foundations of that approach, concentrating on its postulates of rationality, homogeneity, and individualism. It argues that the conceptualisation of actors, their decisions, and the conditions in which they are made, rasies important questions that cannot be posed within the rational choice approach. A final section indicates some of the problems with recent attempts to integrate elements of the rational choice approach into marxism.     

The anti-discriminatory tradition in Virginia school public choice theory

Public Choice - This paper studies the practice of Müsadere in the Ottoman Empire. Müsadere refers to the expropriation of elites—often tax farmers or administrators—by the...     

苏联官僚特权制度的产生和影响

许多学者指出,苏联改革失败和解体的原因之一是其存在庞大的官僚特权集团。计划经济体制下,官僚成为了进行国家生产管理活动的主体。为了实现国家的经济增长和均衡,苏联中央需要将发展经济的动力传递到官僚集团中去。与直接监督的强制性激励手段相比,特权作为诱导性的激励手段,其交易费用远低于前者。然而,这一特权制度并不能真正使官僚产生促使经济增长和均衡的动力,相反,它还方便了官僚的欺骗行为。这一制度的后果并不是经济增长,而是经济的严重衰退和苏共执政基础的削弱。