Europe＇s Integration Process is Floundering

The post-WWII situation in Europe is closely related to Europe＇s integration process. Right now, one of the special features regarding the current European situation is that Europe＇s integration process has nearly become enmeshed in stagnation. The European Union is disintegrating, with various kinds of contradictions cropping up and its cohesion sharply reduced. The EU rotating chair-state Hungarian premier said, ＂Europe is like a bicycle without a chain, unable to move forward.＂     

The Faulty Logic of the European Union & Its Consequences for the United States

The European Union is in crisis because it is based on a wrong understanding of political development. Its founding assumption is that a common market and a common currency would lead to a unified polity; that Europeans would arise out of the euro. This has not happened and Europe is fraying economically and politically. And the United States is not a disinterested spectator because a weaker and more divided Europe undermines a key foreign policy objective pursued over the last century—of a Europe whole, secure, and free. Consequently, it is premature for Washington to reorient its strategic attention away from Europe.     

Comparing Theories of Democratic Support: Lessons from Post-Communist Europe

This article sets out to evaluate the dominant approaches that are used to explain democratic support with a particular interest in what can be learned from the case of post-communist Europe. The main argument is that the case of post-communist Europe illustrates the weakness of the dominant sociological and instrumental approaches. In post-communist Europe democratic support does not depend on a familiarity with democratic institutions and norms, a belief in the democratic form of government, the avoidance of economic deprivation or satisfaction with government performance. Instead it is suggested that an alternative, more nuanced understanding of the dominant instrumental approaches is suited to the case of post-communist Europe.     

Managing the conceptual gap on sovereignty in China–EU relations

While, historically, sovereignty is what Europeans invented and what the Chinese were forced to accept, today it is what Europeans try to bury and what the Chinese hold dear. A conceptual gap on sovereignty clearly exists between China and Europe which more often than not exerts a negative impact on their relationship. It breeds misunderstandings and disputes, makes it more difficult to reach agreements on many bilateral issues, and complicates China–Europe cooperation in third countries. But the conceptual gap on sovereignty does not prevent China and Europe from building a strategic partnership. Given that strengthening or weakening national sovereignty means totally different things to China and Europe, the two parties should jointly and proactively manage their divergence on sovereignty issues by mutual avoidance, mutual assurance, and mutual accommodation, in order to unlock sovereignty-related impasses in China–Europe relations.     

Publics and biobanks in China and Europe: a comparative perspective

We compare public perceptions of biobanks in China and in Europe, reporting similarities and differences in how publics in Europe and China view key issues in the realm of biobank research. Despite many differences in perception, the similarity in the perception of biobanks in China and in Europe is striking. Our research finds that Chinese with lower education levels are less concerned about privacy, while those with higher education levels have preferences in privacy protection that are similar to those in Europe. Transnational research is perceived positively in both regions, but specific historical experiences shape how people approach these issues. While Chinese publics focus on certain effects of international research on the Chinese state, Europeans are mainly concerned about data security and impacts on research. The study is based on 66 focus groups conducted in China (6) and Europe (60), with approximately 700 participants.     

Migrations toward Western Europe: trends,outlook, policies

Recent trends in international migration affecting Europe are reviewed. The author notes that since the 1970s, the pressure from migrants has shifted from northern to southern Europe. He concludes that the focus of future trends will be the Mediterranean region from northern Africa to southern Europe. The possible effect on migration of aid policies to developing countries is considered.     

Has-Been,Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy

In December 2003, the European Union presented its “security strategy”, endorsed by all member states, to provide guidance for Europe’s common foreign security and defense policy. In substance, this document is not an expression of a growing strategic rift between Europe and the United States. One of the purposes it serves, however, is defining Europe’s own, separate “identity”. It reflects the increasing awareness that Europeans need to employ their power more effectively in the service of international peace and security, as much as politically possible. Disagreements on key issues remain in Europe, however, and the practical implications of the security strategy still need to be worked out.     

Cosmopolitan Europe: Border Crossings and Transnationalism in Europe

In recent years European politics has witnessed two simultaneous developments, which are indicative of two contradictory trends. The first is an emphasis on the idea of a cosmopolitan Europe, as facilitated by further European integration. This accelerated integration is said to be creating a cosmopolitan Europe in which citizenship is decoupled from its national bearings and supra-national European institutions facilitate the emergence of new identities and belongings that are not necessarily national in origin. The second trend points towards an increasing visibility of right-wing parties and movements expressing hostility towards cultural multiplicity and an official denunciation of multiculturalism, accompanied by a closure of borders and denial of rights to non-European nationals. This article will argue that these seemingly contradictory trends are not necessarily contradictory but instead complimentary in erecting real and imaginary borders around Europe. The article further argues that growing transnational populations within Europe such as immigrants, refugees, non-residents and non-status individuals act as a corrective to this false perception of a cosmopolitan Europe by bringing the “outside in” and challenging the notions of European borders and established identities.     

"Us" and "them": European and North American attitudes to immigration

This work compares attitudes toward immigration in Europe and North America. Europe has adopted and reinforced a restrictive immigration policy since the 1970s, but family reunification and asylum for refugees have replaced labor migration to maintain the flow of newcomers over the past two decades. Illegal immigration has increased in countries such as Italy and Spain where immigration is a recent phenomenon. Migratory pressure from the former Soviet block, violence against immigrants in Germany and elsewhere, the crisis of social protection systems, economic recession and increasing unemployment have pressured European governments to reinforce their closed door policy. In the US, restrictions against immigration have relaxed greatly since adoption of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986. Over 800,000 immigrants have been admitted annually to the US in recent years. The factors explaining the different immigration policies in North America and Europe are not economic or demographic, but stem rather from history, social structure, the functioning of the labor market and social mobility. North America, more than Europe, has a positive view of immigration as contributing to the vitality and renewal of the culture and promoting development by broadening experience and knowledge. Immigration is regarded in Europe as, at best, a necessity in times of labor shortage and economic expansion. European countries tend to perceive themselves as totally formed and not requiring further cultural contribution. Homogeneity in culture, language, and religion is valued. Social mobility is possible in North America through professional success, but in the older and more hierarchical societies of Europe, social status is determined by birth and family or other connections. Since the early 1990s, public opinion toward immigration has become less favorable on both sides of the Atlantic, with increasing proportions favoring limitation. The positive perception of immigration in America and the work of pressure groups have thus far blocked restrictionist measures. In Europe, restrictive policies are in perfect harmony with public opinion.     

Images,visibility and the prospects of soft power of the EU in Asia: the case of China

Asia Europe Journal - Europe’s ability to project power is said to have depended on a unique combination of normative influence with a specific mix of policy instruments that help increase...     

When All Roads Lead to Beijing. Assessing China’s New Silk Road and its Implications for Europe

The Belt and Road, unveiled by President Xi Jinping in late 2013, is China’s most ambitious geo-economic and foreign policy initiative in decades, combining a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and a sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road which connect China to Europe. With this grandiose initiative, Beijing seeks to tackle industrial overcapacity at home and acquire political influence abroad through investment. Sitting at the end-point of the maritime Silk Road, Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean have been the main focus of investment in infrastructure projects so far. If managed successfully by both sides, China’s Belt and Road could be a great opportunity for a European continent that is still struggling to recover from the crisis. What is urgently needed in Europe is a comprehensive response to China’s new initiative, with the focus not only on the economy and trade, but also on the monetary and financial aspects of the Belt and Road, including discussion of the political and security implications of Beijing’s inroads into Europe and its neighbourhood.     

The Clash in Public Opinion between Europe and China： What, How and Why

Recent years have seen a tension between Europe and China in public opinion, which began in 2006 and climaxed in 2008 when the Tibet riots and the Beijing Olympics put China under the global spotlight. Europeans and Chinese view each other more negatively than in ＂the good old days＂ and there is a growing perception gap regarding the Chinese government. The media （including the Internet） and public opinion leaders （scholars, human rights activists, dissidents, politicians and diplomats） have played a part in causing this both in Europe and in China, and this paper examines their roles. This paper also identifies three reasons behind the clash of viewpoints： First, lack of common values has exacerbated Europe＇s fear of a rising China; second, both Europe and China use this hostility to help redefine their self-identity; third, different development needs in China and Europe have nurtured very different mindsets. In the future, the European public＇s interest in China will continue to grow and Europe＇s and China＇s perceptions of each other will gradually stabilize. In the long run, whether Europe will accept a rising China depends on China＇s ability to develop a ＂Chinese thinking＂ which suits both China＇s and the world＇s development needs.     

Europe’s Leadership Deficit

The European Project is currently experiencing the most serious crisis in its sixty year existence. Past crises have produced transformational leaders who used them to build more Europe. Today transformational leadership at the European level has been replaced with transactional and laissez faire leaders and is being challenged by charismatic populist ‘strong men’ who oppose more Europe. The structure of the EU, the rise of new media, the large flows of immigrants and refugees combined with economic stagnation and the decline of traditional ideologies have undermined the ability of leaders to shape effective policies. Emerging leaders will be grounded in the nation state and in a more Gaullist Europe.     

Europe's Identity Problem and the New Islamist War

Fundamental transformations of identity within Europe have historically resulted in great wars, which in turn resulted in fundamental transformations of identity. This essay discusses, first, four great periods of war in Europe and the succession of identities they produced, and then the new war that Islamist terrorists, and Islamism more generally, have brought to Europe and the West. It considers the inherent weaknesses and failures of the now-dominant Western ideology and identity, liberalism, in dealing with this new war, and concludes with a consideration of the once-dominant Christian identity in Europe. That identity, much more than liberalism, would have strengthened Europe in its current war with Islamism.     

NATO,ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.     

The relativity of decline: a reappraisal of French leadership and influence in a time of global crisis

This article is an attempt, in the context of the Eurozone crisis that has shaken Europe since 2008, to explore and deconstruct two pieces of conventional wisdom on French leadership in Europe and the world. The stereotypical image of a country in decline and denial, out of touch with today’s globalised world, is reproduced so often in the Anglo-American media and even in scholarly discourse, that is has become a self-evident truism. The article examines this truism in two different perspectives: there is, on the one hand, the axiom that France has lost influence in Europe and that the balance of power has shifted inexorably to Germany and, on the other hand, the axiom that Europe does not matter in the global ‘power shift’ and that, as part of Europe, France does not count any more either. In questioning the origins and validity of these axioms, the authors argue that a strong perception bias persists and is constantly perpetuated even though reality has changed. Not only has France rather successfully adapted to globalisation in both political and economic terms, but it has also found new ways and discourses about its role as Germany’s partner in leadership in the European Union. The paper goes on to show that both France and the EU retain and use significant levers for action in three dimensions of power—coercion, agenda-setting and attraction. It concludes that going into 2012, France remains an active and important actor, both in the EU and on the global scene. It is present and influential in major international institutions, effectively builds international coalitions and floats important ideas on reforming laissez-faire capitalism.     

Comparative transformation. Experiences in East Europe and prospects in East Asia

This article1. retraces the origins of the revolutions in East Europe, set against the more retarding socio-political causalities in East Asia,2. benchmarks the sequence of economic transformation in East Europe against the limited and incomplete economic reforms in East Asia,3. sets postcommunist political developments in East Europe against scenarios for political change in East Asia, and4. compares the social crisis in East Europe with prospects for more stable social development in the Confucian cultures of East Asia.The article concludes with the need for negotiated democratic regime change in the remaining Communist dictatorships in East Asia.. While economic structures still require a sustained effort for systemic change towards genuine market economies, its social consequences are expected to be less dramatic than in Eastern Europe.     

Glasnost and the emotional climate in eastern Europe

The year 1989 was as historic for Europe as 1848. The countries of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania had disappeared from the emotional calendar of Western nations. But the people in what was erroneously called Eastern Europe were hurting because of their ostracism from Europe. Under glasnost, they showed, expressed, and acted upon their hurt. The actors were the youth and the artists. Glasnost has revealed what is best and worst in the traditions of these countries.     

Democracy in microstates: why smallness does not produce a democratic political system

To fully understand the function of volatility in today's European democracies, it is necessary to employ the principal-agent model. Where democracy is exercised in the form of party government, then it is especially essential to enquire into how the electorate can monitor politicians. Electoral volatility may increase the responsiveness of the party system to the electorate and increase the accountability of politicians. Party system instability is persistently higher in the east European democracies than in western Europe. System transition in eastern Europe passes through the party system, as new parties enter the electoral arena. Political innovation in western Europe also passes through the party system, where new movements appear alongside the established parties. However, there are signs of decreasing volatility in the east, whereas volatility is on the rise in several west European democracies. There will be convergence between west and east European democracies: both will experience considerable volatility in the future. This is a positive gain for democratic vitality in Tingsten's conception. The level of party system fractionalization is already the same over the regions of Europe. The principal-agent model would favour several agents as well as agent switches, which means a moderate level of party system instability.