‘Fear and loathing across party lines’ (also) in Europe: Affective polarisation in European party systems

Several scholars in the United States have recently addressed an increased partisan animosity between Democrats and Republicans, and have termed this phenomenon ‘affective polarisation’. This surge in partisan affective polarisation is perceived to be highly problematic, as it has been found to have a negative impact on the functioning of the party system and even society at large. The aim of this article is to study the concept of affective polarisation in European party systems. It introduces the Affective Polarisation Index (API) that allows for measuring and comparing levels of affective polarisation also in multiparty systems. This novel measure is applied to 22 European democracies and the United States between 2005 and 2016. The results indicate that affective polarisation is acutely present in European party systems, as partisans are often extremely hostile towards competing parties. The most affectively polarised countries are in Central Eastern and Southern Europe where the degree of affective polarisation is notably higher than it is in the United States, while Northwestern European countries are more moderate in terms of partisan feelings. Further analysis reveals that affective polarisation is significantly correlated with ideological polarisation, but the relationship between the two appears to be conditional: in some Western European political systems ideological polarisation does not lead itself to strong interparty hostility, while in Central Eastern Europe a high degree of affective polarisation can be present even in ideologically centrist party structures. These findings validate the claim that ideological and affective polarisation are two distinct aspects of polarisation, and that the latter also merits additional attention.     

The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination

This study analyzes how perceptions of discrimination against oneself and/or one’s group and whether one self-identifies in national (American), national origin, or panethnic terms affect levels of political engagement among Latinos in the United States. The findings show that perceptions of discrimination against oneself are particularly damaging in that they promote both behavioral and attitudinal alienation (e.g., non-voting and lack of trust), especially among Latinos who identify primarily as American. Behavioral alienation can be mitigated, and even overcome, when perceptions of discrimination are accompanied by a panethnic or national origin self-identification. However, the attitudinal alienation created by perceptions of discrimination is not mitigated by any type of self-identification. These findings shed light on understudied factors that affect political engagement that are going to become more important to understand as the American population continues its ethnic diversification. In addition to expanding our knowledge of political engagement generally, this study also raises important questions about whether the adoption of an American self-identification is in fact beneficial for the health of our participatory political system as a whole.     

How can ‘Britishness’ be Re‐made?

Modern Britishness is widely seen to be based on shared values like ‘fair play’, ‘tolerance’, and respect for ‘diversity’. Can such a ‘values‐based Britishness’ be effective as a national binding agent in an era of devolution and globalisation? The idea that a uniquely ‘British’ character is based on shared values of some kind is not new. The contemporary debate is framed by decisions made over a century ago in the Victorian era—when the decisive shift occurred from a British identity based on religious difference to one based on shared moral values. Through political rhetoric, legislation, and the courts, Victorian governments shaped and changed the character of Britishness. The same tools remain available to contemporary lawmakers in shaping a twenty‐first century Britishness that embraces modern universal values, but also defines some more uniquely British emotional connection points around which national identity can be built.     

Income inequality,electoral systems and party polarisation

This study analyses why income inequality and party polarisation proceed together in some countries but not in others. By focusing on the relationship between income inequality, the permissiveness of electoral systems and party polarisation, the study offers a theoretical explanation for how the combination of income inequality and permissive electoral systems generates higher party polarisation. After analysing a cross‐national dataset of party polarisation, income inequality and electoral institutions covering 24 advanced democracies between 1960 and 2011, it is found that a simple correlation between income inequality and party polarisation is not strong. However, the empirical results indicate that greater income inequality under permissive electoral systems contributes to growing party polarisation, which suggests that parties only have diverging ideological platforms due to greater income inequality when electoral systems encourage their moves towards the extreme; parties do not diverge when electoral systems discourage their moves towards the extreme.     

The politics of other citizens

In all kinds of political action, citizens are confronted with the performances of other citizens. An important guide to political behaviour is therefore likely to be the assumptions people make concerning how others can be expected to behave. This article explores common sense ideas about other citizens as potential political participants, drawing on a series of group interviews conducted with taxi-drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic. I argue the expectations voiced of other citizens tend to be pessimistic in nature, casting them as ill-informed, apathetic, passive and unduly self-interested, notwithstanding the appearance of a more optimistic view which holds they can be expected to follow the lead of those who ‘take a stand’. These empirical observations lead to a discussion of the theoretical issues they raise, notably where to locate the origins of such views, and how to appraise their implications for democracy.     

A Common Future and a Common Identity： The Transformation Process of Political and Social Identities in the South Caucasus Countries

In reflecting on the case of the South Caucasus （Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia）, one of the most popular perspectives is its lack of a common identity. The main argument is that it is a culturally diverse region with old-fashioned, ethnically exclusive nationalism. From this point of view, the process of the formation of a European identity in the region acquires particular importance. A European identity could act as a catalyst for bringing the region together. This identity could be considered as based on much more than just political orientation but fundamentally grounded in common values. This comprehensive integration in the South Caucasus can be achieved through the formulation and acceptance of a common political identity based on the political orientations of the South Caucasian States and their citizens. The main question that this study tries to answer is how people in the South Caucasian countries identify themselves in terms of a European identity. A suitable analysis is increasingly important at both the micro and the macro levels. The author examines the people＇s attitudes in the three South Caucasian states toward Western culture, states, and organizations, drawing on opinion polls conducted by the Caucasus Research Resources Center （CRRC）. The author seeks to analyze attitudes toward the West in the South Caucasus on a macro as well as on a micro level. The author seeks also to provide a much-needed analysis for decision making, based on empirical data that help understand public opinion toward the European Union （EU） in the countries of the South Caucasus, and that can contribute to the refinement of integration strategies.     

Values,trust and democracy in Germany: Still in search of ‘inner unity’?

Twenty years after German reunification, surveys have persistently uncovered differences in political trust between the eastern and western parts of the country. Studies have offered disintegrated and inconclusive assessments of the cross‐regional variation. This variation is traced to a tenacious, retrospective sympathy for socialism steeped in political socialisation and experiential learning. Empirical analyses confirm the presence of two key effects. First, retrospective evaluations of socialism not only fuel popular distrust of political institutions, but are more strongly correlated with trust in the east. Second, East–West evaluations of socialism are sufficiently different to contribute towards explaining the contrasting levels of trust between the two regions. That socialist values constitute a core axis upon which East German attitudes pivot presents a challenge for nurturing trust in democratic institutions and renews attention to processes through which supportive attitudes to democracy are acquired in transitional countries.     

Bet Out the Vote: Prediction Markets as a Tool to Promote Undergraduate Political Engagement

ABSTRACT

Over the course of three semesters spanning the 2016 primary and general elections, we conducted a series of quasi-experiments to evaluate the effects of prediction markets on undergraduate interest in the political process. We gave several classes in our institution’s core American politics course the opportunity to collectively invest in election-related markets on PredictIt.org, and over two-thirds of our students reported that the exercise stimulated their interest in the elections and political process. Roughly half also reported reading more news articles because of their participation in the market. While our treatment group did not demonstrate statistically-significant improvement in tangential political awareness, knowledge, or engagement, our findings do challenge previous conclusions that prediction markets have limited capacity to motivate students in an introductory learning context.     

Networks and political engagement of migrant organisations in five European cities

This article investigates networks and political actions by migrant organisations in five European cities. It examines how political opportunity structures moderate the impact of organisational networks on organisations' political contacts and protests using data from organisational surveys undertaken between 2005 and 2008 in Budapest, Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich. Results suggest that the political context moderates the role that different types of networks have on mobilisation. It is found that migrant organisational networks may be sources compensating for the lack of contextual opportunities, thus fostering the use of protest by migrant organisations. However, migrant organisational networks can also favour the creation of political subcultures, marginalised from mainstream politics. Finally, migrant networks are likely to foster migrant organisations' political integration in multicultural contexts through conventional as well as non‐conventional politics.     

大学生社会主义核心价值观认同基础研究——以中华优秀传统文化为视角

中华优秀传统文化,是社会主义核心价值观的重要来源,也是其重要组成部分。挖掘中华民族优秀传统文化,汲取华夏文明精华,是建设社会主义现代化国家的必然举措,也是实现民族复兴,实现中国梦,培育和践行社会主义核心价值观的文化土壤。正如习总书记所说:"我们提倡和弘扬社会主义核心价值观,必须从中华优秀传统文化中汲取营养"。因此,在中华优秀传统文化视域下,拓宽社会主义核心价值观的认同基础,增强大学生的文化自信、文化自觉、文化自为,既有必要性,也有必须性,是科学性和合理性的辩证统一、合目的性与合工具性的完美结合。     

A Long Way to Go: The Final Report of the Speaker's Conference on Parliamentary Representation

The Speaker's Conference on Parliamentary Representation reported in January 2010. The report calls for a host of measures to improve the representativeness of the House of Commons and to revitalise political parties, as well as to enhance citizenship education, develop youth and community citizenship engagement programmes, and more generally to revitalise British democracy. Early responses indicate that the government and political parties will take the report seriously. The report is thoughtful, thorough and extensive, a treasure trove for policy makers, advocates and researchers. If it has a weakness, it is that it shows a better understanding of parliamentary reform than of party reform.     

Branding in Politics—Manifestations,Relevance and Identity-Oriented Management

ABSTRACT

In contrast to classical marketing, previous research on political marketing has barely considered the branding aspect. This is all the more surprising, given that on the one hand, political parties and their key representatives presumably fulfil the main criteria of an impact-oriented brand as a firmly anchored, consistent perceptual image in the minds of voters. On the other hand, there are many indicators that political brands are of considerable significance for voting decisions. In essence, the importance of brands for voting decisions on the part of the consumers derives from their branding functions, such as orientation aid in the form of an “information chunk” or risk-reduction function in the sense of a confidence surrogate. Based on the hypothesis that brand management thus constitutes a central challenge for the marketing of political parties, it is appropriate to investigate what approach seems best suited to managing political brands and how these should be formulated.     

The tie that divides: Cross‐national evidence of the primacy of partyism

Using evidence from Great Britain, the United States, Belgium and Spain, it is demonstrated in this article that in integrated and divided nations alike, citizens are more strongly attached to political parties than to the social groups that the parties represent. In all four nations, partisans discriminate against their opponents to a degree that exceeds discrimination against members of religious, linguistic, ethnic or regional out‐groups. This pattern holds even when social cleavages are intense and the basis for prolonged political conflict. Partisan animus is conditioned by ideological proximity; partisans are more distrusting of parties furthest from them in the ideological space. The effects of partisanship on trust are eroded when partisan and social ties collide. In closing, the article considers the reasons that give rise to the strength of ‘partyism’ in modern democracies.     

In search of reliable results: Socialist values and political trust in unified Germany – A comment on Campbell's analyses and conclusions

In a recently published article in this journal, Ross Campbell argues that adherence to socialist values establishes a hitherto neglected factor when it comes to the explanation of differences in East and West German citizens’ political trust. As the results of his study indicate, adherence to socialist values impacts negatively on citizens’ political trust, this effect is more pronounced and more stable over time for East German as compared to West German citizens and is sufficiently strong to eliminate aggregate‐level differences in political trust between East and West Germany. However, this research note suggests that Campbell's article contains several substantial inconsistencies and obscurities that question the reliability and validity of the empirical findings presented. It provides a re‐analysis of Campbell's main arguments and shows to what extent his initial conclusions can be upheld after the shortcomings have been remedied. The results of this re‐analysis suggest that socialist values indeed exhibit a negative impact on German citizens’ political trust, which is relatively stronger for East as compared to West German citizens. However, contrary to Campbell's initial results, the negative effect of socialist values on political trust is robust over time for both East and West German citizens. What is more, there is no empirical evidence confirming that differences in adherence to socialist values between East and West German citizens are sufficiently strong to account for aggregate‐level differences in political trust. In light of these findings, two of Campbell's three main conclusions are dubious and call for further examination.