Public policy and privatisation: the case of the Qatari experience

This article uses a qualitative methodology employing the elite model to describe and analyse the complex interplay of political and economic factors in the privatization experience of the state of Qatar. The article begins by providing a theoretical framework for privatisation in the context of public policy and classifying policies of privatisation into two categories: macro‐ and micro‐privatisation. The second part uses this framework to discuss the factors that gives the Qatari experience its distinguished flavour. These factors include: elite legitimacy and social culture, bureaucratic power, international pressure and patron–client networks. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Issue transfer and symbolic legislation: a case study of the Austrian Equal Treatment Act

Abstract. Three strategies which may emerge out of politicians' concepts of rationality (problems solving, agenda management, creation of consensus) are applied to one of the main features of Austrian politics, namely the differentation of policy sectors dominated either by political parties or interest groups. The Equal Treatment Act, which had been transferred from the corporatist arena to the arena of the party system, involved the rationalities of both political parties and interest groups. This paper analyses the 'extended' process of legislation of this law (including implementation). The empirical findings are then linked to the theoretical propositions about the rationalities of the respective political actors. Finally, hypotheses about the conditions of issue transfers from the corporatist arena into the arena of the party system are suggested.     

The European parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals

The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and Parliamentary committee documents, we are able to assess the significance of different amendments, as well as the degree to which they were introduced in the final decision of the Council. Our analysis indicates first that less than 30% of EP amendments are insignificant, while 15% are important or very important; second, that the probability of acceptance of an amendment is the same regardless of its significance. Further analysis indicates two sources of bias of aggregate EP statistics: several amendments are complementary (deal with the same issue in different places of the legal document), and a series of amendments that are rejected as inadmissible (because they violate the legal basis of the document or the germainess requirement) are included in subsequent pieces of legislation. We calculate the effect of these biases in our sample, and find that official statistics under estimate Parliamentary influence by more than 6 percentage points (49% instead of 56% in our sample). Finally, we compare a series of observed strategic behaviors of different actors (rapporteurs, committees, floor, Commission) to different expectations generated by the literature.     

The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals

Abstract The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and Parliamentary committee documents, we are able to assess the significance of different amendments, as well as the degree to which they were introduced in the final decision of the Council. Our analysis indicates first that less than 30% of EP amendments are insignificant, while 15% are important or very important; second, that the probability of acceptance of an amendment is the same regardless of its significance. Further analysis indicates two sources of bias of aggregate EP statistics: several amendments are complementary (deal with the same issue in different places of the legal document), and a series of amendments that are rejected as inadmissible (because they violate the legal basis of the document or the germainess requirement) are included in subsequent pieces of legislation. We calculate the effect of these biases in our sample, and find that official statistics under estimate Parliamentary influence by more than 6 percentage points (49% instead of 56% in our sample). Finally, we compare a series of observed strategic behaviors of different actors (rapporteurs, committees, floor, Commission) to different expectations generated by the literature.     

The influence of business associations on legislation: The case of Kenya

Interest groups seek to influence public policy. Business associations specifically seek to influence policy related to the environment in which their members operate, with the intention of making it easier for the members, and the wider private sector, to “do business.” Scholars question whether interest groups are influential and, if so, the degree to which their activity influences public policy. Even if they do influence public policy at the margins, it is questionable how effective they are in influencing legislation. As a result, there is little exploration of the factors that may determine whether business membership organizations (BMOs) are likely to be successful. This paper explores the efforts of two BMOs in Kenya to influence legislation: In one case, the BMO persuaded the government to introduce legislation to regulate an activity that had previously not been subject to legislation; in the other, a BMO sought to persuade the government to amend its own proposals to replace existing legislation with new legislation. In both cases, we find evidence that the BMO was successful, though one BMO was significantly more successful than the other. We review the factors perceived by the BMOs to have led to their success. Neither was in a position to rely on economic or other power to strong‐arm the government. Both followed a predominantly insider strategy though with occasional media back‐up. Both were successful on the more “technical” issues. Key factors include the use of a champion, engaging across government, supplying information, and providing evidence and good argumentation.     

Ethnography of a policy process: a case study of land redistribution in Bangladesh

Throughout the developing world, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are involved in various aspects of an increasing number of policy interventions. The donor community has lent considerable support to this strategy. One of the key assumptions behind the strategy is that the greater involvement of NGOs in policy processes will result in more resources being distributed to the poor, and will also facilitate the establishment of a policy process which is more inclusive and egalitarian. Here the involvement of NGOs in an important land redistribution policy initiative is used to examine both these assumptions. While there is strong evidence that more land was redistributed to the poor as a result of NGO involvement, the actual mechanism or process for deciding the distribution of land was not found to be all inclusive or completely egalitarian. This ambivalence serves as a timely critique to the naive optimism and simplified assumptions underpinning development thinking and practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reframing privatisation: Deconstructing the myth of efficiency

In the context of ongoing scandals about public versus private ownership, we review the rise and fall of British nationalised industries, and the subsequent rise of privatisation based on perception of market-based efficiency as a means of improving public service. We evaluate the theoretical and empirical arguments around privatisation and find that the argument of privatisation as a vehicle for efficiency gains is a myth. Instead, we suggest that efficiency is not solely a matter of ownership, but requires a complex interplay of social and commercial variables to make it possible. We call for a more inventive and flexible approach in the search for efficiency in the public sector.     

The unseen hands: Collaborative instrumental leadership in the British renegotiation case

The article contends that an important but overlooked explanation for the European Union's resilience in the past decade in the face of several existential crises has been the informal instrumental leadership roles played by EU institutional actors collaborating with each other. In this article, a theoretical framework is developed that can explain why EU governments, facing a crisis, would choose to informally delegate leadership tasks to a set of EU institutional actors. A three-part mechanism of collaborative instrumental leadership provided by institutions is devised that explains why governments informally delegate leadership tasks to EU institutions, and the effects of this informal delegation. The core of the article is a process-tracing case study that explores how collaborative instrumental leadership actually works. The case selected is the British renegotiation of their terms of membership in 2015–2016. While the case has become more-or-less forgotten because the shock ‘no’ vote in the June 2016 Brexit referendum made its terms moot, the deal included quite exceptional reform proposals in which the EU bent over backwards to accommodate the United Kingdom, perhaps even going beyond the bounds of the EU Treaties themselves in the issue of immigration. Given this, analysing how collaborative instrumental leadership supplied by institutions contributed to producing the ambitious deal can shed light on the processes whereby intractable problems in the EU have been solved in the past decade.     

The political economy of regulatory change: The case of British merger control

This article aims to explain the broader evolution of British merger control. To this end it outlines a novel critical political economy perspective on regulation and regulatory change which differs from established political economy approaches, such as the regulatory capitalism/state perspectives, in three main ways: it places regulatory ideas at the heart of the analysis, it differentiates between different degrees of regulatory change, and it links regulatory change in delineated issue areas with changing power balances between fractions of capital and labor. The application of this perspective to the analysis of the evolution of British merger control provides some important new insights, most notably that the content, form, and scope of merger control in Britain have been deeply transformed in accordance with neoliberal ideas since the 1980s and that this process, which was part of a broader regulatory and ideational shift, was premised on the ascendancy of transnational capital.     

Evaluation of automobile safety regulations: The case of compulsory seat belt legislation in Australia

A basic tenet of the new conservatism in political economy is that government policies frequently lead to unintended consequences which may offset the benefits of the policy. Auto safety legislation may be a case in point. As the first country to make the wearing of seat belts compulsory, Australia is highly suitable as a case study. Traffic accident casualties were regressed on six independent variables for the pre-seat belt period 1949–71. The equations were then used to predict casualties for the period 1972–77, using the actual values of the independent variables. In the aggregate, predicted occupant casualties were higher than the actual rates, whereas non-occupant casualties were underpredicted by the equations. An additional test, using a dummy variable to predict the effect of seat belts, supported these conclusions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that drivers respond to a reduction in risk by increasing driving intensity, shifting some of the welfare cost of auto safety legislation on to non-occupants, whose casualty rates are higher than they would have been in the absence of seat belt legislation.I am grateful to Chris Adam and to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions.     

The privatisation of welfare: The impact of parties on the private/public mix in pension provision

The Conservative governments of 1979–95 have encouraged private sector pension provision to the extent that it covers two‐thirds of the British workforce. It is now possible to consider moving from the universal system of state provision laid down in the Beveridge scheme to a targeted system. Indeed, it has been suggested that the basic state pension should be abolished. However, if we consider the policy initiatives of the 1980s it would not seem that Conservative policy differs markedly from the policies pursued by the Conservative Party in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, there are also some similarities with the Labour Party policy. In this sense the case of pensions would appear to support the view that Thatcherism was less radical than has been generally claimed and represents a continuation of past policy. However, if we employ models of welfare state development to analyse policy outcomes we can demonstrate how the cumulative effect of individual policies pursued by the Conservatives has led to a change in the character of the British welfare state and thus the continuities with past policy may be deceptive.     

The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers

This article investigates the connection between the apparently uncorrelated issues of tax evasion and privatisation in a political economy framework. We first consider how the political process – given a country's level of development and income distribution – will affect the efficiency of the tax system. We then discuss the impact of the efficiency of the taxation system on the outcomes of privatisation. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover, we investigate the impact of different forms of corruption both on the initial public support for privatisation, as well as on its long term political sustainability.     

The politics of action on AIDS: a case study of Uganda

This article examines the political dimensions of Uganda's progress in bringing a generalised HIV/AIDS epidemic under control. The article documents the history of the political processes involved in Uganda's battle against HIV/AIDS and analyses the complexities of presidential action and the relation between action at the level of the state and that taken within societal organisations. By the mid‐1980s, Uganda was experiencing a full‐blown epidemic, the virulence of which was connected with social dislocation and insecurity related to economic crisis and war. Political authorities faced the same challenge as other regimes experiencing the onslaught of AIDS in Africa. The epidemiological characteristics of HIV and AIDS—transmission through heterosexual activities, with a long gestation period, affecting people in the prime of their productive life—meant that action required wide‐reaching changes in sexual behaviour, and the educational activities to achieve this, as well as relatively complex systems to monitor the virus and control medical practices (blood supplies, injection practices, mitigating drug delivery). The centralist character of the Museveni regime was crucial not only to mobilising state organisations and foreign aid resources, but also to ensuring significant involvement from non‐state associations and religious authorities. The Ugandan experience demonstrates that there is a tension between the requirements for systematic action that a strong public authority can deliver and the need to disseminate information requiring a degree of democratic openness. The President was able to forge a coalition behind an HIV/AIDS campaign in part because the virus largely ignored the privileges of wealth and political power. With the development of antiretroviral therapy and the access that the wealthy can gain to these drugs, this basis for the broadest possible coalition to fight HIV/AIDS may be weakened in the future. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Privatization as a Political Priority: The British Experience

This article challenges conventional approaches to Thatcher's privatization campaign in which privatization has been judged on the basis of its economic or public policy merits. The privatization programme of the Thatcher Government was driven by political objectives and thus it was more coherent than has been usually asserted. Politicians are motivated by maximizing their political benefits (power) rather than by the pursuit of the common good, that is optimal economic and public policies. Unlike some other papers who have considered the political aspects of the Conservative privatization programme, this paper introduces a distinction between what were the Conservatives' perceptions of the political consequences of privatization and the actual effect of this programme.     

Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study

Compensation schemes in which lawyer’s fees are contingent on winning the suit are becoming increasingly popular throughout Europe. At the same time, the British rule of legal cost allocation is applicable in many European countries. As a result, it is of policy relevance how their coexistence may be harmonized. This paper uses the litigation-contest framework to analyze the consequences of three different cost-allocation regimes if a plaintiff’s attorney is compensated on a contingent fee basis. We compare the equilibrium contest effort, justice, and payoffs for affected parties in the different regimes and find arguments in favor of not reimbursing contingent fees.     

Corruption and electoral campaigns in Mexico: A case study of the federal electoral process in 2018

The article analyzes the relationship that exists between electoral campaigns and corruption, studying the case of Mexico. The most common ways and means of practicing and presenting corruption during these electoral processes are described. In addition, the circle of corruption that begins during the electoral processes and continues once in the government is described. In the same sense, the results of an opinion survey in the Metropolitan Zone of Guadalajara (ZMG) on corruption during electoral campaigns are presented. It is concluded that, many times, corruption in the government begins during the electoral stage, so it is important to articulate various strategies and legal instruments to inhibit it from the electoral stage.