Public policy and privatisation: the case of the Qatari experience

This article uses a qualitative methodology employing the elite model to describe and analyse the complex interplay of political and economic factors in the privatization experience of the state of Qatar. The article begins by providing a theoretical framework for privatisation in the context of public policy and classifying policies of privatisation into two categories: macro‐ and micro‐privatisation. The second part uses this framework to discuss the factors that gives the Qatari experience its distinguished flavour. These factors include: elite legitimacy and social culture, bureaucratic power, international pressure and patron–client networks. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Issue transfer and symbolic legislation: a case study of the Austrian Equal Treatment Act

Abstract. Three strategies which may emerge out of politicians' concepts of rationality (problems solving, agenda management, creation of consensus) are applied to one of the main features of Austrian politics, namely the differentation of policy sectors dominated either by political parties or interest groups. The Equal Treatment Act, which had been transferred from the corporatist arena to the arena of the party system, involved the rationalities of both political parties and interest groups. This paper analyses the 'extended' process of legislation of this law (including implementation). The empirical findings are then linked to the theoretical propositions about the rationalities of the respective political actors. Finally, hypotheses about the conditions of issue transfers from the corporatist arena into the arena of the party system are suggested.     

The European parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals

The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and Parliamentary committee documents, we are able to assess the significance of different amendments, as well as the degree to which they were introduced in the final decision of the Council. Our analysis indicates first that less than 30% of EP amendments are insignificant, while 15% are important or very important; second, that the probability of acceptance of an amendment is the same regardless of its significance. Further analysis indicates two sources of bias of aggregate EP statistics: several amendments are complementary (deal with the same issue in different places of the legal document), and a series of amendments that are rejected as inadmissible (because they violate the legal basis of the document or the germainess requirement) are included in subsequent pieces of legislation. We calculate the effect of these biases in our sample, and find that official statistics under estimate Parliamentary influence by more than 6 percentage points (49% instead of 56% in our sample). Finally, we compare a series of observed strategic behaviors of different actors (rapporteurs, committees, floor, Commission) to different expectations generated by the literature.     

The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals

Abstract The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and Parliamentary committee documents, we are able to assess the significance of different amendments, as well as the degree to which they were introduced in the final decision of the Council. Our analysis indicates first that less than 30% of EP amendments are insignificant, while 15% are important or very important; second, that the probability of acceptance of an amendment is the same regardless of its significance. Further analysis indicates two sources of bias of aggregate EP statistics: several amendments are complementary (deal with the same issue in different places of the legal document), and a series of amendments that are rejected as inadmissible (because they violate the legal basis of the document or the germainess requirement) are included in subsequent pieces of legislation. We calculate the effect of these biases in our sample, and find that official statistics under estimate Parliamentary influence by more than 6 percentage points (49% instead of 56% in our sample). Finally, we compare a series of observed strategic behaviors of different actors (rapporteurs, committees, floor, Commission) to different expectations generated by the literature.     

Reframing privatisation: Deconstructing the myth of efficiency

In the context of ongoing scandals about public versus private ownership, we review the rise and fall of British nationalised industries, and the subsequent rise of privatisation based on perception of market-based efficiency as a means of improving public service. We evaluate the theoretical and empirical arguments around privatisation and find that the argument of privatisation as a vehicle for efficiency gains is a myth. Instead, we suggest that efficiency is not solely a matter of ownership, but requires a complex interplay of social and commercial variables to make it possible. We call for a more inventive and flexible approach in the search for efficiency in the public sector.     

Evaluation of automobile safety regulations: The case of compulsory seat belt legislation in Australia

A basic tenet of the new conservatism in political economy is that government policies frequently lead to unintended consequences which may offset the benefits of the policy. Auto safety legislation may be a case in point. As the first country to make the wearing of seat belts compulsory, Australia is highly suitable as a case study. Traffic accident casualties were regressed on six independent variables for the pre-seat belt period 1949–71. The equations were then used to predict casualties for the period 1972–77, using the actual values of the independent variables. In the aggregate, predicted occupant casualties were higher than the actual rates, whereas non-occupant casualties were underpredicted by the equations. An additional test, using a dummy variable to predict the effect of seat belts, supported these conclusions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that drivers respond to a reduction in risk by increasing driving intensity, shifting some of the welfare cost of auto safety legislation on to non-occupants, whose casualty rates are higher than they would have been in the absence of seat belt legislation.I am grateful to Chris Adam and to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions.     

The privatisation of welfare: The impact of parties on the private/public mix in pension provision

The Conservative governments of 1979–95 have encouraged private sector pension provision to the extent that it covers two‐thirds of the British workforce. It is now possible to consider moving from the universal system of state provision laid down in the Beveridge scheme to a targeted system. Indeed, it has been suggested that the basic state pension should be abolished. However, if we consider the policy initiatives of the 1980s it would not seem that Conservative policy differs markedly from the policies pursued by the Conservative Party in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, there are also some similarities with the Labour Party policy. In this sense the case of pensions would appear to support the view that Thatcherism was less radical than has been generally claimed and represents a continuation of past policy. However, if we employ models of welfare state development to analyse policy outcomes we can demonstrate how the cumulative effect of individual policies pursued by the Conservatives has led to a change in the character of the British welfare state and thus the continuities with past policy may be deceptive.     

The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers

This article investigates the connection between the apparently uncorrelated issues of tax evasion and privatisation in a political economy framework. We first consider how the political process – given a country's level of development and income distribution – will affect the efficiency of the tax system. We then discuss the impact of the efficiency of the taxation system on the outcomes of privatisation. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover, we investigate the impact of different forms of corruption both on the initial public support for privatisation, as well as on its long term political sustainability.     

Privatization as a Political Priority: The British Experience

This article challenges conventional approaches to Thatcher's privatization campaign in which privatization has been judged on the basis of its economic or public policy merits. The privatization programme of the Thatcher Government was driven by political objectives and thus it was more coherent than has been usually asserted. Politicians are motivated by maximizing their political benefits (power) rather than by the pursuit of the common good, that is optimal economic and public policies. Unlike some other papers who have considered the political aspects of the Conservative privatization programme, this paper introduces a distinction between what were the Conservatives' perceptions of the political consequences of privatization and the actual effect of this programme.     

Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study

Compensation schemes in which lawyer’s fees are contingent on winning the suit are becoming increasingly popular throughout Europe. At the same time, the British rule of legal cost allocation is applicable in many European countries. As a result, it is of policy relevance how their coexistence may be harmonized. This paper uses the litigation-contest framework to analyze the consequences of three different cost-allocation regimes if a plaintiff’s attorney is compensated on a contingent fee basis. We compare the equilibrium contest effort, justice, and payoffs for affected parties in the different regimes and find arguments in favor of not reimbursing contingent fees.     

Internal markets in the public sector: the case of the British National Health Service

This article discusses the application of internal markets to the publicly financed British National Health Service (NHS). The objective of internal markets is to obtain, through the stimulus of competition, greater efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness to consumer needs than would be obtained through continued direct government provision. There have been real advances in the NHS attributable to the internal market, not the least of which is a growth of debate, dynamism, experimentation, and entrepreneurial attitudes that contrasts sharply with the glacial pace of change prior to 1990. However, there is also a sense in which the reforms have, thus far, failed to achieve all their promoters hoped for. It is far from clear that efficiency gains exceed the high transaction costs associated with the reform. Competition remains restricted, information is inadequate, and the regulatory and legal framework is flawed. Lack of transparency and a clear publicly stated ‘end vision’ of the reform process, together with a refusal to evaluate it systematically, have heightened already intense controversy. This has blurred the fact that the internal market is not a panacea and cannot alone be expected to solve the problems of a health service where demand is accelerating faster than the resources available through taxation. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)     

Competition in the weapons acquisition process: The case of U.S. warplanes

Consistent with the recent national trend to dismantle or limit the scope of regulatory agencies and controls, the military services are taking increasing advantage of competition to secure low, realistic prices and costs, as well as improved performance and reliability, for weapons and replacement parts. Using the purchase of combat aircraft and related systems as examples, this article assesses the effects of market structure on competition. Although competition can be effective, the unusual incentives flowing from interservice rivalry and the parochial interests of individual legislators often allow contractors to underbid or “buy in” on early development and production contracts and to “get well” on later contracts. Expanding the role of competition within the present institutional framework holds the potential for some improvement in the procurement process. More fundamental change is necessary to alter the role of Congress and eliminate the influence of undesirable rivalry among the services.     

Voting on Europe: The Potential Pitfalls of a British Referendum

As Britain prepares for a possible referendum on continued membership of the European Union, it is essential that more careful thought is paid to the dynamics of referendums. Polling data reveal the existence of a substantial knowledge deficit in the UK and other parts of the EU: large numbers of voters simply do not understand the EU. There is also reason to question the conventional view that voters can correct for such a deficit by using cues from opinion leaders and the media. The experience of recent referendums in other EU member states suggests that many voters will take part in the proposed British referendum without independent and informed knowledge of the issues at stake, that many will have been swayed by partisan elite opinion, and that many will decide on the basis of their views about domestic politics rather than their views about Europe.     

Fascism: The Ideology of the British National Party

The revival in interest in the British far right as a result of recent localised growth in support for the British National Party (BNP) necessitates analysis of its political ideology and objectives. This article seeks to demonstrate that the BNP is virulently hostile to liberal democracy and that this hostility derives from its revolutionary, fascist agenda. The point that the BNP is a fascist organisation is significant and cannot be ignored. At the very least, it raises important questions about the place of the BNP in contemporary British politics     

Intelligence studies: The emergence of the British school

Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds.), Intelligence and International Relations 1900–1945 (Exeter: University of Exeter Publications, 1987), pp.320; £10.00 (paperback).     

The political economy of sugar legislation

The findings of this paper are a rather straightforward account of the political economy of senatorial voting on the sugar program. In the spirit of Stigler and Peltzman's accounts of interest group activity, voting on sugar is indeed related to the concentration of economic interests in the Senators' states. States with high concentrations of sugar growers and processing tend to vote for the program, those with high concentration of users tend to vote against it. The emergence of corn syrup as a sugar substitute and its subsequent interests in the program further supports this perspective. These concentrated interests are associated with conditions ripe for overcoming the collective action problem and, we infer, use their organizations to influence senatorial behavior. The political variables suggest countervailing forces which can be interpreted, at least in part, as further examples of organized (here, politically organized) influences on the interests of Senators. Thus, while the model is one of opposing interests, those of producers and users tend to influence different Senators. The major group-interest trade-off, then, is between the pull of organized interests in the constituency with that of party organization at the national (or national institutional level), at least for those for whom the pull is in opposite directions.It is clear, then, that variables representing (concentrated) consumer interests as well as variables representing grower and processor interests as well as variables representing grower and processor interests are significant in determining voting patterns on sugar legislation in the Senate. This model, therefore, is not one in which one-sided organizational interests operate politically uncontested. That, even so, consumer interests are not powerful enough to prevent sugar programs from passing is clear at one level, due to the existence of the program over most of this period. The existing level of the transfers from consumers to producers and of deadweight losses must be reflective of the magnitude of their respective free rider problems. Yet voting on the program to renew or alter those benefits at any level clearly reflects these interests and their interplay.     

British Pharmaceuticals: a cautionary tale

British pharmaccuticals is generally represented as a successful sector which illustrates the potential of knowledge-intensive, high-valve-added activities. This article presents a revisionist account based on evidence and argument. Pharmaceuticals is a small sector which combines high-value-added and average wages to benefit capital not labour. The knowledge base in the laboratory creates imitative product with marketing then applied to capture social expenditure. When product-market growth slows, the sector restructures defensively without solving its problems.