地方政府创新与政府体制改革

文章分析了地方政府创新的客观空间和动力,探讨了它在坚持与推广方面存在的问题、原因及对策,论述了地方政府创新与政府体制改革之间的关系。     

Explaining the electoral effects of public investments: The case of the expansion of the underground in Madrid, 1995–2007

According to the literature, governments have strong incentives to use the public budget tactically in order to either obtain the electoral support of new voters or strengthen the loyalty of their traditional supporters. Yet vote‐seeking strategies only become rational when voters follow their self‐interest and reward governments when their constituency benefits from public transfers. The literature has focused on the governments' incentives, largely ignoring the importance of knowing whether the electorate is responsive to public investments. This study tests empirically whether incumbents strategically use public investments to gather more electoral support; and whether voters take these investments into account at the polls. These two questions are pursued simultaneously by using as a case study the expansion of the underground network in Madrid, Spain. Only a little evidence is found to support the idea that regional governments constructed new metro stations in neighbourhoods where they had more to gain electorally. Also, the inauguration timing strictly followed the electoral cycle, something that indicates a strategic calculus on the part of the incumbent. However, the models are also consistent with the idea that the government's investments were primarily driven by motives of efficiency. Indeed, although governments are tempted to follow vote‐seeking strategies, they are also aware that they cannot deviate too much from an efficiency‐based allocation of public resources. From the perspective of the voters, robust evidence has been found to show that regional voters rewarded this policy at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods that received new metro stations voted in higher numbers for the incumbent than those quarters without new investments. All in all, these findings may have some implications for normative democratic theory.     

The role of institutional and governance factors in public–private partnerships infrastructure investments in emerging economies

The overall development and sustained growth of any economy depend heavily on its infrastructure provisioning. Emerging economies are usually characterised by constrained public investments in infrastructure. Budgetary constraints of the governments are one of the major hurdles to these investments. Due to these reasons that governments of emerging economies continuously seek collaborations with the private sector for additional sources of funding infrastructure. Economies with solid institutional and governance frameworks are known to provide a conducive environment for enhanced private sector attraction in the sector. However, emerging economies face greater institutional and governance issues than developed economies, and they sometimes fall short of luring private investments in the infrastructure sector. The objective of this study is to empirically evaluate the role of institutional and governance aspects in private sector attraction in emerging economies. This study provides empirical evidence with a sample of 114 emerging economies over a period of 20 years. Various econometric estimates were developed to explore the interplay between public-private partnership investments and governance factors. The results of the study provide an evidence of a positive association between these factors and private investments in public-private partnership arrangements.     

The Canada Pension Plan's experience with investing its portfolio in equities

For the past few years, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) has been investing some of its assets in equities. Without changes, an imbalance between revenues and outlays would exhaust the CPP reserve fund by 2015. Creating an entity that was independent of government was one of several changes the federal and provincial governments enacted to achieve fuller funding. The governments created an independent Investment Board (the CPP Investment Board, or "CPPIB") to oversee the new investments. Because the plan already owned a large government bond portfolio, the CPPIB decided to invest new CPP funds in broad equity indices in March 1999. In 2000, the CPPIB began actively investing a portion of the CPP funds. Key features of that policy and some observations about its implementation include the following: In addition to investing CPP revenues in equities, reform also included contribution rate increases, benefit reductions, and a financing stabilizer. The new investment policy accounted for 25 percent of the total effect of all the reforms. It is premature to know if the investments will achieve their long-term performance objective. The new equity investments are projected by the Chief Actuary, in his most recent Actuarial Report, to earn a 4.5 percent real rate of return on Canadian equity and 5.0 percent real return on foreign equity for a blended real return of 4.65 percent based on an equity mix of 70 percent Canadian and 30 percent non-Canadian. However, it is too early to tell if the equity investments will achieve that goal over the long run. The Investment Board's mandate is to maximize returns. The Investment Board, which oversees the CPP's new investments, has broad discretion to pursue maximum returns on its assets without incurring undue risk of loss while keeping in mind the financial obligations and other assets of the CPP. Furthermore, it has developed into a professional investment organization staffed with private-sector experts in finance and investment. The board is designed to be independent of government. The federal and provincial governments designed the board to operate at arm's length from themselves. The process for selecting directors includes public- and private-sector participation, and the board is in compliance with several sets of governance guidelines for corporations. CPPIB management, with the support of its board of directors, has decided to implement a virtual corporation model involving a small team of senior executives setting strategies for implementation primarily by external professional firms. Consequently, as a virtual corporation, the board currently relies on external fund managers to make investments and vote proxies. Several measures are designed to ensure accountability to the public. The investment legislation subjects the board to overlapping layers of oversight to ensure accountability to the public. The features of this oversight include public meetings in each province as well as quarterly statements and annual reports to Parliament, the federal and provincial finance ministers, and the public. The 10 finance ministers review the CPPIB's mandate and regulations every 3 years, and the CPPIB is subject to a special examination every 6 years by an auditor appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance.     

State Infrastructure Banks and Intergovernmental Subsidies for Local Transportation Investment

This study reviews State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs) as an innovative financing mechanism for federal and state governments to support transportation financing for local governments, and determines the cost savings realized by local governments from receiving SIB loans rather than financing through the municipal bond market. The study finds that SIBs provide a mechanism through which local governments receive subsidized loans for their transportation investments. With the Ohio SIB, localities realized average borrowing cost savings between 34 and 184 basis points. Under the worst‐ and best‐case scenarios, 83 and 98 percent of projects, respectively, benefited from lower borrowing costs.     

公共利益与政府职能

公共利益是一个特定社会群体存在和发展所必需的,该社会群体中不确定的个人都可以享有的社会价值。从公共利益视角考察政府职能,包括两方面内容:一方面,政府应该以实现公共利益为己任,通过公共利益可以界定政府公共职能的基本内容;另一方面,从公共利益的实现机制来看,政府不是公益物品的唯一提供者,它应该在公共利益的实现机制中承担“掌舵”的角色。为了更好地发挥政府在实现公共利益过程中的作用,西方政府正在积极推行新公共管理运动。我国政府也在经历深刻的治理变革,具体内容体现在民主化改革、市场化改革和政府自身改革等三个方面。     

Building sustainable professional capacity in African public sectors: retention constraints in Kenya

Significant investments are being made by aid agencies to increase Master's-level training of African professionals serving in the public sector. Yet no case studies present detailed data or analysis of past efforts to build sustainable human capacity in governmental institutions. The article reviews career and retention data on 169 economists, planners, and statisticians trained under funding provided by 6 long-term aid projects for targeted posts in Kenyan ministries. After reviewing retention constraints revealed by this data and other evidence, it offers recommendations that might assist governments and aid agencies to design and implement capacity building initiatives with a higher probability of ensuring that returned graduates serve for adequate periods of time in the positions for which they were trained. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. Vol. 17 , 307–324 (1997). No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 1. No. of Refs: 31.     

Use of Capital Budgeting Techniques and an Analytic Approach to Capital Investment Decisions in Canadian Municipal Governments

Capital budgeting techniques are useful tools to municipal administrators in managing organizational resources. A survey of capital budgeting practices of Canadian municipal governments reveals that a minority used capital budgeting techniques; payback period dominates over discounted cash flow analysis in evaluating capital investments; and pitfalls are common in its application. More specifically, there is an emphasis of quantitative/financial items over qualitative/intangible factors. In this study, the analytic hierarchy process, a multi-attribute decision model that accounts for both tangibles and intangibles, is presented as a tool for capital budgeting decisions such that resource allocation becomes more effective in municipal governments.     

Non‐Governmental Monitoring of Local Governments Increases Compliance with Central Mandates: A National‐Scale Field Experiment in China

Central governments face compliance problems when they rely on local governments to implement policy. In authoritarian political systems, these challenges are pronounced because local governments do not face citizens at the polls. In a national‐scale, randomized field experiment in China, we test whether a public, non‐governmental rating of municipal governments' compliance with central mandates to disclose information about the management of pollution increased compliance. We find significant and positive treatment effects on compliance after only one year that persist with reinforcement into a second post‐treatment year. The public rating appears to decrease the costs of monitoring compliance for the central government without increasing public and media attention to pollution, highlighting when this mode of governance is likely to emerge. These results reveal important roles that nonstate actors can play in enhancing the accountability of local governments in authoritarian political systems.     

全球化背景下的地方政府竞争——提高政府核心竞争力的战略选择

市场经济的发展,使处于平等地位的政府主体为获取更多的资源、政治影响力和控制权而处在相互争取和竞争的状态。而目前处在全球化背景下政府竞争的发展态势,正从单纯的国内竞争向国际国内全方位竞争演变,从有形的资金、人才和资源的竞争向无形的制度、服务和管理水平的竞争演变,从不规范竞争向规范竞争演变。为避免政府的过度竞争及其消极影响,各级政府必须进一步明确角色特征,调整行为取向,切实维护公民权利,创造竞争机会;营造公平竞争环境,维护竞争规则;调整经济发展战略,制定适宜的社会政策,调节竞争结果;进一步在政府自身建设中,引入竞争机制,提高政府效能和政府竞争力。     

Fiscal Federalism, European Stability Pact, and Municipal Investment Finance: A Microdata Analysis of Spanish Municipalities

In countries where subnational governments control a large partof the public finances, the central government's ability tokeep its commitment to the European Union's Stability and GrowthPact can be a difficult matter. European rules demand that theoverall budget be balanced over the medium term; applying thisrule at subcentral level may unduly reduce capital outlays andlocal budgetary autonomy. This article examines the possibleimpact of budgetary stability legislation on the capital expenditureof Spanish municipalities. The empirical findings suggest thatthe new budgetary stability framework will oblige municipalitiesto (i) limit their investments, (ii) raise the tax burden, or(iii) reduce the funds allocated to other budget items. We believethe Spanish municipal experience is generalizable to other federalcountries in Europe that are facing hard budget constraintsand high earmarked grants.     

Managing contract performance: A transaction costs approach

Managing contracts is a complex process, often exacerbated by high transaction costs inherent in negotiating, implementing, and monitoring contract relationships with vendors. Through analyses of data from a 1997 International City/County Management Association survey of municipal and county governments, the way in which municipal and county governments respond to transaction cost factors inherent in contract service delivery is examined. The results of the analyses demonstrate that when governments contract for services in contexts that risk contract failure, they engage in a variety of monitoring techniques to improve their ability to monitor and correct vendor performance. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Discerning Immunity for Governmental Entities: Analyzing Legislative Choices

In 2006, three disagreements about the scope of immunity for governmental entities were considered by the U.S. Supreme Court. Governmental entities were seeking to avoid liability for their actions, claiming the defense of sovereign immunity. Other lawsuits involving governmental immunity under state constitutional and statutory provisions disclose controversies concerning the responsibilities of governments to injured persons. The complicated jurisprudence governing immunity for governmental entities shows two alternatives for legislatures. They have the ability to increase liability by waiving immunity or to add defenses that defeat liability. The trend seems to be to waive immunity for governmental entities while adding statutory defenses that are available to both the private sector and governmental entities.     

Lockbox Government: Segregated Funding Strategies and the Decline of Governmental Flexibility

Proponents of "reinvention" assert that it will produce governments that are more agile, better able to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, and able to produce public services at much lower cost. However, attempts to make government "work better and cost less" have had limited success. Policy-makers have consequently invested their creative energy in another class of institutional innovations: segregated funding strategies, which protect agencies and programs from the impact of fiscal restraint by excluding them from normal budgeting processes. The proliferation of budget "lockboxes" may actually introduce new rigidities into the public sector and erode democratic influence in policy-making. On the other hand, there may be some circumstances in which these devices can be justified as a method of ensuring that critical long-run interests receive appropriate attention.     

Terrorist threats in Europe: hype or reality?

On 3 October, the American and British governments issued travel advisories on the threat of terrorist attacks in France and Germany. The United States government characterised the threat as ‘high’, while the United Kingdom raised the terrorist threat level for France and Germany from ‘general’ to ‘high’. Shortly afterwards, the French government issued a warning to its citizens about the risk of a terrorist attack in Britain. Within the UK itself, the threat level in respect of Islamist jihadist terrorism has been set since January 2010 at ‘severe’, the second highest level, indicating an attack is likely but not yet judged imminent. This has remained unchanged.     

National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union

This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game-theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more likely to express dissent. However, when they do express dissent, they vote ‘No’ more often. Parliamentary control depends on the presence of formal oversight institutions as well as the motivation of parliamentarians to hold their governments accountable. Empirical support is found in an analysis of votes on 1,387 legislative proposals that represent more than a decade of Council decision making in the period 2004–2014. This article contributes to the discussion on the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs, and clearly distinguishes the different forms of dissent in Council decision making.     

From Gerontocracy to Gerontonomia: The Politics of Economic Stagnation in Ageing Democracies

One in five people in the EU and nearly one in ten in the world are now aged 65 and over. This demographic transformation is one of the great successes of the twentieth century and has profoundly altered the composition of electorates in many democracies. This article explores whether and how this population ageing reshapes the relationship between democracy and capitalism. I argue that ageing changes the economic and policy priorities of a growing share of democracies’ electorates in ways that incentivise elected governments to prioritise certain social policies and economic outcomes, such as pensions and low inflation, at the expense of others, most notably greater social investments and pursuing economic growth. As a result, gerontocracies increasingly lead to what I call a ‘gerontonomia’ characterised by democratically sustained economic stagnation.     

Environmental Protection Versus Economic Development: A False Trade‐Off?

Is a trade‐off between the social benefits of regulation and the economic benefits of development inevitable? We argue that environmental regulation may deter economic growth in some contexts, however, in other contexts the benefits of regulation may be obtained with little or no economic loss. We develop an explanation of the economic impacts of state environmental policy based on a model of public influence on private resource allocation decisions. In this model, we assume utility‐maximizing firms will make investment choices based upon the projected profits on their investments and their willingness to accept the risk associated with the investments. We assert that state policies and administrative institutions influence perceptions of risk by increasing or decreasing uncertainty over future environmental policy and influence return on investments at particular locations by affecting firm‐level production costs. Our results confirm that certain administrative arrangements for environmental regulation may enhance, rather than impede, economic development.     

Government termination in multilevel settings. How party congruence affects the survival of sub-national governments in Germany and Spain

ABSTRACT

Past studies on government survival in parliamentary democracies have been limited to national governments. However, most societies live in a multilevel polity where different policies are decided at distinct governmental layers. So far, the conditions triggering sub-national governments’ termination have remained unexplored. Our paper makes a twofold contribution to the literature. First, we explicitly focus our analysis on the sub-national government level. Second, we expand the analytical scope by assuming a multilevel setting, in which the survival of sub-national governments is dependent on both the party composition of the national government (vertical congruence) and their sub-national peers (horizontal congruence). We test the impact of both congruence measures on the early termination risk of regional governments. Our analysis is complemented by including “traditional” factors from national government termination literature, such as structural attributes of governments and their bargaining environment, into empirical modelling. Analysing a novel dataset on 494 regional governments in Germany and Spain we find that the risk of sub-national government termination is related to varying levels of vertical congruence. Furthermore, we find interesting explanatory variation between the two countries with regard to the effect size of economic performance, regional authority and congruence.