Indian Health Service; contract health services--PHS. Final rule

This is a final rule clarifying the regulations governing receipt of contract health services from the Indian Health Service (IHS). Under this rule, IHS is specifically designated as payor of last resort for persons defined as eligible for IHS contract health services notwithstanding any State or local law to the contrary.     

Absolute liability in contract

Kingship, Law and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V. Edward Powell. Oxford. 1989. Clarendon Press, xii + 319 pp. (incl. index). £35.00 cased.

Sir Henry Maine: A Study of Victorian Jurisprudence. R.C.J. Cocks. Cambridge. 1988. Cambridge University Press, viii + 224 pp. (incl. index). £25/$49.50 cased.

The Birth of the English Common Law (2nd ed). R. C. Van Caenegem. Cambridge. 1988. Cambridge University Press, xviii + 160 pp. (incl. index). £27.50/ $39.50 cased, £9.50/$13.95 limp.

Inventing the Industrial Revolution. The English Patent System 1660–1800. Christine Macleod. Cambridge. 1988. Cambridge University Press, xii + 302 pp. £25 cased.

The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany. D.P. KOMMERS. Duke University Press. 1990. xxxvi + 590 pp. (incl. index). £29.25 paperback.

Sokrates. Johannes Irmscher. (3rd ed.) Leipzig. 1989. Verlag Phillip Reclam jr. 120 pp. (inch index).

The Welsh Laws. T.M. Charles‐Edwards. Cardiff. 1990. The University of Wales Press for the Welsh Arts Council. 106pp. £3.50 limp.     

The contract theory of patents

Two distinct theories of patents, the “reward theory” and the “contract theory,” are customarily adopted by the courts to justify the patent system. The reward theory maintains that the function of the patent system is to remunerate successful innovators so as to encourage R&D effort. In contrast, the contract theory holds that the function of the patent system is to promote the diffusion of innovative knowledge. Assuming that in the absence of patent protection innovators would rely on trade secrecy, it views patents as a contract between innovators and society whereby a property right is granted in exchange for disclosure.This paper develops an economic analysis of the contract theory of patents. To disentangle the disclosure from the reward motive for granting patents, we assume that the innovation process is entirely serendipitous, so that R&D effort is not a concern. Our main finding is that the disclosure motive alone suffices to justify the grant of patents. The optimal patent duration should strike a balance between the incentive to induce disclosure and the aim of limiting the monopoly distortion induced by patents.     

一起船舶保险合同纠纷案

保险合同中保险人的责任限制、免责权利等条款的告知,以保险单背面的书面告知为限;保险人保险赔付前,没有权利和义务参加船舶碰撞纠纷案的诉讼;碰撞损失数额的确定,依具体案情而定。     

The risks of contract law

The economic analysis of law may be able to provide some reason why it is efficient to enforce wholly executory contracts, but (I submit) it has not done so.