‘Democratic Socialism’ and the Concept of (Post)Capitalism

This article explores the ‘democratic socialism’ being proposed by new left movements on either side of the Atlantic, and evaluates its claim to be a form of anti- or postcapitalism. It argues that in the democratic socialist worldview, the line between capitalism and socialism rests on the balance of power between workers and capitalists in the economic sphere. While traditional social democracy seeks to redistribute wealth but leaves relations between workers and capitalists within firms untouched, democratic socialism seeks to abolish private property in the economic sphere. Production is controlled democratically by the workers themselves, in league with a workers’ state. The article critically appraises the claim that such a scenario constitutes a form of postcapitalism. Drawing on the work of critical Marxists such as Moishe Postone, it argues that capitalism is not primarily defined by private property relations in the economic sphere, but rather the peculiar social form of capitalist labour. Unlike in pre-capitalist societies, for labour in capitalism to secure a continued basis on which to reproduce the means of subsistence, it must be socially validated as ‘value-producing’. The criteria for value validation is not set in the workplace, or within a single nation state, but rather on the world market. The article concludes that, for all its merits, the democratisation of workplaces does not overcome the need for this social validation, but rather constitutes an alternative form of managing the process of production in this context. As such, democratic socialism, like social democracy, remains susceptible to the same imperatives and crises as other forms of capitalist production, and so cannot be said to constitute a form of ‘postcapitalism’.     

What comes first,democracy or human rights?

Minimalists about human rights hold that a state can have political legitimacy if it protects a basic list of rights and democratic rights do not have to be on that list. In this paper, I consider two arguments from Benhabib against the minimalist view. The first is that a political community cannot be said to have self-determination, which minimalists take to be the value at the heart of legitimacy, without democracy. The second is that even the human rights protections minimalists take to legitimize institutions cannot be had without democracy. These rights can only be adequately interpreted and specified for any social context if the interpretations and specifications result from democratic processes. Here, I bring out some important problems with these arguments and so conclude that they do not represent a robust case for rejecting minimalism.     

Voters should not be in prison! The rights of prisoners in a democracy

In Hirst v UK, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the UK must end its blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting. In this paper I argue that the court’s reasoning undermines collective political self-determination by assuming away the essential connection between political citizenship and civil liberty in a representative democracy. I outline a democratic theory of imprisonment and argue that the democratic citizenship of imprisoned offenders is suspended not by their disenfranchisement but by their imprisonment. While many aspects of the UK’s penal practice are inconsistent with democratic self-government, the voting ban is not one of them. I conclude by outlining the numerous rights that prisoners should enjoy in a democracy.     

Post-capitalist property

When writing about property and property rights in his imagined post-capitalist society of the future, Marx seemed to envisage ‘individual property’ co-existing with ‘socialized property’ in the means of production. As the social and political consequences of faltering growth and increasing inequality, debt and insecurity gradually manifest themselves, and with automation and artificial intelligence lurking in the wings, the future of capitalism, at least in its current form, looks increasingly uncertain. With this, the question of what property and property rights might look like in the future, in a potentially post-capitalist society, is becoming ever more pertinent. Is the choice simply between private property and markets, and public (state-owned) property and planning? Or can individual and social property in the (same) means of production co-exist, as Marx suggested? This paper explores ways in which they might, through an examination of the Chinese household responsibility system (HRS) and the ‘fuzzy’ and seemingly confusing regime of land ownership that it instituted. It examines the HRS against the backdrop of Marx’s ideas about property and subsequent (post-Marx) theorizing about the legal nature of property in which property has come widely to be conceptualized not as a single, unitary ‘ownership’ right to a thing (or, indeed, as the thing itself) but as a ‘bundle of rights’. The bundle-of-rights idea of property, it suggests, enables us to see not only that ‘individual’ and ‘socialized’ property’ in the (same) means of production might indeed co-exist, but that the range of institutional possibility is far greater than that between capitalism and socialism/communism as traditionally conceived.     

The Future of Socialism and New Labour: An Appraisal

Recently, much controversy has been generated about what Tony Crosland would have made of New Labour. Critics and supporters of the Blair project alike have laid claim to Crosland's legacy. For some it is evidence of New Labour's integrity; for others it confirms the party's betrayal of social democratic values. An examination of the arguments in The Future of Socialism indicates that it is neither. In this article, I offer a new appraisal of that text that challenges the orthodox analysis of it. Most accounts present the volume as a theoretical and original statement, one seeking to align British socialism with Swedish social democracy. I argue that the volume does not offer this kind of original contribution to debates about socialism. It is neither primarily a theoretical volume nor one that breaks decisively with the insularity that has shaped the trajectory of British socialism. I maintain that the importance of Crosland's legacy is emotional and symbolic: it offers Labour a charismatic and reassuring image of the party's past.     

Civil Rights and Political Human Rights: Contesting Human Rights Failures within the Minimally Democratic State

Allen Buchanan argues that democracy ought to be added to the list of basic human rights, but he limits the conception of democracy to a minimum of electoral representation within the nation state, effectively collapsing human rights into civil rights. This, however, leaves him unable to address the problem of human rights failures occurring within established states that meet his standard of minimal democratic representation. In order to address this problem, I appeal to James Bohman's conception of the political human rights of all members of humanity, as opposed to the civil rights of the citizens of particular states. I argue that while this provides the basis on which to address the problem of human rights failures within minimally democratic states, Bohman's conception also entails the potential for deep tensions to arise between the different claims of civil and human rights.     

A Socialist State of Grace: The Radical Reformism of Jean Jaurès*

Jean Jaurès (1859–1914) forged an innovative theory of radical reform by adopting a universalistic conception of human rights from the liberal tradition and a theory of capitalism and class from Marxism. He urged the labor movement to place less emphasis on the hope of a post-revolutionary “paradise” and instead to “live always in a socialist state of grace,” understanding socialism as a regulative ideal guiding a reformist practice. This liberal socialist politics could only take shape, he suggested, to the extent that liberal norms intersected with the self-interest of existing social movements: Jaurès's socialism, thus, is highly contingent, and makes no promises about political success. Jaurès prompts us to shift the focus of left democratic theory from the polity to the social movement, from “radical democracy” to “radical reform.”     

The Ethics of Immigration

This review essay examines recent work in political theory on the ethics of immigration admissions. It considers arguments put forward by Michael Walzer, Peter Meilaender and David Miller, among others, for state control of borders. Such arguments tend to appeal to the value of political communities and/or the exclusion rights of democratic associations, and I argue that neither of these are successful. Turning to work by Joseph Carens, Phillip Cole, Michael Dummett and others who advocate open or much more open borders, the article considers various arguments that would support this stance, including appeals to freedom of movement, utilitarianism and social justice. I argue that rights to immigration need embedding in global principles of resource redistribution. In the conclusion I sketch a cosmopolitan approach to immigration by which impartial criteria such as population density and gross domestic product would determine how many migrants states have a duty to admit.     

Human Rights Without Political Participation?

John Rawls claims that “benevolent absolutisms” honor human rights without honoring political participation rights. Critics argue that he is mistaken. One objection appeals to the instrumental value of political participation rights. This objection holds that without political participation rights, individuals cannot secure the content of their rights against encroachment. Given this, individuals without political participation rights cannot be said to have rights at all. Here, I evaluate this instrumental objection. I identify three ways of relating political participation rights to human rights and show that one makes sense of Rawls’s claim. I then defend this view from instrumental objections. This has implications beyond the realm of Rawls scholarship. Many societies are not democratic and are not democratizing. We must determine whether any of these societies can secure at least the content of human rights and, if so, what shape their social and political institutions must take to do so.     

Laski on Rights and the Problem of Liberal Democratic Theory

From 1919 until the mid-1920s Laski developed a cogent egalitarian theory of democratic rights. In the 1930s he turned his attention to the conflict between such rights and the capitalist property rights of liberal theory. His defence of democratic rights is significant in the context of contemporary discussions of rights, autonomy and democracy.     

Labor, Democracy, Utility, and Mill's Critique of Private Property

Scholars have long debated whether John Stuart Mill became a socialist, as he claimed in his Autobiography . This article strengthens the case that he did, ironically, by examining Mill's longstanding adherence to a labor-based justification for private property in means of production. Even while he developed sharp criticisms of capitalist property relations based on democratic principles of individuality and freedom, Mill held on to this labor justification, which partly offset his growing socialist sympathies. But relatively late in life, Mill reconsidered and discarded the labor justification and began to argue for a more explicit utilitarian analysis of the relevant questions, thus bolstering the importance of his democratic critiques of the system of private property. A recognition of the slow gestation of Mill's views on the labor justification enriches our understanding of his thought on socialism versus capitalism and provides an insight into how he applied utilitarianism in a practical context.     

Why states have no right to privacy,but may be entitled to secrecy: a non-consequentialist defense of state secrecy

ABSTRACT

Despite an increase in initiatives aimed at enhancing political transparency, democratic states claim the right to withhold information from citizens: classified intelligence and military programs, diplomatic discretion, closed-door political bargaining, and bureaucratic opacity are examples. Can the state’s claim to restrict access to information be justified? In the first part of the essay, I focus on the arguments that defend the state’s claim to restrict access in terms of the state’s right to privacy where the state privacy is presented as a species of group privacy. While I concede that group privacy may be defended, I argue that governments and parliaments are not the kind of groups that may exercise privacy against citizens because of the relation of accountability in which they stand to citizens. In the second part of the essay, I propose an alternative argument to the effect that the scope of openness required in democratic governance is less extensive than traditionally assumed. I focus on the concept of democratic authority and argue that we can understand the practices of classification as an exercise of a special right to secrecy that is implied in the democratic state’s right to rule in a content-independent way.     

Democracy and noncitizen voting rights

The boundaries of democracy are typically defined by the boundaries of formal status citizenship. Such state-centered theories of democracy leave many migrants without a voice in political decision-making in the areas where they live and work, giving rise to a problem of democratic legitimacy. Drawing on two democratic principles of inclusion, the all affected interests and coercion principles, this article elaborates this problem and examines two responses offered by scholars of citizenship for what receiving states might do. The first approach involves expanding the circle of citizenship to include resident noncitizens. A second approach involves disaggregating the rights conventionally associated with citizenship from the legal status of citizenship and extending some of those rights, including voting rights, to resident noncitizens. This article argues that both approaches fall short of satisfying the democratic principles of inclusion, which call for enfranchising individuals not only beyond the boundaries of citizenship but also beyond territorial boundaries.     

Bridging the human rights—Sovereignty divide: Theoretical foundations of a democratic sovereignty

Human rights and sovereignty are generally construed as disputatious, if not entirely incompatible; the liability of the former constrains the license of the latter. This article challenges the certitude of that notion and argues that democratic, isocratic, and humanistic elements, or what may be thought of as precursors of human rights, are actually embedded in early theories of sovereignty, including what I call Bodin’s hierarchical, Althusius’ confederative, Hobbes’ singular, and Hegel’s progressive/constitutional sovereignty. Despite the differences in governmental structure to which each attaches sovereignty, each disassociates sovereignty from its agents (who does the work of supreme authority) and aligns it to its end (the good of citizens). From them I derive eight theses to ground a democratic, human rights friendly conception of sovereignty, which aids in bridging the divide between human rights advocacy and sovereign defenders.     

Surveillance and resilience: Relationships,dynamics, and consequences

“Resilience” is a contested term with varying and ambiguous meaning in governmental, business, and social discourses. Surveillance is increasingly relied on as an instrument for resilience, enhancing the capability of anticipating, preventing, or recovering from adversity, thus preserving the fabric of society and the state. However, surveillance itself might undesirably erode social freedoms, rights, and other public goods. In the present study we focus on the interrelationship of surveillance and resilience. Studying the relationships between surveillance and resilience requires not only the theoretical study of possible examples but also the exploration and evaluation of the resilient entity’s core properties, strategies, and tactics and the external observer’s stance toward the entity in question. Furthermore, different contexts may exhibit different effects of surveillance on resilience. For example, an increase in surveillance by a democratic state may lead to increasing resilience of the state in the face of terrorist attacks but may also lead to the decreasing resilience of that society’s ability to exercise democratic values. The various models generated by these differing relationships will be explored with relation to three examples: the surveillance of international migration, the surveillance of extremist views, and the surveillance of digital financial transactions.     

Polish Democracy in Transition?

The roots of the current weaknesses in Poland's democratic process reach back not only to the era of socialism, but also to the first years of systemic reforms. The policy choices and the style of governance at such time of unprecedented revival of social activity were bound to have a long-term impact on the development of the political process, including the democratisation of society and of the political system. In the light of this, I argue that the authoritarian, exclusive and undemocratic style of politics of the first years of reforms squandered social trust and undermined the potential which this democratic revival represented, and that it damaged the prospects for building sound democratic foundations for the Polish political order in the nearer future.     

The right to exclude

Many contemporary theories of immigration begin with the idea that we obtain the right to exclude, because there are some goods that can be produced only within bounded societies. I believe these views to be mistaken, both ethically and empirically. More plausible accounts of the right to exclude begin with the idea that individuals have rights, in virtue of their moral rights of association or of property, to avoid admitting foreigners into their societies. I believe these accounts have to be amended to make reference to the juridical nature of the modern state. My own view is that the right to exclude is grounded in the right to avoid becoming the agent charged with the defense of another’s human rights – unless there is some independent moral reason one ought to become so charged. This account is able to ground the right to exclude, but does not justify the ways in which modern states employ that putative right.     

Voting and Human Rights in Democratic Societies

The majority of research on human rights focuses on the consequences of regime-type for human rights violations, and overwhelming evidence suggests that democracies are less likely to violate human rights of their citizens as compared to non-democracies. However, a regime-type perspective is unable to account for disparities in human rights violations within democratic and non-democratic regimes. This paper disaggregates regime-type and analyzes the relationship between citizens’ participation and human rights violations. I argue that a participative citizenry, as captured by high voter turnout, is indicative of an active and vigilant populace who are more likely to hold governments accountable and ensure better human rights protections. The paper tests the relationship between human rights and voter turnout among 89 democratic countries from 1976 to 2008. The findings demonstrate that a participative citizenry enhances governmental respect for human rights.     

Defending a cosmopolitanism without illusions. Reply to my critics

This essay engages with several critiques of my project a ‘cosmopolitanism without illusions.’ Who is the subject of rights? What are the objects of rights? Is there a distinction between human and moral rights? Furthermore, what is prior in this cosmopolitan account: democracy or human rights? Do democratic iterations exhaust the meaning of principles of rights? Finally, does the ‘scarf affair’ really signify the return of ‘political theology’ or have not such disputes always accompanied secularization and modernity? I argue that moral rights comprise more than human rights and that non-human beings such as animals can have moral rights claims against us. Democratic iterations and rights complement one another; neither is prior and that although debates about religion and secularization have been endemic to modernity, the return of references to Carl Schmitt’s ‘political theology’ is rather new.     

William Talbott’s Which Rights Should be Universal?

In this review essay, I first set out and then subject to criticism the main claims advanced by William Talbott in his excellent recent book, “Which Rights Should be Universal?”. Talbott offers a conception of basic universal human rights as the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy. I argue that his conception is at once too robustly liberal and democratic and too inattentive to key features of the rule of law to play this role. I suggest that John Rawls’s conception of human rights comes closer to hitting the mark Talbott sets for himself and that Talbott incorrectly rejects Rawls’s view. I conclude that what likely divides Talbott and Rawls is that Rawls, but not Talbott, explicitly frames the inquiry into the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy in terms of a liberal democratic people attempting to determine, as a matter of its just foreign policy, whether or not to recognize other organized polities as independent and self-determining within the international order.