Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

Vedāntic Analogies Expressing Oneness and Multiplicity and their Bearing on the History of the Śaiva Corpus. Part I: Pariṇāmavāda

Journal of Indian Philosophy - This article, divided into two parts, traces and discusses two pairs of analogies invoked in Sanskrit(ic) literature to articulate the paradox of God’s oneness...     

Yogic Mindfulness: Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s Quasi-Buddhistic Interpretation of Smṛti in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20

This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda āra?ya’s unique interpretation of sm?ti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdar?an (1911), I argue that his interpretation of sm?ti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of sm?ti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on sm?ti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipa??hānasutta and Buddagho?a’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, he also builds into his complex account of the practice of sm?ti certain fundamental doctrines of Sā?khyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“ī?vara”) and mental identification with the Puru?a, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of sm?ti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of sm?ti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Mi?ra and Vijñānabhik?u straightforwardly identify sm?ti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the a??ā?gayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that sm?ti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the a??ā?gayoga.     

A Śaiva Interpretation of the Satkāryavāda: The Sāṃkhya Notion of Abhivyakti and Its Transformation in the Pratyabhijñā Treatise

It is a well-known fact that the ?aiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sā?khya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sā?khya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the ?aiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, in perfect contradiction with the Sā?khya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the ī?varapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr?ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other ?aiva sources, including Somānanda’s ?ivadr???i and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sā?khya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (?akti), and that his criticism of the Sā?khya understanding of causality might target the ?aiva dualists as well as Sā?khya authors.     

Vedāntic Analogies Expressing Oneness and Multiplicity and Their Bearing on the History of the Śaiva Corpus. Part II: Vivartavāda

Journal of Indian Philosophy - This article, divided into two parts, traces and discusses two pairs of analogies invoked in Sanskrit(ic) literature to articulate the paradox of God’s oneness...     

Remarks on the Visuddhimagga,and on its treatment of the Memory of Former Dwelling(s) (pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa)

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

On the Alleged Indebtedness of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā Towards the Vedānta Kaumudī: Some Considerations on an Almost Forgotten Vivaraṇa Text (Studies in Vedānta Kaumudī I)

Dharmarāja Adhvarin’s (middle XVII cent.) Vedānta Paribhā?ā (VP) is a well-known introduction to Advaita Vedānta, targeted to beginners who are already trained in Navya Nyāya. According to Dasgupta (1942), the VP is so heavily indebted to Rāmādvaya’s Vedānta Kaumudī (VK), which was composed in the middle of the 14th century and is today almost forgotten, that the VP’s “claim to originality vanishes”. The VK was, however, only edited in 1955 and then again in 1973. In the light of this improved textual basis, what is our judgement about Dasgupta’s hypercritical statement? Did actually the VP ever claim to be original? Was this originality somehow superimposed on the VP later? Is the VP really so much indebted to the VK? This paper aims at comparatively analysing the textual background of these questions. I will start from the analysis of one Advaita’s epistemological tenet, namely the valid knowledge (pramā), in the VK and then compare it to the corresponding parts in the VP.     

The Supreme Array Scripture: A New Interpretation of the Title “Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra”

This article argues for a new interpretation of the Sanskrit compound gaṇḍa-vyūha as it is used in the common title of the Mahāyāna text the Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra.The author begins by providing a brief history of the sūtra’s appellations in Chinese and Tibetan sources. Next, the meanings of gaṇḍa (the problematic member of the compound) are explored. The author proposes that contemporary scholars have overlooked a meaning of gaṇḍa occurring in some compounds, wherein gaṇḍa can mean simply “great,” “big” or “massive.” This general sense is particularly common in the compound gaṇda-śaila (a “massive rock” or “boulder”) and is found in such texts as the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Harivaṃśa and the Harṣacarita. Following the discussion of Gaṇḍa, the author examines the term vyūha (“array”) as it is used in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra. The article concludes with the suggestion that a more appropriate translation of the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra would be “The Supreme array Scripture.”     

The Impact of Navya-Nyāya on Mādhva Vedānta: Vyāsatīrtha and the Problem of Empty Terms

Journal of Indian Philosophy - In this article, I explore the encounter of the Mādhva philosopher Vyāsatīrtha with the works of the Navya-Naiyāyika Ga?ge?a...     

Classical Sāṁkhya on the Relationship between a Word and Its Meaning

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the classical Sā?khya view on the relationship between a word and its meaning. The study embraces all the extant texts of classical Sā?khya, but it is based mainly on the Yuktidīpikā, since this commentary contains most of the fragments which are directly related to the topic of our research. The textual analysis has led me to the following conclusion. It is possible to reconstruct two different and conflicting views on the relationship between a word and its meaning from the classical Sā?khya texts. The first view, the source of which is the Yuktidīpikā, is that all words are conventional in their origin. It resembles the Nyāya-Vai?e?ika theory of the primary linguistic convention and the conventional origin of all words. The second view, which is the implication of the Sā?khya idea of the authorless Vedas we can reconstruct on the basis of the majority of the classical Sā?khya commentaries (including the Yuktidīpikā), is that the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural. This view is probably influenced by Mīmā?sā. Both of these views are hardly compatible with the Sā?khya teaching. It seems like classical Sā?khya, not having created its own detailed theory, oscillated between different conceptions.     

Nirvāṇa and Tathatā in the Early Yogācāra Texts: The Bodhisattva’s Adaptation of the Śrāvaka-Path

Indian and Chinese commentaries on the Bodhisattva-path assign to it a path of seeing analogous to that of the ?rāvaka-path. Consequently, the non- discursive insight of the bodhisattva is usually taken to be equivalent to the insight of the ?rāvaka when s/he experiences the unconditioned. Yet a matter of concern for the bodhisattva in the Prajñāpāramitā literatures and many other earlier Mahāyāna texts is that s/he should not realize the unconditioned (=nirvā?a) in the practice of the path before s/he attains Buddhahood. Because the bodhisattva has to accumulate immeasurable kalpas of merits in order to attain Buddhahood, s/he does not want to end the circle of existence by realizing the unconditioned. Ending the circle of existence would deprive her/him of the chance to attain Buddhahood. An early extant system of the Bodhisattva-path delineated in the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh), especially in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh) follows these early Mahāyāna sūtras in the treatment of the unconditioned. However, according to BoBh, the bodhisattva beginning from the first level can take rebirths at will and at the eighth level s/he enters into Suchness (tathatā) with non-discursive knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna). On the other hand, the bodhisattva has no esteem for the unconditioned and abstains from the abandonment of all defilements and the realization of nirvā?a. By comparing the Bodhisattva-path in BoBh with the ?rāvaka-path delineated especially in the ?rāvakabhūmi (SrBh) of the same YBh system this paper tests whether the insight of the bodhisattva or the insight of Suchness is endowed with properties equivalent to the transcendental status of nirvā?a or whether the insight of Suchness is a mundane insight, which still falls short of nirvā?a.     

Sharing a Single Seat: The Poetics and Politics of Male Intimacy in the Vikramāṅkakāvya

In this essay, I trace the enabling conditions for the major statement of the subversive subtext in Bilhaṇa’s Vikramāṅkadevacarita (VDC) by unpacking the operation of the work’s patent, eulogistic text. In particular, I will explore the place given to the depiction of male intimacy as a poetic substitute or simulacrum for the political alliances central to Vikramāditya’s coming to the throne, as described in the mahākāvya’s fourth through sixth sargas. My intention in focusing on the intense friendships between men is to highlight a significant rhetorical strategy of Bilhaṇa’s, which allowed the poet both to introduce and to buffer the poem’s most explicit statement of his skepticism towards royal power. It is this charged affective theme—one that occupied only a tenuous position within the regnant critical discourse of literary emotion at the time—that sets up Bilhaṇa’s most powerful and explicit denunciation of kingship. The explicit theme of royal praise and the subtext of its denunciation can thus be seen as contrapuntally related, which goes some way towards explaining how the court poet was able to successfully carry off his potentially incendiary literary project.