Bicameralism and Minority-Party Influence on Legislative Development: Evidence from House Standing Committee Votes

The ability of the minority party to influence legislation in Congress is debated. Most bills are passed with large bipartisan majorities, yet the House, where most legislation is developed, is seen as a majority-party-dominated institution. I develop a theory of House minority-party influence at the committee markup stage as a result of the Senate’s institutional rules. An original data set of congressional committee votes shows that minority-party support in House committees predicts House and Senate passage. During unified party control of the chambers, an increase in Senate majority-party seats results in lower minority-party support for the legislation in the House committee, while during divided party control of Congress, the House majority passes more extreme bills as the chambers polarize. Even in the majority-party-dominated House, the minority’s preferences are incorporated into legislation, and the Senate’s institutional rules moderate bills to a significant degree.     

The Calculus of Cosponsorship in the U.S. Senate

We investigated why a legislator would be willing to vote “yea” on final passage of a bill but would choose not to cosponsor that bill. We tested a series of hypotheses regarding the cosponsorship decisions of individual senators, using a dataset that includes every major initiative that was introduced and received a floor vote in the Senate between 1975 and 2000. We found that senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when their preferences diverge from the Senate median but are closer to those of the bill's sponsor. Also, senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when they sponsor a higher number of bills overall, when they become more connected with colleagues, and when their constituents increase demand for legislation within particular policy areas. Senators are less likely to cosponsor bills if they received a higher percentage of the general election vote in their most recent election.     

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Nearly all studies of pork‐barrel politics in the U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward factors that are active in the House. This article highlights differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We identify four important differences between the House and Senate, generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical accounts of pork‐barrel spending need to account for these interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important differences in legislative structure and organization.     

A Lab Experiment on Committee Hearings: Preferences,Power, and a Quest for Information

In principle, committees hold hearings to gather and provide information to their principals, but some hearings are characterized as political showcases. This article investigates conditions that moderate committee members' incentives to hold an informative hearing by presenting a game‐theoretic model and a lab experiment. Specifically, it studies when committees hold hearings and which types of hearing they hold by varying policy preferences of committee members and the principal and political gains from posturing. Findings provide new insights to how preferences and power distribution affect individuals' incentives to be informed when they make decisions as members of a committee in many contexts.     

Recurring bills and the legislative process in the US congress

Recurring bills may be interpreted in two very different ways. First, there is the ‘legislative loser’ perspective, which posits that legislators introduce bills repeatedly for symbolic reasons, not intending or expecting them to go very far. Alternatively, there is the ‘softening up’ perspective, which assumes that legislators introduce bills more than once for policy reasons. They first test the waters, making a second attempt more successful. In this research article, we test these assumptions by examining the legislative impact of recurring bill status at various stages in the US House and Senate: initial committee attention, committee passage, attachment to an omnibus package and enactment. The evidence is mixed for the first stage of the process, while the findings for subsequent stages support the softening up interpretation. We discuss the implications for representation and future research.     

Yea or Nay: Do Legislators Benefit by Voting Against Their Party?

This article asks whether legislators are able to reap electoral benefits from opposing their party on one or more high‐profile issues. Using data from a national survey in which citizens are asked their own positions on seven high‐profile issues voted on by the U.S. Senate, as well as how they believe their state's two senators have voted on these issues, I find that senators generally do not benefit from voting against their party. Specifically, when a senator deviates from her party, the vast majority of out‐partisans nonetheless persist in believing that the senator voted with her party anyhow; and while the small minority of out‐partisans who are aware of her deviation are indeed more likely to approve of and vote for such a senator, there are simply too few of these correctly informed citizens for it to make a meaningful difference for the senator's overall support.     

Parliamentary Rule: The US Senate Parliamentarian and Institutional Constraints on Legislator Behaviour

This article analyses the extent to which institutional rules constrain member behaviour in the United States Senate by examining the evolution of its parliamentarian. Interestingly, the US Senate parliamentarian has received surprisingly little scholarly attention given the important role she performs in the legislative process. The subsequent analysis thus provides a new understanding of the parliamentarian's role in the legislative process and the interplay between institutional rules and member behaviour in the Senate. To this end, the following analysis is situated within the context of the two primary theoretical approaches to understanding how institutional rules constrain member behaviour: path dependency and majoritarianism. These contrasting approaches provide expectations about the extent to which members will defer to the parliamentarian's interpretation of Senate rules rather than exercising their own discretionary control over those rules. Examining the evolving relationship between the parliamentarian and individual members affirms the centrality of institutional rules as a constraint on member behaviour over the past several decades. Yet such an examination also yields two surprising, and potentially contradictory, observations. First, individual senators in both parties have increasingly deferred to the parliamentarian to interpret the Senate's rules. This is surprising given that the Senate has simultaneously become more individualistic, partisan, and ideological over the same period. Second, the majority party has recently disregarded the norm of parliamentary constraint reflected in past practice and demonstrated a willingness to ignore Senate rules when doing so was necessary to achieve legislative success. This could signify a potential shift in how majorities view the constraints imposed by Senate rules if current trends of legislative dysfunction continue.     

Black Political Representation: An Examination of Legislative Activity Within U.S. House Committees

How minority legislators influence policy development in Congress remains a relevant question for those interested in race and political representation. This article addresses this question using evidence from participation in committee work—a vantage point that has received minimal attention in scholarship on black political representation. I interpret racial differences in participation in House committees across a range of policy areas, demonstrating that black members participate at higher rates within committees than whites on both black interest and nonracial bills. The results suggest that race has a substantive effect on members' policy priorities and their legislative activity within committees.     

Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll‐Call Voting,Decentralized Administration,and Distributive Politics

Congress packages pork‐barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll‐call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home‐state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within‐legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.     

Committee Property Rights,Executive Dominance,and Political Parties in Latin American Legislatures

Motivated by theories of congressional committees in the US context, and building on the growing body of work focusing on the institutional features of legislatures in Latin American presidential systems, this paper explores two previously overlooked aspects of committee politics. Using comparative data from three Latin American countries, it examines the strategic and jurisdictional dynamics in which chamber leaders assign bills to committees and then investigate the factors affecting presidential and partisan success within committees. In general, the authors find that committees have strong property rights and that characteristics of both bills and bill initiators strongly influence the survival of legislation in committee. The results shed light on the effects of institutional design on the policy process in presidential systems.     

State-based Representation and National Policymaking: The Evolution of the Australian Senate and the Federation

Ostensibly, Australia's constitutional framers designed the upper house as the ‘guardian of states' interests', ensuring that the smaller states were adequately represented in the federation. In recent decades the Senate has positively reinvented itself as a guardian of democracy, and is commonly known as the ‘house of review’. This study examines the changing representative role of senators and the Senate through surveys and interviews of current and former senators. The Senate has also become more of a guardian of the national interest, with proportional representation, larger constituencies and longer terms being the key institutional factors.     

Informative Committees and Legislative Performance in the American States

The information theory of legislative organization suggests that legislative committees are designed to provide their parent chamber with necessary information to legislate. Despite empirical evidence for various aspects of the theory, we have limited knowledge of committees’ influence on legislative outputs. I argue that informative committees are more than information providers, that they also substantively impact legislative outcomes. With supportive evidence from the US state legislatures, this article shows that the presence of an informative committee system not only lowers the number of bills introduced to the legislature but also enhances the chamber's efficiency in transforming legislative proposals into laws.     

Issue Attention and Legislative Proposals in the U.S. Senate

This analysis of bill sponsorship across a variety of issues and Congresses shows that committee membership is the single most important factor shaping a senator's level of issue attention. Constituency demand is of secondary importance. Ideology, partisanship, and national conditions play little or no role. Consistent with a theoretical cost‐benefit framework, the results suggest that senators are motivated by the prospect of electoral and policy rewards from successful legislation rather than from mere position taking. The findings attest to the enduring importance of the committee system in a highly individualistic and increasingly partisan Senate.     

The Italian Senate

This article analyses the composition and the functions of the Italian Senate. There are 315 senators, three-quarters of them elected in single-member constituencies through a first-past-the-post system, the remaining ones are elected according to the additional member system among the best losers. The voting age for the Senate is 25 and only Italian citizens who are 40 years or older can be elected. All former Presidents of the Italian Republic are life senators - at present two. Moreover, the President may appoint additional life senators among outstanding Italian citizens - at present five. The Italian Senate has the same powers and performs the same functions as the House of Deputies. According to some scholars and politicians, this system accounts for a better legislation; according to the critics, the Italian model of bicameralism is simply old, cumbersome and useless. The Senate provides a number of ministers commensurate to its size, but only one Prime Minister has ever held a seat in the Senate. The most important debates take place in the House of Deputies, but the government may be defeated in the Senate because all Italian governments must enjoy the confidence of both chambers. Though several proposals for the reform of the Senate have been entertained, none has been approved so far. It is unlikely that even the transformation of the Senate into a Chamber representing the regions, along the model of the German Bundesrat, will take place.     

Vehicles of opposition influence or agents of the governing majority? Legislative committees and private members’ bills in the Hungarian Országgyűlés and the Israeli Knesset

ABSTRACT

In this article, we assess the role and the strength of the legislative committee system of two legislatures: the Hungarian Országgy?lés and the Israeli Knesset, by looking at the fate of private member bills over the past four legislative cycles (1998–2014 in Hungary and 2006–2019 in Israel). We find that Israeli committees allow opposition PMBs to succeed at a significantly higher rate than Hungarian committees do, even though the formal properties of the two committee systems are very similar: during the examined period, more than one-fifth of the laws that were passed by the Knesset were initiated as opposition sponsored PMB, whereas the corresponding number in the Országgy?lés was only one per cent. The central reason for this unexpected divergence in the success rate of opposition sponsored PMBs, in spite of a favourable institutional setting shared by the committee systems of the two parliaments, may lie in the different degrees of party concentration in the two legislative party systems.     

Can Formal Rules of Order be Used as an Accurate Proxy for Behaviour Internal to a Legislature? Evidence from Costa Rica

Scholars rely heavily on formal rules to classify legislatures, but parchment institutions may only tell part of the story about how the chamber works. Behind-the-scenes behaviour may counter-balance or temper the power distribution created by formal rules. To begin examining if formal rules are an accurate predictor of actual behaviour, we analyse standing committees in Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly. We find that despite the formal institutions that favour a majoritarian bonus, the opposition party is a full participant in the legislative process in committee sessions. Opposition deputies participate equally or more so than majority party deputies, and deputies of all parties work together to investigate bills and kill legislation evaluated to be flawed, which indicates that formal rules are only one component to understanding legislative behaviour.     

Bicameralism and Geographic Politics: Allocating Funds in the House and Senate

Because they represent different kinds of constituencies—states versus parts of states—senators and House members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized benefits, House members need to use policy tools—earmarks and narrow categorical programs—that target funds to their constituencies. Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money. Examining House‐Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts.     

All the President's Senators: Presidential Copartisans and the Allocation of Federal Grants

Previous scholarship argues that House members' partisan relationship to the president is among the most important determinants of the share of federal dollars they bring home to their constituents. Do presidential politics also shape distributive outcomes in the Senate? Analyzing the allocation of more than $8.5 trillion of federal grants across the states from 1984 to 2008, we show that presidential copartisan senators are more successful than opposition party members in securing federal dollars for their home states. Moreover, presidents appear to target grants ex post to states that gain presidential copartisans in recent elections.     

Legislative Efficiency and Political Inclusiveness: The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament

This paper contributes to discussions surrounding interest group representation in the European Parliament. Drawing from conceptualizations of legitimacy, and theoretical work on information-access we argue that different procedures bestow a different type of authority to parliamentary committees affecting their legitimacy orientation, in turn impacting the balance between private and public interests mobilised. We assess a population of 10,000 accredited lobbyists, and the procedural output across the 7th legislature’s committees (2009–2014). Our analysis indicates that committees with a higher ratio of Ordinary Legislative Procedures to Own Initiative Reports see greater private interest mobilisation. Conversely, in committees where the procedures’ ratios are inverse we observe greater public interest mobilisation. Theoretically, we provide a novel approach for framing the committee’s nature from a procedural perspective, bridging discussions on interest group mobilisation and the democratic deficit. Empirically, the results overturn the premise of business dominance across the institution’s committees through a unique dataset.